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THE PEACE  
AND THE PROTESTANT  
SUCCESSION



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ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE

THE PEACE  
AND THE  
PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

BY

GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, O.M.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

\* \* \*

*WITH MAPS*

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Vouchsafe to those that have not read the story,  
That I may prompt them : and of such as have,  
I humbly pray them to admit the excuse  
Of time, of numbers and due course of things,  
Which cannot in their huge and proper life  
Be here presented.

Chorus, Act V, *Henry V.*

ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE  
(PREVIOUS VOLUMES)

BLENHEIM  
RAMILLIES AND THE UNION WITH SCOTLAND

## PREFACE

WITH this third volume I complete *England under Queen Anne*. I have told the story of those dozen decisive years during which the stormy and heroic life of Seventeenth Century England, constantly giving birth to new and wonderful things, was transmuted into the classic calm of Eighteenth Century Britain. Henceforth our country appeared to her neighbours no longer as an incalculable island of warring factions, sometimes a volcanic and sometimes a negligible force in the world's affairs, but as the steady, sole mistress of the seas, a power coequal with France, and the seat of an ordered freedom admired by continental philosophers of the coming era.

At Utrecht the bigwigged Plenipotentiaries ended an epoch, and liquidated the fifty years' struggle of the smaller States of Europe to save themselves from the hegemony of France, and of the Protestants of Europe to save themselves from the fate of the French Huguenots. These two movements of self-defence, combined by the political genius of William, had triumphed through the military genius of Marlborough. England, entering late into the struggle, had decided the issue. Her success had demonstrated that a country of free institutions could defeat a State based upon autocratic rule. This was a new idea in the world, and caused men to think afresh on the maxims of State.

If we consider the relative positions of France and of England from 1680 to 1688, and compare them with the situation when Anne died, the contrast is great indeed. England, lately despised abroad and distraught at home, had become the chief instrument in winning the world war, and had then dictated the Peace. With sea-power no longer rivalled either by France or Holland, with financial



and commercial pre-eminence hardly less remarkable, and endowed for the moment with the martial greatness lent her by Marlborough, Great Britain was relatively more important in the world in 1713 than in 1815 or 1919. No country save France was then a rival to her greatness. Bolingbroke settled the terms of Utrecht to a far greater degree than Castlereagh those of Vienna, or Lloyd George those of Versailles. But whereas Lloyd George negotiated the peace with his allies and dictated it to the enemy, Bolingbroke negotiated it with the enemy and dictated it to the allies. Broadly, his peace was a good one, whatever we may think of the methods by which it was obtained. No doubt he saw that England fared the best and showed a keener eye for her interests than for her honour. In the last year of the war he deserted our allies in the field and betrayed their military secrets to his French friends. And he ordered the British Fleet to take part in the reduction of Catalan resistance in Barcelona. He regarded the Barrier Treaty, which England had unwisely signed with Holland in 1709, as 'a scrap of paper,' and set on Swift to abuse the Dutch when they objected to this breach of faith. Yet neither the Dutch nor any of the other allies except the Catalans came off badly at Utrecht. And the ex-enemy France, though her power of aggression had been taken away, remained unembittered and unprovoked to revenge. The fortunate Eighteenth Century was well launched upon its reasonable and civilized course.

The general lines of the Utrecht settlement, particularly in the matter of leaving Spain to the Bourbon Philip, were for many years denounced by the Whigs as infamous. But in my opinion Bolingbroke was right. It is interesting to note that Macaulay thought so and said so, though Seeley, who accused Macaulay of being a Whig partisan, himself reiterated in the first number of the *English Historical Review* the old-fashioned Whig condemnation of 'a Peace without Spain,' for reasons which appear to me too speculative in relation to the later history of the 'Family Compact.'

Unfortunately for the Tories, the making of the Peace became involved, through the fault of their leaders, with

the question of the Succession to the throne of Britain. The statesmen who negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht, in so doing entangled themselves in a close intimacy with the French Ministers through the medium of French Jacobite agents, and became correspondingly hostile to Holland and the German Princes, including George of Hanover. The question of the Peace and the question of the Protestant Succession became closely intervolved. The Whigs denounced the Peace and stood up for the Succession ; the Tories defended the Peace and in so doing half of them were drawn to desire a Jacobite Restoration. They assumed that James would pleasure them by turning Anglican. He refused, and so left them without a policy, a great host divided and distraught, when the news of the death of Queen Anne sounded in their ears like the tramp of doom.

Such is the story here told. It is highly complicated in detail, but intensely dramatic in the march of events. I hope that I have been able so to tell it that the wood may be observable in spite of the trees.

The key to the history of the last four years of Queen Anne, especially for the close connection of the peace negotiations with the Jacobite conspiracy, is to be found in the Archives of the French Foreign Office, whose officials I beg to thank for their courtesy towards me. I wish also to express my gratitude to Earls Spencer, Stanhope, and Dartmouth for allowing me the free use of their ancestors' papers ; to the Duke of Bedford and his librarian, Miss Scott Thomson, for communications most kindly volunteered from the Woburn MSS. ; to Mr. Arthur Bryant for the use of the Shakerley MSS., and to the Reigate Corporation and Dr. W. Hooper, of Redhill, for the use of the Somers MSS. ; to Mrs. Mustard, of Baltimore, for leave to reproduce the miniature which Queen Anne gave to her ancestor, Col. Parke, for bringing the news of Blenheim ; to Professor Norman Sykes for information kindly given ; and to Professor Geyl for valuable assistance and advice. The late Miss Thora Stone, whose untimely death is much to be deplored,

kindly allowed me the use of her unpublished *Struggle for Power on the Senegal and Gambia 1660-1713*.

I wish also to thank Mr. Staton, of Emery Walker Ltd., for the excellence of his work as map-maker for my books, ever since 1907.

#### NOTE ON METHODS OF DATING

Readers will note the difference between the New Style (N.S.) and Old Style (O.S.) of reckoning dates. Until 1752 the English at home always used the Old Style ; after 1700 it was eleven days behind the New Style of Gregory XIII's Calendar, which was current in all continental countries except Russia. Our sailors, on service at sea and on coast operations like the taking of Gibraltar, generally used the Old Style familiar at home. Our soldiers in the Netherlands and Spain generally but not always used the New. Diplomats abroad most of them used the New, but some the Old. *I employ the O.S. for home affairs ; and for affairs outside England I use the N.S. or put the double date, thus—Aug. 1<sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub>.*

Anne came to the throne on March 8, 1702—at least, so we say now. But our ancestors called it March 8, 1701. For, with them, the New Year began not on January 1, but on March 25. March 24, 1701, was followed after midnight by March 25, 1702. This is confusing to modern students of old documents, who are liable to get a year out in affairs occurring in January, February or early March, particularly in Parliamentary affairs, as the normal session was held in winter, astride of the two years. The Lords' and Commons' Journals of Anne's reign change from 1701 to 1702 only on March 25. *All modern histories, including this book, begin the new year at January 1.*

MR. CHURCHILL, MACAULAY, MRS. MANLEY  
AND MARLBOROUGH

As Mrs. Manley and her notorious *New Atlantis* figure in this volume (pp. 38-39 below) I think it desirable to reprint here (by kind permission) a letter of mine that

appeared in *The Times Literary Supplement* on October 19, 1933 :

*To the Editor of The Times*

SIR,—I have no criticism to make of the review of Mr. Churchill's *Marlborough* in your last number, but its appearance gives me the opportunity to say something on a particular point in Mr. Churchill's book, to which I feel it my duty to call attention. Before doing so I wish to express the great admiration I feel for the book as a whole and my earnest hope for its popularity and success. It combines qualities too seldom found together in historical work—swinging narrative, careful study of the authorities, clear technical exposition, acute insight into several of the principal characters, and an understanding of the conditions of the period so different from those of our own day. I am also in agreement with his general view both of the domestic and foreign questions of the time and of Marlborough's character.

I have stated elsewhere that I think Macaulay was wrong in his reading of Marlborough. Indeed, I think it is the worst thing in his History, and I have no wonder that Mr. Churchill's family piety has aroused him to take revenge. All the same, he has no right to call Macaulay a 'liar.' A 'liar' is not a man who misreads another man's character, however badly, or who sometimes accepts inadequate evidence ; if that were so, almost all historians would be 'liars.' A 'liar' is a man who makes a statement that he knows to be false. Now, the facts that Macaulay states, barring the Camaret letter, are not very different from Mr. Churchill's facts. Mr. Churchill admits that he took for patron the man who kept his sister ; that he himself took money from his own mistress and invested it well ; that he deserted James while high in his military service ; that he afterwards corresponded with the Jacobites. I agree with Mr. Churchill that his desertion of James was in the circumstances commendable, and the other three actions by the standards of the time not unpardonable. But there is a surface case against Marlborough, and many people in his own day thought ill of him. An historian who, before the days of our modern research, was deceived by these phenomena into thinking Marlborough a bad man was not necessarily dishonest.

Now I come to my particular point. When Mr. Churchill states, on Paget's authority, that Macaulay took Mrs. Manley, the authoress of the *New Atlantis*, as 'his witness,' it is untrue. I admit that Macaulay, for all his alleged Whig bias, trusted far too much to Jacobite and High Tory libels about Marlborough. For instance, he was too much influenced by Swift ; and his innuendo

that there may have been truth in the allegations of 'The Dear Bargain' is very bad; Mr. Churchill is right there (p. 482). But Macaulay drew the line at Mrs. Manley.

Mr. Churchill has relied in this matter too much on Paget, who like other good historians was fallible, and in this case has failed Mr. Churchill. Paget (*Examen*, p. 8) writes: 'Little do the readers of Lord Macaulay suspect that his eloquent denunciation of Marlborough is but a *réchauffé* of the forgotten scurrility of a female hack scribe, whom Swift used to call one of his "under spur-leathers."' And to establish this charge Paget says in the note: 'See the history of "Count Fortunatus" in the *New Atlantis*, i. 21-43. The passage is too long, and part of it is wholly unfit, for publication. Any reader whose curiosity may lead him to verify our assertion may compare p. 27 with Macaulay, Vol. ii. 8vo. 1856, p. 254, containing the account of Marlborough's marriage, and pp. 26, 31, 41 and 43, with i. 457, 458 and ii. 251, 252, 253.'

I have most carefully compared these passages; and the oftener I read them the less I can understand what Paget means. There is very little in common, and nothing that Macaulay could not have got elsewhere. He gives his references to Burnet, Chesterfield and others, but not to Mrs. Manley. If he has misinterpreted Marlborough's motives, he was quite capable of doing that for himself without her help. When he rejects the story she invented about Marlborough refusing money to Barbara in later years, he does not even deign to quote Mrs. Manley as responsible for it; he quotes Pope, who repeated it in another form. It would be impossible to gather from his narrative that he had so much as read Mrs. Manley. To say that Macaulay has 'transcribed whole passages' of the *New Atlantis* into his History, as Mr. Churchill does on p. 53, is as inaccurate as anything in Macaulay. It is entirely untrue. But I am sure it was written in good faith. We historians are a fallible folk, and must be charitable to one another.

Mr. Churchill (pp. 130-2) tells two of Mrs. Manley's most disgusting stories as being worthy of confutation because she was 'Macaulay's witness.' He repeats the phrase three times in the three pages, so that some hasty readers might suppose that Macaulay countenanced these two stories; but he never did. It is Mr. Churchill who has dragged them to light.

I believe that a main cause why Macaulay misunderstood the character of Marlborough was the Camaret letter, in the false light of which he misread the rest of his life's actions. Mr. Churchill has now given us reasons to doubt whether he ever wrote any such letter at all. I think his reasoning so cogent that I intend to alter a passage

of my own in *Blenheim*, p. 181, in any later edition. But Macaulay, like every one else in his day and long after, thought Marlborough did write the letter. And moreover Macaulay failed to examine the circumstances that afterwards showed Paget and Wolseley that the French already knew the secret of the intended Brest expedition and that Marlborough knew they knew it when he 'revealed' it—if reveal it he ever did. Now this does not make Macaulay a 'liar.' I do not think Mr. Churchill makes enough allowance for the 'pioneer' historians of a hundred years ago. They had not the machinery we moderns have, the masses of published documents, the Historical Manuscripts Commission volumes, the learned periodicals, and whole libraries of monographs and studies of particular points. A pioneer historian who had to find the straw for his own bricks, and was moreover 'cock-sure' by temperament, could make ghastly mistakes without being a 'liar.' Macaulay's weakest point was his study of personal motive and character, which he did in blacks and whites. His strong points were the political, constitutional and legal history of our country, which come very little into Mr. Churchill's scope in this biography. Maitland said to me once that Macaulay was always right in the points of law he discussed in his History. But he was certainly not right on all the points of human character.

G. M. TREVELYAN.

CAMBRIDGE



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
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# THE RIVAL CLAIMANTS TO THE THRONE



# ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE

## THE PEACE AND THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

### CHAPTER I

#### MALPLAQUET

Over-confidence of the Allies. Villars reanimates the French army. His Lines of La Bassée check Marlborough and Eugene. Siege of Tournai. Investment of Mons. Battle of Malplaquet. Effect on opinion in England. The mine of Alicante. Birth of the *Tatler*. Steele on Duelling.

WHEN the Allies, in the spring of 1709, refused to make peace on any reasonable terms,\* they were encouraged by the expectation that the resistance of the French army would soon be brought to an end by famine, and that the road to Paris would lie clear. The *Tatler* for June 4 amused the Town by an address to 'Lewis le Grand,' taunting him with the poverty and starvation to which he had reduced France, and ending with the advice :

Then, sir, the present minute chuse,  
Our armies are avancéd ;  
Those terms you at the Hague refuse  
At Paris won't be granted.  
Consider this, and Dunkirk raze,  
And Anna's title own ;  
Send one Pretender out to graze  
And call the other home.

The 'other' Pretender was his grandson, Philip V of Spain.

Indeed, the famine in France that year threatened to put an end to the national resistance. The British Government made corn contraband, and in the summer an English squadron under Sir John Norris was sent to the Sound to stop the exportation of corn to France in Scandinavian and other neutral bottoms. The

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 398-402.

cargoes thus stopped were not confiscated, but bought, for the Maritime Powers were throughout the war most anxious not to quarrel with the Baltic States. At the Hague the French negotiators confessed that they could no longer resist 'Famine, the hand of God.'<sup>1</sup>

It was believed that the enemy forces were in a state of dissolution ; and such, in truth, was the case when Villars first took over the command on the Franco-Belgian frontier. He himself tells us that, when he arrived at Tournai in March, the privates had sold their arms and jackets for bread and that even the subaltern officers were parting with their shirts. Men were fast drifting away from the colours in search of food. Hope and discipline were dead. If in April Marlborough could have gathered 80,000 men ready to attack, he could have marched to Versailles. But when he actually took the field at the end of June, 120,000 proved not enough : Paris had been saved by the customary six months' pause in military operations. During the spring and early summer a new French army had come into being, largely new in personnel and wholly new in spirit. How was this miracle accomplished ?

All France knew that Villars was the only man who could stop Marlborough, as he had stopped him on the Moselle four years before. The French Marshal's air of jovial gasconade, expressive of unbounded self-confidence, was tonic to his depressed and anxious fellow-countrymen. Though always swaggering as if he alone had the secret of victory, he was no dupe of his own optimism ; he seldom miscalculated chances and was far less rash in the presence of Marlborough than Marsin, Villeroy or Vendôme. He had, moreover, something of the equalitarian spirit of the French armies of the Republican age unborn. He was no courtier, no observer of persons, and seemed out of place in the *ancien régime*. He bullied Versailles till it sent bread to the army ; he spoke in open scorn of the Marshals and Princes whose failures in the field had landed the country in this pass. It was his hour. Neither priests nor nobles dared murmur

Marlborough's campaign of 1708 had been prolonged until the beginning of January 1709, but to make up for that he only took the field in 1709 late in June, long after his usual season.

against him, for he was their only hope. Madame de Maintenon supported him and he wrote her the frankest letters on the situation.

It might have been said of Villars as it had been said of Cromwell : ' In the dark perils of war, in the high places of the field, hope shone in him like a pillar of fire, when it had gone out in all the others.' And from him it rekindled itself and spread. The habitual expression of his face was a smile in which were blended high spirits, self-approbation and sheer good humour. The soldiers saw in him their comrade, to whom they could speak man to man. The spirit of discipline could not have been restored in that army without confidence and the personal touch. He went round among the starving troops and heard their griefs, thanked them for their endurance, stirred their pride, awoke their expectations. Often, so he tells us, he promised them bread on such and such a day, when he did not in fact know whence it was coming. But the soldiers knew that at least he was making the most strenuous efforts to ransack France on their behalf. '*Monsieur le maréchal a raison,*' they would answer, '*il faut souffrir quelque fois.*' Others said to him '*Nous vous demandons du pain : du reste, nous nous passerons d'habits et de chemises.*'

King Louis, having named Villars to the command, supported him with all his might. The Provincial Governors were set on to furnish the army with bread at the expense of everyone else. The peasants starved, the rich ate black bread and sold their plate, that the soldiers might live. Villars gave rations to a regiment on the days when it marched ; on days of repose it fasted. After this fashion they weathered that dreadful spring. When the peasants heard that food was to be had in the camp, sturdy youths came in by thousands to enlist and follow the bread waggons. The thinned ranks filled again. Frost and famine such as France had not known for a hundred years acted as recruiting sergeants for a force still dependent on voluntary enlistment.

\* This answer, which Villars records, reminds us of the remark of the Republican soldier of 1794 : ' Le Représentant a dit avec du fer et du pain on peut aller en Chine. Il n'a pas parlé de chaussures.'



And so, beneath the tattered flags, a hollow-cheeked army was formed under its gay commander. Men who had been through that experience would fight, under Villars, more stubbornly than the French of Ramillies and Oudenarde. Villars asked that some Princes of the Blood should come to share the campaign, but, suitably enough, none came except the gaunt young 'King of England,' fit company for men in misfortune. Another exiled Prince had been found by Villars on his first arrival on the frontier, the Bavarian Elector, from whom he had parted in anger the year before Blenheim. 'I found him,' he wrote, 'in a very different condition from the brilliant surroundings where I had last seen him at Munich.' But in misfortune the two men, both of them brave and generous, speedily forgot their old quarrels.<sup>2</sup>

While Villars was thus at work, the Allies at the Hague were helping to revive the spirit of France. Their gross rejection of the almost abject terms which Louis offered as the price of peace,\* while it defeated the hopes and disconcerted the politics of many quiet folk in England and Holland, put Louis in unity with his people. As early as October 1706 Vendôme had advised that the King should convoke the States General, in abeyance for a hundred years past, and 'expose to them the insolence of the foe.' The Grand Monarch could not stoop to that, but he took a new departure when in June 1709 he issued with great effect a proclamation to his subjects, setting out the case as it now stood between himself and his enemies, recounting the sacrifices he had offered to make and calling for 'new efforts, since the immense concessions I was ready to grant prove useless for the re-establishment of peace.'<sup>3</sup> A war begun in the pride and world-ambition of a despot had been turned by the victories of Marlborough into the defence of a country by its citizens. The French spirit, sometimes so blind and ~~un~~bearing, now appeared in its pure and legitimate shape.

On the other side an immense army was being assembled in the Spanish Netherlands to march on Paris under Marlborough and Eugene. The abnormal winter caused suffering throughout all Europe, but to nothing like the same

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 399-405.

extent as in exhausted and besieged France, where, moreover, the harvest prospects were worse affected than elsewhere by the power of the long-continued frost. Food and money were more plentiful among the Allies. Before the new year, the Whig Parliament had voted an increase of 10,000 men to the British contingent in Flanders. The Opposition dared only murmur that the decision might well have been left over till they learned what the Dutch were ready to do ; and a few days later came the news that the States had decided to raise an additional 6000 men for 1709.\* The war-party was at length in full control of Holland, at the very moment when peace had become the most pressing need of the impoverished Republic. The greatest force ever yet raised by the Dutch was sent into the field under the charge of Deputies who, however little some of them like Goslinga loved the Duke, no longer dreamed of putting their veto on his use of the blue-coats in battle.

While Marlborough's command was thus increased, Eugene appeared beside him at the head of an unusually powerful German and Imperial contingent. The King of Prussia, according to his wont every winter, had grumbled and threatened to withdraw his troops, but had once more yielded to a personal letter of Marlborough and sent 5000 extra men.

And so, at the end of June, the Allied Army entered the plains of Lille some 120,000 strong, nearly twice the number that had triumphed at Ramillies. Villars had by June 1709 that time gathered 80,000 or 90,000 to oppose. Shortage of food for men and horses continued to hamper the French movements throughout the Campaign, but at least Villars was now in a condition to put up some resistance to the Allied advance.

Caution was still demanded of him : he was inferior in numbers, in supplies and in the prestige of victory, and his was the last army of France. Another Ramillies or Oudenarde would put an end to the war. He could not risk a battle in the open, yet he must stop the advance on Paris,

\* *De la Colonie* (pp. 345-346) speaks of 'the famine which raged in our army,' stopping movements even after Malplaquet, and says the horses that had escaped that action 'perished of hunger at their picket ropes.'

and he was well aware, as he tells us, of the truth of Turenne's dictum, that 'the general who is absolutely determined to avoid a battle surrenders his country to the general who appears to seek one.' He therefore adopted the system of field entrenchments, always dear to the soldiers of King Louis. As Uncle Toby said, from his experience of the wars of King William :

If the French have the advantage of a wood, or you give them a moment's time to entrench themselves, they are a nation which will pop and pop for ever at you.

Combining caution with boldness, Villars constructed 'the Lines of La Bassée,' forty miles long, from the neighbourhood of Aire to the neighbourhood of Douai.† His own headquarters were in the centre at La Bassée, only ten miles from the enemy's quarters at Lille. In spite, as he tells us, of 'the timorous counsels of several general officers,' he had constructed the Lines in the most advanced position that could be defended, yielding to the invader as little as possible of the sacred soil. The marshy reaches of the upper Lys and Scarpe greatly added to the strength of the earthworks, and in some stretches altogether took their place. Heavy rains in June made the position more formidable, and the approach more difficult.

Cadogan, disguised it is said as a peasant, conducted a reconnaissance of the Lines of La Bassée, and his report was discouraging as to the chances of an attack. Marlborough and Eugene knew that they could not take such liberties with Villars as with Villeroi or Tallard. 'If it had been reasonable,' the Duke wrote to Sarah on June 27, 'this letter would have brought you news of a battle ; but Prince Eugene, myself, and all the generals did not think it advisable to run so great a hazard.' They reluctantly turned instead to the siege of Tournai.

In a sense this decision was the crisis of the campaign and indeed of the whole last phase of the War of the Spanish Succession. For if, instead of an immediate march to Paris, a long course of sieges was after all necessary to clear the

\* *Tristram Shandy*, Bk. V, Chap. XXI.

† For this chapter see *Map of the Netherlands at end of book.*

way, the chance was considerable that the patience or cohesion of the Alliance would be exhausted before the last frontier fortress was taken under the eyes of the vigilant Villars.

Having decided to besiege Tournai, Marlborough and Eugene deceived the French Marshal as to their real intentions, by a movement which seemed to threaten the north-western end of his Lines of La Bassée. To meet it he shuffled his troops, and withdrew a portion of the Tournai garrison. Then Marlborough, by a rapid turn of the Allied Army on its night march, invested the town before the men withdrawn from it could be sent back, or the place itself revictualled.

Except Lille, that had fallen the year before, Tournai was the strongest fortress of the age. But the Allies hoped, in the circumstances, to take it in a month. It was, however, gallantly defended by its reduced and famished garrison of 6400 men, and more than two months elapsed before both town and citadel had fallen.

Next after Lille, Tournai afforded the siege of the war most interesting to professional soldiers. Its elaborate system of mines and underground galleries involved the attacking parties in a novel species of warfare in the dark, amid unseen dangers, 'more terrible than ever is met with in any other part of a soldier's duty.' 'Not a foot of ground,' wrote Colonel Revett, 'that is not undermined and casemated,' in this 'the finest and strongest fortification in Europe.' 'Our miners,' wrote Marlborough, 'have discovered one of their galleries at each attack, but dare not advance to make the proper use of this discovery, because of the enemy's continual fire of small shot under ground. We are preparing to roll bombs into these galleries in order to dislodge them.' When at length the citadel fell on September 3, the Allies had lost over 5000 killed and wounded, including a large proportion of British.<sup>5</sup>

The campaign had begun late, and when Tournai fell

The Allied siege train was at Menin. It was sent round by water, down the Lys to Ghent, and thence up the Schelde to Tournai. The water route, though many times longer than the land route from Menin to Tournai, was quicker for heavy traffic, owing to the badness of the roads of the period during a wet summer.


autumn was already at hand. Villars' Lines, which he had now extended eastward from the Scarpe to the Schelde above Condé, denied all approach to Valenciennes, Douai or Béthune on the route to Paris. Marlborough and Eugene decided that the best use they could make of the remainder of the year was to take Mons. Its capture would afford a pledge of some diplomatic value, but it would do little to open the road into France. Only if, to save Mons, Villars left his Lines to offer battle, could anything great be accomplished. It is probable that Marlborough now realized that nothing except a battle could put a speedy end to the war, and that he was proportionately eager to bring one about.

Another skilful and secret movement, and a long circuitous route involving prodigies of marching by the Allied troops, placed them between the enemy and Mons. Villars arrived on the scene too late to throw in succours. But instead of returning at once to the shelter of the Lines of La Bassée, he remained to see what opportunity might occur of disturbing the progress of the siege.

Between the two armies lay a long screen of forest, which could be traversed either by the Gap of Boussu to the north, or near the southern end by the Gap of Malplaquet.\* Villars hung about behind the western edge of the trees, keeping the Allies in uncertainty and rendering it necessary for them to guard the debouchment of both the Gaps, lest he should attack them through one or the other. When, therefore, by a sudden march southwards he appeared in the Gap of Malplaquet, he caught Marlborough's Dutch and British army encamped near Blaregnies at some  
 Sept. 9 distance from Eugene's smaller German army,  
 1709 which was camped further north watching the Gap of Boussu. The French were in strong ground of woods and marshes, not yet reconnoitred by the Allies. Moreover, Marlborough's field artillery had not yet fully come

Often called the Gap (Trouée) of Aulnois. But I prefer to call it after Malplaquet, since that village gave its name to the battle that took place at the Gap. The names that I use for the various Woods are those used in 1709, some of which have since been altered.


There is an excellent professional modern account of the battle by Major Burne, in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, April 1933.



Stanley Walker Ltd., etc.

The manoeuvres before  
**MALPLAQUET**

English Miles



up. Those authors, therefore, who have blamed him for not attacking Villars on September 9, when he first appeared in the Gap of Malplaquet, may well be mistaken.

But the opposite school of critics, who blamed Villars for not himself attacking the Allies on that day, may be equally unjust. His was the last army of France, and he had no right to risk the freedom of his country on such a hazard. It would have taken many hours to deploy his 80,000 men into line ; and, after that, it would have been no light task to crush the enemy's best troops, fighting under Marlborough's eye. Before he had disposed of the Dutch and English, Eugene's Germans might have arrived, like Blücher's at Waterloo, to overwhelm him with the superior numbers of the united Allied force. Moreover, the revived morale of his own troops was still unproven ; his decision to test it behind entrenchments but not in the open field was very probably the salvation of France.†

On the morning of September 10 Eugene's army was united to Marlborough's in face of the French, who were drawn up in the Gap of Malplaquet and in the parts of the forest contiguous on either side. It would have been possible for the Allies to refuse battle, to draw lines of contravallation against Villars, and proceed with the siege of Mons under his nose ; and some, though not all, of the British officers thought this would be the wiser course.\* But Marlborough and Eugene were playing for high stakes. There lay the enemy within their reach. Let them strike him as they had struck at Blenheim and at Oudenarde, and bring the war to an end.

It remained to be decided whether they should attack that day or wait till the morrow. The argument for delay was that eighteen battalions under General Withers were still on the march from Tournai and could join in the battle on the 11th but not on the 10th. Rightly or wrongly it ~~was~~ decided to give them time to come up. The extra day enabled Villars to render more formidable the system of

\* This important fact is noted by Orkney (*E.H.R.* Apr. 1909, p. 317) : 'Wee had no guns come up.' But the French accounts show that Marlborough had some artillery which he used with effect on that day.

† See Appendix, p. 25 below. I. *Should either side have attacked on September 9 ?*

field defences from which he derived so immense an advantage in the battle. After the event, it became usual to think that the decision to wait had been wrong, though nothing is certain in the might-have-beens of war.\*

At any rate, Villars used to good purpose the two nights and the whole day that passed between his arrival in the Gap of Malplaquet and the actual engagement. The army was set on to entrench itself in the open ground in the centre, and to fortify its woodland flanks with abatis of felled trees. In the Wood of Sars, line behind line of defences sprang into being. In the open country formidable earthworks were erected, with re-entrant angles, taking skilful advantage of the contours of the ground. Everyone, cavalry as well as infantry, toiled with a will. Only, wherever Villars appeared, the soldiers dropped spades and axes and ran up to tell him how they meant to defend their handiwork next day.†

A recent event had raised the enthusiasm of the army to its height. Boufflers had arrived in camp. The veteran of so many wars was the only other French Marshal whom Villars respected, and he had been wisely chosen by the King to go and strengthen his hands. Villars had responded generously and had offered to serve under his senior ; but the old man had replied in the same spirit that he came only 'as a volunteer.' His presence and the manifest concord between the two best generals of France increased the ardour of the troops, as much as the notorious discord between Tallard and Marsin at Blenheim, and between Vendôme and Burgundy at Oudenarde had discouraged the temperamental and sensitive French *poilu*.<sup>7</sup>

The plans of the Allied commanders to force this formidable position could not have been better laid. But they failed to reckon on the renewed spirit of the French soldiery : no doubt they expected a long and hard struggle and grave losses all along the line as at Blenheim, to be followed once more by the moral disintegration of a large

\* See Appendix, p. 25 below. II. *Who made the decision not to attack on the 10th ?*

† See Appendix, p. 25 below. III. *Should Villars have taken up a position behind the woods ?*



part of the French army when the day was lost, opening the road to Paris.

The ground in the French centre, between the woods, was strongly protected by a series of 'redans' and entrenched batteries. This part of the line was 'refused'—that is to say, withdrawn behind the protruding wings. In particular, the Wood of Sars was so situated that, until the Allies had occupied its skirts, they could not attack the French centre without being subjected to a devastating cross-fire. Orkney, therefore, with fifteen battalions of British infantry, stood motionless in the centre during the first half of the battle, gazing at the high 'redans' that he was ultimately to storm and so cut the French army in two.

But on both flanks an attack was to be begun in the morning, at seven by the Germans on the Allied right against the Wood of Sars, and half an hour later by the Dutch on the left. The great army of the States General, nominally under the command of Count Tilly, but led and inspired that day by the gallant young Prince of Orange, was to assault the entrenchments on Villars' right, within and without the Wood of Laignières. But this operation, though it was to be pushed hard in order to hold the French forces in that quarter from being sent elsewhere, was only meant as a 'containing' attack, like that of Eugene on the enemy's northern flank at Blenheim.†


The object of the Allied commanders was to break the enemy's left wing in the Wood of Sars, and to pierce his centre after it had been weakened by withdrawals of troops to strengthen the threatened flanks. To secure success, a fine strategic combination, unique in the wars of that period, was planned and effected: General Withers was coming up from Tournai with his eighteen battalions, partly of British infantry, accompanied by six squadrons of horse; he was ordered to join the main army on the field of battle, as he came into action on the extreme right wing. Indeed, Withers was to approach the field by an isolated and dangerous route. He was to push through the forest belt

The skirts of the Wood of Sars, where the fighting took place, were then known as the Wood of Taisnières, now Wood of Blaregnies.

† See Appendix, p. 26 below. IV. *Did Orange disobey orders?*



MAP II



by an undefended track to the north of the general battle, debouch on to the western or French side of the woods, and, passing through the village of La Folie, fall on the left flank and rear of the enemy behind the Wood of Sars at the moment of crisis. This operation, requiring careful timing if it was not to lead to disaster, is of the same type as the arrival of the Prussians at Waterloo, or the junction of their two armies on the field of Königrätz. It succeeded to a nicety and won the day.

A dense blanket of morning fog enabled the Allies to deploy and begin their approach, unmolested by the enemy cannon. When it lifted, shortly after six o'clock, a Sept. 11 majestic sight was disclosed. Line behind line, in 1709 perfect order, the infantry three-deep, the cavalry behind them in the same formation, a hundred thousand men were moving to the attack, while over their heads flapped like sails a forest of huge flags, unfolding the blazonry of a score of the greatest States and Princes in Europe. The artillery, already mounted in earthwork batteries which the Allies had constructed overnight, were bombarding the French positions, and the enemy guns were replying as the mist rose. The sight thrilled spectators the more because nothing could be seen of the 80,000 defenders, except here and there a three-cornered hat showing above a parapet. The rest were hidden in the woods to left and right, or concealed in the centre behind the high entrenchments.†

\* Colonel Blood, the celebrated head of Marlborough's engineers and artillery in the campaigns of Blenheim and Ramillies, had died in 1707; he had been succeeded by the able Col. Armstrong, who also won the Duke's confidence (Porter's *History of the Royal Engineers*, I, pp. 113-115). His figure, mounted on a white horse, appears prominently in the Blenheim tapestry of Malplaquet.

† Major Burne, R.A., who has made much the best and closest examination of the battlefield, writes in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery* (April 1933, pp. 47-48): 'The French cavalry were drawn up on the ridge on which the French Custom-house is situated. We are told they suffered severely from the Allied guns. But from the position of the latter only the French front line can be seen on the near crest. It is unlikely, to say the least, that indirect fire was employed by the artillery. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that, as at Landen, it was the "overs" and ricochets fired at the infantry that did the damage to the cavalry. The French cannon-balls, on the other hand, directed at our infantry would have a plunging effect; hence a comparative absence of ricochets and a corresponding small damage to our cavalry.'

'It was hardly seven o'clock when we marched to attack,' wrote Orkney, 'and it really was a noble sight to see so many different bodies marching over the plain to a thick wood where you could see no men.' 'It was the most deliberate, solemn and well-ordered battle I ever saw,' wrote Colonel Blackader, second in command of the Cameronians that morning; 'a noble and fine disposition and as nobly executed. . . . I never had a more pleasant day in my life. I was kept in perfect peace; my mind stayed, trusting in God.'

But, in bosoms less serene, more devilish passions were soon aroused. The failure to come to terms at the Hague had enraged the two armies against one another. Little quarter was asked or given, especially in the hand-to-hand struggle that raged in the deadly shadows of the Wood of Sars. The entrenchments along its edge had been carried by the high-hatted grenadiers charging at the head of their respective regiments; but deep in the heart of the forest stretched line behind line of felled trees, each shaped into a rough abatis, each to be defended, taken, retaken and lost again, as hour after hour the glades re-echoed to the thunder of volleys and the crash of companies bursting through the trampled underwood.

Thirty-six battalions of Eugene's Germans had entered the forest on the north, supported by twenty-two battalions of Prussians, Hanoverians and British under Lottum. 'Before the end of the day,' writes Marlborough, 'we had eighty battalions in that wood, and I believe they had more.' The bulk of the British infantry were still waiting in the centre under Orkney, but he detached his own regiment the Royals and a battalion of Guards, to join the Buffs in the Wood of Sars at a critical moment of the struggle for its possession. Under cover of fire from the Allied battery of forty guns, they forced their way in across a marsh, 'so that we got possession of the corner of the wood which flanked the retrenchments of the enemy.'<sup>8</sup> There they found the Buffs, who were fighting behind their Colonel, the Duke of Argyle. As John Campbell was putting himself up as a rival to Marlborough, he felt all the more bound to lead the charges on foot, like the proud Highland Chieftain that he was. After one repulse from before a woodland abatis, he tore open his waistcoat and shirt to show each private of the

Bufs that he wore no privileged breast-armour, and led them again to the attack.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, in this Homeric battle the leaders in all parts of the field exposed themselves to encourage their men. Before evening, Eugene and Villars had both been hit, and innumerable general officers and colonels on both sides were laid low.

Disputing every tree, the French were being driven back out of the Wood of Sars ; Withers and his eighteen battalions were approaching their flank and rear through the village of La Folie, drawing Villars to that spot as the scene of crisis ; and gradually the 'redans' in the centre were being stripped of defenders, hurried off to repel Withers or to hold the last corner of the woodland. And so, about one o'clock, Marlborough launched Orkney and his remaining thirteen British battalions at the 'redans.' Those formidable 'retrenchments upon the top of the hill,' Orkney tells us, were taken 'without firing a shot ; for we found nothing to oppose us.' The key to the French position was won.<sup>10</sup>

The Allied cavalry, following close behind, passed through the gaps in the 'redans' and formed up under cover of the fire of Orkney's infantry from the captured ramparts. Ten of the cannon from the forty-gun battery had been brought forward in the wake of the English foot, and now opened fire at close quarters on the French horse. The protection thus afforded to our horse was welcome, for they had to deploy on the far side of the entrenchments in face of the cavalry of France. The Maison du Roi, commanded by Boufflers in person, were drawn up, line behind line, across the wide heath of Malplaquet. A great cavalry action ensued on very even terms, that eventually ended in the defeat of the French.\*

The Scottish private (*Remembrance*, p. 496) thus sings of the doings of the Scots Greys, now commanded by Stair :

The Earle of Staire in person was there  
 Commanding the Scotch Dragouns.  
 And Sir James Campbell their Lieutenant Cornall  
 Did ordour them in squadrouns.  
 A French officer in that ramcounter  
 Meet Cornall Campbell indeed,  
 Then with fair play and without delay  
 The Cornall stroke off[f] his head.

No wonder Orkney wrote home that his brother Scot, 'Jemmy Campbell, at the head of the grey dragouns, behaved like an angel.' It was a good fight, and

Meanwhile, on the Allied left, the Dutch army—the same splendid troops who had broken the resistance of the French at Ramillies—moved up to the attack. They assaulted the trenches partly in the Wood of Laignières, but chiefly in the open ground near it. Led on by the young Prince of Orange, their infantry stormed the first line, but were broken before the second and chased back. Again and again they came on, but were each time repulsed ‘with such a butchering that the oldest generall alive never saw the like.’ The ‘Blue Guards,’ beloved of William III, went down in swathes. The flower of the army of the States General was sacrificed in just such a way as the Field Deputies in years gone by had been wont to fear overmuch. But on this occasion the principal Deputy, Goslinga, was galloping gladly about the field, displaying a courage and presence of mind that won him golden opinions ;<sup>11</sup> neither before nor after the battle did he blame his old enemy Marlborough for making the attack. Nevertheless, things went so ill with the Dutch that the Duke had to intervene in person with reserves in order to prevent a French advance.

About three o’clock the decision was reached upon the other wing. Withers, debouching from La Folie, made contact with the troops of Eugene and Lottum emerging on the west side of the conquered Wood of Sars. Some of the German artillery had been dragged right through the forest in the wake of the infantry and now came into action on the far side. The Irish ‘Wild Geese’ had been sent to repulse Withers, but the platoon firing of the Royal Irish broke the gallant charge of the exiles, and the decision of the Boyne and Aghrim was repeated beside the Flemish wood.<sup>12</sup>

The Household of France was good men and horse  
And near broke the Scottish Dragouns.

But ‘Marlborie,’ as usual, ‘sent suplie’ :

Til the French was beat and sadlie defeat  
And forced in batell to flee.

The Jandarms of France they had a great loss  
At the batell of Malleplackie.

The French officer *De la Colonie* (p. 342) speaks of ‘the Scotch Guards of the Queen of England,’ clearly meaning the Scots Greys, ‘most excellent troops’ who led the charge, which was ‘a most violent one.’

It was at that critical point in the field that Villars, ever present where he was most wanted, received the wound in his knee that put him out of action. Boufflers, on whom the command devolved, drew off the army of France, defeated but neither demoralized nor pursued. They left behind most of their artillery, but very few prisoners, except some fifteen hundred of the wounded whom they had not been able to move. They returned to the Lines of La Bassée and left Mons to its fate. After forty days Villars was well enough to be moved to Paris. 'My passage through the towns on the way, lying on a stretcher, was a kind of triumph'—and, though it is he who tells us so, we can well believe it.

Marlborough, racked with headache as always after any great exertion, was kept hard at work for many days. He paid assiduous attention to the wounded of all nations. According to an excellent custom of that polite age, many of the enemy officers were sent back on parole to be cared for by their own folk. One of these, an Irish adventurer named Peter Drake, has told us the tale of his personal appeal to the Duke upon the field :—

I made shift to advance five or six yards toward his Grace, who, on seeing me in that condition, was so good as to stop and ask what was the matter. I told him as loud as I could that I had the honour to serve in the Gens d'Armes, and that I was a prisoner of war, very much wounded, and in danger of losing my life for want of a surgeon to dress my wounds, and begged he would please to take my parole of honour, which was a favour generally granted to prisoners of our corps, and to order some method to carry me to the French army where I should be taken care of. He immediately called for Cardonnel who was his secretary and then at hand, and asked him how came all these poor gentlemen (meaning the prisoners) were not sent away, he having sent orders for that purpose, and desired carriages to be got ready for those that were not able to walk, for that there were no surgeons enough to dress our wounded.

As a result, Drake and his companions in misfortune were, as he tells us, sent to their friends at Bavay that very afternoon. But it is to be feared that, with the best will in the world, the regimental surgeons of the Allies could have done little enough for the wounded privates of all the nations,



of whom nearly 15,000 must have remained upon their hands.

Meanwhile, pious Colonel Blackader, left at the head of the Cameronians by the death of Colonel Cranstoun in the battle,

went to view the field to get a preaching from the dead, which might have been very edifying, for in all my life I have not seen the dead bodies lie so thick as they were in some places about the retrenchments, particularly at the battery where the Dutch Guards attacked. The Dutch have suffered most in the battle of any ; their infantry is quite shattered so that it is a dear victory. It is a wonder to me the British escape so cheap, who are the most heaven-daring sinners in this army. But God's judgments are a great depth.<sup>13</sup>

What would be the effect of Malplaquet upon opinion in Europe and England ? The feelings of Orkney, a friend to Marlborough, were frankly expressed in a letter home to his brother five days after the action.

I can liken this last battle to nothing so much as an attack on a counterscarp from right to left, and I am sure you would have thought so, if you had seen the field as I did the day after. In many places they lie as thick as ever did a flock of sheep. I really think I never saw the like ; particularly where the Dutch Guards attacked it is a miracle. I hope in God it may be the last battle I may ever see. A very few of such would make both parties end the war very soon. The French are very proud they have done so well. I do not believe they have lost so many as we. I doubt it is with us as it was with the French at the battle of Landen. . . . None alive ever saw such a battle. God send us a good peace.

'A good peace.' No word of a march to Paris !<sup>14</sup>

The attacking force had lost between sixteen and eighteen thousand men ;<sup>15</sup> the defenders probably not much over 11,000. Yet the Allies had again asserted their

\* *Drake*, p. 190. Drake's story is borne out in essentials by Marlborough himself (*Dispatches*, IV, p. 599). 'Upon viewing the field of battle on Thursday, and finding great numbers of French officers and soldiers who had crept into the neighbouring houses and in the woods, wounded, in a miserable condition for want of assistance, I wrote to both the Marshals to acquaint them with it, that they might send a number of waggons to fetch them away, and told them I would order L.-General Cadogan to Bay to meet such officer as they should send to agree on the manner of carrying them off.'

military superiority, for they had driven the enemy from a position so strong that Marlborough, inspecting the captured lines next day, wondered at his success, especially since, to use his own words, 'the French have never, during this war, fought so well as this time.'<sup>16</sup> If he had known beforehand that they would fight so well, would he have attacked such a position? Had he reckoned, wrong for once, that after a stout resistance they would give way to panic as so often before? These questions find no answer either in his letters or in his recorded conversations. If he had been Wellington, a word dropped to a friend in the ease of conversational retrospect would some day have let out the secret of his thought. But Marlborough was one who never boasted and who never confessed.

If such a field as Malplaquet had been won during the wars of William, England would have been all aglow with pride and joy. But Marlborough, by the glory of his deeds, had set up a standard of expectation not attained by a victory in which the victors lost more than the vanquished. Moreover, the battle had been fought when men were growing weary of the war. They had been disappointed by the Allies' refusal to make peace in the spring, and held that it could only be justified by a decisive battle and a march to Paris.

There was an element of sound political sense in the Tory outcry against Malplaquet, but as military criticism much of it was questionable. The 'butcher's bill,' denounced as so extravagant, amounted for the British army to less than 600 killed and less than 1300 wounded, out of 14,000 engaged.<sup>17</sup> Our humane and enlightened generation slaughters ten times as many every year rather than limit the speed of its road traffic in time of peace; and it was a thirtieth part of the British losses in a single day of the Battle of the Somme. The Dutch, indeed, might have complained with better reason, since more than 8000 of their troops had been killed or wounded; but the Tories who talked of the 'butcher's bill' cared nothing what happened to the Dutch.

If in 1709 England and Holland had still been fresh and eager to push their advantage, Malplaquet would, like

one of Grant's costly victories, have helped to open the road to the enemy's capital in a few years' time. Professional military critics therefore regard the battle as being an Allied success—justly from their point of view. But there is always a diplomatic and political situation behind every act of war in relation to which it must be judged. So viewed, Malplaquet was a French success. Marlborough, by attacking, had intended to destroy their army and it was not destroyed. Villars, by awaiting the attack, had intended to foster the nascent confidence of his troops, and on the whole they were more confident after the battle than before. But his success had only been relative to their former discouragement. The French made no further attempt to prevent the fall of Mons, and in no succeeding year did they dare give battle to Marlborough in the open field.

The first news of the storming of the enemy's Lines was received with joy in England. 'The guns went off all the afternoon,' we read, 'and the evening is concluding with bonfires.' Even St. John and Peterborough wrote to congratulate the Duke on his fourth great victory.<sup>18</sup> But before the end of the month the losses were known and Malplaquet became a party question. The Tories began to talk of 'the late carnage,' and to declare that the battle would not have been fought in the way it was, 'could a great man have found in his heart to have parted with intelligence money,'—although, in fact, no General of the age was so well served with intelligence as Marlborough. Hearne, the Oxford Jacobite, had heard, unmoved, of Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde, which find no mention in his voluminous daily jottings. But at the news of the slaughter at Malplaquet the learned diarist was all agog :

As this has been the most obstinate so it has been the most direful battle to England that has yet happened, and there is not, in the opinion of all honest men, the least reason for bragging. Private letters frequently come which give most impartial accounts, and we are well assured that from the greatest to the meanest officer hardly one escaped but was either slain or very much wounded,

a statement which was grossly untrue, particularly of the British regiments.

The Whigs, on the other hand, carried through the

national thanksgiving for the latest victory with pomp and ceremony uncurtailed, hymned Marlborough to the skies and prophesied the speedy fall of Paris. A Malplaquet song was set to music :

Now cannon smoke clouds all the sky,  
And through the gloomy wood  
From every trench the bougres fly,  
Besmeared with dust and blood.  
While valour's palm is ours in fight,  
And Mons to terms we bring,  
Let bragging Boufflers vainly write  
False wonders to the King.

Monsieur, Monsieur, leave off Spain.  
To think to hold it is in vain,  
Thy warriors are too few.  
Then without more ado  
Be wise and strait call home little Anjou.

So sang the Whig politicians in their taverns, but it was no longer the full national chorus.<sup>19</sup>

In one important quarter there was no weakening. The City, on whose goodwill the Government so largely depended, was still for 'No Peace without Spain.'

Upon the strength of your victory [wrote Godolphin to Marlborough nine days after the battle] I spoke yesterday to the Bank, that, pursuant to the latitude given in the last session of Parliament, they would now contract with me for the circulation of £600,000 more in Exchequer bills to the carrying on the public service. What I said seemed to be pretty well received, and I hope it will succeed. But upon that occasion Sir Gilbert Heathcote, who is Governor [of the Bank of England], said to me, 'Pray, My Lord, don't let's have a rotten peace.' 'Pray tell me,' I answered, 'what you call a rotten peace?' 'I call anything a rotten peace,' he said, 'unless we have Spain.' 'But, Sir Gilbert,' I said, 'I want you a little to consider the circumstances of the Duke of Marlborough and me; we are railed at every day for having a mind, as they call it, to perpetuate the war.' He replied very quick, 'They are a company of rotten rogues: I'll warrant you we'll stand by you.'<sup>20</sup>

The policies of the Bank of England with regard to the disposal of the crown of Spain had not been forwarded by

the events of the year's war in that country. So far from accomplishing anything in the Peninsula in 1709, the Allies had lost further ground, and by the autumn little outside Catalonia was left to the Austrian candidate, 'Charles III.' The last fortresses that still flew his flag along the coast of Valencia, under the partial protection of the English fleet, were falling one by one to the Bourbon armies. The French General, D'Asfeld, a cruel man, skilful in siege warfare, put to the sword the Spanish adherents of Charles in one captured town after another. In November 1708 he had at last taken Denia, and subsequently Alicante after a five months' siege of the rock on which its Castle stood.

Alicante Castle was gallantly defended by 800 English and Huguenots under Major-General John Richards, who had first become known to fame as Peterborough's faithful but critical lieutenant. The rock was so tall and steep that it was useless to approach it by the ordinary methods of siege. D'Asfeld therefore spent three months in boring a mine fifty-six yards long in the living rock, at the end of which he placed 1200 barrels containing about 17,000 pounds of gunpowder, said to have been the greatest charge ever, till then, used in war. It was 216 feet below the parade ground of the castle. When all was ready, D'Asfeld called on Richards to surrender, inviting him to send officers to examine the mine. After carefully drawing up a paper of arguments in two columns 'for' and 'against,' Richards decided to stand the shock; the explosion would be terrific, but its effect would be uncertain because the body of the rock was traversed in all directions by clefts. To encourage his men, he determined to take his stand exactly over the mine. Some of his officers expostulated at his unnecessary self-immolation, but when he insisted they too claimed the right to stand by his side.

And so, on the morning of Monday, March 3, 1709, a little group of English and Huguenot officers, headed by the Governor, John Richards, in full regimentals, walked

For Richards see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 71-73, 154. Being a Roman Catholic, Richards was nominally in the Portuguese service, really one of the most loyal servants of England. See *Map of Europe at end of this volume for the war in Spain*.

quietly into the middle of the parade ground and stood there, having ordered the privates of the guard to retire. In the streets of the town below, the enemy could be seen running for shelter from the force of the coming explosion.

The mine was blown up, and with little or no noise made an opening in the rock, on the very parade, of some yards in length, about three feet wide, into which the Governor, Lt.-Colonel Thornicroft, Major Vignoles and other officers fell, and the opening instantly closing upon them, they all perished.

There were some who accused Richards of having sacrificed himself and his staff to 'a fond curiosity,' but the more general feeling was an awed appreciation of an incident recalling the leap of Curtius into the gulf rather than an actual incident of modern warfare. The garrison held out more than a month longer, and capitulated in the middle of April on honourable terms. Nothing else of importance happened that year in Spain.<sup>21</sup>

In the year 1709 England had made her greatest effort in war, with no answering degree of success. But 'peace hath her victories . . .' While the red-coated grenadiers were playing their game of hide-and-seek with death in the charged chambers of Tournai and in the woodland alleys of Sars, the Londoners were eagerly buying and discussing a new wonder and delight, Steele's *Tatler*, born on April 12, and making its appearance every second week-day on a single unfolded sheet. Its influence, and that of the *Spectator* which grew out of it in two years' time, did more to launch Eighteenth Century civilization on its characteristic course than all the blood shed at Malplaquet. England's foreign wars, even at their most extravagant and burdensome height, did not in those happy days prevent the progressive softening of manners and the growth of the civilized arts in our island.\*

Addison wrote in the paper, but the idea and the enterprise were Steele's, who brought his friend's shy genius into

\* In January 1710 Thomas Coke, M.P., received a pleasant family letter from the country: 'You won't expect any news from Melbourne, but we thank you for that you send us; especially the *Tatlers* have of late been very entertaining, and between the hopes of hearing of you and reading the *Tatler* your daughters are impatient for the hour of the post' (*H.M.C. Coke*, R. 12, *Ap.* III, p. 83).

play side by side with his own ever-marketable wares. Defoe's *Review* had shown the way in this style of publication, but the larger and better part of the *Review* had been political. Defoe's great gifts did not include the deft touch on social comedy which the Steele-Addison partnership gave to a delighted Town. And the *Tatler* was not only amusing but moral and rational—an unusual combination at that date. Humour changed sides and came to the rescue of good manners and good feeling. It was characteristic of the new influence that, in the summer of 1709, Steele preached in the *Tatler* a series of sermons against duelling—an unusual course for a man of fashion to take in those days. Most men thought such a view fit only to be held by parsons, but here was an ex-soldier who had, in his day, been compelled unwillingly to 'pink' his brother officer, a Whig who supported the army against its clerical detractors, here was Dicky Steele taking up his pen against the duel. 'I shall talk very freely,' he wrote, 'on a custom which all men wish exploded, though no man has courage to resist it.' He denounced, in particular, the Gothic barbarism of the usage by which even the seconds were compelled to stab at one another, sometimes with fatal results, though, busy as the Devil is, there was no pretence of quarrel between them. This attack on a practice peculiarly associated with military habits, being launched at the height of our war-effort by a supporter of the war, is an evidence of the essentially un-military character of English society, although more than a hundred years were to elapse before duelling completely disappeared from among our national customs.\*

\* *Tatler*, Nos. 25, 26, 39. In No. 39 appears the following very interesting dialogue:

*Col. Plume.* I remember that a rencounter or duel was so far from being in fashion among the officers that served in the Parliament army [1642-60], that on the contrary it was as disreputable, and as great an impediment to advancement in the service, as being bashful in time of action.

*Sir Mark.* Yet I have been informed by some old Cavaliers that they were much more in mode among their party than they have been during this last war.

*Col. Plume.* That is true too, sir.

*Mr. Sage.* By what you say, gentlemen, one should think that our present military officers are compounded of an equal proportion of both those tempers; since duels are neither quite discountenanced, nor much in vogue.

On Steele, see Aitken's learned *Life* of him.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

### SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ABOUT MALPLAQUET

#### I. *Should either side have attacked on September 9?*

Although the German Nineteenth Century author of Eugene's *Feldzüge* (Serie 2, Band II, pp. 98-99) thinks Marlborough ought to have attacked on the 9th, so did not Eugene, who was at Marlborough's side that day (though his army was distant); Eugene wrote that evening (9th) to the Kaiser explaining with complete conviction why it would have been impolitic to attack that day. See also *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 22. *Feuquières* (ed. 1741, IV, pp. 34-38) on the other hand blames Villars for not attacking Marlborough on that same day. I follow *Taylor* (II, pp. 359-361) and *Atkinson* (pp. 393-395) in thinking both these opposite opinions very doubtful, for the reasons given in the text, pp. 8-10 above.

It is, of course, quite another question whether or not they should have attacked next day (10th) instead of waiting till the 11th. That I discuss on pp. 10-11 above.

#### II. *Who made the decision not to attack on the 10th?*

Was it Eugene or Marlborough who on September 10 insisted on delaying the attack until the 11th? On this point there is a conflict of contemporary rumour, but no first-hand evidence. Prince Lichtenstein, in family archives (cited in *Feldzüge*, 2, II, p. 101), says that Marlborough vetoed the attack on the morning of the 10th. But Lichtenstein was in Spain that morning. Rousset, on the other hand, who was present at the battle on the Allied side, asserts that Marlborough wished to attack at once and that Eugene insisted on waiting till the 11th (*Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 542, for text of Rousset). But Coxe (III, ed. 1819, p. 78 *note*) says he knows no confirmation of Rousset's statement; neither do I. Neither Marlborough nor Eugene made any statement either way. On the reasons for the decision itself see *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 23.

#### III. *Should Villars have taken up a position behind the woods?*

Some critics, such as *Feuquières* (IV, pp. 39-42), think that Villars, once he had decided to stand on the defensive, should have entrenched himself in the open ground further back, so as to fire on the Allied forces as they tried to debouch from the Wood. Villars, however, explains that he took up the more advanced position with a view to drawing on a battle and raising the siege of Mons. See his *Mémoires* sub 1709, and his letter to Louis after the battle, 'La vérité est que j'ai souhaité d'être attaqué.' Boufflers wrote that Villars' dispositions



had been *parfaitement bonnes* (*Pelet*, IX, pp. 377, 345). The question is well discussed by Major Burne in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, April 1933, pp. 44-46.

#### IV. *Did Orange disobey orders?*

The plea advanced by English apologists for Marlborough both then and now (even by *Taylor* and *Atkinson*) argues that the Dutch attack was meant only for a 'feint,' that Orange had been so instructed and that contrary to orders he turned it into a real attack, with disastrous results. I am sceptical on this point. Where are the alleged orders to Orange to make a 'feint,' or what first-hand evidence is there that he received any such? Marlborough never said so, and never complained of Orange's conduct in any of his numerous letters about the battle. Neither his printed letters, nor *Add. MSS.* 9107, ff. 20-40, contain any hint of that kind, e.g. on f. 38 he writes: 'Our left was the Dutch troops only, who behaved themselves extremely well, but could not force the enemy's retrenchment, so that their effort has suffered more than any other nation.' Nor does the Allied plan of battle, as given in *Feldzüge* 2, II, p. 101, contain anything about a 'feint.'

Moreover, what was Marlborough's usual practice? When, at Ramillies, he sent his English troops to make a 'feint,' he kept the secret in his own breast. He did not tell their commander, Orkney, that his was not to be a real attack; he let the attack develop seriously, and then called it off himself (see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 108-109). Marlborough was in command of the Dutch army at Malplaquet, and it was his failure if he allowed his subordinates to push the 'containing' attack harder than he intended. He never said that they did. And whether they did or not, it was his ultimate responsibility. He is big enough to bear it.

## CHAPTER II

### THE BARRIER TREATY AND THE TWILIGHT OF THE WHIGS

The Barrier Treaty, October–December 1709. The negotiations at Gertruydenberg, spring 1710. The War and the Ministry grow unpopular. The ‘Palatines’ and Mrs. Manley’s *New Atlantis*, 1709. ‘Captain-General for life’? Anne, Abigail, the Marlboroughs and the Whigs. Shrewsbury and Harley conspire for Peace.

WHATEVER effect Malplaquet was destined to have on English public opinion, the government only hardened its heart. Indeed it was during the six months following the campaign of 1709 that the Whig Ministers surpassed their previous record in demands that rendered peace impossible. During this period, Marlborough and Godolphin, already on bad terms with their colleagues owing to personal misunderstandings and rivalries at home, adopted a detached and critical attitude towards the foreign negotiations, from the conduct of which the Duke gradually retired, leaving them in the hands of Lord Townshend, the special representative of the Junto at the Hague.

The Duke and the Treasurer, in the days of their own undisputed power, had themselves initiated the policy of ‘No Peace without Spain,’ and they did not abandon it now. But Marlborough at least was beginning to see the difficulty of carrying it out, and he disapproved of the methods by which the Whigs sought to achieve the impossible task. He had, however, no alternative policy to suggest, and by refusing to take an active part at this crisis of European affairs he reduced himself to a cypher as diplomat and politician. But as a soldier he remained one of the most important pieces on the diplomatic board, because the fear that the French felt of ‘Malbrook’ at the head of the Allied armies still gave a certain reality to the attempt to force upon

France terms that the Duke himself privately declared to be monstrous. On October 9, 1709, he wrote to Godolphin :

It is most certain that the great and only difficulty of the peace is the evacuating of Spain. I believe it was in the power of France at the beginning of the Treaty to have given us possession of several places in Spain, but how shameful a part that must have been I leave to others' judgment. It is certain there is no relying on French authority, so that I see no good end to the taking of measures for the forcing of them out of Spain.<sup>22</sup>

The victor of the war had, in short, no plan for harvesting the peace. He was content to sit with hands folded before the difficulties of the situation, and to watch his Whig colleagues break themselves against it in vain. If he had been as great a statesman as he was a soldier he would not have been content to play the part of onlooker at foreseen disaster.

In order to carry through their policy of securing Spain and Spanish America for the Austrian Charles, it was necessary for the Whig Ministers to purchase at a high price the support of Holland, whose people were weary of war, and whose statesmen were critical of the demands that had led to the rupture of negotiations in the spring of 1709. There was only one way to secure the unwilling adhesion of Heinsius and Buys to further extravagant demands on Louis : let England guarantee to the Dutch all they asked in the Spanish Netherlands, in defiance of Austria and at the expense of Charles III ; and let England herself forgo the monopoly of South American trade and the possession of Minoica in deference to Dutch susceptibilities. On those terms the Whig Ministers could not only obtain Dutch support in the renewed negotiations with France, but they could bind the States General to give military support to the Hanoverian Succession, in case the Jacobites challenged the Act of Settlement. Such were the principles underlying the famous Barrier Treaty.

Holland was sorely in need of peace. Her strength was ebbing away with the drain of war. With nothing equivalent to England's agricultural and industrial resources, she depended for her greatness on trade alone. Yet she shared with England the annual burden of naval armaments, and

of subsidies to the Allies ; and the Dutch army in the field and in the garrisons greatly outnumbered the British. The Tories gave it out that Holland was growing rich by her occupation of the cities of Belgium, but so long as the conflicting armies wasted the Spanish Netherlands, the States General spent there far more than they were able to raise.<sup>23</sup> Every year that the war continued exhausted still farther the strength of the little Republic, and left her, when peace returned, deprived beyond recovery of her position as a first-class Power. In the Eighteenth Century, Holland was to be no longer the colleague but the vassal of England.

For these reasons the Dutch statesmen should have insisted upon peace. Unfortunately the offer that the Whigs made them in the Barrier Treaty was too tempting to be refused. The course now taken by the statesmen of Holland proved ultimately disastrous to their country's interests. But at the moment it was very difficult for them to do anything else. William III, no doubt, could have resumed the whole negotiation with France into his own hand, in the joint interest of the Maritime Powers ; but there was no longer a Stadtholder-King, and Heinsius had inherited neither his dual position nor his genius.

The only apparent alternative to close alliance with England, on the attractive terms she now offered, would have been for the Dutch to initiate a separate agreement with France, like Bolingbroke two years later. But such a proceeding smelt of treachery, and it would have been full of danger for the Republic. England might be strong enough to flout and betray Holland, but Holland could not with impunity flout and betray England. By a separate peace with France the Dutch could no doubt have obtained everything they wanted in the Netherlands—so far as it was in the power of France to give it. But England was offering as much, apparently on better security, for Heinsius did not foresee how short could be the term of British Ministries and of British faith. Moreover if Holland, depending on her old enemy France, were to defy England and Austria, the

\* Portland, whose influence was potent behind the scenes in keeping the policies of England and Holland in harmony, was always strong for a continuance of the war. He died suddenly in November 1709.

English fleet, now greatly superior to her own, could cut her off from the trade of the world by which she lived. Then, whether 'Spain and the Indies' went to Charles or to Philip, they would be closed to the Dutch.

On the other hand, by the Fifteenth Clause of the Barrier Treaty conceded by the Whigs, it was stipulated that Great Britain and Holland were to enjoy equal trade privileges in the Spanish Empire. The Whig Ministers thus abandoned the monopoly rights of trading with Spanish America which Stanhope had secured for Britain by a secret Treaty two years back with Charles III\* ; and at the same time they were forced to concede that Minorca, in spite of its capture by the English, should remain the property of the Austrian King of Spain. On no other terms would the Dutch trading community accept the Barrier Treaty and the further prolongation of the war.<sup>24</sup>

In short the Junto promised Holland everything she wanted, even at the expense of British interests, not only in the Spanish Netherlands but in the Mediterranean and in the New World. Delusive as the offer eventually proved on all counts, it seemed at the time too good for the Dutch statesmen to refuse. They signed the Barrier Treaty in October 1709. Townshend alone signed for Great Britain, since Marlborough refused to have anything to do with so bad a bargain. After further negotiations it was ratified before Christmas, with the addition of two separate articles.

By the Barrier Treaty the Dutch were to be allowed to garrison a long list of cities and fortresses in the French border and throughout the Spanish Netherlands. The key position of Dendermonde was included, although the Junto had indignantly refused it a few years back. The effect of these Dutch rights of garrison and of the financial and commercial provisions that accompanied them, was to strip Austrian Charles of half the value of his property in the Netherlands and to endanger the freedom of British trade.

The draft of the Treaty in Stanhope's handwriting, dated July 1707, is at Cheneveng. A joint Anglo-Spanish company was to be formed to monopolize the trade of Spanish America. This treaty Charles III signed, but the Barrier Treaty of 1709 annulled it.

Upper Guelders, to which the King of Prussia laid claim, was also to go to Holland.'

The interest of all the principal Allies had thus been sacrificed to the Dutch, nominally to secure, as the Treaty declared, their armed support of the Hanoverian Succession. But in fact Holland, for her own safety, would in any case be obliged to lend all possible aid against a Jacobite Restoration. The thing that had really been purchased by Great Britain in the Treaty was not mentioned in its terms—namely the assistance of Holland in the coming diplomatic struggle to win Spain for Charles III. If that negotiation were to break down, the Barrier Treaty would appear as a sacrifice of British interests that had been made in vain, and the Ministry who had made it would in all probability fall.

But until the renewed parley with France had actually broken down, the Barrier Treaty was accepted as a fact. Prussia could only grumble. The Austrian statesmen were unable to do anything effective against it, although Marlborough was now in sympathetic consultation with them and with Eugene. The worst fears of the Emperor had been realized; the Dutch under the pretext of 'a barrier against France wished to get the entire Catholic Netherlands into their power.'<sup>25</sup>

The intended sequel to the Barrier Treaty of Christmas 1709 took place in the negotiations with France at Gertruydenberg in the following spring. Dutch support for the full programme of 'No Peace without Spain' had been bought at a dear rate and was duly forthcoming. The Dutch statesmen, including Buys who had been the leader of the peace party, were compelled to negotiate on behalf of the Allies, and to demand from the French envoys all that England and

\* The Treaty is printed in full in *Geikie and Montgomery*, pp. 377-386, and epitomized and commented on pp. 155-164. For the Dutch policy in the matter, see *Geyl*, pp. 17-20. The towns which the Dutch were to garrison were Nieupoort, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournai, Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Charleroi, Namur, Liere, Hal, Dendermonde, besides the Castle of Ghent, and Knocke, Damme and other forts. For the very different Whig policy of 1706 see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 139-140. The only important town that the Whigs in 1709 refused to yield to Dutch demands was Ostend, the port of entry for British trade into Belgium.

Austria required. The orders were even more monstrous than the year before. Austria and England were united in the demand that Louis, by the interpretation now  
 March- put on Article Thirty-Seven of the Preliminaries,  
 July should with his own forces compel his grandson  
 1710 to abandon Spain in two months' time. If he failed, the Allies were then to be free to renew the war on France, with the advantage of possessing those cautionary towns which Louis was to cede them in order to obtain the two months' respite. Under these penalties the Allies sought to burden King Philip's grandfather with the task, to which they themselves were unequal, of the expulsion from Spain of the King chosen by the Spaniards. No wonder Chancellor Cowper said of his Cabinet colleagues, 'For my own part nothing but seeing so great men believe it, could ever incline me to think France reduced so low to accept such conditions.'

Louis had not been unduly elated by Malplaquet. At Gertruydenberg he offered more than he had offered the year before. He would give up Alsace. He would pay a subsidy to help the Allied armies to dethrone his grandson. He had already recalled all his regiments from Spain, leaving the Spaniards to their own resources. Only he could not undertake to fight Philip and the Spanish people with French troops. It would 'wound his honour,' as Torcy declared on his behalf, 'to make war on his own flesh and blood and on a Prince who had always obeyed him. He desired peace, but not a truce for two or three months, bought at the price of Kingdoms and of his own frontier fortresses.'

There was scarcely anything the Allies might not have had from France in Europe or America except the one absurdity on which they insisted. Buys and the other Dutch negotiators, who really wanted peace, made some feeble efforts to obtain for France a mitigation of Article Thirty-Seven, or at least some compensation—a Kingdom in Sicily or elsewhere,—which might induce Philip voluntarily to quit Madrid. But the moment the Dutch began to murmur of reason the Whig Ministers frowned upon them, and compelled them to present to France the rigour of the Allied

\* For the last year's negotiations see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 398-401.

demands. Bound by the Barrier Treaty, the Dutch had no choice but to make themselves the cat's-paw of England and Austria, reviving the animosity that Louis had formerly felt against the insolent burghers of Holland.

It might not seem strange to Englishmen, but it could not fail to amaze the Dutch, that England, after bribing Holland by the Barrier Treaty to become the agent of the Allies in thus heaping insults on France, should, in the very next year, herself go secretly to France and offer to leave Philip in Spain and to tear up the Barrier Treaty, while a campaign of contumely was begun against Holland by Swift and the pamphleteers in the pay of the new Cabinet. To an Englishman such changes may seem the natural consequences of a General Election, which of course overrides all international engagements and friendships. To the Dutch it could only seem bewildering bad faith. Indeed the preposterous conduct of the Whig Ministers in 1709-1710 had rendered it very difficult for their successors to obtain peace for Europe without bad faith. But the traditional Tory dislike of the Dutch enabled them to make the *volte-face* with peculiar gusto and ruthlessness at the expense of the duped Republic.

While the Whig doctors of State were thus ordering away the banquet of peace from John Bull's table, the weight of the war was being increasingly felt by common folk. It is true that some favourable circumstances encouraged the Ministers in the course they pursued: the trade with

\* Petkum truthfully wrote to Rouillé: 'Had you [the French] only to do with the Dutch you would not have much difficulty. But there are two other powers [Austria and England] who would give you no quarter save for the Dutch.' See Petkum's correspondence in *H.M.C. Round*, pp. 340-351. Professor Geyl writes of the Conferences at Gertruydenberg as 'one of the most disastrous and truly humiliating episodes of Dutch diplomatic history. The Dutch delegates, who seemingly fulfilled the proud task of conducting the negotiations for the whole Alliance, were in reality the puppets of the Hague conference, in which England and Austria pulled the strings, and all the Republic gained by them was the deep resentment of the French, who were at last cured of the delusion that it was through the States that the coalition could be best approached,' *Geyl*, pp. 20-25. See also Professor Geyl's criticism in *History*, July 1926, p. 164, of Mr. Wickham Legg's *British Diplomatic Instructions, France, 1689-1721*, and see pp. 17-19 of that volume; *Torcy*, I, pp. 3-95; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 396-420, 445-451; *Cowper*, p. 41.



Portugal was bringing into the country much gold from the mines of Brazil, then the chief source of the world's supply, and much excellent port wine, in exchange for English cloth;<sup>26</sup> the convoy system had got the better of the enemy privateers, and British merchants no longer complained that their ships were unprotected ; the City was eager to lend money to the government to enable it to fight on till Spain was won. On the other hand distress was becoming general, especially in the country districts. Two bad harvests raised the price of corn in 1709 and 1710 to twice what it had been in the earlier years of the reign.<sup>27</sup> The four-shilling Land Tax continued to afflict the Squires, and as no House of Commons would vote for its further increase, Godolphin had each year to meet the ever-rising war expenditure by higher indirect taxation that fell heavily on the people at large. And even so the Treasury was falling behindhand in its payments at home and abroad. From all these causes shopkeepers and retailers felt the decline of demand for goods ; and shutters went up in London streets and market squares.

The enforced recruiting of the unemployed, under the new Acts to replenish the army, often served as a weapon of tyranny in the hands of local magistrates\* and was so widely unpopular that the Whigs in the House of Commons refused a government Bill to strengthen the compulsory powers for recruiting ; members feared that

Jan.  
1709

it would lose them their seats at the next election.<sup>28</sup> The dread and dislike of the regular army was strongest among Tory squires and parsons, but was by no means confined to those classes. It was a general English sentiment, to a degree hardly imaginable in our day. Tutchin's *Observer*, which came as near to being Radical as any organ of that period, inveighs against a standing army, and, after attacking the Game Laws for disarming the peasantry, thus proceeds :

What will be the end of spending our money and the lives of our men in a foreign war, for the interest of foreign princes and to make the fortunes of a few families at home ? 'Tis true the times are good for some. But we must not judge of the face of the country by

\* See *Blenheim*, pp. 218-219.

the face of some courtiers. We must not look at the great palaces that are built out of the monies got by the war, but at the little cottages.

That had been written by a Whig democrat as early as June 1707, and two years later such sentiments were being widely expressed.

Another independent Whig of a very different type from poor Tutchin, the great Duke of Shrewsbury, watching the world from his lonely and lofty eminence, observed the changing mood of his countrymen. He had been 'great friends' with the disgraced Harley ever since Christmas 1708, and in the following November he wrote to him the result of his reflections :

I do not doubt but the generality of the nation long for a peace, and the majority of those who represent it, when discoursed [with] singly in the country, agree in that opinion. But how they may change their minds when they come to London and submit to their leaders, I will not take on me to determine. However it is evident so many circumstances from at home as well as from abroad make peace desirable, that if the nation could see how they might have a good one, it is my opinion they would be very uneasy till they had it.<sup>29</sup>

The course of intrigue and ambition followed in the next two years by the writer and receiver of this letter was in no small degree inspired by the patriotic conviction which they held in common that peace was needed and demanded by the nation, but that before peace was to be had the character of the Ministry would first have to be changed.

The distress in the country and the desire for peace began the reaction against the Whigs during the summer of 1709. One sign of popular discontent was the outcry against the 'Palatines.' Whig and Tory had long differed as to the degree of encouragement that should be given to Protestant refugees. The fact that foreign immigrants were never Church of England men tended to alienate the sympathies of the Tory ; to the Whig it was enough that they were fellow-Protestants. The advantage derived by the country from the French Huguenot immigration was too

great to be denied : in William's reign our raw levies had been taught their business largely by officers driven from the French army on account of their religion ; and the secret of new crafts had been brought into the island by a skilled and industrious population, who in twenty years had very much more than repaid to the country of their adoption the charity bestowed on them when they landed after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Whigs in the House of Commons declared in 1709 that the Huguenots had 'subscribed near £500,000 into the Bank of England.' But to the Church of England they subscribed less liberally, and as Protestant Dissenters they voted Whig.

During the negotiations for peace with France in 1709-10, Lord Portland wrote to Lord Somers regretting that the terms to be imposed on Louis did not contain provision for the Re-enactment of the Edict of Nantes. Portland gives the reason why this idea, so often mooted, has now been dropped : people in England and Holland are unwilling to pave the way for the return to France of so much industry, ability and wealth. But in fact these fears, he writes, are groundless : the Huguenots have struck such deep roots in England and Holland and are doing so well, that very few of them will return to the land of their fathers ; the people who will benefit by Toleration in France will be the million who have not migrated but have pretended to become idolaters ; their souls and their children's after them ought, writes Portland, to be a consideration with the victorious Allies. The letter is both interesting and sincere, yet it is doubtful how much a Toleration enforced by foreign bayonets would have been worth, or how it would have been guaranteed in time to come. It was perhaps better to leave the matter to Voltaire.<sup>30</sup>

In the spring session of 1709 a Bill was introduced into the British Parliament for the naturalization of foreign Protestants, if they would take the oaths to government and receive the sacrament in any Protestant church. Tory amendments, that proposed to restrict the test to communion with the established Church, were defeated in both Houses, and the Bill became law in its Whig form.<sup>6</sup> During the Lords' debate, Burnet of Salisbury had as usual spoken for

the larger latitude, to the indignation of many of his brother churchmen.\*

In the following year an immigration took place which seemed to many to justify the High Church objectors. There was distress in the Rhenish Palatinate, due partly to the ravages of the war and of the French, but in part to the persecuting policy of our ally, the Roman Catholic Elector, towards his Protestant subjects. Queen Anne's good reception of fifty Lutherans from the Palatinate, co-religionists of her late husband, being reported in their native land, attracted a tide of immigrants in the summer of 1709, coincident with the great rise in corn prices and distress among the English poor. More than ten thousand 'High Dutch,' as Germans were then called, came over in a state of complete destitution. Some were genuine religious refugees of a good type; others, who had nosed John Bull's wealth and bounty from afar, proved 'inactive and mutinous.' Two thousand of them turned out to be Papists and were sent home at once. The most part remained, a charge on English charity, and competitors for English employment in a bad year.

Much generosity was shown, not only by the government but by private persons. The Queen subscribed heavily; and one pious lady gave £1500. They had 'plentiful relief,' and 'canvas hutches both at Blackheath and Camberwell' were erected for them till they could be drafted elsewhere. England paid but grumbled.

The case of the Palatines is all our domestic talk [Ralph Verney heard from his uncle]; I find there will be circular letters to all the parishes and all vestrys in order to receive some families at £5 per head. But what to do with them is hard to imagine, and 'tis thought Parliament will enquire into the invitation they had hither.

The cry that 'Charity begins at home and these foreigners are a plague to us' was popular that year among the English of all classes, particularly among the labouring poor.

Eventually several thousands of these unwanted strangers were drafted to the American colonies, and three thousand

\* Burnet records this in his *History*, and Swift writes on the margin 'Dog Burnet, V, p. 399. For the text of the Act see *Stats. of Realm*, 7 Anne, cap. V.

to Ireland, where no one was likely to look a gift Protestant in the mouth. Swift's friend, Archbishop King, vied with Wharton, the Whig Lord Lieutenant, and the Dublin Parliament, in the business of planting them in Southern Ireland, where they would serve to resist the next native rising or French invasion. They were granted land on better terms and on longer leases than the Catholic peasantry around, for whom anything was good enough. None the less, the plantation proved a failure. Many of them had been craftsmen, not peasants, in their own country, and nearly all disliked the strange soil and stranger inhabitants. In less than a year more than half of them had thrown up their farms and drifted back to England or to the fatherland.

When the Sacheverell trial began, the talk in England against the 'Palatines' and those who had encouraged them to come over, helped to foment the indignation of the mob against the persecutors of the High Church champion.<sup>31</sup>

The change of national opinion in 1709 was very real below the surface, but it was not apparent to careless observers. Before the Sacheverell trial, it found no adequate voice in literature, journalism or public speech. Harley was preparing the great change in secret, by closetings with Shrewsbury, Abigail and the Queen. St. John, who had lost his seat in the House, was enjoying the pleasures of retirement—'in this obscure and private life,' he wrote to Harley in September, 'I am perfectly easy, and shall with the same ease return to the noise, whenever the service of my country calls me forth.'<sup>32</sup> Swift was still unattached to either party and was living quite as much in Whig as in Tory society during his visits to England. Steele, Addison and Defoe were all writing for the government. Indeed the publication that did most harm to the Ministry that year was a book of the lowest order, the *New Atlantis*, wherein Mrs. Manley, a woman of no character, regaled the public with brutal stories, for the most part entirely false, about public men and their wives, especially Whigs and above all the Marlboroughs. For example, Sarah was accused of being Godolphin's mistress, with Marlborough's connivance! Fancy names thinly veiled the persons libelled. The book

soon had a second volume and passed through many editions. At the end of October the government had Mrs. Manley arrested, but she was bailed out and the prosecution was dropped.\*

In September 1709 the *Tatler* described the authoress of the *New Atlantis* 'as using 'artificial poisons conveyed by smells.' The criticism, rightly or wrongly, has been attributed to Swift. At any rate a year later he wrote to Addison that her characters only 'happened to be right once in five hundred times.' It was not till 1711, when the passions of party had seized the Doctor, body and soul, that he wrote of her as the 'poor woman' and tried to get her a pension 'for her service in the cause, by writing her *Atlantis* and prosecution, etc., upon it.' Finally he declared that she 'has very generous principles for one of her sort and a great deal of good sense and invention.' 'Invention,' in one sense, she certainly had, but it is difficult for anyone who has read her garbage to admire the 'generosity' of her 'principles.'<sup>33</sup>

In sight of the gathering storm the Ministry should have closed its ranks and reconsidered its policies at home and abroad. But while it refused to make peace, and provoked its domestic foes by the Sacheverell trial, it was too patently divided by personal jealousies, which encouraged Harley and Shrewsbury in their plot to break it up piecemeal. Throughout 1709 and the early months of 1710 the rift between the Junto and the Marlborough-Godolphin interest was constantly widening. Each side suspected the other of intrigues with the common enemy. Sarah was always being told by her henchmen that one or other of the Junto—now Somers, now Halifax—was paying court to Abigail, Lady Masham. The Duchess, indeed, no longer trusted any of her old friends the Whigs except Lord Chancellor Cowper. Shrewsbury drew Somerset, the other

\* It is curious that Mrs. Manley libelled the Cowper family under the name of 'Volpone' (*New Atlantis*, 2nd ed. 1709, I, p. 213 *et seq.*), whereas a few months later Sacheverell, as is well known, was thought to refer to Godolphin by the same word. Indeed, the context of Sacheverell's sermon shows that he meant Godolphin, as an ex-Tory. I suppose the name of Ben Jonson's character was in general use to denote a hypocrite. The key to the names in the *New Atlantis*, Vol. I, will be found in *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 292.

independent Whig Duke, into correspondence with Harley in May 1710; and, long before that, Somerset had been trying on his own account to make trouble in the Whig party, by telling Wharton that 'he had been ill-used by the Lords that he thought his friends.' Wharton did not believe him, but he suspected Godolphin of having set on Somerset to divide him from his colleagues of the Junto. The air was full of stories of intrigue and betrayal.<sup>34</sup>

Meanwhile Lord President Somers was basking in the unaccustomed warmth of royal favour. Anne had for many years disliked him on report and kept him at arm's length, but now that he was able to approach her as one of her confidential servants, she soon fell under his charm. He received, by a private arrangement with the Queen, three additions of £1000 each to his salary, paid respectively in April and October 1709 and in June 1710. The royal bounty appears to have affected his conduct, which became disloyal to his colleagues. Sarah was not far wrong when she suspected that Somers was intriguing to replace Godolphin as Lord Treasurer, and that Harley and Anne for a while deluded him with the hope.<sup>35</sup> The Cabinet had long been lacking in cohesion and mutual trust, when, in the summer of 1710, the plan to break it up, carefully prepared by Shrewsbury, Harley and Abigail, was at length brought into action by the Queen.\*

Marlborough's sense of the insecurity of the political situation led him to ask that his post of Commander-in-Chief, or 'Captain-General' as it was called, should be secured to him during life. As early as May 1709 he bade the unwilling Lord Chancellor, Cowper, to hunt for precedents, but none were forthcoming. He then employed his client, James Craggs, in the same search with the same result. Marlborough believed that Monk had been rewarded by Charles II with the Captain-Generalship for life, but he

\* For the payments of secret service money to Somers see *P.R.O.*, T., 38, 737, ff. 273, 289, 307. The secret service money accounts contain some curious but few, if any, scandalous, items. £200 a year is paid to the saintly Non-Juror Ken, through Hooper, his friend and supplanter at Bath and Wells. Three payments of £10 (all too little) are made to Margaret Farquhar, widow of the excellent dramatist, who left his family in dire poverty on his death in 1707.

was informed on enquiry that even the King-maker's commission had been held during the pleasure of the Crown. Cowper could not conceal his opinion that to make the command of the army irrevocable would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, an injury at once to the Queen's prerogative and to the liberties of a country in which the military must be strictly subordinate to the civil power. But the Duke was obstinate, and in the autumn made his demand of Anne herself, and when she refused in indignation and alarm, wrote her an angry letter, complaining of her attachment to Abigail.

It was one of the very few imprudent acts of his life. He had touched both the Queen and the country on the raw. For although he had only sought to set his relation to the army above the ebb and flow of political parties, his action was represented as an attempted treason. The Tory Chiefs and his rival Argyle accused him of seeking to make himself 'Perpetual Dictator.' They raised the cry of 'Cromwell and the military power,' with more semblance of reason than they could squeeze out of any other circumstance of the time. The Duke had disconcerted his friends and played into the hands of all his enemies. Indeed the affair was one of the chief causes of the ingratitude and contumely with which he was, for some years to come, treated by the nation he had saved.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile the quarrel between Anne and Sarah was growing worse every week. The situation had indeed become intolerable for all parties. Sarah, who had for many years been the Queen's most intimate friend, was still Mistress of the Robes, Groom of the Stole and Keeper of the Privy Purse, and was still officially in charge of the domestic concerns of the royal household, whereas her hated supplanter was already the sole confidante and favourite. Given the temper of the three women, a war of petty insults and reprisals was inevitable. One day the Queen disposed of rooms in Kensington Palace that had been ascribed to Sarah, without letting her know, and, when challenged, equivocated and took refuge in sulky silence. On other occasions the offence came from the Duchess.



Sarah's partisans upbraided her because she did not visit Anne every day : <sup>37</sup> she would have been better advised not to visit her at all. Marlborough, wiser in his wife's case than in his own, warned her not to weary the Queen with complaints :

. . . as it has always been my observation in disputes, especially in that of kindness and friendship, that all reproaches, though ever so reasonable, do serve to no other end but to make the breach wider.

Thus he wrote to her very sagely at the end of August 1709, while he was taking the Citadel of Tournai. But two months later Anne found occasion to write to him :

You seem dissatisfied with my behaviour to the Duchess of Marlborough. I desire nothing but that she would leave off teasing and tormenting me, and behave herself with the decency she ought both to her friend and Queen.

At the same time she wrote to Sarah :

It is impossible for you to recover my former kindness, but I shall behave myself to you as the Duke of Marlborough's wife and my Groom of the Stole.

Upon the receipt of this letter [wrote the unteachable Duchess], I immediately set myself to draw up a long narrative of a series of faithful services for about twenty-six years past. And knowing how great a respect her Majesty had for the writings of certain eminent divines, I added to my narrative the directions given by the author of *The Whole Duty of Man* with relation to friendship.

Behind the comedy lay tragic facts. The Queen, who had lost all her children and the husband she loved, was now losing her one intimate and life-long friend. How many old memories, once sweet, must the quarrel have turned sour to Anne's recollection ! Nor could Sarah's place in her heart be filled by Abigail Masham, a new-comer with no part in her past life, an adventuress, a listener at keyholes. If the fault was mostly Sarah's, the tragedy was mostly Anne's. For Sarah was left less forlorn. She had more resources in herself ; and she had the unchanging love of her husband, of which she was far more proud than she had ever been of the royal friendship even in its palmiest days.<sup>38</sup>

Harley, admitted up the back-stairs by Abigail whenever he wished to see the Queen, prompted her at the New Year to an action calculated to bring on a crisis. Jan. Without consulting Marlborough she made Earl 1710 Rivers Lieutenant of the Tower of London, then the most important military arsenal, and offered his regiment to Abigail's brother, Jack Hill, whose only claim to a Colonelcy lay in his relationship to the woman most odious to the Commander-in-Chief. Marlborough was furious : 'It is, madam,' he told the Queen, 'to set up a standard of disaffection to rally all the malcontent officers in the army.' He claimed the dismissal of Abigail : unless that woman ceased to attend the Queen, he would no longer command her troops. Sunderland and Walpole wished to have an address for the favourite's dismissal to be carried by the House of Commons. But Somers, Cowper and Godolphin were for more moderate counsels.<sup>39</sup>

After many heated consultations, much heart-burning and mutual suspicion among Ministers, a compromise was finally agreed to by the Queen and the Duke, both of whom bitterly resented the constraint put upon them by the intermediaries. Hill did not get his regiment, but Rivers remained at the Tower, and Abigail in the closet with the key of the back-stairs. Up them Harley continued to come, bearer of suggestions from Shrewsbury for further undermining of the Ministerial power. The Cabinet had antagonized the Queen and had lost all internal cohesion and mutual trust. Marlborough perhaps had been right. Perhaps he and all the Ministers had better have resigned rather than go on upon such terms :

This physic but prolongs thy sickly days.

If the crisis that ultimately came in August 1710 had been anticipated in January, Europe might six months the sooner have enjoyed the blessings of peace.<sup>40</sup>

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

### POLITICS AND THE ARMY

THE following letter written by Marlborough from the field to Godolphin in England, lets us into the pulse of the machine of politics as it was then conducted. It has no date, but must have been written in 1709 or 1710. I have put the explanation of the cypher in brackets after each cypher figure, and I have preserved the original spelling. The letter is unsigned and unaddressed, but must have been enclosed in a packet addressed to Godolphin. It is now in my possession, and a facsimile of the first side is produced opposite.

for yourself

By the different accounts I have from 108 [England] it will be a great ease to mee to know from you how far 38 and 39 [you and I] may safely depend upon the sincerity of 28 [Shrewsbury]. The encouragement 221 [Argyle] has received by the favour 42 [the Queen] has shown him, makes it absolutely necessary for 39 [me] to countenance 37 [Ld Orkney] in opposition to 221 [Argyle], which makes me beg of you that you will use your intirest with 42 [the Queen] that thay [*sic*] wou'd be pleased to allow me to give assurance to 37 [Orkney] that when any of his Countrymen [the Scots] are made Pears that he shall be made an English Baron, if it be the intention of 42 [the Queen] that I shou'd serve Her which I am ready to do with all my heart, she must in order to bring the dissipline of the army back to that happy posture in which it was some time ago for her Service, let me have in my power to oblige the officers, and not to have anybody incorged to think thay can meet with preferment by others. If 42 [the Queen] dose not think this absolutely necessary and good for Her, I shall be as well contented to be quiet, and retier, which may make mee happyer, if I were not morally sure that Her service can't succeed any other way, pray lett me have your mind freely, and your advice as a faithfull friend, for I can't be at ease in my mind, til I have fixt my resolution, as to my behaviour, for the remaining part of my life, which will bee very much guided by what I shall hear from you.

## For your self

By the different accounts I have from 108. it will be a great ease to me to know from you how far 32. and 39. may safely depend upon the sincerity of 28. the encouragement 221. has received by the favour 42. has shown him, makes it absolutely necessary for 39. to countenance 39. in opposition to 221. which <sup>most</sup> I beg of you that you will use your interest with 42. that they would be pleased to allow me to give assurances to 39. that when any of his Country men are made Bairs that he shall be made an English Baron, if it be the intention of 42. that I should serve Her which I am ready to do with all my heart, she must in order to bring the discipline of the Army back to that happy posture in which it was some time ago for Her service, let me have in my power to oblige the officers, and not to have any body encouraged



## CHAPTER III

### SACHEVERELL

The last Whig Parliament of Anne. Financial straits: the Lottery. Dr. Henry Sacheverell. His sermon and impeachment. Whig and Tory theories of the Revolution. The Sacheverell riots. The Lords' decisions. The Middle Party. Effect of the Sacheverell agitation in the country.

PARLIAMENT, as usual, met during the season when the world's armies were in winter quarters. It was the last session of the Queen's reign to be held under Whig

Nov. auspices. The business was finance and Sache-  
1709- verell, both strong Tory arguments.

April The endless war was telling even on the English  
1710 financial system, the strongest in Europe. Thirteen

millions was now the annual expenditure; it had been less than three millions in the last year of peace. And the war was costing annually twice what it had cost in 1703. Spain alone ate up more than a million a year, although our forces in the Peninsula were diminishing in number and were cruelly ill provided. Government was heavily in debt; the Navy alone was four millions in arrears. The 'poor seamen' were going unpaid, very much as in earlier reigns. Foreign contractors exacted their dues, while English creditors and public servants had often to wait and borrow. To be a British Envoy abroad always meant embarrassment and might mean ruin. Payment was the more difficult as there was then no national system of paper money. All this rendered the Whig war unpopular with many who had at first found their advantage in it. Over and above the fixed revenue, the Commons this winter voted more than six millions, by means of the usual four-shilling Land Tax, and increased charges on many articles, including candles,

beer and coal. Such burdens were resented in a year of dearth.<sup>41</sup>

One financial expedient, however, was popular enough, and caused pleasurable excitement, particularly in the fashionable class. The device of the Lottery, employed early in William's reign, had been discarded and made illegal in 1699 as 'a common and public nuisance.' It was now revived by the House of Commons on the advice of the Treasury officials.

It served to render ordinary investments in government loans more attractive, by adding to their certain profit the chance of larger gains. Ten-pound shares, represented by 'tickets,' were to be bought, and any ticket might prove in the draw to be a lucky number, carrying extra annuities. But even the blank tickets registered sound claims on government.

The letters and diaries of this year reveal the most respectable ladies and gentlemen immersed in this safe and patriotic form of gambling. Even the saintly Rachael, Lady Russell, dead to the vanities of the world ever since her husband's execution long ago, expresses a kindly hope that her grand-daughter may be 'gratified in the lottery.' Fathers bought tickets for their daughters, and distant country-houses were all agog on days when the prize numbers were publicly drawn from the wheel of fortune by the 'Blue-coat Boys,' chosen for the task as the most innocent persons in town! 'The Jackanapes gave themselves such airs in pulling out the tickets,' growled Swift, 'and showed white hands open to the company to let us see there was no cheat.'<sup>42</sup>

Sarah's friends, the Herveys of Ickworth, invested deeply, in an almost pious spirit. Lord Hervey in his private diary writes :

1710 June 15. Thursday I took out mine and dear wife her lottery tickets, mine being 110 tickets, hers and her childrens 45, in all 155 lottery tickets, numbered 32802 inclusive to 32956.

Aug. 12. Saturday I had (by God's good Providence) a benefitted ticket of five hundred pounds per annum come up in the State-lottery against one of the numbers of my tickets, viz. 32847, commencing from Michaelmas 1710 for 32 years.

And, a week later, God again providently catered for his Lordship in the matter of ticket 32868.

As all the world knows, Godolphin and the Whigs precipitated their own ruin by the State prosecution of a parson for a foolish sermon. But Doctor Henry Sacheverell was not, as has sometimes been said, an 'obscure' parson, who would never have been heard of if he had not been impeached before the Lords. On the contrary, ever since, in the first year of the reign, he had 'hung out the bloody flag of defiance' to Whigs and Dissenters from the University pulpit, and poured foul abuse on half the Bishops in his pamphlet entitled *The Character of the Low Churchman*, he had been the principal mouthpiece, if not the leader, of high-flying clergy in Oxford and elsewhere. Atterbury had far greater talents but was relatively unknown; he had never revealed his authorship of the famous *Letters to a Convocation Man*, and until the last years of the reign he did not figure so prominently as 'the Doctor' whose defence before the House of Lords he composed. Ken, who would have led the High Church party with the dignity and charity it so often lacked, had with characteristic scrupulosity seceded from the Establishment as a Non-Juror. Many thought that Sacheverell should have done the same. Hearne, the bitter Oxonian Jacobite, wrote of him at the height of his fame that such an advocate of Non-Resistance 'was not to be excused, he having taken the oaths'; and set him down as 'conceited, ignorant and impudent.' But whatever his faults may have been, Sacheverell was a power in the land long before his trial.<sup>43</sup>

In December 1705 he had preached, with great applause,

\* *Diary of John Hervey* (1894), p. 52; Miss Scott Thomson, with the kind permission of the Duke of Bedford, has given me notes of some of the accounts of Mrs. Elizabeth Howland, mother-in-law of the then Duke, herself a careful investor, as became a daughter of the great Josiah Child. She dealt largely in the Lottery, e.g. one of her entries runs: 'Blank lottery tickets of 1710; 329 sets at £9 13s. 0d. per set, 25 years to go . . . £3207 15s. 0d.' Partly on account of their connection by marriage with the great East Indian magnate, the Dukes of Bedford at this period traded on a large scale in the East India Company. Two ships in the Company fleet were named the *Bedford* and the *Tavistock*. The Russell wealth, ever since the fifteenth century, was largely made by trade.



another University Sermon attacking Whigs, Dissenters and 'moderate' Tories. Four years later, he delivered the substance of it with large additions in St. Paul's before  
 Nov. 5 the Lord Mayor of London.<sup>44</sup> The occasion was the  
 1709 Fifth of November, a day consecrated to the double event of Guy Fawkes and William's landing at Torbay. Such a sermon, if preached on January 30th, might have passed unnoticed amid a thousand other fulminations launched that day against rebels and fanatics who had executed Charles I and whose successors were said to be still busy in the land. But a sermon which reasserted the doctrine of non-resistance in its most extreme form as the duty of subjects in all circumstances whatsoever, when delivered on November the Fifth seemed an attack on the Revolution, intended to undermine its corollaries, the Act of Settlement and the prospective Hanoverian Succession. And when this sermon, dedicated to the Lord Mayor, was printed and circulated as a party pamphlet to the extent, it was said, ultimately of 40,000 copies, the affair assumed a national importance.

On these grounds, and not from mere vindictiveness against an 'obscure parson,' the Ministers decided on an impeachment, in order to argue out before the highest tribunal of the land the lawfulness of the existing Constitution and the prospective rights of the Protestant Succession. As Burke long afterwards wrote in his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, on behalf of the same Constitution when threatened no longer by the Jacobites but by the Jacobins :

The Impeachment of Dr. Sacheverell was undertaken by a Whig ministry and a Whig House of Commons and carried on before a prevalent and steady majority of Whig Peers. It was carried on for the express purpose of stating the true grounds and principles of the Revolution, what the Commons emphatically called their *foundation*.

But there is usually more than one reason for any political act. There had been other parts of the Sermon that helped to provoke the decision to prosecute. Whig pamphleteers complained that Sacheverell 'had exhausted all the topicks of Illnature and Billingsgate to patch up his discourse.' He had denounced Dissenters in brutal terms, and made

a personal attack on the servants of the Crown, particularly on Godolphin as the Tory who had betrayed his party. The text of the sermon was ‘In perils among false brethren.’

Nor indeed [said the preacher] could any one be supposed so sottish as to place the least confidence in these men, did they not bait their hook and cover their treachery with the sacred and plausible pretences of friendship. In what moving and living colours does the holy psalmist point out the crafty insidiousness of such wily Volpones? *But it was even thou! my companion, my guide, mine own familiar friend!*

—and so forth. Everyone made the application to the Lord Treasurer. And he, for years past, had been more sensitive to the attacks of the pulpit than his Whig colleagues, who took it as all in the day’s work to be belaboured by parsons. As early as 1705 Godolphin had been writing to his friends about ‘the insolences of the clergy,’ and the need that government should prosecute them as it prosecuted lay pamphleteers who overstepped the mark.\*

There may therefore be some truth in Swift’s statement :

About this time happened the famous trial of Dr Sacheverell, which arose from a foolish, passionate pique of the Earl of Godolphin, whom this divine was supposed, in a sermon, to have reflected on under the name of Volpone; as my Lord Somers, a few months after, confessed to me; and at the same time that he had earnestly, and in vain, endeavoured to dissuade the Earl from that attempt.

Whether Somers had been always opposed to an Impeachment is not, however, certain. Sarah, a prejudiced witness no doubt, long afterwards wrote :

When there was something very material to be done in the House of Lords concerning Dr Sacheverell’s trial, Lord Somers excused himself from coming to vote because his mother was dead. This was an odd thing for a man when he could not possibly take his mother out of the grave, and especially on a business that he had himself to my knowledge and to my hearing pressed all the Ministry to have Sacheverell prosecuted. And I heard him myself say in a meeting in my lodgings, if it was not done the clergy would take the Crown from the Queen by preaching.<sup>45</sup>

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 7.

Indeed the other main object of the Impeachment, besides the most public and solemn restatement of the *foundation* of the Revolution Settlement, was to put a curb on the party use of the pulpit in the approaching political crisis. The expectation was that after the condemnation of the Doctor there will be an injunction to all the Clergy not to meddle with the Toleration, Administration and Politics.

The Whigs were in high glee. 'Nothing was in their mouths,' wrote Lord Ailesbury, 'but that they would roast the priest, which proved a fatal dish for them and their adherents.' The House of Lords was chosen as the national theatre, rather than any lower Court, partly to give solemnity to the statement of Revolution principles by the Managers of the prosecution for the Commons, and by their Lordships as Judges, partly also, as the Tories believed, because no ordinary Court of Law would 'condemn a man for innuendoes'; and because a Jury must be unanimous, but a majority sufficed in the Lords.<sup>46</sup>

Having once determined on an Impeachment, the Whigs staged the scene with all the circumstance of a great historic pageant. Sir Christopher Wren prepared Westminster Hall with wooden scaffolding, as it had been prepared for the trial of Strafford. But even when it was crowded to the roof it could not contain the whole world of fashion and power that clamoured for admission. The younger Lords, besieged by fair applicants, demanded eight tickets apiece. The members of the House of Commons took up one whole side of the Hall. To get more room, Sir Christopher was bidden to put a gallery above the box where the Queen was to sit, but he was obliged to tell their Lordships 'that the Queen was positive *she would have no body over her head*, which made the House laugh, coming so pat to what had been so lately the discourse of the Town.'

Colley Cibber complained on behalf of the legitimate drama that 'our audiences were extremely weakened during the trial, by the better rank of people's daily attending it.' 'Sacheverell,' wrote old Lady Wentworth, 'will make all the Ladys turn good huswivs, they goe att seven every morning' to secure their seats. The Tory ladies 'wet all

their clean handkerchiefs ' with tears over the dear Doctor's defence. But the brigade of Whig beauties, not being inspired by the soft emotion that agitated the breasts of their rivals, found the long constitutional arguments vastly tedious ; they and their lords were soon regretting to one another the nuisance of ' this nasty trial.'

The Tories in Parliament had at first hesitated, for many of them liked neither the man nor his sermon. But, encouraged by the fury of their partisans in the country, they adopted the Doctor's cause as their own. The Queen, during the preliminaries of the Impeachment, told Burnet ' it was a bad sermon and he deserved to be well punished for it.' But party spirit is contagious and she too was drawn into the strong Tory current. At the bar, the defendant appeared surrounded by her Chaplains, ' encouraging and magnifying him.' Every day she came in her sedan chair from St. James's Palace, escorted by a vast crowd shouting ' We hope Your Majesty is for a High Church and Sacheverell.' And every day she dined on the premises of Parliament, to lose no word of the proceedings. Indeed neither Queen nor subject could stand neuter in such a heat of partisanship. ' The great amusement of this town,' wrote a cynical observer, ' is the affair of Sacheverell, about which all companies squabble and box.' For his part, Sacheverell came every day from the City to Westminster Hall, in his glass coach surrounded by a countless multitude armed some with bludgeons and others with drawn swords. The Tories borrowed from their foes the arts with which Shaftesbury's ' brisk boys' were wont to overawe the capital.<sup>47</sup>

The speeches for the prosecution and for the defence brought out very clearly the single Whig and the several

Tory points of view on the Revolution that was past, Feb. 27— and by implication on the Hanover Succession that March 23 was still to come. The united front of the one party, however unpopular at the moment, in contrast to the discordant and embarrassed arguments of

Sacheverell and his defenders, portended the Tory catastrophe of 1714, though the trial itself led first to the Whig catastrophe of 1710.

The exponents of the Whig point of view all said one

thing. Robert Walpole, General Stanhope and the other Managers of the Impeachment for the House of Commons, and the Noblemen and Bishops who spoke against Sacheverell when their Lordships adjourned to discuss the case in their own Chamber, all declared that the nation had laws and rights that should in extremity be defended by force even against the Crown. The Revolution had been such a case of just resistance against a King who had broken the laws. And the title of Queen Anne, and of the House of Hanover after her, rested on Acts of Parliament overriding strict hereditary right. The doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance incapable of any exception, as Sacheverell had preached it, would make the Revolution criminal, and would vitiate the Queen's title to the throne.

In so arguing the Whigs tacitly abandoned the tale of the warming-pan. They assumed that the Pretender was Anne's brother. For this they were taken to task by Tory speakers for the defence, for whom the warming-pan still had its uses, as the dim cave where the ancient doctrine of divine hereditary right might continue to hibernate. The Whigs, it was said, had done Queen Anne and the House of Hanover an ill service by resting their claims solely on Acts of Parliament, and 'many thousands were alienated by this impolitic discovery.' It is, indeed, probable enough that the Whig acknowledgment of the Pretender as James II's son did something to stimulate the Jacobite movement then gaining ground in the Tory party. Nevertheless the Protestant Succession was safer in the long run for being based on truth and common sense, instead of on sophistical arguments drawn from a lying tale.

\* Constantine Phipps, in his speech on behalf of Sacheverell, said : ' I do not think that the Doctor, who asserts the hereditary right of the Queen, can be charged with an intention to bring in the Pretender. I am in your Lordships' judgment whether the denying Her Majesty's hereditary right be not the most likely way to bring him in. For I submit to your Lordships whether the denying the hereditary right of the Queen be not to suppose an hereditary right in somebody else.' (*State Trials*, XV, p. 225.)

Swift, who, as an Irish Protestant, was always a strong Hanoverian, blamed the Whigs in 1711 for dropping the warming-pan story. The denial of it, he says, 'whether it be true or false, is very unseasonably advanced, considering the weight such an opinion must have with the vulgar.' *Examiner*, No. 40 (39 in the reprint).

See also *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVII (ed. 1819, p. 167) on Hare's letter.

The House of Commons speakers for the Defence, when their turn came, adopted a different line from that chosen by the Doctor himself. Sir Simon Harcourt advanced, in defence of Sacheverell, doctrines which in the mouth of a Whig would have been condemned as Republican. He told their Lordships that the Obedience and non-Resistance which, as set forth in the Sermon, admitted of no exception, was due not to the Crown but to 'the Legislative Power'; but in fact Sacheverell had neither said nor thought any such thing.

If that defence failed, Sir Simon fell back on another explanation :

An unlimited Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance [he admitted] is a slavish notion. My Lords, Dr Sacheverell does not contend for it. I humbly apprehend, my Lords, that extraordinary cases, cases of necessity, are always implied, though not expressed, in the general rule.

But neither of this plea of exceptional cases would Sacheverell avail himself. He stood by the doctrine of his Sermon, 'the utter illegality of Resistance upon any pretence whatsoever.'

Since Sacheverell and Atterbury disliked and regretted the Revolution though they dared not say so, their argument about it was pure sophistry. The Revolution, Sacheverell had said in his Sermon and now repeated before the Lords, was not Resistance at all, because William in his Declaration had proclaimed that he did not come to conquer England. Therefore there had been no resistance in the winter of 1688 ! Walpole's reply was all that so paltry an evasion deserved :

It cannot now be necessary to prove Resistance in the Revolution. I should as well expect your Lordships would desire me, for form's sake, to prove the sun shines at noon day.

The more effective part of the oration that Atterbury had so well composed and that Sacheverell delivered with all the arts of the orator to that vast and excited audience, was an appeal for the liberty of the clergy to comment from

For a very curious letter of De Foe's on Sacheverell's views, see Appendix C, p. 332 below.

the pulpit on State affairs—the other real point at issue besides the lawfulness of the Revolution. His defence then slid into a High Church harangue against the Dissenters, who though tolerated by law, still bear the guilt of schism—‘which guilt may still rest upon their souls, however it may cease to affect their bodies and estates.’ In particular he denounced their ‘Seminaries,’ where they had the insolence to bring up their own youth excluded by law from Oxford and Cambridge. In his sermon Sacheverell had denounced these Dissenting Academies in yet hotter terms, as

seminaries wherein Atheism, Deism, Tritheism, Socinianism, with all the hellish principles of Fanaticism, Regicide and Anarchy are openly professed and taught, to corrupt and debauch the youth of the nation.

The Schism Act of 1714, that took away from Dissenting parents the liberty of educating their children according to their own beliefs, was one outcome of the Sacheverell trial. All the issues of the trial were in fact one. The Schism Act was repealed because the House of Hanover came to the throne.<sup>48</sup>

The opinion of a very large part of the Tories, who were not like Atterbury and Sacheverell crypto-Jacobites, but who disliked the Whig doctrine and attitude, was expressed in the Lords’ debate by Hooper, the excellent Bishop of Bath and Wells :

He allowed, indeed, of the necessity and legality of Resistance in some extraordinary cases ; but was of opinion that this ought to be kept from the knowledge of the people, who are naturally too apt to resist. That the Revolution was not to be boasted of and made a precedent ; but we ought to throw a mantle over it, and rather call it Vacancy or Abdication. And that the original compact were two very dangerous words ; not to be mentioned without a great deal of caution.<sup>49</sup>

The Whig prosecutors, on the other hand, had begun their case by stating that ‘the law is the only measure of the Prince’s authority,’ and that the law ‘derives its being and efficacy from common consent.’ But ‘instead of this, at later times, patriarchal and other fantastical schemes have

been framed to rest the authority of the law upon ; and so questions of divinity had been blended with questions of law.' <sup>50</sup>

These are high matters. Sacheverell may have been a mean man, but the debate he aroused was no mean argument.

Meanwhile, outside the doors of Parliament, a storm of popular passion was raging in minds quite incapable of distinguishing these nice points in the theory of the constitution. The lapse of time and the desire for peace had engendered a Tory reaction in the *Mobile Vulgus*, already called 'the Mob' for short. Tens of thousands, who in the uncared-for suburbs of London had never been taught any religion and never attended any divine service, were Protestants in their hatred of Popery and High Churchmen in their hatred of Dissent. The two frenzies, which in their true nature were anti-clerical rather than religious, held alternate sway. A few years ago the London mob had cheered De Foe in his pillory ; roared round the bonfires into which Pope, Devil and Pretender were pitched on November the Fifth ; and smashed the unilluminated windows of Papists. But now the time had come to burn the Dissenting chapels, thickly strewn over the metropolitan area outside the City to make good the paucity of parish churches in that dense hive of humanity.

The ill-timed impeachment of the High Church champion had let loose these passions on the Capital, and for the moment there was nothing to restrain the forces of destruction. 'The Watch' was a jest as old as Dogberry and Verges, unreformed since then. Indeed in the suburbs outside the City there was scarcely the pretence of a Watch, however feeble. By law the duty rested on all citizens in turn ; in practice it devolved on no one. In winter, when it was most required, it was argued that the obligation did not exist.<sup>51</sup> The prevalence of burglary by professional thieves and of street outrages by young bloods was the

Parish churches were thick inside the City but were sadly lacking outside its ancient boundaries, see *Blenheim*, p. 58. A population of some 400,000 was served by 28 parish churches, 18 chapels of ease and 88 Dissenting chapels.



talk of the Town. The householder could rely for his defence only on himself and his roused neighbours. Still less, in time of popular excitement, was there any force that could attempt to quell a mob, until the train-bands were called out in the City, or the Queen's Guard marched down from St. James's Palace. And on this occasion the precautions were taken dangerously late.

Ministers had neglected the warnings sent them by the Reverend Daniel Burgess, whose spirited and often amusing sermons were the delight of a large and wealthy Presbyterian congregation. On the night of March the First his well-appointed chapel was torn down by the mob, who made a glorious bonfire in the neighbouring Lincoln's Inn Fields of pulpit, pews, cushions and of the famous japped clock :

The faithful clock which oft before  
Had pointed to the pudding hour.

Half a dozen other meeting-houses went up in flame. The mansions of Whig Lords and Bishops were threatened by the insurgence of ever new mobs, who took complete possession of the town. At length the cry was raised to storm the Bank of England, the greatest Whig citadel of all, full to the roof, as the mob believed, of golden guineas. The Directors sent an urgent message to the Secretary of State. At last the authorities awoke to their duty.

The only available force was the Queen's Foot and Horse Guards, responsible for her person at St. James's. She met the hesitating suggestion of the Ministers half way, scouted the idea of danger to herself and insisted that horse and foot should march at once to quell the riots. Captain Horsey, commanding, would have been more at ease charging the French lines, for he declared that ' he ventured his neck by going upon verbal orders without anything in writing to warrant his march.' Supposing the Palace were attacked, during his absence, by one of the marauding bands caring more for plunder than politics !

All, however, went well. When the troops reached the scene of operations, the rioters, many of whom were

Burgess once told his flock that the Jews were called Israel-ites because the Lord did not wish his chosen people to be called Jacob-ites.

armed with swords, put up a show of resistance. But the Horse Guards, on their plump, bob-tailed chargers, broke in among them, slashed off one man's hand, cut down a good few more and put the rest to flight. Mob after mob was dispersed, and the City Militia took charge when the Guards returned to their duty round the Palace.

London had been saved from the fate that befell it seventy years later in the Lord George Gordon riots. A number of arrests were made, and next month several ring-leaders were tried for High Treason, convicted by a jury, and pardoned by the Queen.<sup>52</sup>

When at length the Lords retired to their Chamber to consider their verdict they were divided between alarm at the strength of feeling in the country and unwillingness to appear to approve, under mob violence, of Sacheverell's doctrine of Non-Resistance. They sought refuge in a middle course. The accused was voted guilty by 69 votes <sup>March 20</sup> to 52—seven bishops voting him guilty and six not <sup>1710</sup> guilty. He was then condemned to the mildest possible punishment—to abstain from preaching for three years ; his sermon was to be burnt by the hangman, but that ceremony would not impede its circulation.

In the debates and divisions by which their Lordships arrived at this result, a Middle Party, consisting of Shrewsbury, Somerset and Argyle, began to make its power felt as a new factor in British politics. These noblemen were determined to overthrow the existing Administration and obtain Peace for Europe. But they were not less staunch for the Hanoverian Succession. They hoped to secure both ends, as they ultimately did, greatly to the advantage of the State. Shrewsbury had for some time been in secret league with Harley, but it was a fact of great import that he now came out in public against the Junto and voted Sacheverell Not Guilty, though expressing his disagreement with his doctrines. Somerset voted neither way, but took, behind the scenes, an active part against the Ministry. Argyle, who sat in the House of Lords as Earl of Greenwich, made his weight felt. Harley sent an emissary to him who reported back as follows :

I have obeyed your commands to the Duke of Argyle ; he says he can't bring himself up entirely to vote for acquittal, because he has very freely and openly given his opinion that the sermon deserves censure. He thinks too that an absolute acquittal would rather tend to promote a high Tory scheme than to ruin the interest of the Junto ; besides he's afraid he should prejudice his interest in Scotland by it. However he thinks he may fairly oppose any excessive punishment that shall be proposed and he believes the Duke of Somerset may be brought to concur with him in that.

And a few days later :

He has now come to a resolution to oppose all sorts of punishment that shall be proposed by the Junto . . . I wonder the Queen does not give the Duke of Argyle the garter.

And so, by the time the Trial was finished, it was known that the great chief of the Campbells and of the Scottish Whigs had gone into opposition to the Government in league with Harley, although he voted for the Doctor's condemnation and in explaining his vote delivered himself of the Whig sentiment :

That the clergy in all ages have delivered up the rights and liberties of the people, and preached up the King's power in order to govern him ; and therefore they ought not to be suffered to meddle with politics.

Whether this applied to ' North Britain ' he did not say.<sup>53</sup>

The light sentence on the Doctor was celebrated by the Tories as a moral victory. An admirer had just given him the living of Selattyn on the Shropshire border of Wales, and his journey thither by way of Oxford and Worcester was organized as a triumphal progress, like a King's, or like Monmouth's of old. The gentlemen of each shire rode in troops beside his carriage ; when he came to a town the bells rang and the municipality received him with addresses and banquets. The more old-fashioned of his supporters feared it ' savoured of vanity and inordination ' in him to accept such honours. Meanwhile, all over England the Tories took heart, and the more violent began to insult Whigs and Dissenters when they met them in the streets and country lanes. Some great change was in the air.<sup>54</sup>

By favour of the good Queen a General Election was

hoped for soon. That summer the gentlemen and clergy in many shires chose the hottest candidates they could find, and undertook to support them not only against the Whigs but even against the sitting Tory member, if like Thomas Coke of Derbyshire he had done nothing to help the Doctor. The heat of a man's zeal for Sacheverell was made the test of his suitability as a candidate.

Moderate Tories began already to be frightened at the success of their own extremists. Although the course of the impeachment had been described as 'nuts for Mr. Harley,' a member of his family wrote in March :

This business in all probability will break the Whigs. My foolish fears are it will raise the Tories to their old madness. The extravagance of every party is to be dreaded. If the clergy take up their old way of railing in their pulpits, as some already practice, this will certainly be the consequence, to empty the churches and fill the meeting-house.<sup>55</sup>

Indeed the violence of the language that some of the clergy now used against Dissenters, as we read it in their sermons and pamphlets, is astonishing to modern ears. The outcry for the closing of the Dissenting schools and academies which Sacheverell had raised, was taken up with fury. If the Toleration Act was not to be repealed it was at least to be circumvented. In June the *Observer* wrote :

You may see by the address from Hereford that the pulse of the [Tory] Faction beats so high against the Toleration Act that they solicit Her Majesty to leave the Church in such a condition that they may not be distracted by what they call Schism, and arraign the poor little schools of the Dissenters in the language of that trumpeter of sedition, Sacheverell.\*

The forces that had been roused by the Impeachment of Sacheverell could not fail, with the Queen's help, to sweep on to victory and achieve part at least of their intents. And, by the good luck that so often blessed our history in those days, that part of their purposes which came to fruition

*Observer*, June 10, 1710. As an example of clerical language about Dissenters, exceeding others in impropriety and wit, but not in brutality, see Swift's remarks on the Sacheverell riots in his *Letter to the Bishop of St. Asaph* (1712), where he compares Dissenting chapels to houses of ill-fame.

was the best—to be rid of the Whig Ministry so as to make peace with France. A lesser convulsion would scarcely have sufficed for that end. But the other part of the Tory dream, not so easy to fulfil, was to crush out of the island every manifestation of religion and intellect that could not be fitted into the four walls of the Church of England ; to deny all varieties of religious experience ; to leave no place in the national life for heterodoxy, religious or irreligious, anywhere to subsist. In seeking to do that, the Tories were fighting against the future and against the true spirit of the Church of England herself.

Nevertheless this great upheaval left an important impress on our ecclesiastical polity. The Whigs never forgot the Sacheverell year and its consequences, and therefore, when they recovered power under the House of Hanover, they never provoked the churchmen or attempted to deprive the establishment of any of the formidable monopolies that had been left to it at the Revolution Settlement. The bulwarks of Church ascendancy remained until the first of them were removed during the ministry of Wellington and Peel.

And so the Sacheverell uprising, which might easily have ushered in a generation of civil strife, was overruled first to give us peace abroad, and ultimately to secure the observance of peace at home.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FALL OF THE WHIGS

The Queen uses the power of the Crown. Last scene between Anne and Sarah. Tactics of Anne, Harley and Shrewsbury bring about the gradual dissolution of the Ministry, April–September 1710. Godolphin dismissed. The General Election in October.

THE Sacheverell agitation in March 1710 indicated that the Whig Ministers had lost the confidence of the country. But they seemed to be safely entrenched behind their majority in both Houses of Parliament, at least until the General Election, which under the terms of the Triennial Act could be deferred till 1711 but no longer. And meanwhile no step would be taken in the direction of peace. It was during the months immediately following the impeachment of Sacheverell that the Whigs presented to Louis their extravagant terms at Gertruydenberg, through the agency of the unwilling Dutch. And after the breakdown of those negotiations, the letters of Somers and Godolphin show that both of them regarded it as axiomatic that the war must be continued till Spain could be won by the conquest of France.

But the day of peace was hastened and the wishes of the people forestalled by the action of the Crown. Anne took advantage of the Parliamentary recess to change her Ministers, not as a consequence of the General Election but as a preparation for holding it under Tory auspices.

At the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, custom still enabled the sovereign to dismiss Ministers in possession of a majority in Parliament without incurring any charge of unconstitutional action—such as was brought against

See Appendix B, pp. 326–330 below, nos. 1 and 3. See also Hardwicke's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 7. For Gertruydenberg see p. 32 above.

George III and again against William IV when they dismissed Whig Ministers under very similar conditions. By this bold, but then perfectly legitimate operation, Anne rendered a second service to her people, comparable to her dismissal of the High Church Ministers, who early in her reign had obstructed the conduct of the war. The overthrow of the Whig Cabinet to pave the way for peace, was the last great independent activity of her waning life. When, four years later, she handed the White Staff to Shrewsbury on her deathbed, at the unanimous request of the Privy Council, it did not imply so personal and active a choice on her part as these earlier instances of policy.

In 1710 the Queen was encouraged to change her Ministers by Abigail, Harley and Shrewsbury, who were daily about her person after her breach with Sarah. And the same trio arranged with her the cautious stages by which she was to part with her too masterful servants, lest Marlborough, Godolphin and the Whigs should make a united stand at any one point and threaten to resign *en masse*. The gradualness of the process of dismissal, spread from April to September, and accompanied at each step by reassuring promises to the remaining Ministers, was a tactical device, but it also represented the genuine 'moderation' of Shrewsbury, Harley and the Queen herself. 'Tactics' are often most successful when those who practise to deceive are only half conscious of their own hypocrisy. The Queen and her unofficial advisers did not know precisely how far they wished to move along the path of reaction. They wished to be quit of the Junto, but not to fall under the dictation of the Tory zealots.

The ideal of a 'Queen's Ministry above party' was cherished by Harley and Shrewsbury as well as by Anne herself. Like Marlborough and Godolphin before them, they hoped to govern the land by favour of the Queen and by the goodwill of the many moderate men among her subjects. They intended to lean on the Tories as much perhaps as Godolphin had leant on the Whigs five years back, but no more. As late as September, a month after the dismissal of Godolphin, Harley wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

As soon as the Queen has shewn strength and ability to give the law to both sides, then will moderation be truly shewn in the exercise of power without regard to parties only.

In writing thus he was not conscious of deceiving Newcastle, for he was also deceiving himself. But all these nice calculations and balancings were swept away by the catastrophic results of the General Election in October, which bound the Queen and Harley to the chariot wheels of the High Tories, left Shrewsbury, Newcastle and Somerset in the air, and proved once more that Parliamentary Government could only mean Party Government.<sup>56</sup>

The last meeting in this life of the Queen and the Duchess, on April 6, 1710, formed a fitting prelude to the removal of Sarah's political allies from power. It was a painful and needless scene, for the breach was complete already. Anne had wished never to see her Mistress of the Robes again; and Sarah, advised by her husband, had acquiesced in the separation as final. Unfortunately, she was warned by a friend at Court that certain untrue tales—apparently of her use of very disrespectful language about the Queen—were being circulated in the Palace and believed by Anne. To contradict these slanders, she forced herself into the presence, in spite of the royal command to write what she had to say: she declared it was impossible to commit to paper such delicate concerns. To her flood of passionate eloquence, Anne replied by repeating over and over again, 'You may put it in writing,' and 'You desired no answer and you shall have none.' At length Sarah's nervous system gave way, and she was seized by a fit of hysterical weeping which her old friend surveyed unmoved. In some respects the Duchess was the more finely constituted nature, or the weaker vessel, of the two.

A whole generation later, Marlborough's widow told to a grinning world the story of this scene, with a candour that preferred truth to her own dignity, and an unreserve that could not be surpassed by any of the memoir writers of our own day.<sup>57</sup>

In the middle of April the first overt step was taken by the conspirators—if the Queen and her council of the back-stairs



may be called so without disrespect. The moment was opportune, for Marlborough was away among diplomats and generals at the Hague, and Godolphin among squires and jockeys on the Heath. The Queen, made bold April by their absence, sent for the Marquis of Kent, the 13-14 least important and able of the Whig Ministers, 1710 purchased his resignation with a Dukedom, and made Shrewsbury Lord Chamberlain in his stead.

In other circumstances the change would have signified little, for Shrewsbury was a Whig in principle, if no longer in party connection. But *ex pede Herculem*. It was, as Marlborough wrote, the first hole in the dyke, and who could stop the flood of waters piled up behind? Moreover, all the world clearly saw Harley's hand at work. Godolphin from Newmarket wrote a letter of strong remonstrance to the Queen, pointing out that Shrewsbury had voted against the Ministry at Sacheverell's trial, and complaining on constitutional grounds of

Your Majesty's having taken a resolution of so much consequence to all your affairs both at home and abroad, without acquainting the Duke of Marlborough and me with it till after you had taken it.

The alarm and outcry in the political world was such that for two months the conspirators made no further move, and during those two months the negotiations with France at Gertruydenberg came to their appointed end in failure. In the ministerial discussions Shrewsbury spoke in vain against the unwillingness of his colleagues to offer reasonable terms of peace. None the less, he worked hard to placate their anger at his presence in their midst. Godolphin and the Whigs were far from being persuaded by his blandishments, but their own mutual suspicions prevented agreement on any united action to coerce the Queen. The accomplished fact of Shrewsbury's intrusion was accepted. The storm it had aroused died down.<sup>58</sup>

It is the first step that counts. Impunity made the plotters more bold and recruited their ranks. In May the proud and timorous Duke of Somerset was put in touch

\* In *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 540, is a characteristic letter of Mrs. Masham's to Harley, asking for an appointment to meet him secretly, *contrary to the Queen's orders*. Apparently Anne thought the useful Abigail somewhat too busy.

with Harley, and in June and July held a series of meetings with him, conducted with all the clandestine pomp of conspiracy so dear to them both. The Duke would only come to Harley's house in a sedan chair with the curtains drawn, which the porter had strict orders to admit unexamined through the hall door.

In June, largely at the instigation of Somerset, the next blow was struck. Sunderland was dismissed, and was succeeded by the Tory Lord Dartmouth. As  
 June 14 member of the Junto and as son-in-law to Marl-  
 1710 borough, Sunderland was the hyphen uniting the two parts of the ministerial alliance. If the other members of the Cabinet accepted his removal, they themselves were doomed. But though their protests were loud, their action was nil. One by one they paid their visits of congratulation to Dartmouth as the new Secretary of State. All they could agree on among themselves was a round-robin to implore Marlborough not to resign his command of the army because of his kinsman's disgrace.<sup>59</sup>

From this moment forward the retreat became a rout, everyone running separately for cover, or secretly intriguing for terms with the victors. Somers dreamt of forming a new Ministry with Harley and Shrewsbury by sacrificing Godolphin. Marlborough and Godolphin clung to office, the Treasurer from official habit and the soldier in the hope of reaching Paris in spite of the troubles at home.

Before we condemn as contemptible the failure of the Ministry to defend itself or even to fall with dignity by a unanimous resignation, it must be remembered that the modern theory and practice of the unity of the Cabinet was then only in process of evolution. There was no recognized duty of Ministers to protect one another and stand or fall together. They were the Queen's servants and she could pick and choose them as she wished. The only principle of cohesion in the Cabinet was derived from Party allegiance, and that bond did not include Marlborough and Godolphin.

\* *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 542, 545, 553; see also pp. 548 and 553 for the Duke of Argyle, who could take no direct part in politics this summer owing to his absence abroad in the field. But he warmly approved the changes at home, and was getting more and more personally bitter in his expressions against Marlborough.

Moreover, since the Whig Shrewsbury and Somerset and the Moderate Harley were conducting the changes, Ministers hoped, by a compromise with them, to avert the dreaded General Election.<sup>80</sup>

It was on August 8 that the dismissal of Godolphin gave the *coup de grâce* to the Ministry called by his name. It had governed England for eight years. At first Tory, then neutral, and finally Whig, Godolphin's Ministry had done a great work. It had completed the tasks of William III ; it had liberated Europe from the power of France, joined England and Scotland in a Union that has proved permanent, raised the island over which Anne reigned to a height of glory, and set it on the road of immense future prosperity and influence. The Ministry, like all things mortal, had served its uses and it was time for it to go. But it is impossible not to regret that the Queen, who owed her present greatness and future fame in so very large a measure to Godolphin and his kinsman, chose to dismiss the Treasurer as a squire would discharge a cheating bailiff. Anne treated Godolphin even worse at parting than Victoria treated Gladstone. She refused to see him at all ; she sent him no message of kindness or gratitude, but merely an order to break the White Staff of his office.\*

On such an occasion it would have been well if the sovereign, however much displeased with the subject's conduct at the time, had remembered old and long service, and in this case still older private friendship. Queen Anne was quite as ungrateful as any of her Stuart ancestry who have been charged with that fault. She has been called stupid : she was not stupid in the policies she adopted, but there is a certain stupidity in her personal relations with anyone against whom she had taken umbrage. She could not rise out of the circumstances of the moment as poor mortals should when saying a long farewell.

\* See Godolphin's letter to her on this occasion, Appendix B, no. 2, p. 327 below. Sarah says Anne sent her message of dismissal to the Treasurer 'by a liveryman,' but Dartmouth says by Godolphin's friend, Mr. Smith. *Burnet*, VI, p. 9 note ; *Coxe*, Chap. XCIV ; *Conduct*, p. 260. A version that to some extent reconciles the two stories is given by Swift in his letter to Archbishop King, Sept. 9, 1710, *Swift Letters*, I, p. 194.

Even after the fall of Godolphin the Whigs still hoped, though with growing desperation, to make their own peace with the new lords of the hour.

On August 10, two days after the Treasurer's dismissal, Halifax wrote to congratulate Harley as the successor in charge of the nation's finance, which had once been the writer's own province.\* Somers appeared to regard Godolphin's fall as a circumstance wherein he might hope to find his own advantage. On August 5 Harley wrote to Newcastle :

Lord Somers is so full of himself and his own schemes that he would have Lord Dartmouth and myself assist him in serving his revenge on Godolphin, and his ambition in the other matter, and then he would be at liberty to act as he pleases. But I am to go this night to the Queen and I hope the chimerical matter will be at an end.<sup>61</sup>

The Whigs were soon undeceived, and after the head of the Government had fallen, were one by one removed from their posts and replaced by Tories.

Yet even now Harley desired not High Toryism but those moderate policies, by the promise of which he had drawn Shrewsbury, Somerset and Newcastle into the plot to overthrow Godolphin and the Junto. On this basis Defoe, who had been serving the Whig Ministry, returned to his old allegiance to Harley as the true 'moderate,' declaring unabashed that 'Providence seems to cast me back upon you and lays me at your door.' Till eclipsed by the sudden rise of Swift in the following winter, Defoe was the most formidable pamphleteer and journalist of the age. And he was Harley's link with the Puritan parties in the island. In September he was fee'd and sent back to his former hunting-ground in Scotland to plead Harley's cause there

\* *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 560. Harley was made Chancellor of the Exchequer in August 1710, and was promoted to be Lord Treasurer only in the following May, the Lord Treasurership having remained vacant during the winter. It had been discussed by the Queen's secret advisers in July whether Shrewsbury should succeed Godolphin, but he had declined: 'I have ten strong reasons, every one strong enough to hinder my doing it, but that of engaging in an employment I do not in the least understand is in itself sufficient.' Shrewsbury was not a financier. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 198, and Turberville's *Shrewsbury*, p. 179. When he accepted the Treasurership at the Queen's deathbed in 1714, it was to govern in the brief crisis and so secure the peaceful accession of King George.

among his old friends, the Presbyterians of Edinburgh, and allay their very natural fears as to what a High Church Ministry would mean for 'North Britain.'<sup>62</sup>

On the day Godolphin fell, Harley expounded his 'moderate' programme in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle :

The Queen is assured you will approve her proceedings, which are directed to the sole aim of making an honourable and safe peace, securing her allies, reserving the liberty and property of the subject, and the indulgence to Dissenters in particular, and to perpetuate this by really securing the succession of the House of Hanover.

And a month later he had the temerity to say to Lord Chancellor Cowper that 'a Whig game was intended at bottom.'<sup>63</sup>

Harley desired to keep Cowper in office because the Queen liked him personally, and because he had never been identified with the Junto. He had even criticized his colleagues' obstinacy in refusing to make peace, and if he could be induced to retain the Lord Chancellorship when all the other Whigs had been dismissed, he would serve to uphold moderation in the new Cabinet against the oncoming flood of High Toryism. But Cowper was too honest and too shrewd to accept such a position, which, as he said, he would be forced to surrender the moment 'any Tory of interest would press for my place.' Though Cowper was singularly free from the prejudices of party, he understood better than Harley the inexorable laws under which party government would have in future to be conducted in England. Five times the Queen refused to accept his resignation of the seals, but he insisted day after day, until at last on September 23 she took them back with many expressions of regret and personal esteem. With that, the process of exterminating the old Ministry was completed at last.

It is Cowper who deserves the reputation of the wise and honest Whig which has, with less reason, become traditionally attached to Somers. He had urged reasonable terms of peace with France, yet he, almost alone among the

<sup>62</sup> *Cowper*, pp. 42-47. Walpole, already dismissed from the Secretaryship at War, lingered on in the subordinate administrative post of Treasurer of the Navy, till in January 1711 he was dismissed from that also.

Whig chiefs, continued to visit the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough when they were being violently attacked and slandered by the Court, the Tories and the base tribe of pamphleteers.

My Lord Cowper [wrote Sarah], whom I likewise brought in to be Chancellor, was the only Whig that behaved himself like a gentleman to me. He owned me when I was under a hurdle.<sup>64</sup>

The change in the personnel of the Ministry, though it had taken five months to accomplish, had been very rapid according to the ideas and practice of the age. It had taken five years to extrude all the Tories from Godolphin's Cabinet. But Swift was able to write in November to Stella :

The Queen passed by us with all Tories about her ; not one Whig, and I have seen her without one Tory.

Marlborough still remained in command of the army. The Whigs urged him to stay there and conquer France. And the new Ministers had no wish to precipitate the inevitable quarrel with the Allies or to relax the Duke's pressure on the enemy until they had made their own arrangements with Torcy for the peace.<sup>65</sup>

Harley's 'moderation' took effect in shielding many magistrates and civil servants from the clamour of partisans demanding the spoils for the victors. The same clamour had been raised eight years before, when the Moderate Godolphin had saved the Treasury officials from dismissal. In 1710 Harley repeated this work of mercy and wisdom and again guarded the nascent Treasury traditions, and the permanency of the Civil Service, from the blows of party warfare. Neither the great William Lowndes nor any of his Treasury clerks appear to have been dismissed, though they had been closely associated with the fallen Ministers.<sup>66</sup>

Harley indeed had reason to walk warily in finance and take the best advice he could get : for the national balance sheet told an alarming tale of debt and deficit ; and the Governor of the Bank of England and other big City men were trying to frighten the Queen back into the arms of the

Whigs by declaring that 'credit' would not survive a change of government.<sup>67</sup>

Tory candidates, with their eyes on the coming General Election, wrote to Harley demanding new Lords Lieutenant, Justices of the Peace and 'Excise and Custom House officers, whose influence on Boroughs is greater than can be imagined.' But these expectations were only partially fulfilled.<sup>68</sup>

The change of Ministry, effected by the Queen's will, had preceded, not followed, the General Election. This was fully in accordance with the constitutional ideas and practice of the age. The question whether or not there should be an immediate Dissolution of Parliament had agitated political circles all summer scarcely less than the changes in the Cabinet. The Whigs had kept on terms with Harley and Shrewsbury in the hope of averting the Dissolution, which was loudly demanded by the Tory rank and file. The extent of the changes in the Ministry determined the issue. As Sir Thomas Hanmer wrote to Matt Prior in June :

A new Ministry with an old Parliament will be worse than the Gospel absurdity of a piece of new cloth in an old garment, or new wine in old bottles.

But it was not till the middle of September that the decision was taken. On the 14th Harley wrote to Newcastle :

I send this flying packet to acquaint [you] that the Queen is resolved in a few days to have a Dissolution, it being resolved in her own breast, and indeed it is impossible to carry on Parliament without intolerable heats.<sup>69</sup>

When the Dissolution was announced, public enthusiasm for Sacheverell was still unabated.\* To speak against the idol of the hour required some courage. Kennett, the antiquarian Dean of Peterborough, had written a

Swift wrote to Stella a year later, in August 1711 : 'Sacheverell hates the new Ministry mortally, and they hate him and pretend to despise him. They will not allow him to have been the occasion of the late change ; at least some of them will not ; but my Lord Keeper owned it to me t'other day.' The statesmen who competed for the friendship of Swift disliked the notion of owing their power to so foolish a fellow as Sacheverell.

pamphlet against the Doctor's famous sermon, and had more recently refused to sign a Tory address to the Queen. The Rector of Whitechapel, accordingly, had an altar-piece painted and set up in his church, representing the Last Supper, with Kennett as Judas, and the words *The Dean, Traitor* inscribed underneath. Multitudes came daily to the church to admire this masterpiece of piety and wit. The Rector, it was believed, had wished Bishop Burnet to figure as Judas, but the painter, fearing prosecution for *scandalum magnatum*, would rise no higher than a Dean. After a while Compton, Bishop of London, ordered the picture to be removed, but it is said to have reappeared over the high altar of St. Albans. In any case, Kennett was consoled with the Bishopric of Peterborough, when George I came over and 'moderate men looked big' once more.<sup>70</sup>

At the polls in October 1710 the reunited Tory party swept down their antagonists, as easily as eight years before in the summer after the Queen's accession. The desire for peace, and the intensity of the passion for High Church and Sacheverell, would together have sufficed to defeat an established Ministry at the polls. But the authority of government and the glamour of the Queen's name were now on the popular side, and the large class of persons who, alike from public and private motives, made a practice of supporting the government of the day, were all for the Tory candidates. The mob was violent and the atmosphere of unanimity was infectious. The clergy electioneered with a zeal that even they had never displayed before. It was a particularly drunken election. Defoe in the *Review* declared that the Tories 'first made the poor freeholders drunk and then told them to vote for the Church,' but it is not likely the Whigs were far behind. 'I am always drunk for a week at every election and I won't vote for the man who won't make me drunk,' one honest miller declared.

Harley had succeeded in dividing the Presbyterian and 'orthodox' Nonconformist vote in some constituencies by his promise to respect the Toleration Act, though efforts to detach the Quakers, Baptists and Huguenots from the Whig cause failed.<sup>71</sup> Some of the more country-keeping Whigs appear not to have resented the turning out of the



Junto in the name of 'moderation'; Yorkshire squire Molesworth wrote to Harley during the election :

My principles are the very same they were from the first moment you knew me, and I cannot be persuaded that you and the Duke of Shrewsbury, after having rescued the nation from the tyranny of one set of men can be for subjecting it to another of priests.

But ere long Molesworth, like the Presbyterian waverers, was reduced to despair by the high-Tory policy of the new government.<sup>72</sup>

Even before the election, those Whig grandees who had conspired with Harley to oust the Junto felt uneasy at the consequences of their work. The Duke of Newcastle hedged, putting in two Tories for Boroughbridge, and 'two sworn junto men' for Aldborough, another of his Yorkshire pocket boroughs.<sup>73</sup> This did not prevent him from taking Cabinet office in the new Ministry, as Lord Privy Seal. The Duke of Somerset used his whole interest for the Whigs, but his candidates in the Wiltshire boroughs were defeated by popular enthusiasm for Sacheverell, since 'His Grace was against the Doctor.' Somerset came up to the new Parliament diminished in power and credit, despised by both parties as a man on whom no one could depend, 'rather a ministry-spoiler than a ministry-maker,' and, in spite of his pretensions to Roman virtue, 'a false mean-spirited knave.'<sup>74</sup> Shrewsbury, on the other hand, stood firm by Harley in the elections, and hoped so to consolidate his power as to be able to hold his own as a moderate Whig in a Tory Ministry—a game he played not without some measure of success.

In all parts of the country Whig strongholds were stormed. The squires of Kent still stood by 'the good old cause,' but the clergy and freeholders beat them and returned two Tories for the shire.<sup>75</sup> Elsewhere the country gentlemen joined the clergy in leading the Tory cry. In Derbyshire the squirearchy, in their zeal for Sacheverell, overbore the yeomen and ousted the Moderate Tory member, Thomas Coke, on the charge of being lukewarm in the cause of 'the Doctor.' Coke found a safe seat in the rotten borough of Grampound.<sup>76</sup>

Out of the ninety-two county members elected for England and Wales, not a dozen were Whigs. And the Boroughs were swept by a wave only one degree less overwhelming. The regions where the losing party held its ground to some extent, by the help of lordly borough owners, were Yorkshire, Cumberland and Northumberland, Beds\* and Bucks, and the close Cinque Ports.

Addison's great friends returned him for Malmesbury. 'I believe if he had a mind to be chosen King,' wrote Swift to Stella, 'he would hardly be refused.'

Among the Cornish pocket boroughs, thanks to the local influence of Godolphin and of Bishop Trelawny who still adhered to the party that had translated him to Winchester, the Whigs kept a dozen out of some forty members; they had secured only one in the first election of the Queen's reign when Godolphin and Trelawny had both been in the Tory interest.

But in the Boroughs with anything like a popular vote, where the Whigs used often to do well, they were on this occasion smitten hip and thigh. The City of London returned four Tories. At Westminster, General Stanhope, the hero of Minorca, Almenara and Saragossa, serving in the Peninsula on what then looked like a victorious campaign, was, in spite of the Huguenot and Dissenting vote, defeated by the Tories after a most bitter election, in which the soldier absent in the field was freely bespattered with the mud of personal slander, and his supporters subjected to mob violence. Even in war time, popular sentiment had much less regard for soldiers than it has in our own day.<sup>77</sup>

When the last polls were announced, England and Wales were represented by about 320 Tories, 150 Whigs and 40 'doubtful.' The Whigs were beaten by more than two to one. The 45 Scottish members showed at least a fair proportion of Whigs, and brought to Westminster a new element of avowed Jacobites, for beyond the Border there were no Tories of the English type.

\* So strong was territorial influence that in Bedfordshire, where Lord Russell and another Whig were returned for the county, the majority of the Church clergy, led by Archdeacon Frank at the instigation of Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, voted for the Whigs and the House of Russell, even in this election. *Wake MSS.* Professor Norman Sykes pointed this out to me.

A marked feature of the Parliament was the increasingly rigid division of almost all the English members between Whig and Tory. There was a great diminution in the class of members independent of either faction. In 1705 Harley had spoken of Whigs, Tories, and 'a hundred Queen's servants,' but there was no such century in the Parliament of 1710. Party was swallowing up every other kind of allegiance.<sup>78</sup>

## CHAPTER V

### DECISION REACHED IN SPAIN

Some consequences of Poltava. Marlborough's indecisive campaign of 1710.  
Last phase of the Peninsular War: Stanhope and Starhemberg; The  
flash of success and final catastrophe—Almenara, Saragossa, Brihuega.  
Death of Emperor Joseph and its effect on the question of Spanish  
Succession.

WHILE the decisive result of the General Election rendered it possible for the new Ministers to set about treating for peace with every chance of overcoming the resistance of the Whigs, the disastrous outcome of the Peninsular War that same winter made it easier for them to expedite an arrangement with Louis by conceding that Spain should be left to Philip. Nor had Marlborough's operations in the summer, on the Netherlands frontier of France, done more than prepare the way for the advance on Paris, to be executed next year, some time, or never.

When the preparations for the year's campaign had been on foot early in 1710, the allied plans had been disturbed and endangered by reactions consequent on the overthrow of the Swedish power by Russia the year before. Charles XII, bereft of his army on the field of Poltava, had fled south with the Cossack Hetman Mazeppa, of romantic equestrian fame, leaving his Swedish dominions open to the revenge of all those neighbour Princes over whom he had so long been riding rough-shod. Augustus, Elector of Saxony, recovered his Polish crown. The rulers of Denmark, Prussia and Hanover turned their eyes from the war in the West to the war in the North. There was imminent danger that all these jealous monarchs would simultaneously withdraw their 60,000 men from the various French fronts, to fight out their rival claims in a general scramble for Charles XII's lost inheritance. Queen Anne's Whig

Ministers, then still in power, feared the departure of the German and Danish troops from the West and feared also the dismemberment of the Swedish kingdom, which would overturn England's policy of the Balance of Power in the Baltic. Our diplomats patched up a Convention to avert the spread of hostilities ; it was the best that the Swedes could hope for in the circumstances, and their Regency made haste to accept it.<sup>79</sup>

March  
1710

Meanwhile Marlborough, by the help of this Convention on Baltic affairs, had succeeded in taking the field against Villars in strong force. But the French Marshal had lost none of the caution which seasoned his more dashing qualities. The Duke could not bring him to battle, and the net outcome of the campaign of 1710 was the capture, by the Allies, after costly sieges, of the four fortress towns of Douai, Béthune, St. Venant and Aire. These fortresses gave Marlborough a better control of the upper reaches of the Scarpe and Lys, completing the river system by which his supplies could be brought up from Holland to the front in France. This would render more easy his next year's progress. But his design for the capture of the Channel ports by co-operation with the fleet had not even been attempted ; and between him and Paris still lay various obstacles, including yet another line of inundations and earthworks which Villars prepared to replace the lost lines at La Bassée, and called by the boastful title of *Ne plus ultra*.

April-  
Nov.  
1710

The rate of Marlborough's advance had been slowing down each year since Oudenarde, and though he might yet reach Paris some day, the English people were tired of waiting, and the new English Ministry, for a variety of reasons, domestic and European, had no desire to see him occupy the enemy's capital. Such a consummation, even if it were practicable, would open out more questions than it would solve.\*

I do not know of any document in which either Harley or St. John expressed this view, but I think it is a fair conclusion that they held it. Their colleague and representative Lord Strafford wrote it in clear words to the Electress Sophia from Utrecht on August 27, 1712 (*B.M. Stowe MSS. 224, ff. 303-305*) : ' Nothing less was to satisfy than going to Paris, to serve, I suppose, the French King and his Grandson as the King of Sweden did King Augustus ; to dethrone them both. This was carrying things much farther than the balance of Europe demanded.'

If the outcome of Marlborough's campaign still left it doubtful whether or not the Allies would ever pitch their tents in the gardens of Versailles, a military decision was reached that year in Spain.

The last phase of the Peninsular War had opened in the summer of 1710 under changed conditions. The French troops had been withdrawn by Louis, partly to protect his own threatened frontier, partly to persuade the Allies that he meant what he said when he promised no longer to support his grandson's cause. But the grandson was now better able to look after himself. All Spain, save Catalonia—the exception that proved the rule—had accepted Philip as King, and as the nation's leader against foreign invasion. Outside the Catalan province, the Allies held no fortress or foot of ground beyond Gibraltar's Rock.

In July 1710, therefore, the Bourbon field army consisted entirely of Spaniards and a few Walloons in the Spanish service, in all some 5000 good horse and 15,000 indifferent foot. Then, as in the days of Wellington, the Spanish infantry, so courageous behind walls or in the ambushes of guerilla war, would not submit to the discipline necessary to translate them into regiments fit for the field. This army was under the command of the Marquis de Villadarias, the Spanish General who had unsuccessfully besieged Gibraltar five years back.

The Allies in Catalonia had a field army slightly exceeding that of the enemy in numbers, but no longer containing so large a proportion of red-coats as in former years. The British troops in the Peninsula had wasted away with disease and hardship, and their ranks had not of late been replenished from home. General Stanhope was kept miserably short both of money and of men from England. On the other hand, Marlborough had sent him Palatines and Hessians who would otherwise have been under the Duke's orders in Flanders.<sup>80</sup> And the Emperor Joseph, secure now in his Italian possessions, and able at last to pay attention to the fortunes of his brother Charles in Spain, sent over considerable Austrian forces to his support. When, therefore, the Allies took the field on the Catalan border in the summer of 1710, they consisted of some 14,000 Germans, 4000

English, 1400 Dutch, 1400 Portuguese in English pay, and over 3000 Spanish Carlists.

Still, as in the days of Peterborough and his rivals, the movements of the army were determined not by any one General, but by a confusion of discordant advice. King Charles presided uneasily over an international Council of War, divided between the factions of Starhemberg and Stanhope. The Austrian Field-Marshal was capable but unadventurous. Stanhope was a fiery and chivalrous fighter, a fine type of English executive officer, but liable in matters of the higher command to be carried away by the ardour of his temperament, and not understanding on the spot, any better than Marlborough understood far away, the limitations imposed on the Allies by the profound hostility of the population of Castile. By sheer force of character, and by his position as representative of England, Stanhope on one occasion after another beat down Starhemberg's resistance to the forward policy, and led the Allies on, twice to victory and finally to disaster.

In July Stanhope urged invasion of Aragon and battle with Villadarias. His instructions from home ordered that full advantage should be taken of the departure of the French. He told Charles that he would never be King of Spain if he lingered on the borders of Catalonia, and that the Spaniards could easily be defeated if they were attacked before the French came back over the Pyrenees. So far he was right, as the event proved. He dragged Charles and Starhemberg into battle, first at Almenara.\* In a letter to his friend, Robert Walpole, Secretary at War, he gives a confidential account of the circumstances bringing on this action :

Three days after the date of my last to you which went by Mr. Craggs, our succours joined us about nine in the morning, upon which, a Council being called, it was strenuously urged by the English, Dutch and Palatines to march immediately on Lerida, in order to force the enemies to a battle by cutting them off from that place. But the King and Marshal [Starhemberg] as strongly opposed and showed themselves determined not to venture anything. . . . Our next thought was to cross the bridge at Balaguer, to which purpose

\* *For the war in Spain, see Map of Europe at end of volume.*

I was detached. I marched at midnight and took post on the Aragon side of the Noguera at six in the morning of [July] the 27th. . . . The enemy came up apace and formed before me about 15 squadrons, which I was going to attack when the Marshal came up and prevented me, seeming still determined not to hazard anything. Both armies continued marching to get up, and, about six, all our infantry had passed the river. . . . The Marshall was pressed several times to attack the enemies' horse which was before us, their foot marching at a great distance behind them. About six the enemies having got up with all their horse, they marched several squadrons down a little hill which was between us. Upon which we all cried out 'Shame,' and I did earnestly press the King we might have leave to dislodge them, which was at last complied with but not till sunset.

Thus at length unleashed, Stanhope, with eight English squadrons, four Dutch and six of German Palatines, dashed at the forty-two squadrons of Spanish cavalry, and  
 July 27 after a severe struggle drove them off the field. In  
 1710 this action of Almenara, as fine an achievement of the British cavalry as any at Balaclava or Waterloo, Stanhope killed a Spanish General with his own hand ; his modesty forbade him to mention the classical incident in his dispatches, but it became the talk of the Town.

The Spanish foot, many of whom were still straggling up in column through the broken ground, were not yet in battle array ; on witnessing the defeat of their horse, they fled without more ado. Thanks to Starhemberg's long delays, the fall of night saved King Philip's army from complete destruction, and he himself just escaped capture.<sup>81</sup>

The defeat at Almenara induced Philip to change his Generals. He replaced Villadarias by the Marquis de Bay, but he had no real confidence in any Spanish commander, and implored his grandfather again to supply him with a French Marshal. Louis felt himself released by the breakdown of the negotiations at Gertruydenberg and free to interfere once more in Spain. He therefore dispatched Vendôme, but before he could reach the Pyrenees the Marshal was met by the news of a second and more serious disaster that had befallen the unaided forces of King Philip.<sup>82</sup>



The Spaniards had retreated from Almenara, through Lerida and along the south bank of the Ebro as far as Saragossa, leaving north Aragon undefended. Again yielding to Stanhope's pressure, Starhemberg had reluctantly seized his chance and occupied Aragon between Ebro and Pyrenees. He was even induced to approach Saragossa from the North. But he decided not to cross the Ebro, because the enemy's army was on the other side. For the same reason Stanhope had come to the opposite determination, and showed the Allies the way over the river. He then proceeded 'contrary to orders' to approach the enemy so close that Starhemberg was obliged to march up to his support.\*

There, almost in sight of the anxious citizens crowding the walls of Saragossa, a battle was fought to the south of the town, on hilly ground sprinkled with vineyards and groves of olive. The modern combatants advanced against each other across the dried bed of a torrent called, after some old slaughter of the Moors, the *Barranca de los Muertos*, now to be once more a 'ravine of the dead.'

The Spaniards were half beaten before the fighting began, for they believed that the Marquis de Bay was betraying them by accepting battle. The story ran round the camp fires that secret orders had come from France for an engagement in which the Spanish forces should be destroyed, with a view to giving King Philip a good excuse to obey his grandfather and abandon the contest for the crown. This wild legend had demoralized whole regiments, and not a few officers deserted on the eve of action. The Allies, on

\* Stanhope's part in bringing on the battle of Saragossa is made clear by General Carpenter's letter to Walpole on the evening after the affair (*Somerville's Queen Anne*, p. 639): 'This business and that of Almenara is entirely owing to Mr. Stanhope, both for pressing in council and indeed forcing our march forward in order to action, and for the execution his resolution carried the day. All her majesty's troops did well and the officers, but no pen can do justice to Mr. Stanhope, having hectored the court and Marshal into these marches and actions . . . and now passed the Ebro with 2000 horse and marched so near the enemy here that the Marshal could not avoid bringing up the army to him, which was absolutely the occasion of the battle; his march so near them was contrary to orders.' This confirms the more general statement in Stanhope's dispatch, printed in *Mahon*, Ap., p. cxvi. *Parnell* seems as unfair to Stanhope as to Peterborough.

the other hand, were in high spirits, and though they were starving for want of supplies, the English marched into battle with a courage which Stanhope's infectious energy had done much to instil into their hearts. There were about 20,000 on either side, though the Allies were weaker in horse.

Starhemberg, when once he found himself committed beyond avoidance to a battle, had drawn up the army with ability and care. The main struggle was on the Allied left wing, where the best of the Spanish cavalry were encountered by Stanhope. He had 'interlined' his squadrons with four battalions of English foot, and by that means was just able to resist and ultimately break the repeated charges of the Spanish horse. But a part of the enemy's cavalry penetrated his line; they pursued too far, falling upon the reserve train of artillery, while behind their backs Stanhope and Starhemberg advanced and won the day. The allied centre and right had an easy task. The Spanish infantry soon broke or surrendered. Over five thousand were made prisoners, about three thousand were killed or wounded, and many dispersed to their homes. Less than half the army rallied next week to King Philip's standards. Almanza had been avenged by a victory no less complete.

Saragossa received King Charles with some show of enthusiasm. In parts of the province of Aragon the Carlist cause might yet be galvanized into life by victory, but nowhere in Castile.

Stanhope's lieutenants, Carpenter, Wills and Wade, afterwards famous in the annals of anti-Jacobite warfare and Highland road-making at home, had contributed much to the success of the day. Their Chief was the hero of the battle which, but for his enterprise, would never have been fought. Saragossa was the crown of Stanhope's military career. If he had fallen in the hour of victory beside the *Barranca de los Muertos*, he might be remembered to-day as Wolfe and Moore are remembered. He survived, to lose at a single blow his reputation as a General, and to earn another, more enduring, as one of the best Foreign Ministers who ever led England and guided Europe in the paths of peace.<sup>83</sup>

A week after the victory beneath the walls of Saragossa, a Council of War was held in the town to decide between the rival policies of Stanhope and Starhemberg.

Aug. 27  
1710

The English General urged the immediate occupation of Madrid to end the war at a stroke. He assumed, rashly as the event proved, that the Allied army in Portugal would march to join them in the capital of Spain. The bold plan he propounded had behind it the authority of Marlborough, who, never having fought in the Peninsula, never fully understood the local peculiarities of its warfare. A year back Marlborough had written to Godolphin :

The reduction of Spain will never in my opinion be effected until the army in Catalonia and that in Portugal be in such a condition as that they may both march the nearest way to Madrid ; for if we shall think of forming projects for the reducing of the provinces of Spain, the war is likely to last much longer than I shall live.<sup>84</sup>

As Stanhope's forward policy had been vindicated by success on every occasion in the disputes of the last two months, the majority of the Council of War took his side in the fatal decision of August 27. Indeed Starhemberg's Fabian tactics went much against the humour of the English, Dutch and Portuguese officers : they were heartily sick of Spain, and they leapt at the prospect of being so soon and so well quit of the ill-omened land. Their impatience was shared by the Spanish Carlists at the Council Board, who, like partisans and exiles in all ages, deluded themselves as to the real feelings of their fellow-countrymen.

It was, therefore, in vain that Starhemberg reminded the Council that the experiment of occupying Madrid had been tried in 1706 with disastrous results and that Castile's willingness to submit was not to be judged from that of Aragon. The heart of Spain, the Austrian Marshal believed, could only be reduced to yield by a long process of isolation and blockade. His plan was to occupy all Aragon and Navarre ; to hold the Passes at either end of the Pyrenees so that no French force could enter Spain ; to rouse once more the Carlists of Valencia and the eastern seaboard ; to get in touch with the forces in Portugal and

Gibraltar and induce them to occupy Galicia in the north and Andalusia in the south ; to take Cadiz and so control the trade of Spain. When Castile had been isolated by these measures, Madrid might at last submit. And, if not, Charles at the worst would be able at the next peace conference to bargain at advantage, with half Spain in his hand.

It might have been hard work to accomplish the whole of this programme, but the advice to block the Pyrenean Passes and not to invade Castile was right. Unfortunately, Starhemberg's policy of caution had always proved wrong in the disputes of that summer, and the Allied Generals thought that he must surely be wrong again. Charles was of one mind with his Marshal, but was forced to yield to the more general opinion. 'If this plan of the English should succeed,' he wrote gloomily to his wife, 'all the glory will be theirs ; if it fail, all the loss will be mine.'

The victors of Saragossa were soon in Madrid, but from that moment everything went as wrong as Starhemberg had foreseen. Philip left his capital, but he went accompanied by a crowd of loyal subjects of all ranks of society, so vast that it was computed at thirty thousand. And those who stayed, remained behind shuttered windows and bolted doors. The foreign conquerors tramped through a city as dead to them as the Paris of 1871 to the triumphal passage of the Germans. In the days and nights that followed, many of the foreign soldiery were assassinated in the dark alleys of old Madrid.

Meanwhile the expected aid from Portugal did not arrive or even draw near. But Vendôme entered Spain at the head of some eight thousand French troops, whom he had mustered from various points on the Pyrenean border. The descendant of Henri Quatre acted throughout the campaign that followed with the energy which he could always

\* It is to be noted that Stanhope so far supported Starhemberg that he proposed, a few days after the Council at Saragossa had taken the decision to march on Madrid, to send a detachment to Pampeluna to prevent the French entering Spain. But this was vetoed by the Council, whether because, as was said, all wanted to share in the plunder of Madrid, or possibly because they thought the army was not large enough to serve both purposes at once. *Bacallar*, II, pp. 355-364 ; B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 98-100 ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 179.

display whenever he chose to shake off his habits of luxury and sloth. At the news of his coming the Spanish people sprang to arms. Vendôme was soon at the head of a regular force larger than that of the Allies. It included 10,000 excellent cavalry. He placed himself on the Tagus between Madrid and Portugal.

Besides the regular troops arrayed under the French Marshal, guerilla bands under more savage leadership were scouring the country, destroying convoys, driving in foragers, cutting the throats of stragglers, aides-de-camp and scouts. The Allies in Castile, ill provided from home, had no money and soon no food, save what they could rob from the countryside. These habits of plunder destroyed their discipline and morale, while starvation, varied by bouts of debauch, undermined their health. 'Our soldiers,' wrote an English critic, 'are not good for to suffer heat and want of victuals, and, besides being the most disorderly in the world, great devourers of fruit, and that could not abstain from wines when they came in their way, which would fling them into fluxes and calentures.'<sup>85</sup> The anger of the countryside was inflamed by the excesses they actually committed, and by tales, some of them invented for the purpose, of outrages perpetrated by the English heretics against images and shrines. This pious propaganda took, it is to be feared, an air of verisimilitude from the report of actual events near Cadiz and Gibraltar half a dozen years before.<sup>86</sup>

Altogether, it needed no great gift of prophecy when Peterborough, one day near the end of October, said to Harley that 'Stanhope would lose Spain before Christmas ; and though Mr. Harley argued to the contrary,' says Swift, who was present, 'he still held to his opinion.' Indeed, the talk of the Town, after the General Election, among the Tories who did not love Stanhope, was that 'he has carried his men on but won't know how to get them back again.' It was already expected that he would shortly be replaced by Argyle.<sup>87</sup>

In the second week of November the Allies finally evacuated Madrid, compelled thereto by fears of starvation and of the approach of the enemy now in superior force. Three months after Saragossa, its consequences seemed to

have been reversed without another battle, by some black magic of the sun-baked, inhospitable soil. The red-coats turned their backs on Madrid for another hundred years.

The retreat of the Allied forces towards Saragossa was begun from Chinchon, a place some twenty miles south-east of Madrid. Since they had invaded Castile without the supply bases usual in the warfare of that day, they could only live by stripping the bleak countryside as they passed. They therefore marched from Chinchon in three parallel columns, to give the foraging parties wider scope. It was agreed at headquarters that Stanhope with the left-hand column of some 4500 men, nearly all British, should pass by way of Brihuega. He arrived there on December 6, and stayed there for two days to levy meal from the town stores and bake it into bread.

While thus occupied, it gave him little concern to observe squadrons of Spanish horse gathering on the limestone scars that look down upon the vale. He believed the infantry and artillery of Vendôme to be a hundred miles away at Talavera on the far side of Madrid. But in fact the French Marshal had already passed through the capital, not allowing King Philip to stay there to celebrate its liberation, and by forced marches drawing nearer every hour to the English, whom his cavalry had marked down in Brihuega. The peasants, who might have warned the Allies, hated them and held their peace. And Stanhope, with a mistaken confidence that cost him dear, put no scouting parties on the hills that surrounded the bottom in which he lay.

When, on the afternoon of December 8, enemy infantry and guns appeared on the heights overlooking the town, it was too late for him to escape. At six that evening his aide-de-camp, Captain Cosby, started on a perilous and circuitous ride to avoid the enemy's lines, and in five hours reached Starhemberg, at Cifuentes, with a message that the English were trapped in Brihuega, short of ammunition, but would try to hold out till help came. But it must come at once.\*

\* See Appendix D, p. 334 below, Pt. II, Criticisms of Stanhope.

Vendôme, dragging King Philip with him, had surrounded the British with a force of more than twice their number, and of all arms. The defenders of the town had no artillery, for the English guns were with Starhemberg's column. The old Moorish wall, a mile and a quarter in circumference, was composed of a mixture of limestone, gravel and mud ; it 'was nowhere flanked,' wrote Stanhope, 'and in very few places was broad enough to put any men upon it, so we could not hinder their lodging themselves at the foot of the wall in several places.' On the morning of December 9, after a preliminary bombardment of Brihuega from the hills so near that 'even with small-shot they commanded most of the streets,' the cannon were brought down to the valley and run up close to the walls, which were soon breached. The English had improvised defence-works overnight, especially round the gates and inside the town. But they fought under every other disadvantage.

Dec. 9  
1710 Early in the afternoon Vendôme was informed that Starhemberg had begun to move, after his slow fashion, from Cifuentes, a dozen miles away, to the relief of Brihuega. Thereupon the French and Spanish infantry were loosed to the assault, and the short winter afternoon was occupied by hand-to-hand fighting on the breaches, at the gates, and finally in the trenched and barricaded streets. As the attack progressed, cannon were dragged into the town itself, to ply the English with grapeshot. The modern Spaniard, as has since been proved at Buenos Ayres and elsewhere in both hemispheres, is never so formidable as when opposed to better disciplined troops in street fighting, where drill counts for least and individual valour for most. French, Spanish and English had never in the whole war fought more fiercely than at Brihuega ; it was like the defence of Gibraltar over again, but with a different result.

If Starhemberg had been a Blücher, he would have come in time, caught the enemy between two fires and inflicted on him a severe defeat. He received Stanhope's message late on the night of December 8, and had the whole of the 9th in which to traverse the dozen miles that divided Cifuentes from Brihuega. He started early enough in the morning, but he halted on the way for long hours to give time for the

very last of his units to come up. Night closed down over Brihuega, and he had not arrived. It was said that his distant signal guns were heard by Vendôme outside the town but not by Stanhope in the midst of the mêlée. The defenders had only 700 rounds of musket shot left. Stanhope, who had been driven back into the citadel, decided that without ammunition he could not hold it till daylight, and surrendered on terms, to save the lives of his men. His decision, though criticized by some of his ill-wishers, seems to have met with the approval of most of the officers and men, who had borne themselves so well in the fight.<sup>88</sup>

The capture of 4000 British troops would not in itself have decided the issue of the war in Spain, had it not been already a foregone conclusion. But Stanhope's defeat made the realities apparent at last to all the world. Starhemberg next day repulsed the attack of the victorious Vendôme at Villa Viciosa, but none the less he had to resume his retreat and continue it, past Saragossa, till he was safe within the walls of Barcelona. Aragon was again abandoned. All Spain belonged to King Philip, except Catalonia; and the Catalans also, having served British purposes for six years, were soon abandoned to Bourbon vengeance. When that disastrous night had closed down on the burning streets of Brihuega, the Peninsular War had been brought to a decision.†

Each successive turn of the Spanish campaign of 1710 was reflected in the negotiations for peace, which under a cover of careful secrecy were proceeding that autumn between Lord Jersey on behalf of Queen Anne's Ministers and Torcy's London agent the Abbé Gaultier. From the moment of its formation, the new English Ministry had been strongly inclined to abandon Spain to Philip. But the news of Stanhope's victory at Saragossa compelled Jersey in the first days of October to say to Gaultier 'We must wait for the face of things in Spain to change a little before negotiation, and see if the King of Spain will be absolutely

\* See the first-hand evidence printed in *Tindal*, IV, p. 181; Capt. Cosby, who was with Starhemberg on the 9th, also thought he was to blame for delay, *Wentworth Papers*, p. 185.

† See Appendix D, pp. 333-334 below, on Brihuega.



driven out by his rival King Charles.' But the evacuation of Madrid by the Allies in November, shortly followed by Brihuega, enabled Jersey to send Torcy the following message just before Christmas :

We will no longer insist on the entire restoration of the Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria, or if we do it will be weakly and *pro forma*, and we shall be content provided France and Spain will give us good securities for our commerce ; and as soon as we have got what we need and have made our bargain with the two crowns, we will tell our Allies.<sup>89</sup>

The principle of ' No Peace without Spain ' had been once for all repudiated.

After Brihuega, the English Ministers would in any case have had less than no hesitation in abandoning the Austrian pretensions to the Spanish crown. But the argument for their new policy was immensely strengthened, in face of Whig and Allied criticism, by an event that took the world by surprise next spring. The young Emperor Joseph died of smallpox. He left no son, and his brother Charles thus unexpectedly became the Hapsburg successor. He was elected Emperor in Germany, under the title of Charles VI. Austria, Bohemia, Silesia, Hungary were his own, and already the war had put him in possession of Italy and Belgium. Surely that was enough. Were England and Holland to go on fighting to add Spain and half America to his vast inheritance ? To carry out the Whig programme of ' No Peace without Spain ' would now mean the revival of the Empire of Charles V, and the overturn in another direction of that Balance of Power, to save which from French hegemony had been the great object of the war. The partition of the Spanish Empire, always desired by William III, had been inscribed by him in the Treaty of Grand Alliance as the chief object of the war. It was St. John's part to impose the terms of that treaty on France at the Peace of Utrecht. In so doing, Bolingbroke in the retrospect pronounced himself to have been heir of William's policy and fulfiller of his wise intents.

\* See his Letter VIII, *The Study and Use of History*, written in 1735-6. For the Treaty of Grand Alliance, Sept. 1701, see *Blenheim*, pp. 145-147.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE NEW SCENE. WINTER 1710-1711

The issues of the Peace and the Succession. Conversations with France begun through a Jacobite medium. Hanover and the Tories. '*Cujus est, Reddite.*' Harley and St. John. The October Club. Swift and Addison. *The Examiner* and *The Spectator*. Pamphlet warfare. London Life. Duels, Opera and Party. Bank and East India Company Elections.

THE new Ministers, from the very moment of their entry into office, found themselves in the presence of two questions that dominated every other—the Peace with France and the Succession to the Throne. Their Whig predecessors had had no practical policy about peace, but a strong and simple policy about the Succession—to put the existing Act of Settlement into force whenever Anne should die. The Tories, on the other hand, knew how to obtain peace, but knew not whom they wished to succeed the Queen.

The great party that emerged triumphant at the polls in October 1710 was united in the intention to stop the war. But there agreement ended. The Tories were divided between Jacobites, Hanoverians and a large middle body of uncertain allegiance, attached by reason and patriotism to the Protestant Succession, but by tradition and sentiment to the House of Stuart. The October Club was Jacobite when drunk and Hanoverian when sober. But what if the Pretender would listen to the advice conveyed to him by so many of his English friends and join the Church of the country that he aspired to rule? Then might not all sorts and conditions of Tories unite to repeal their own Act of Parliament and bring back James III by legal process, on his sister's death? Then, for all time to come, the Whigs and Dissenters would be the disloyal men, suspect and penalized as such. No

wonder a prospect so delightful to the party mind dazzled the judgment.

Such was the hope that kept so many Tories aloof from Hanover. Yet it was from first to last a delusion. In all that concerned his faith, the pious, melancholy young man was most truly his father's son. He had none of the easy indifference of his uncle Charles or of his great-grandfather Henri Quatre, to whose example his English friends referred him in vain. In their ignorance of his real nature, the Tories loved to dream of him as one of themselves—encouraged thereto by the interested reports of Jacobite agents. And so they continued, waiting for an impossible conversion, halting between two opinions, until the fatal hour had struck.

But in 1710 Queen Anne was in no immediate danger, and it was not the Succession but the Peace that craved immediate action. The Tories were therefore the men of the hour, called in to do what the nation demanded, and equal to the task. But their good fortune in the present became linked with the catastrophe awaiting them in the future. For the peculiar course which our statesmen adopted to obtain peace drew the great body of the Tories every year further away from their original loyalty to the Act of Settlement, which they had themselves passed in 1701. The Ministers obtained, indeed, a reasonable peace for Europe, with specially good terms for England ; but they did so by becoming fellow-conspirators with French statesmen and Jacobite agents to coerce the Whigs, the Dutch and the Elector of Hanover into the acceptance of terms dictated by England and France. Our Allies became our enemies and our great enemy our ally.

This change of sides was carried very far. In the last year of the war (1712) St. John withdrew the British army from the fighting line, and afterwards boasted to his friend Prior that he had thereby saved the French from 'being beat' ; and a few months later Harley and St. John, then become Oxford and Bolingbroke, betrayed the military secrets of Prince Eugene to the French.<sup>90</sup> In return for these good offices they received from Villars in the field letters of abuse of the Whigs and Allies, warning them to

beware of a counter-movement in England, contrary to the common interest of France and Britain.<sup>91</sup> And they obtained from the Grand Monarch assurances of personal sympathy and protection in their struggle against the common enemy, the House of Hanover and the Whigs.<sup>92</sup>

Bolingbroke in later life argued that he had had no choice, because the obstinacy of the Whigs and the Allies, in refusing to accept the terms dictated by England at Utrecht, compelled him to adopt these methods, and to co-operate with the great European champion of the exiled Stuarts, in order to bring the Dutch to 'submit' to terms less advantageous to themselves than those which England had guaranteed to them in the Barrier Treaty of 1709. Whatever we may think of this justification, the consequence of the Anglo-French *entente* against the Dutch and the German Princes was to draw the Tories into the orbit of Jacobite France, and to drive the Elector of Hanover into the arms of the Whigs, with the result that the land had Whig rule for forty years.\*

Less than six months before the Queen's death, James succeeded at last in persuading Oxford and Bolingbroke that he would not change his religion to solve their perplexities. But even then they would not heartily and actively espouse the Hanoverian cause. They had already gone too far in the opposite direction. Although Bolingbroke declared that the Grand Turk would become King of England more easily than James as a Roman Catholic, the Tory Minister could not shake himself free from the sympathies and antipathies that had been engendered at home and abroad in the course of the long struggle over the Treaty of Utrecht. He was too closely bound to France, too widely alienated from Hanover, to be able to retrace his steps.<sup>93</sup>

The remainder of this volume must be in large measure devoted to presenting the successive scenes of this complicated domestic and European drama. To many of those engaged on either side in the conflict, the questions of the

\* When, a few years later, George I's Whig Ministry made friends with France, the Regent Orleans ceased to favour the Pretender. The death of Louis XIV for a time deprived the exiled Stuarts of support from France.

Peace and the Succession came to appear inseparable. Posterity, standing above the dust of the actual arena, is able better to distinguish the issues, and may be inclined to think that the Tories served their country well in making Peace, and the Whigs in securing the Succession.

Even before the dismissal of Godolphin in August 1710, there was already a close connection between Jacobitism and the negotiations that led to Peace. During the years of war the French Minister Torcy had employed a certain Abbé Gaultier as his most trusted agent in England. He lived here under various disguises, seldom venturing to write to Versailles ; he was at one time attached to the household of the Tory-Jacobite Earl of Jersey, whose wife was a Roman Catholic. He was in close touch with the English Jacobites, and as a true servant of King Louis desired to effect a restoration of the Stuart Prince who was bound to his master by so many ties of interest and gratitude. Priest though he was, Gaultier hoped that James would at least simulate conversion to Protestantism in order to attain the Crown. For he had lived in England long enough to be sure that no one could win or wear it on any other terms.<sup>94</sup>

In July 1710, when the change of Ministry was as yet only beginning in England, Torcy took time by the forelock and instructed Gaultier to approach the new favourites, Shrewsbury and Mrs. Masham. In the first days of August Jersey sent for Gaultier and asked him if he had no message from the French Minister. So began the negotiations that ended at Utrecht. Shrewsbury, stout Hanoverian as he was, became associated with the Jacobite Jersey and had to act through the French Jacobite agent, Gaultier, in order to pave the way for the pacification of Europe which he had so deeply at heart. In September Jersey sent word to Torcy that the Queen would never again take Whigs as her Ministers, that she was determined on a ' prompt peace ' and that the Dutch would be roundly told to submit. Early in October, while all England was occupied with the General Election, Gaultier wrote a remarkable letter to Torcy in their usual cypher :

As to Mons. de Montgoulin [the Pretender] the new merchants [Ministers] have a great regard for him, and it appears that if he would think as they do [on religion ?] they would have no difficulty in giving back to him what belongs to him *mortuū tamen Prothosā* [when Queen Anne is dead].

In this way, long before St. John took the matter in hand, the first approaches were made towards the peace negotiations in an atmosphere not only of intimate understanding with Versailles but of professed goodwill to St. Germain, which on the part of Jersey were certainly sincere.<sup>95</sup>

Meanwhile, in the same autumn of 1710, Marlborough and various Whig agents were writing to the Elector of Hanover that Harley and the Tories meant to restore James III.<sup>96</sup> And George was hardly less perturbed when he discovered next year that they intended to make peace without Spain, a subject on which he happened to have conceived a strong prejudice. 'Everyone sees,' the Elector wrote to the Duke of Buckinghamshire, one of the new Ministers, 'what an addition of power France would receive if the Duke of Anjou should support himself on the throne of Spain and the Indies, and you fill too deservedly the post the Queen has committed to you, not to exert yourself to prevent such a misfortune.'<sup>97</sup>

The Tories were on better terms with George's mother, the Dowager Electress Sophia, the heir presumptive to the English throne. She read with attention whatever her friend Lord Raby wrote to her in defence of the foreign and domestic policy of the British Government. But even she was growing uneasy ; moreover she was an old woman and must soon die, leaving her rights in England to her son.<sup>98</sup>

At this juncture an affair took place in Scotland which revealed to the Elector of Hanover how much the new Ministers of Great Britain were dependent upon the support of his foes. Ever since the General Election the Edinburgh Jacobites had acted as if the country belonged to them. 'It is so open a thing,' wrote Defoe thence to Harley in November 1710, 'and so much the mode of the place to own the Pretender, drink his health, and talk most insolently of his being restored that I think it my duty to represent this

to you.' In the following July the Roman Catholic Duchess of Gordon presented to the Faculty of Advocates—perhaps the most influential body in the Scottish capital—a medal representing the Pretender's head on one side with the legend *Cujus est*, and on the other a map of the British islands with the word '*Reddite*'—restore.\* By a majority of sixty-three to twelve, the Advocates accepted the treasonable gift, after a debate in which some of the speeches had been openly Jacobite. In London, whence Scotland was supposed to be governed under the Union, no notice was taken of the affair until, in the autumn, the indignant representation of Bothmar, the Hanoverian Envoy, caused Ministers to make some pretence of action.<sup>99</sup> Harley had begun to play the double game that was to ruin him in the end, courting the Jacobite vote at Westminster, which was, by orders from St. Germain, put at the disposition of the Queen's government. There is little wonder that Bothmar in London became increasingly attached to the Whigs, and that his master conceived an ill opinion of the English Tory Ministers.

The fall of the Junto had been engineered by Harley and Shrewsbury, but it was Harley and St. John who emerged as the *dioscuri* of the Tory revival. If the General Election had been less of a party triumph, Shrewsbury and Harley might have continued to figure as the Moderators of the nation and of Europe. But in a Ministry that had to work through a High Tory Parliament the Whig Duke could exert only a secondary and restraining influence, a part with which his own unambitious nature rendered him perfectly content. Even before the Election, he had scouted the proposal that he himself should become Lord Treasurer. It was only in great crises of decision, like 1688, 1710 and 1714, that Shrewsbury cared to play a leading part. On each of these occasions the country had the benefit of his brief but powerful exertions on its behalf. But he had

\* In the British Museum there are a number of these medals of various sizes, some of the larger having the variant *Reddite igitur*. They were struck in great numbers in France for import into Great Britain. They were the work of Norbert Roettier, the French Government's Engraver-General.

neither the health nor the inclination for the long strain of workaday government.\*

Henry St. John was a very different man. As early as March 1710 he had told Harley that he would not again be content with a minor Cabinet post.<sup>100</sup> In the following autumn he was made Secretary of State for the Northern Department; the Southern Secretary was Harley's friend Lord Dartmouth, who was treated by his 'brother Secretary' with a studied insolence calculated to keep him in due subordination. Dartmouth suffered under St. John's treatment, and thought that Harley did not stand up well for his friends.<sup>101</sup>

St. John aimed at the highest. In the winter of 1710 it was still his part to play the faithful friend and colleague to Harley, but, before the first session of the new Parliament ended, his rivalry had become apparent.

For 'tis all one to courage high  
The emulous or enemy;  
And with such, to enclose  
Is more than to oppose.

The instrument of his ambition lay ready to hand in the October Club, and in the animosity of the High Churchmen against his rival. Harley, 'the spawn of a Presbyterian' as the Dean of Christ Church at this time called him, was reported to be still in the habit of attending a Dissenting chapel, like the 'Occasional Conformist base' that he was. The charge was perhaps a slander; but Tory suspicion of him was so far justified that he was in fact still receiving from Halifax of the Junto a constant succession of letters, full of flattery and of advice on Treasury expedients, and occasionally suggesting a conference with the Whig leaders.<sup>102</sup> Harley was unfitted to be leader of a party, alike by the defects of his character and the breadth of his mind. His love of secret intrigue made him always pursue two or more policies at once; and his wisdom made him aware, before Walpole, that moderation was the secret of government in the new England.

\* For Shrewsbury see *Blenheim*, pp. 200-202. For his refusal of the Treasury in July 1710, see p. 67 above, note.



Such a doctrine was not suited to St. John, till years of exile had tamed his fiery spirit to accept the dull, true opinions of the rival whom he had so long despised. He himself has left on record, in the famous *Letter to Sir William Wyndham*, the nature and motives of his policy as Secretary of State to Queen Anne :

I am afraid that we came to court in the same dispositions as all parties have done ; that the principal spring of our actions was to have the government of the state in our hands ; that our principal views were the conservation of this power, great employments to ourselves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped to raise us, and of hurting those who stood in opposition to us . . . The view therefore of those amongst us who thought in this manner, was to improve the Queen's favour, to break the body of the Whigs, to render their supports useless to them, to fill the employments of the Kingdom down to the meanest with Tories. We imagined that such measures, joined to the advantages of our numbers and property, would secure us against all attempts during her reign ; and that we should soon become too considerable not to make our terms in all events which might happen afterwards ; concerning which, to speak truly, I believe few or none of us had any very settled resolution.

It was a policy doubly unwise. Kindly old England has always in the long run revolted against ' fascist ' experiments at the permanent suppression of ' the other side ' ; nor could a party which confessedly had ' no settled resolution ' of any sort on the Succession, hope to win popular confidence at the crisis that must ensue on the Queen's death, or royal favour in the next reign.

The ' October Club ' of High Tory members of Parliament who met to drink October ale and abuse the Whigs, was said to have existed since the reign of William. But no one had heard much about it until the meeting of the new Parliament of 1710, when the great increase in the number of its members, particularly of ' young gentlemen of estates,' gave them a sudden political importance. The youthful vigour of their indiscretion rebelled against Harley's Cabinet of ' old men,' whom they suspected of Moderation. They ' meet every evening at a tavern near Parliament,' wrote Swift to Stella, ' to consult affairs, and drive things on to extremes against the Whigs, to call the old Ministry to

account, and get off five or six heads. . . . The Ministry is for gentler measures and the other Tories for more violent.' 'The Ministry is upon a very narrow bottom, and stand like an isthmus between the Whigs on one side and violent Tories on the other. They are able seamen, but the tempest is too great, the ship too rotten and the crew all against them.'<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless Harley, in spite of his friend's forebodings, weathered the storms of the first session with increased prestige.

Of all the important happenings of the winter of 1710, the one that most attracts the attention of posterity is Swift's sudden leap to fame and influence. For some years past the Irish parson had paid frequent visits to London to solicit, on behalf of the authorities of the Church of Ireland, the remission of 'first-fruits and twentieths' of livings, on the same principle that had recently been applied to England by Queen Anne's Bounty. The total sum in question would only have cost the revenue one or two thousand pounds a year. Swift, in pursuit of this small act of justice to the island he hated and the Church he loved, had consorted with Whig Ministers and literary men, had been well received by Somers and had formed a friendship with Steele and Addison, which the bitter political divisions of later years only very gradually dissolved.

An an Irish Protestant, Swift was, by English standards, Whiggish in politics; for he revered the memory of William and regarded Jacobitism with contemptuous horror. On the other hand he was never a complete Whig, for the author of the *Tale of a Tub* had as little liking for Jack as for Peter, and warmly advocated the monopolies of the Established Church in both islands. In Ireland he hated the Presbyterians of Scottish origin, whose numbers, organization and energy seemed to him to threaten the existing ecclesiastical order; and when he came to England it was

<sup>1</sup> According to Dartmouth (*Burnet*, VI, p. 37 note) Nottingham proposed to Harley, Shrewsbury and St. John to adopt the October Club's policy of prosecuting the ex-Ministers, beginning with Sunderland, and only after this had been refused, went into opposition, and even made alliance with the Whigs. But Dartmouth, in his notes to Burnet, is not always a very reliable witness, writing as he does long after the event.

natural for him to extend these sentiments to the English Dissenters who, if less formidable in themselves, were strong through their alliance with the Whig Lords. And he detested free-thinkers, unless, like St. John, they were politically good churchmen.

In 1708 he could not refrain from publishing a pamphlet against the abolition of the Sacramental Test for office in Ireland, which was being then proposed in order to unite the Protestant interest, but which he thought would have the effect of undermining the Establishment. Earlier in that year Lord Somers, as he tells us, had 'thought of me for the Bishopric of Waterford.' But it is probable that he lost his chance with the Whigs through this pamphlet, which should be studied as the most disinterested and careful expression of Swift's real views on Church and State. At any rate, the Godolphin Ministry neither settled his business of the first-fruits nor gave him any post or preferment.\*

Harley, on attaining power in September 1710, at once secured Swift's gratitude by remitting the First Fruits,<sup>104</sup> and by showing a desire for his literary companionship and conversation which was the more flattering because it was three parts genuine. A few weeks later St. John was competing for his friendship, and these three strangely assorted men of letters and affairs became inseparable at dinner time. It is a pity no Boswell was present on our behalf. Never before had a denizen of Grub Street been so courted on equal terms by 'the great.'

The better treatment that he received from the Tories was a main reason why he became so violent a partisan. His views would have led him to be a moderate of the Harley type : but his wrongs, real and imaginary, and his proud, angry brooding over them, made it impossible for him to write of the Whigs with moderation. That autumn he wrote to Stella again and again that he would have 'revenge' on Godolphin for his coldness at

\* *Swift Letters*, I, pp. 80-89, 116-117, 165-166, 176 ; *Letter Concerning the Sacramental Test* (*Prose Works*, IV, p. 15) defines his own position and that of other Irish Churchmen as 'moderate Whigs,' opposed to 'the Presbyterians and their abettors.'

an interview, and on the Whigs at large for their previous neglect : <sup>105</sup>

'Rot 'em for ungrateful\* dogs ; I will make them repent their usage before I leave this place.'

'I am already represented to Harley as a discontented person, that was used ill for not being Whig enough ; and I hope for good usage from him. The Tories dryly tell me I may make my fortune if I please ; but I do not understand them, or rather I *do* understand them.'

And when in November he began his attacks in the *Examiner*, he took revenge out of all proportion to the Whig sins of omission in his regard. Where he touched he scorched. Marlborough was held up as the monster of meanness and avarice that he has since remained in the imaginations of all too many of his countrymen. Swift's hatred of the great soldier was in part professional ; for, as he loved the black coat, so he loathed the red. But it was hardly to the credit of his cloth that he should stoop to revive the lies and slanders which he had despised when Mrs. Manley had put them about in her *New Atlantis* the year before ; now, to glut his revenge against a party, he himself could hint the utterly unjust charge of 'bigamy' against Lord Cowper, accuse Sarah of being Godolphin's mistress, and allow no shred of private character to any Whig. Promiscuous slander was a weapon quite unworthy of the genius that could state the general arguments of party as cogently as Swift was able to do in the more serious parts of his *Examiner*.

The ferocity of his native temperament, when once fairly roused, carried him far beyond the 'moderate' policy of Harley. It was St. John's hounds that he hallooed on to the prey. Yet, if Swift could have stopped to think, he might have perceived that such violence must hurry the party towards Jacobitism, to seek a King who would continue the policy of crushing Whigs and Dissenters after Anne was dead ; otherwise the rebound might be fatal.

\* It is hard to see why he called the Whigs 'ungrateful' ; 'neglectful' of his interests they had been, but not 'ungrateful,' for he had done nothing for them.

But Swift, the Irish Protestant, so loathed the Pope and the Pretender that he could never believe that half his English friends were crypto-Jacobites. To the last he was kept in ignorance of St. John's negotiations with the Roman Catholic claimant, and declared all rumours of that sort to be Whig lies. Posterity, which has the use of the documents in the French Foreign Office, knows much that was never revealed to Swift.

In post-revolution England, a land where the struggle for political power was conducted by persuasion and free controversy, 'the Press' might already have been called 'the fourth Estate of the Realm.' The value of Swift's *Examiners* to the party was very great, nor was their influence confined to London. The Tory member for Scarborough, for example, sent off a copy every Thursday to his constituents : after its arrival there on the following Sunday 'the honest parson,' we are told, 'invites a good number of his friends to his house after evening service, where he first reads over the paper and then comments on the text, and all week after carries it about with him to read to such of his parishioners as are weak in the faith.' <sup>106</sup>

In the days when ordinary newspapers contained little or no political argument, when speeches in Parliament were seldom reported and few were made anywhere outside its walls, pamphlets like *The Conduct of the Allies* and periodicals like the *Examiner* were the very life-blood of politics. After the fall of the Godolphin Ministry, the intensity of party conflict multiplied such publications. The pamphlets bearing dates from 1711 to 1714 are by many times more numerous than those of the early and middle parts of the reign. The Whigs, in spite of frequent prosecutions and imprisonments of publishers and reputed authors, put up a good fight. Harley was informed 'Tis a notion in the pamphlet shops that Whiggish libels sell best.' <sup>107</sup>

But they were none of them a match for Swift. Indeed the change of government for a time silenced the best Whig writers. Defoe in his *Review* took to preaching Harleyism as the true Moderation. Though he confessed to grave alarm at the rising tide of High Church intolerance, he

affected to trust his patron's power to stem it, and stuck to him in spite of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts. He had drifted, in his poverty, into an equivocal position, and no longer exercised his former influence on his more downright countrymen.

Steele was bolder and more reliable as a Whig controversialist. But he too allowed himself to be muzzled during the first three years of the Tory government, by retaining his place in the Stamp Office until June 1713, through a friendly conspiracy of Addison and Swift on his behalf, after he had been turned out of his post as Gazetteer. The Press was free from censorship, but the rewards of successful journalism were in the hands of Government, and the Opposition suffered from the fact.

Even Addison, as soon as the Tories were firmly in the saddle, gave up in October 1710 the *Whig Examiner* that he had been writing during the previous month with a success that extorted admiration from Swift himself. Though always true to his principles, Addison was not made to be the martyr of a cause, and his heart was never more than half in politics. In a fortunate hour he turned for awhile from the service of party to that of mankind.

'Have you seen the *Spectator* yet,' wrote Swift to Stella in March 1711, 'a paper that comes out every day?' 'Tis written by Mr. Steele, who seems to have gathered new life, and have a new fund of wit. It is in the same nature as his *Tailors*. I believe Addison and he club.' Addison, indeed, did something better that year than rage against the new Ministry; he gave the world Sir Roger de Coverley. The coffee-houses and drawing-rooms of fashionable London were charmed by a breath of the rural life that still was the essential England, still in the background even of the Londoner's consciousness. Thus the most lovable portrait in our literature of a Tory country gentleman was drawn by a Whig. While Swift too often used his genius to brutalize, Addison employed talents, possibly less remarkable, to sweeten life and civilize the coming era.\*

\* But Addison also wrote a very amusing, not wholly ill-natured, caricature of a Tory squire in Nos. 22, 44, 47 of his *Freeholder*, 1715. There is no reason to doubt the general opinion of his contemporaries that the reformation of manners

If the Eighteenth Century owes much of its reasonableness and good manners to the Whig scholar, it owes much of its realistic force to the Tory parson. Swift is the Hogarth of the pen. While the General Election was going on, he delighted the town by a picture of its outward self, that still shows to posterity the vivid humours of London in days when its streets were not speedways for machines but markets and playgrounds for mankind. It was entitled 'A City Shower.'

Now in contiguous drops the flood comes down,  
Threatening with deluge this devoted town.  
To shops in crowds the daggled females fly,  
Pretend to cheapen goods, but nothing buy.  
The templar spruce, while every spout's abroad,  
Stays till 'tis fair, yet seems to call a coach.  
The tuck'd-up semstress walks with hasty strides  
While streams run down her oil'd umbrella's sides.  
Here various kinds, by various fortunes led,  
Commence acquaintance underneath a shed ;  
Triumphant Tories, and desponding Whigs  
Forget their feuds, and join to save their wigs.  
Box'd in a chair, the beau impatient sits,  
While spouts run clattering o'er the roof by fits,  
And ever and anon with frightful din  
The leather sounds ; he trembles from within.

Soon frost followed the rain, and Swift writes to Stella :

Delicate walking weather, and the Canal and Rosamund's Pond  
[St. James's Park] full of the rabble sliding, and with skates, if you  
owed much to his writings. But he must, I think, have smiled at the over-  
emphatic statement of the case by his friend and client Tickell in the lines :

*To the Supposed Author of the Spectator*

' Thy spotless thoughts unshocked the priest may hear ;  
And the pure vestal in her bosom wear.  
Lashed in thy satire, the penurious cit  
Laughs at himself and finds no harm in wit :  
From felon gamesters the raw squire is free,  
And Britain owes her rescued oaks to thee,  
His miss the frolic Viscount dreads to toast,  
Or his third cure the shallow Templar boast ;  
And the rash fool, who scorned the beaten road,  
Dares quake at thunder and confess his God.'

Here is reformation indeed !

know what those are. Patrick's bird's water freezes in the gallipot, and my hands in bed.\*

The Whigs were still strong in financial and in fashionable circles, and in spite of their rout in the country held together in town with a courage that alarmed the possessors of a majority of two to one. Political duels, 'some with sword and pistol,' were frequent that winter, though discouraged by Parliament. The Duke of Argyle 'had a penny post letter sent him by an unknown hand that, the night before, his health was proposed to be drunk and that Colonel Cout said damn him he wouldn't drink the health of a man that had changed sides.' The fiery Campbell, though under orders to take up the command in Spain, called out the Colonel and disarmed and wounded him in Hyde Park at early morning.<sup>108</sup>

Even the stage became a property of faction. The Italian opera had always been regarded askance by Steele, Addison and other Whigs, as un-English.† And now, during the first session of the Tory Parliament, we read that

since the Whigs have espoused Mr. Porrel, he has turned his ordinary show into an opera in ridicule of *Hydaspes*, in which Punch most heroically kills a pig and sings *Io Pean* in Italian music. This has affronted Nicolino and he threatens to tread the stage no more. But this folly was acted six weeks by subscription at a crown a ticket. Mr. Walpole and Mr. Mackertney were managers, received the tickets at the door, and suffered no Tory to mix with them in this extraordinary pleasure.<sup>109</sup>

The political complexion of the Bank of England and of the East India Company was a more serious matter. A great attempt was made by the Tories in the spring of 1711 to storm these Whig strongholds by the use of Ministerial influence. The elections for the Directors of the great Company and of the Bank were held amid scenes of intense

\* *Stella*, Jan. 31, 1711. They seem to have had a series of hard winters. On Dec. 14, 1712, a country gentleman writes: 'Mr. Chester is with me in full expectation of hunting, but the weather has proved cross and unseasonable, that I have had less of that dear diversion than was expected at the prorogation of Parliament. But the practice of the pipe has been customary in frosts.' *Verney Letters of the Eighteenth Century*, I, p. 243.

† See *Blenheim*, p. 87.



excitement. Sacheverell himself took shares and solicited votes in vain. The other shareholders were alarmed at the parson's interference with matters he did not understand. The Whigs carried their candidates, and the greatest institutions in the City did not pass into Tory hands.

The Duchess of Marlborough had worked for this end with her usual vigour and zeal. Lord Hervey, who owed her his Peerage, hated London and, even at her bidding, would not come up to vote. He could not tear himself away from Newmarket races and from his own lovely park at Ickworth, Bury St. Edmunds. His wife, devoted to the pleasure and bustle of the town, wrote to him thence :

Thursday is the day of election, and the Duchess of Marlborough says it is a terrible reflection upon anybody that can stay to see a horse race though there were but a possibility of the Bank of England put into ill hands by it ; and, if the Tories get the better, Mr. Hopkins says you may all make use of your horses to run away.

In spite of these reproaches, Hervey preferred, as he said, 'seeing all the pride of nature opening itself day by day at Ickworth,' and anyone who knows that park to-day of an April morning may well understand his choice.<sup>110</sup>

But in town the Bank Election caused more excitement than horse-racing or the spring ; it even got into schoolboys' letters to politically minded parents. John Cocks writes from school in London to his Whig father at Worcester :

I am now second captain of the seventh form, so that my removal into the next may be expected to be suddenly heard of. Dr. Sacheverell to his great mortification, has been hissed at in the Bank, being come thither to give his vote.<sup>111</sup>

It was while the Bank Election was coming on, that Addison wrote one of his rare political numbers of the *Spectator*, to point out the economic consequences of a Jacobite Restoration. He saw in his vision the fair lady, 'Publick Credit,' seated amid a heap of money-bags in the Bank, when there entered

a young man of about twenty-two years of age, whose name I could not learn. He had a sword in his right hand, which in the dance he

often brandished at the Act of Settlement ; and a citizen, who stood by me, whispered in my ear that he had a sponge in his hand.

Credit faints, and the money-bags shrink like pricked balloons.

Whilst I was lamenting this sudden desolation that had been made before me, the whole scene vanished. In the room of the frightful Spectres, there now enter'd a second dance of Apparitions very agreeably matched together and made up of amicable Phantoms. The first pair was Liberty with Monarchy at her right hand : the second was Moderation leading in Religion ; and the third a Person whom I had never seen, with the genius of Great Britain.

With the entrance of the Hanoverian heir 'the bags swell'd to their former bulk, and the heaps of paper changed into pyramids of guineas.' This was no mere poetic fancy of Addison's. The most solid men in the City believed that the Restoration of James III would mean the repudiation of government debts contracted since the Revolution, and it was not a little this fear that kept the members of the Bank of England faithful to the Whig cause in the hour of its deepest depression.<sup>112</sup>

## CHAPTER VII

### THE FIRST SESSION OF THE NEW PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 1710—JUNE 1711

The October Club *versus* Harley. Tory measures, ministerial and other. Landed Property Qualification Bill: squires and moneyed men. The new London churches. The Spanish debates in the Lords. Argyle in Spain. Peterborough again. Marlborough and the Ministers. Sarah removed from her places at Court. Swift, Sarah and the Duchess of Somerset. St. John *versus* Harley. St. John's Quebec project. Guiscard stabs Harley. Triumph of Harley, Lord Treasurer and Earl of Oxford. The South Sea Company. Ministerial changes. The Bishop of Bristol in secular office. Atterbury at Christ Church. Academic independence of Oxford and Cambridge.

EVER since the Revolution the Tories had been a Parliamentary party no less than the Whigs, and their return to power tended to increase rather than diminish the importance and activity of the Commons House. The new regime was ushered in by a long session of seven months, which was occupied by a veiled struggle between the spirit of the October Club in the Commons and the spirit of moderation in a Cabinet presided over by Harley. With the help of the House of Lords and of Harley's tactful management, the Moderates upon the whole prevailed in this first session. But the end was not yet.

The Queen's Speech was almost impertinently moderate, and gave little satisfaction to the House that had just chosen the High Church champion, Bromley, as its Speaker. No promise was made of any Bill against the Dissenters, to whom Harley wished, if he could, to keep his electioneering pledges of protection. No specific measures were proposed against the Whigs, of whom it was known that many still occupied posts in the army, magistracy and civil service. The Queen did not even promise

Nov.  
1710

peace, but asked for supplies towards 'carrying on the war in all parts, particularly in Spain.' Yet her Ministers had already made secret approaches to France, and were on the point of deciding, if they had not already decided in their own minds, to give up Spain to Philip. The House of Commons accepted the Speech, probably knowing that more was intended about peace than was expressed; and Sir John Packington of Worcestershire roused the loud cheers of his fellow-members by his declaration that an end ought to be put to the war, 'to prevent the beggaring of the nation, and to prevent moneyed and military men becoming lords of us who have lands.'<sup>113</sup>

The Commons were ready to trust the Ministry to make peace, but they themselves took in hand the attack on their domestic enemies. Members as distinct from Ministers had more control over legislation than they have in our own day. An important part of the business of every session consisted of Bills introduced by private members, and these were often carried contrary to the wishes of the 'placemen.' It was only in regard to proposals for taxation that the initiative of servants of the Crown was acknowledged to be expedient.\* The October Club, therefore, was able to give vent to its feelings by passing a number of Bills to which Ministers were indifferent or hostile, and which the House of Lords threw out to the secret satisfaction of Harley. Such were a Place Bill further limiting the posts under the Crown that could be held by any member of the House of Commons, and a Bill resuming all grants made by William III—hardy annuals of Tory intransigence.<sup>114</sup>

Robert Walpole, though dismissed from the War Office, had been left in his Treasurership of the Navy, in hopes that he would carry over to the Tory camp the ablest brain among the Whigs: he 'was worth half his party,' Harley told him. But as he failed to oblige, he was turned out in January 1711, and a charge of peculation was at once initiated by the Tories against the man whom they had tried in vain to attract into their service. It had been

\* The famous Standing Order of the House of Commons, No. 66 (to use the present-day enumeration), that gives effect to this principle, was passed in June 1713. See *Ramilles and the Union*, pp. 164-166.

reported to the House that thirty-five million pounds had not been accounted for, and the October Club was all agog. But Walpole's able defence, and a further examination of the facts, dissipated the whole charge. St. John behaved well, warmly defending his Whig friend, James Brydges, afterwards first Duke of Chandos, the Paymaster of the Forces, with whom he himself had been associated when he was Secretary at War. This act of personal loyalty displeased the October men whom it was his cue to lead, and gave a temporary check to his ambitions as Harley's rival.<sup>115</sup>

St. John, in defending Brydges, was following the dictates of private friendship. But it was as spokesman for the whole Ministry that he had opposed the Place Bill which the Lords afterwards threw out; he had urged the Commons to pass in its stead the Landed Property Qualification Bill.<sup>116</sup> That strange measure purported, like the Place Bill, to secure the true independence of future Houses of Commons, and it had the advantage of doing so by a method even more pleasing to High Tory sentiment. For instead of excluding Placemen, who were now for the most part Tories, it proposed to exclude professional and moneyed men, who were generally Whigs. It was the first sop thrown by the Ministers to the October Club.

The avowed object of the Qualification Bill was to prevent any Englishman who was not a squire from sitting in the Commons. Henceforth no one was allowed to sit who was not possessed of land to the annual value of £600 if a knight of the shire, and of £300 if representative of a borough. The heirs of Lords or of persons qualified to be knights of the shire might be chosen, but all landless younger sons were to be rendered ineligible. The provisions of the Act did not apply to Scotland on account of her poverty, or to the Universities on account of their learning and religion. A similar Bill had been passed by the Tory Commons in 1703 and thrown out by the Whig Lords,\* but this time the Lords dared not oppose; it became law, and was not repealed until the reign of Queen Victoria.

(The action of the Bank of England in trying to prevent the recent change in the Ministry, and the unpatriotic

efforts of some of the Whigs to shake public credit and refuse money to Government under the new regime,<sup>117</sup> had blown to flame the indignation always smouldering in the Tory mind against the interference of the moneyed power in politics. St. John told the House that, unless they passed the Qualification Bill, 'we might see a time when the moneyed men might bid fair to keep out of that house all the landed men, and he had heard of societies of them that jointed Stocks to bring in members.'<sup>118</sup>

The Qualification Bill was clean contrary to the older principles of the Constitution, that had been based on free election and the permissive representation of boroughs by their own citizens. The new law was intended to make the landed oligarchy omnipotent. Men of both parties seriously feared and hoped that it would perpetuate the Tory power in future Parliaments by excluding all save squires from political life.<sup>119</sup> Such, however, was not its result. Its bark proved worse than its bite. The ingenuity of lawyers sufficed, by a little easy conveyancing at the approach of each General Election, to enable professional and moneyed men and younger sons of squires to become landlords in name alone, and take their seats by the use of legal fictions. Had it been otherwise, the Act must have been soon repealed, or else Pitt, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, Canning and half the brightest luminaries of our Parliamentary firmament would, during all or part of their lives, have been excluded from their predestined spheres.

It is, indeed, possible that the Act was to some slight degree effective by encouraging the process, always going on in English social history, by which great merchants invested their wealth in landed estates and became, they or their descendants, country gentlemen. Partisans might orate on the opposing interests of the 'landed' and 'moneyed' classes, but they were more closely connected in England than anywhere else. A Swiss who visited our country in the reign of King William had written of the English merchants :

They seem to me to differ from other merchants in many things : they are neither in so much haste as the French to grow rich, nor so niggardly as the Dutch to save ; their houses are richly furnished and

their tables well served. There's something very singular in their character, and which in my opinion distinguishes them still more from other merchants ; *no sooner do they acquire wealth but they quit traffic, and turn country gentlemen.*<sup>120</sup>

It was largely for this reason that, in the Eighteenth Century, English agriculture was so greatly improved by the application of capital made in industry, and that the amenities of rural life, building and scenery were carried to so high a pitch of perfection. For in every county, and most of all in the orbit of great towns, such as London, Bristol or Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the wealth of trade, mines and manufacture was being poured into the development and embellishment of landed estates.

Scarcely had this unjust but ineffective measure on behalf of the Landed Interest received the assent of Parliament, when a better-conceived plan for showing favour to the Church was evolved by the Commons, in close consultation with the clergy of the Lower House of Convocation. The proposal, which speedily became law, was to build fifty new churches in outer London, with the help of £350,000 of public money. It was to be raised over a number of years by an increase in the coal duties in the Port of London, the method that was still paying for the rebuilding of St. Paul's and the churches destroyed by the Great Fire. The movement in London church-building which had been associated with Wren was extended into a new era by the Commons' vote of 1711. Sir Christopher himself was now an old man, but the 'new churches,' which were actually erected under George I, gave opportunity to his successor, James Gibbs.

It was indeed the most positive outcome of the Convocation movement, which otherwise proved so unfruitful of all save strife. Here was a better way of waging the Church's battle against Infidelity and Dissent than angry sermons and pamphlets, Occasional Conformity Bills and Schism Acts. The persecuting Statutes have been repealed long ago, the angry sermons are read only by students amazed or amused by so much noise and fury, but Gibbs's St. Martin's in the Fields and St. Mary le Strand still adorn London, and the

religious and charitable work done in these and many other parishes as a consequence of this vote of the Tory Parliament has been continued from generation to generation.

In modern times the grant of public money to build more churches for the Establishment would not be approved. But in those days it seemed perfectly natural, and was in fact the only practical method of expanding the inelastic parish system in accordance with the nation's needs. The fixed character of the parochial ministry of the Church of England had long restricted the sphere of her influence, and proved an ever-increasing hindrance during the coming century of Industrial Revolution.\* The administrative geography of the Church, little changed since mediaeval times, made no provision for the new mines and factories as they came into being. Their population was left to heathenism or to John Wesley. In the reign of Anne, while the Industrial Revolution and little John were both in their infancy, a similar state of things was already observable in the Metropolitan area. The grant of money to build fifty churches there was a real effort to meet a real need.

The House of Commons declared that it was 'sensible how much the want of churches hath contributed to the increase of Schism and Irreligion.' Confessedly the movement was inspired by rivalry with the existing 88 Dissenting chapels in Greater London, where there were in 1711 only 28 parish churches and 18 chapels of ease. Though the zealots of Convocation could not see it, there was much to be said for 'Schism' and competition in religion, if only to stimulate the relaxed energies of the Church and her partner the State.

In the end not half the proposed fifty new churches were built.† But what was done was all to the good, and much of the money was used not in building new churches but in restoring and repairing the old. After a while the effort

\* The difficulty of setting the cumbrous machinery of Parliament in motion to create a new parish is illustrated by the Bishop of Lichfield's correspondence with Lord Somers about the attempt to build 'a new church at Birmingham,' 1706-7, in *Somers MSS.*; see also *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 135.

† It is difficult to say exactly how many 'new' churches were built: e.g. St. Martin's in the Fields was an entirely new building, but in place of a former building, become ruinous and insufficient.



died out for another hundred years, till the policy of church building out of State funds was revived, from much the same motives, by the Tories after Waterloo.<sup>121</sup> But it was only the reform of ecclesiastical revenues, carried out by the 'sacrilegious' Whig governments of the Reform Bill era, coinciding with the revival of Church life after the Evangelical and Oxford movements, that enabled the Church to cope with modern conditions by the proper use of her own revenues, by her own reformed machinery and by the voluntary contributions of her children which had been too little forthcoming either in the High Church days of Queen Anne or in the Latitudinarian times that followed. Until the era of Reform, she was fain to rely on State subventions, which in this wicked world were not likely to be perpetually renewed.<sup>122</sup>

Although there was still a Whig or Moderate majority in the Lords to throw out violent measures that came from the Commons without the full backing of the Ministry, the number of Peers who, like Argyle, were inimical to Marlborough or the Junto for a mixture of personal and public reasons, was enough to serve most ministerial purposes against the Whigs. An examination into 'the late ill success in Spain' was, therefore, staged in the Upper House. Party capital must be made out of it and the blame put upon Marlborough, the late Ministers and the Whig generals in the Peninsula, Galway and Stanhope. Peterborough, whom Marlborough and the Junto had recalled, must be magnified at their expense. Since Galway was directly responsible for Almanza, and Stanhope for Brihuega, this was not very difficult. Peterborough and Argyle, in high feather, led the attack. Less was said against Stanhope, from a feeling that it was unfair to attack a prisoner of war in enemy hands. But Galway was arraigned and censured by their Lordships for having given battle at Almanza four years back; and Sunderland, who as Secretary of State had ordered a vigorous offensive in Spain, came in for his share of denunciation. Almanza indeed had been a terrible mistake, and Peterborough had advised against the policy that led to it. Galway could not evade the responsibility for the disaster.

The enquiry was enlivened by outbursts of Highland temper from Argyle and flights of fancy by Peterborough. And one day, Lord Tyrawley, being examined on the nature of the councils of war held before the Almanza campaign, at some of which he had been present, spoke of them as 'privy councils which the Spaniards call *Juntos*, at which the House laughed.' <sup>123</sup>

At the end of these debates, the only thanks the late Ministry received for winning the war against France in Europe and on the sea, was to be censured by Lords and Commons for having lost it in Spain. Peterborough was acclaimed by resolutions of both Houses as the national hero, less from any real gratitude to him than out of spite to the victor of Blenheim and Ramillies.

After this triumph over their personal enemies, in which Peterborough showed some good nature and Argyle much vindictiveness, both were hurried abroad. The Ministry indeed had no intention whatever of employing Peterborough, their 'greatest general,' in military operations. He was dispatched on a diplomatic errand to Vienna. Thence in the following November it was intended to send him on to the Italian courts; Lord Dartmouth 'feared he would do more hurt than good at Turin,' but the Queen wrote to Harley 'I think he should be sent somewhere, for I fear if he comes home while the Parliament is sitting he will be very troublesome.' St. John wrote contemptuously 'I have a letter of twenty sheets from Lord Peterborough, wherein the whole world is parcelled out, as if with a fiat and the breath of his mouth it could be accomplished.' That was how his new political allies regarded the quicksilver of the age. <sup>124</sup>

Argyle was sent to take up the command of the English remnant in Spain. He had refused to serve again under Marlborough in the Netherlands. The Ministry were, not without reason, afraid of his personal pride, his fiery temper and his fundamentally Whig principles. He would do very well as far away as Barcelona, quarrelling there with 'King Charles' and his Germans, till the peace with France had been arranged by cooler heads. Argyle was not long in discovering that he had been sent on a fool's errand. He

was not expected to wage war, and therefore he was not supplied with the means. He complained that the army in Spain was unpaid and unprovided, as indeed it had been before Brihuega. By this time, he wrote, it was 'the shadow of an army,' and he himself was 'tore to pieces from morning till night for what I can't remedy.'

He formed the same opinion of 'Charles III' and his German councillors as all English generals before him. He found this King, who had lost all the other provinces of Spain, engaged in a violent quarrel with his only remaining subjects, because he claimed absolute rule in Catalonia in contempt of her ancient rights. Shut up in Barcelona, Charles addressed the Catalans as if he was dictating to them from Madrid with the whole power of Castile behind him.

Argyle, starved of money and of all real support, remained, as he wrote to Harley, 'chained to the galley' until the summer of 1712, when he carried the remnant of the British army to Minorca; there they were left, ragged and unpaid. The treatment that Argyle had received from the home government in his Spanish command prepared the way for his breach with the Tory Ministers after his return. He then thought they had betrayed the country over the peace and that they were working for the return of the Pretender. Argyle was a gallant soldier and a fearless statesman, but he was not an easy colleague for either Tory or Whig.<sup>125</sup>

Marlborough, having lost support in both Houses of Parliament, was entirely at the mercy of Ministers. But until they had secretly arranged the outlines of the peace with Louis, they had no wish either to quarrel with the Allies or to relax the military pressure on France. They had therefore to induce Marlborough to continue at the head of the army in the field for one more campaign. Their policy was, as St. John wrote, 'to break Lord Marlborough's faction without giving him any just mortification as general'; —a nice operation requiring all Harley's tact.<sup>126</sup>

In December 1710 three officers of the Duke's faction—Meredith, Maccartney and Honeywood—were forced to sell out, for drinking his health and confusion to his enemies,

or more specifically 'damnation to the new Ministry' as the Tory version ran.<sup>127</sup> And next month the Duchess was dismissed from all her places about Court. St. John, when he had served as Minister at War under the Duke, had conceived for him so strong an admiration that he had offered the astonished dons of Christ Church to set up his statue in their college; and in years to come he wrote of Marlborough in retrospect as 'the greatest general and the greatest Minister that our country or perhaps any other has produced.' But at this crisis of the Duke's fortunes he showed towards him a vindictiveness of which Harley was as incapable as of the higher flights of admiration. Marlborough, wrote St. John, had been clearly told 'that his true interest consisted in getting rid of his wife, who was grown to be irreconcilable with the Queen, as soon as he could, and with the best grace he could. Instead of this he teased the Queen and made the utmost effort to keep this woman in her places.' St. John wished at once to cashier many more of Marlborough's men.<sup>128</sup>

But Harley, of milder mood and more moderate policy, so handled the incensed Duke as to persuade him to take the field yet another year. The payment of the public moneys, due for the building of Blenheim, was part of the inducement offered him to keep on terms with the Ministers who had 'broken his faction' and with the Queen who had dismissed his wife. Another motive was the strongly expressed desire of the Whigs and of the Dutch and German Allies that he should not resign the command. And he himself, little as he trusted the peace policy of the new government, realized that the terms granted by France would be even more inadequate if he stultified the war effort of the Allies by playing Achilles in his tent. Indeed there was always more of Odysseus than of Achilles in the Duke of Marlborough.<sup>129</sup>

The Duchess would have done well if, when her quarrel with the Queen was clearly beyond repair, she had resigned her posts about Court. Since she never saw Anne again after the painful scene in April 1710, her political influence was nil, and her retention of the offices and salaries so

strongly coveted by her victorious rivals had at least the appearance of monetary greed, although desire to keep Mrs. Masham from their enjoyment was probably an even stronger motive. Swift in November led the cry against her with a false charge of peculation.\* When the clamour against the 'fury,' the 'plague,' 'the worst of women' was at its height after Christmas, the Queen dismissed her from

her posts of Groom of the Stole, Mistress of the Jan. Robes and Keeper of the Privy Purse, in spite of 1711 her husband's somewhat undignified appeals. Anne however was ready to contradict in private the charges of peculation, declaring that 'everybody knows that cheating is not the Duchess of Marlborough's crime.' Harley, although he passively countenanced Swift's attacks, had previously written to Sarah testifying that her careful and unselfish administration had saved great sums for the Crown.

Indeed, as Sarah showed in papers she drew up on the subject, she had not only stolen nothing and sold no favours, but she had effected reforms and economies in the Royal Household, where wild extravagance by the courtiers and cheating by tradespeople had been the age-long tradition. Sarah was justly indignant at being 'cried about the country for a common cheat and pickpocket' by Swift. Yet she was herself in part to blame. She had held on too long to her posts, and after her fall from favour she had asked and received from the Queen the arrears of an annuity which she had declined nine years before, now amounting to £18,000. On moving from St. James's Palace she was graceless enough to carry off all she had added to the apartments at her own expense, down to the brass locks from the doors. It was an act dictated by anger rather than by avarice, but it seemed to confirm all that her enemies were saying against her.<sup>130</sup>

In bitter rage she established herself in her newly built mansion of Marlborough House over the way. The

\* *Examiner*, No. 17 (16 in the reprint), Nov. 23, 1710. In later years he was so absurdly venomous as to accuse Sarah of being Godolphin's mistress, a charge which throws light not on Sarah's conduct but on Swift's mind. See *Memoirs relating to the change in the Queen's Ministry in 1710*, *Prose Works* (ed. T. Scott), V, p. 368. Some editions gracefully substitute 'friend' for 'mistress,' but Mr. Scott's edition is based on the real text.

triumphant Tories kept watch from the upper windows of St. James's Palace to see what bold visitor would dare to approach Marlborough House, and report it to his disadvantage. Alone of the Whigs, the good Lord Cowper was seen to enter the door of the fallen favourite.<sup>181</sup>

Sarah's places at Court were divided between Abigail Masham in the High Tory interest, and the Duchess of Somerset for the moderate Whigs. The Queen still gave expression to her persistent desire to be 'above party,' by keeping Somerset's wife at her side. Harley was glad enough to see a 'moderate' influence behind the throne, but his followers raged against 'Carrots,' as they called the red-haired Duchess. She was the daughter and heir of the last Percy Earl of Northumberland, and, though she was much abused by the High Tories, we have the word of the Tory Lord Dartmouth, who knew her well, that she was much to be preferred to her proud and wayward husband, that she was 'the best bred as well as the best born lady in England,' and that she 'maintained her dignity at court, with great respect to the Queen and sincerity to all others.' Swift observed with chagrin that 'she quickly grew in higher credit with the Queen than all her Ministers together.' To pull her down, he wrote and privately circulated some witty rhymes about 'Carrots,' reviving an old and false story that she had murdered her former husband, Thomas Thynne.

This piece of pleasantry proved the most impolitic act of Swift's life. The influence of the Duchess, added to that of the grave Archbishop of York, easily persuaded the Queen that the author of the *Tale of a Tub* and of brutal lampoons on private persons was unfit for high clerical preferment.\* In the midst of a more licentious generation, Anne had something of the standards of Queen Victoria.

\* Swift's own account of the causes of his failure to get the preferment he wished for is well known :

' By an old [murderess] pursued,  
A crazy prelate and a royal prude ;  
By dull divines, who look with envious eyes  
On ev'ry genius that attempts to rise,  
And, pausing o'er a pipe, with doubtful nod,  
Give hints that poets ne'er believe in God.'

If Bolingbroke had not been a notorious rake and of dubious financial integrity, he might have been her Lord Treasurer ; if Swift's writings had been as pure as his life, if he had been as decent towards his foes as he was true to his friends, she would have made him an English Dean. It was not, perhaps, wholly unjust that his inability to keep his bitter tongue silent even about a woman was the deciding cause why he never obtained the ecclesiastical reward which his political services had, according to the usage of that time, so very amply earned.<sup>132</sup>

According to Harley's reckoning, it was in the beginning of February 1711 that

there began a separation in the House of Commons, and Mr. Secretary St John began listing a party, and set up for governing the House. Upon this a meeting at dinner was appointed, where the Duke of Shrewsbury, the Earl of Rochester, Lord Dartmouth, Earl Poulett, Robert Harley and others preventing any such attempts, in which Lord Rochester took much pains. This was the last time Robert Harley was ever invited to Mr. Secretary's House.

This direct evidence of Harley's, couched in characteristically clumsy and ungrammatical language, dates the origin of the most famous personal quarrel in our political annals. But intercourse was not broken off, and for another three years St. John occasionally wrote friendly letters to his rival.<sup>133</sup>

The struggle for power between the two chiefs, rendered inevitable by their respective characters, and invited by the differences of temperature in the body of the Tory party, first took the form of a quarrel over the expedition to Quebec, a project on which St. John had set his heart. His motives were various. It had always been the High Tory doctrine that the maritime and colonial sphere was the proper place for England's action in war time, before William diverted it to the mainland of Europe. To win French Canada would redound to the lasting advantage of the English race and to the personal glory of St. John, and would enable the Tories to show themselves no whit less patriotic than

Marlborough and the Whigs, mingling the olives of peace with the laurels of victorious war.

There was indeed a great deal to be said for the taking of Quebec, if only St. John had known how to take it. Unfortunately, though he had served well in the War Office under Marlborough, he had not, when left to himself, the qualities requisite to organize war with success. Nor was the national interest the only one considered in his thoughts on a military problem. It was an essential part of his design against Quebec to employ Mrs. Masham's brother, the notoriously incompetent 'Jack' Hill, in command of the troops, because Abigail's favour would be a key position in the coming struggle with Harley for the headship of the State. It was not on such grounds as these that Pitt chose Wolfe for the same enterprise.

Harley, supported by Rochester, opposed the whole scheme. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, he feared that St. John was planning to relieve his distressed private finances by illicit commissions upon twenty-eight thousand pounds worth of contracts for 'clothes sent to Canada.' Indeed it was only on the express orders of the Queen that Harley consented to pay the money for the contracts, without making those enquiries which he thought the case merited, but which St. John deprecated 'with much passion.' And according to Harley, who considered his rival a rogue, 'upon the return of that expedition, it was discovered that the whole had cost but £7000 and that £21,036 5s. was divided' between St. John and his confederates.<sup>134</sup>

The question whether to proceed with the Quebec expedition was hotly dividing the Cabinet when, on March 8, 1711, the rivalry of the two leaders was complicated by the attempt of Guiscard on Harley's life.

Antoine de Guiscard, a French noble, at one time an abbé, had been compelled for misconduct to leave France. He had been employed by the Godolphin Ministry for various services during the war, but had lately fallen on evil times. Harley did not like the seedy rascal and had reduced his pay. St. John had refused to help him and the Queen



would not listen to his petitions. In despair he sold himself back to France and began a trade in British military secrets. His treasonable correspondence was discovered ; he was arrested and brought before the Committee of the Privy Council, in the Cockpit at Whitehall.

The principal Cabinet Ministers were present at his examination and at the unexpected scene by which it was interrupted. Guiscard, who had concealed about his person a small penknife which he had picked up in the office, leant over and stabbed Harley in the breast. The frail weapon broke at the first blow, or the second might have proved fatal.

Harley's passive courage, which never forsook him in any crisis of life, kept him the coolest person in the room during the wild minute that followed. Cabinet Ministers tumbled over each other as they flew to the rescue. 'The villain has killed Mr. Harley,' cried St. John, as he ran his rapier into Guiscard's body. Others cried out 'spare him to confess.' The wounds received from the gentlemen's swords were less serious than the pummelling from the State Messengers, who rushed on him and with furious violence 'knocked him down and tied him neck and heels.' Harley, before he himself was carried away, bade them attend to his assailant's hurts.

Three weeks later Guiscard died in Newgate, not of the stabs but of the blows he had received. His wild talk about his intention to kill Marlborough, to kill St. John, was of little account. In his desperate mood he was like a mad dog and might have bit anyone. But already the world of political and personal intrigue was seeking to make the most of the incident. The adherents of St. John put it about that the Secretary had been the intended victim, hoping to steal the credit from the actual sufferer. According to Harley's friends, 'a party was formed against him while he was ill of his wounds.' The preparations for the Quebec expedition were pushed forward fast in his absence, greatly to his chagrin when he heard the news on his sickbed. While he still thought he might die of the fever following on his wound, he vainly sent to his friend Rochester, the President of the Council, his 'dying request' that the Canadian project should be laid aside.<sup>185</sup>

Thanks to Guiscard, St. John secured the Quebec expedition; but the Frenchman had in some respects done the Secretary an ill turn, for Harley's narrow escape turned public and royal sympathy so strongly in his direction that no intrigue and insinuation could for a while divert it. 'The poor creature lies stabbed in his bed,' wrote Swift, 'by a desperate French Popish villain,' a priest to boot and a spy in enemy pay, who, as the Tories took care to note, had previously been in the favour and employ of the Whig Ministers. The address of the two Houses of Parliament to the Queen declared that Harley 'had drawn upon him the hatred of all abettors of Popery and faction,' and ended with the request, usual on these occasions, that the Queen would 'cause Papists to be removed from London and Westminster,' for the greater safety of herself and her subjects. To the sentimental popular mind Guiscard's attempt was in itself proof of the victim's patriotism, and of the baseness of all his enemies, from whatever quarter they might come. Queen Anne, whose simple heart registered the general feeling of her subjects as surely as Queen Victoria's, seized the moment to bestow on Harley the highest honour and advancement. As soon as he recovered—if indeed it were granted him to recover from the dastard blow—he should be promoted from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Lord Treasurer—'Prime Minister' as some people were beginning to call the post—and should be raised to the Peerage as Earl of Oxford and Earl of Mortimer.<sup>136</sup> Even the Whigs, through Halifax, sent him private messages of support, exhorting him to take firm charge of the government of the country, which tottered while he lay sick. The death of the Emperor Joseph, throwing all Europe into confusion, demanded a strong hand on the helm of State. It seemed Lord Oxford's hour indeed.<sup>137</sup>

Yet if St. John had understood the trend of our constitutional practice better than those around him, he might have felt, instead of the bitter pangs of jealousy, a secret satisfaction at being left alone to lead the Commons. But he had not the foresight of Walpole, who first of our statesmen made the shrewd choice to govern the country from its true seat of power rather than be buried in the dignity

of the Upper House. In Anne's reign no one saw things in that light. And St. John was no wiser than the rest. His one object now was to follow his rival to the Peers and outshine him there.

Already indeed the inconveniences of turning all great men into Lords was being felt in the political world. Swift wrote to Stella on April 22 :

Another difficulty is that if Mr. Harley be made a Peer, they will want him prodigiously in the House of Commons of which he is the great mover, and after him the Secretary [St John] and hardly anyone else of weight.

Yet the obvious solution, that Harley should remain where he was wanted, never occurred to anyone. He had earned his promotion and no one would deny him the reward.

A circumstance that further enhanced the triumph of the wounded statesman was the confusion that reigned in the House of Commons during his six weeks' absence. Whether St. John was to blame for mishandling the House it is hard to say. But in fact the October Club ran amuck, and, joining with some Whig members ready to fish in troubled waters, threw out the tax on leather, an essential part of the year's supply, proposed on behalf of the Treasury by Lowndes. They had some months before passed the hated four-shilling Land Tax for yet another year of war, but they now rebelled on a minor issue, to vindicate their right to revolt. In vain the Secretary besought his followers to come to heel. The leather tax was thrown out and all was confusion. In the lobbies it was said that money matters must wait till the Chancellor of the Exchequer recovered and came back to the House—though only for the fag end of the session before he departed for ever to higher regions. 'Several politicians,' reported Peter Wentworth, 'that could not endure Mr. Harley, say they see now there's no man the Court employs has address enough to manage the House of Commons but him.'

All this was gall and wormwood to St. John, and doubtless his failure on this occasion made him all the more eager to leave the House of Commons. He was the greatest orator there, but he was no financier, and he had not that

genius for managing his party in the House, which was one of the many ways whereby his professed imitator Disraeli so greatly surpassed him. Meanwhile Walpole sat watching from the Opposition benches and smiled his fat, cynical, good-natured smile.<sup>138</sup>

When at the end of April Harley reappeared for his last weeks in the Commons, he took the financial affairs of the country powerfully in hand. It was not enough to provide taxes for the year. A weight of debt lay heavy on the nation, the legacy of the long war. Everywhere, at home and abroad, the soldiers and sailors and public servants were going unpaid. And the proportion of unfunded debt was alarming. The 'lottery' to induce private persons to lend their money to government was no ultimate solution, though the expedient had been taken over by Harley from Godolphin, and good Tories now hastened to buy lottery tickets as good Whigs had done a year before.\*

In these circumstances Harley produced his famous plan to consolidate the floating debt, which was said to have been in part suggested to him by Defoe. A South Sea company, of which Harley himself became Governor, was set up. The creditors of the State were to become its first shareholders. The floating debt of ten millions was assigned to it, with a guaranteed interest at the rate of six per cent. The South Sea Company was not in 1711 the wild-cat scheme it had become by 1720. It represented the trade with South America that Britain would be privileged to drive, free of French and Dutch competition, as soon as the terms of peace designed by the Ministry were secured. 'The Monopoly of the South Sea trade,' writes Mr. W. R. Scott, 'was the bait that tempted people to consent to the funding of their share of certain debts, on an insufficient guarantee of interest which they would not otherwise have entertained.'

Thus the finances of the country were based in May 1711 on the assumption that the *Asiento*, or monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America, would be wrested from France as an integral part of the terms of peace ; and

\* See p. 46 above. • Halifax wrote to Harley approving the terms of his new lottery, but some of the Whigs decried it for Party reasons. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 658, 663 ; *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 446.

moreover that no share of it should be conceded to the Dutch, as should have been done according to the Fifteenth Clause of the Barrier Treaty of 1709, which bore the signature of Townshend for Great Britain. Harley's South Sea Act effectually pledged government to make peace, and to make it on these terms at the expense of France and Holland.

On the May morning when Harley revealed the plan to the House of Commons, the Tories were wild with delight. This was better than their unfortunate and lamented Land Bank : here at last would be a solvent and flourishing rival to the Whig Bank of England. The State creditors, however, were less enthusiastic. Till peace was actually signed they liked not the security. But they took it as the best they could get.<sup>189</sup>

Before the end of the month the Earl of Oxford and Mortimer \* took his seat in the House of Lords for the last few days of the closing session, from which, contrary to the expectations of his friend Swift, he had emerged in glory, as the Lord Treasurer, with all his enemies and rivals at his feet. It was in part a personal triumph over St. John, in part the triumph of moderate over extreme Toryism. But both victories were due rather to the changeable favour of the Queen and the passing accident of Guiscard's attempt than to the balance of power in the new Parliament. Harley would be a great man indeed if he could long maintain the position he had won, and use it to give Great Britain not only Peace abroad but an undisputed Succession at home.

At his best, there was much that was wise in his policy

\* *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 309. With regard to the double title, Harley's brother Edward tells us : ' The title of Oxford that had so long continued in the family of the de Veres being lately extinct, the Duke of Newcastle proposed that the Chancellor [of the Exchequer, Harley] should take the title, which he said no family had more pretence to than his own and the Chancellor's ; and therefore had mentioned it to the Queen, which he said her Majesty had consented to. This being known, the Earl of Lindsey, encouraged thereto by the Lord Wharton and others, endeavoured to obstruct, and entered his claim before the Duke of Newcastle, then Privy Seal, but his grace was so zealous in this matter that in spite of the caveat he immediately passed the Bill for granting the title for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was so cautious in this matter that, to prevent any slur on her Majesty or himself, he took with it the title of Mortimer, to which family he was allied by blood.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 656. Compare in our day the somewhat similar question about the assumption of the title of Earl of Oxford and Asquith.

and lovable in his character. It was not for nothing that Swift on May 22, 1711, wrote to the two Irish ladies of his friend's triumph :

This man has grown by persecutions, turnings out and stabbing. What waiting and crowding, and bowing will be at his levee ? Yet, if human nature be capable of so much constancy, I should believe he will be the same man still, hating the necessary forms of grandeur he must keep up. 'Tis late, sirrahs, and I'll go sleep.

To Swift, indeed, as to all his private friends, he always remained ' the same man still.'\*

During the summer there was a reconstruction of the Ministry, due partly to Oxford's promotion, and partly to the deaths of Rochester, the Lord President, in May, and of Newcastle, the Lord Privy Seal, in June. Both men had been staunch supporters of Harley against St. John, though Newcastle was a Whig and Rochester a High Tory, and their removal doubly weakened the Treasurer's position. There was some talk of bringing Nottingham, the veteran leader of the High Tories, into office again, but Oxford's friend Lord Poulett warned him :

If you put Nottingham in and he oversets the balance, you can no more raise the scales again. You know him of no great consequence as he is out, and what service can he do you with the Tories, to make amends for misleading others to be desperate ?

The Duke of Buckinghamshire was therefore made Lord President, as one ' who can never be dangerous.' When next month the Duke of Newcastle died of a hunting accident, the Privy Seal was given to John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol.†

\* Pope told the following anecdote to Spence (Spence's *Anecdotes*, ed. 1858, p. 134) : ' Lord Oxford was huddled in his thoughts, and obscure in his manner of delivering them. It was he who advised Rowe [the dramatist] to learn Spanish, when Rowe was asking for an appointment abroad. And after all his pains and expectations, only said " *Then, Sir, I envy you the pleasure of reading Don Quixote in the original.*" ' I have more than once heard this story told as of Lord Palmerston's dealings with an applicant for a consulship. It is thus that stories are fathered on one great man after another down the centuries.

† *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 684. For list of principal Ministers, see p. 322 below. The enormous monument erected by filial piety to Newcastle cannot escape attention in the north transept of Westminster Abbey.

Robinson was primarily a diplomat, who had done the country good service in that capacity in Scandinavia. For this he had, in November 1710, been rewarded with the Bishopric of Bristol, by one of the first acts of the Tory Ministers. In the Middle Ages high clerical preferment had been the customary reward of State servants, such as William of Wykeham, and hundreds of other great administrators, including a long line of Chancellors.\* After the Reformation the custom had declined, but not disappeared. Charles I had used Bishops in State offices. But the lay nobles regarded the practice with jealousy ; moreover the idea that a Bishop was first and foremost a servant of the Church was growing, though it had not yet attained the complete recognition it enjoys to-day. Encouraged by mediaeval precedent and by the practice of the Martyr King, the Tories regarded the Princes of the Church as the natural rulers of the land—were not so many of them such sad Whigs. On the other hand the more secularly minded Whig laity raised an outcry when the Bishop of Bristol was made Privy Seal in August 1711. ‘The Whigs,’ Swift gleefully wrote to Stella, ‘will fret to death to see a civil employment given to a clergyman. It was a handsome thing in my Lord Treasurer and will bind the Church to him forever. But what care you who is Privy Seal, saucy sluttikins ?’

Next year the Bishop was seconded from his English duties, ecclesiastical and lay, to go as British Plenipotentiary to Utrecht. But the long Whig regime that followed the death of Anne put an end to this overlapping of lay and clerical careers.

The Queen and her new Ministers were at one in raising only High Churchmen to preferment, and in the last four years of the reign much was done to redress the superiority of the Low Churchmen on the Episcopal bench, which William had created. Oxford University was completely in the ascendant, and though Whig Bentley trimmed his

\* In a Tory pamphlet of 1711-12, *Reasons of the Clergy being employed in the Government*, defending the Bishop of Bristol's appointment as Lord Privy Seal, these mediaeval precedents are set out at great length.

political sails somewhat, his biographer tells us that in the course of the four years of Tory rule 'scarcely a Cambridge man was preferred.'<sup>140</sup>

If Bentley of Trinity, Cambridge, was in the shade, his old enemies of the Phalaris controversy, the gentlemen Grecians of Christ Church, were in the blaze of Ministerial favour. It may even be said that they were scorched by its beams. Dean Aldrich, who had ruled the House so benevolently ever since the flight of the Popish Dean at the Revolution, died at Christmas 1710, and after seven months' delay the formidable Atterbury was appointed in his stead. There had been no opposition from within the college. The Christ Church men did not know, what they very soon learned, that the great champion of Convocation had, like Bentley, a temper as tyrannical as his talents were superb. For two years Christ Church was in the same case as Trinity, trampled under the hoofs of a contest between old indifference and an arrogant, merciless will to reform. Indeed Atterbury appears to have been more brutal than Bentley himself. On one occasion, at Christmas 1712, one of the Canons, Dr. William Stratford, records that

He fell on a sudden into a violent passion ; he hopped up to Dr. Gastrell from whom he had not had the least provocation ; he pushed him with great violence several times, and cried ' Get out of my house, you pitiful fellow.' I never saw any man so much under the power of rage ; his face looked black and every joint in him trembled.

When in June 1713 Atterbury departed to be Bishop of Rochester and Dean of Westminster, there was more joy in Christ Church Meadows than lower down the Thames. The Queen had yielded to the pressure of the more violent of her Ministers, but she knew the character of the man she was promoting 'with so much reluctance' at their request, and told them that she did so only to avoid the worse scandal of making Sacheverell a Bishop as the Lord Chancellor had asked. It was well for the Church that the accession of the House of Hanover prevented a man at once so able and so violent as Atterbury from rising to be Primate of All England.<sup>141</sup>

Except in the case of Atterbury, the Queen followed the



advice of Oxford rather than of Bolingbroke and Harcourt. Therefore, although all the Bishops whom she made between 1710 and 1714 were Tories, most of them were moderates, at least to the extent of being staunch for Hanover. Such a one was Dawes whom in 1713 she chose to succeed her favourite Sharp in the charge of the Province of York, at the advice of the dying Archbishop himself. And so, at the crisis that occurred on the Queen's death, the leaders of the Church, with few exceptions, acted as open and sincere advocates of the Protestant Succession, although the character of the Bench was very much less Whig than on the day that King William was alive and dead.

Apart from a few Crown appointments, like the Christ Church and Trinity Headships, Oxford and Cambridge had ever since the Revolution enjoyed a very complete immunity from Royal and Ministerial interference—an academic liberty that held in it the seeds of intellectual freedom for the whole country, as compared to the practice in many other lands down to our own time. The quarrel of James II with the Universities was constantly in the recollection of the dons, who, whether Whig or Tory, would never, in his daughter's reign, permit the least interference with their internal government by royal mandate or request. Any such attempt was promptly met by expressions of the hope that Queen Anne would 'reflect upon what was done in Magdalen College in her father's time.'<sup>142</sup> Meanwhile politics swayed College elections, as in the case of poor 'Mr. Entwistle's pretensions' to a Fellowship at Brazen-nose, for the young man was found to be a Whig, 'which was against the present humour of the College.'<sup>143</sup> Such an incident in 1711 is not surprising, but it is a remarkable proof of academic freedom from government control that Oxford was permitted to continue such practices and to remain Tory, and largely Jacobite, under the Hanoverian kings and their Whig governments. Academic and scholastic freedom, which is a necessary condition of intellectual and political freedom, was established as against the State in Eighteenth Century England. In a great part of Europe it does not exist to-day. It is one of the island blessings we have inherited from our Whig and Tory ancestors.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MARLBOROUGH'S LAST CAMPAIGN

The forcing of the *Ne Plus Ultra* Lines, 1711. Bouchain. Marlborough and England.

DURING the summer of 1711, while secret negotiations were being pushed forward between the English and French Ministers to lay the foundations of a general peace, operations of war were conducted in various parts of the world, the success or failure of which would affect the terms of the bargain to be struck between Torcy and St. John.


In Spain the war was dead. In Italy and on the Rhine it was moribund. But on the Netherlands border of France, where Marlborough and Villars stood opposed, it was likely to show signs of life. And if St. John's venture against Quebec should prove successful, it would change the whole character of the North American settlement to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace.

The Duke was no longer the recognized chief of the Alliance, laying its plans of campaign by land and sea all over the world. Even Britain's fleets and armies were no longer at his disposal. He was only the commander of the British and Dutch forces in the Netherlands, and that on a most uncertain and humiliating tenure. Much to his chagrin, St. John took five British battalions away from him to send to Quebec. Worse still, Eugene, followed soon by the Imperial army, was withdrawn from co-operation with Marlborough and sent to do nothing on the Rhine. The cause of this movement was the death of the Emperor Joseph in April. The approaching choice of his successor by the Electors, though practically certain to alight on his brother Charles, rendered the statesmen of Vienna nervous

lest a revival of the claims of the House of Bavaria should be supported by French arms and intrigue. To ensure the situation, Eugene and his troops were moved back to the German frontier, thereby destroying the last chance that Marlborough could take Paris that year.

He was left with the British and Dutch armies, inferior in numbers to the French mustered against them under Villars. The Marshal, whose natural prudence was fortified by strict orders from Versailles, was content to lie safe behind the famous 'Lines' which he had constructed to stop Marlborough once for all, giving to them the boastful title of the *Ne Plus Ultra*. They ran from Oppy on the head waters of the Canche, through Arras and Bouchain, to Valenciennes. At their western end, where there was no natural defence, earthworks had been erected for a distance of ten miles ; but from Arras to Valenciennes protection was afforded by the Scarpe, the Sensée and the Schelde. Their waters had been let out over the countryside, and the few practicable roads across the inundations, like that at Arleux, were guarded by elaborate entrenchments.

Operating from the fortresses he had captured the year before—Aire, St. Venant, Béthune and Douai—Marlborough determined to force the Lines by stratagem and take Bouchain in the face of Villars' superior force. In the political conditions of England and of Europe there could be no question of fighting another Malplaquet, yet that was precisely what he pretended that he would do, deceiving his own army and even his own staff in order the better to deceive the French. He affected a morose ill temper, which, after the treatment accorded to him and his wife in England and the departure of Eugene, would have been natural in any other human being as subject as he was to headaches ; but it appalled his officers, who had never before seen his military judgment clouded by passion. Having moved his army across the plain of Lens to the neighbourhood of Aubigny, he threatened there to attack the French army entrenched behind the western end of the Lines. The Dutch and English gloomily prepared to be led to a useless sacrifice, while in the French camp all



rejoiced at the prospect of an assault which they felt certain to repel. Villars withdrew his men from the east end of the Lines to meet the coming attack on the west—as Marlborough had intended he should do.

The night before the expected battle, the scene was suddenly changed. The Allied army received with fresh astonishment the orders to march off in column to Aug. 4-5 the east. For awhile the enemy was ignorant of 1711 their departure. Throughout the hours of darkness they re-crossed the plain of Lens, and next morning were met by a message from Marlborough, announcing that the detachment under Generals Cadogan and Hompesch had traversed unopposed the causeway near Arleux, and were in possession of the French Lines : ‘the Duke desires the infantry will step out.’ And out they stepped, restored to more than all their old confidence in ‘this man,’ as Captain Parker called him, ‘who never led us in any one action that we did not succeed in.’ The English humour appreciated the joke of Corporal John’s feigned ill-temper the day before, and Villars’ very real ill-temper that morning.

Our army [wrote Captain Parker] continued their march with all the cheerfulness imaginable, not making the least halt, or observing any kind of order ; but every Regiment of Foot brought up as many men as they could, without waiting for any that dropped behind. The enemy also pushed on their march with the utmost expedition, insomuch that it was a perfect race between the two armies. But we having the start of them by some hours, constantly kept ahead of them.

Thirty-six miles were covered in sixteen hours, a marvel of marching for a great army weighted with arms and accoutrements. The English won the race and arrived in time to reinforce Cadogan and Hompesch before Villars could bring back his forces from the west. Without the loss of a single man killed, Marlborough had placed his army on the southern side of the Sensée, within the ‘impregnable’ Lines, and was standing triumphant between the enemy and Bouchain.

Elated by a success that was in fact due solely to Marlborough’s skill, the Dutch Deputies clamoured that he should attack Villars’ army as it lay before Cambrai. But

he refused to assail a force at least as large as his own, protected, as he wrote to St. John, by 'hollow roads and precipices of which that country is full,' especially as his own retreat in case of a repulse would be impeded by the rivers he had just passed. His English enemies took up the cry from the Dutch Deputies ; according to some Tory pamphleteers Marlborough was an incompetent coward, who had neglected a chance of defeating Villars. But if, at the suggestion of the Dutch, he had fought a bloody and decisive action, the same writers would have demanded his impeachment.

The Duke proceeded to reduce Bouchain, in the face of Villars' superior force, which he kept off by lines of contravallation. When this difficult task had been accomplished, scarcely any fortifications except the minor fortress of Le Quesnoy lay between him and the open road to Paris. He was eager to end the year's campaign by taking Le Quesnoy, and wrote for the necessary supplies from Holland and England. But the authorities in both countries failed to answer his demands. He was bitterly surprised at the want of Dutch support ; <sup>144</sup> he was more bitter but less surprised at his failure to secure help from England, whence his emissary, the Earl of Stair, returned empty-handed in September, 'with a bamboozling letter from Lord Oxford.' The fact of the peace negotiations with France had begun to leak out, owing to the detention of St. John's secret emissary, Matthew Prior, by the over-zealous Mayor of Deal, on the watch for spies landing from France.<sup>145</sup>

Bouchain was Marlborough's last siege. It can be said of him, as it cannot be said of Wellington, that he never sat down before a fortress that he did not take. And he never fought a battle that he did not win. The passage of the *Ne Plus Ultra* Lines without the loss of a man was his last and not least glorious victory in the field. He himself regarded that operation, followed by its sequel, the taking of Bouchain, as his professional masterpiece. It is significant that the beautiful Blenheim tapestries, executed by de Vost in Brussels with map-like fidelity according to the careful instructions of Marlborough, show as many as three

scenes dealing with this episode, and only one representing any other event of his military career.\*

His success left the Allies in a position to begin next year with a chance of reaching Paris, if they decided to fight the war to the bitter end, and if they chose to concentrate their forces in the Netherlands instead of dispersing them along the Rhine. The Tory Government may indeed have been right in declining further to pursue the uncertain chances of war. And it may even be that a treaty dictated at Versailles, as more treaties than one have since been, would have proved a less good basis for ultimate European security than a negotiated peace. Such questions are decided, in a well-governed country, by the civil power, and it is the just boast of England that ever since 1660 the civil power has been supreme. None the less the soldier who serves the State should be thanked for doing his part, and no English soldier has ever done it better than Marlborough. The thanks he received, on his return home that winter, was to be arraigned in Parliament as a swindler, attacked in the Press as an incompetent and even a cowardly soldier, and driven back, an exile in disgrace, from the island he had saved to the continent he had set free.

\* The best account of the forcing of the *Ne Plus Ultra* is to be found in Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, Vol. I, Bk. VI, Chap. X; Captain Liddell Hart, in *The British Way in Warfare* (p. 233) writes: 'Look at Marlborough, twisting and turning in such bewildering manœuvres that his men thought him mad, until he walked through the *Ne Plus Ultra* Lines without sacrificing a life, except a few in marching.'

## CHAPTER IX

### QUEEN ANNE'S EMPIRE


The English and French Colonies in America. Deerfield and French-Indian outrages. The Capture of Port Royal, Acadia, 1710. Failure of the Quebec Expedition, 1711. Hudson's Bay. The West Indian Islands. Forts and Factories in Africa. The Slave Trade. The Levant Company. The East India Company. Governor Pitt.

PRIOR to the reign of George III there was no difference of principle between English Whigs and Tories in Colonial policy. Both regarded the 'Plantations' as markets for our goods, indispensable in days when all countries, as far as possible, excluded foreigners from the trade of their overseas possessions. Colonial commerce was to be encouraged in so far as it supplied England with the articles she herself required, and in so far as it enabled her to sell to the Plantations the products of her own manufacture. Tobacco, naval stores, sugar and furs from beyond the Atlantic should be exchanged for English clothing and hardwares ; but the trade of our American Colonies with foreign lands, and even with the British West Indies, must be circumscribed by Navigation Laws and otherwise, according to the supposed interests of British manufacturers and merchants.

In return, the Colonists had no bad bargain. They obtained, free of charge, naval protection against French fleets and privateers, and some measure of military assistance on land. In time of war, they could not have carried on their external trade at all without the protection of the British fleet. They enjoyed in their Assemblies a degree of self-government to which there was nothing that answered in French or Dutch Colonial life. Freedom was the hallmark of the English settlements. In religion, too, they were allowed to go each their own way. In the Southern



MAP IV



Colonies the Church of England flourished ; in the Middle Colonies, round New York, a number of different religions imported from the British Islands and the European Continent prospered side by side ; in New England, Puritanism was established in a spirit at least as monopolistic as Anglicanism in the old country. Louis XIV would allow no Huguenots to go to Canada, but Anglican England rejoiced to see her Puritans take themselves off to Massachusetts and her Roman Catholics to Maryland.

Yet if the principle of colonial liberty was old, so also was the tale of trouble between the mother country and her children. From the reign of Charles I onwards there had been constant friction. The remnant of political authority retained by the Crown in the person of the Governor of each Colony, came into conflict with the spirit of democracy natural to a new world with no feudal or regal backgrounds. Colonial Governors and military and naval officers came out from England with monarchical and aristocratic habits of mind, consonant with the tone of society and politics at home, but not consonant with American conditions. The Colonists sometimes strove to bring the Governors into submission by making their salaries dependent on the votes of the Assemblies. Each of these petty parliaments was singularly unwilling to co-operate even in time of public danger, either with their own Executive, or with the Assembly of any other State. The spirit of freedom too often showed itself in obstructive provincialism.

The commercial restrictions, the most serious grievance from which the Colonists suffered, led to smuggling and law-breaking on an extensive scale, largely from New York, but most of all from seafaring Massachusetts. The revenue laws of the English Parliament had been broken wholesale every year in New England, as well as in the old country, for a century before the tea-chests were emptied into Boston harbour.

Many things made for mutual misunderstanding. Conditions of life and thought in the pioneer Continent of unfelled forests were necessarily very different from those prevailing in the garden of England. The ocean, that still took two months to traverse, kept the two parts of the

Empire in gross ignorance of one another. The traditional animosity between Anglican and Puritan ; the fact that America was even more, and England far less, democratic and equalitarian than is the case to-day ; all these circumstances were preparing the divergent growth of two distinct nations, and no one on either side of the Atlantic then dreamed of the possibility of an Empire that should include two or more distinct nations in an unforced loyalty to the Crown. The Crown, instead, made spasmodic efforts to assert its power and dignity, often through some proud and tactless Governor, with the result of further irritating the most insubordinate communities in the world.

The character and extent of the tension were as clear at the end of Anne's reign as at the beginning of George III's. In 1712 Caleb Heathcote wrote to Lord Oxford :

It is my opinion that through all North America, for every member of the Church there are thirty or forty Dissenters. In the Colony of Connecticut, until I went there, the prayers of the Church had never been read in all that colony. . . . It very much concerns the nation of Great Britain to take some speedy care of us, and as these countries increase in people, the best of religions, the Church of England, may take root, lest in time the seed of rebellion should spring up. . . . Both in New England and Connecticut the people talk as if they were now in a condition to set up for themselves, and were not now to be governed by England.

Ten years before, Lord Cornbury, Governor of New York, had written to the Council of Trade and Plantations that the Colonists 'hate everybody that owns any subjection to the Queen.' <sup>146</sup>

But Old and New England still had one great interest in common, shared only to a less degree by the Middle and Southern Colonies—defence against France. In time of war, the Colonists, from Maine to Carolina, lived in the shadow of two terrors—the French privateers at sea, and those Indian tribes whom the Jesuits sent to murder and scalp along the English frontier. As early as 1710 a Frenchman in Canada was wise enough to prophesy that if ever the French power in America was annihilated, the English Colonies 'will then unite, shake off the yoke of the English Monarchy and erect themselves into a democracy.' <sup>147</sup>

The British settlements on the mainland of America had increased from an aggregate population of 200,000 in the year of the English Revolution to nearly 350,000 at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, although twenty of those twenty-five years had been spent in war.\* There had been no large immigration; the increase was in the main due to the fertility of the pioneer stocks, in a healthy climate, with good trading facilities and a boundless reserve of cheap land. The total population of French Canada was estimated at 15,000 or less.<sup>148</sup> With such disparity in numbers, a little active co-operation between the various English Colonies, vigorously supported by the mother country, would have enabled them to conquer Quebec during the twenty years' war with Louis XIV, anticipating by two generations the exploit of Wolfe and Pitt,—with what consequences to the history of America and the British Empire it is interesting but idle to speculate.

But neither the Colonies nor the mother country cared enough to take the necessary steps. Indeed, the initiative in the War of the Spanish Succession came rather from the enemy's side. French Canada formed a compact political unit, governed harmoniously by priests and feudal seigneurs, who were popular enough; and its policy was directed by orders from Versailles which no one thought of questioning. Small as Canada was in number of inhabitants, her concentrated and easily mobilized power tempted her to take the offensive against the ill-organized bulk of her southern neighbour. The English Colonies were jealous of one another and still more jealous of the home government. They were, moreover, as pacific and unmilitary as English-speaking peoples usually show themselves, till roused by insult or stirred by greed. The French trappers and fur-dealers, on the other hand, were accustomed to life in the forests in company with the Indians, and many of them were always ready to go on the war-path with their allies.

In every way the French lived on closer terms with the

\* In 1713 the New England Colonies were reckoned at 110,000, the Middle Colonies at 73,000, and the Southern Colonies (Maryland to South Carolina) at 150,000; this last figure included a certain number of negroes, but slavery had not yet grown to the proportions it reached during the Eighteenth Century. *C.H.B.E.*, I, pp. 266-267.

red men : the Jesuits had converted numbers of them to a kind of Christianity ; many of the French intermarried with their women. The land-hunger of the white farmer, so fatal to the redskin, was less marked in the French than in the English colonies. The English, therefore, tended either to neglect or to ill use the Indians, except indeed the Quakers acting on Penn's principles, and the agents of the Hudson's Bay Company seeking furs that could only be obtained by the help of the inhabitants of the forest. Generally speaking, the Indian tribes, with the notable exception of the Iroquois or Five Nations, were on the side of the French. And even the Five Nations tended to neutrality during the wars of Queen Anne.<sup>149</sup>

The French Canadians were well aware of the danger of their own position, shut in between the Hudson's Bay Company to the north and the teeming populations of the British colonies to the south. Moreover the English-speaking traders, in dealing with the Indian tribes in time of peace, had the advantage of providing cheaper goods, especially cheaper cloth from home—not to mention cheap liquor which was a great article of commerce in the woods. Fears for their ultimate position in North America drove the French to push forward up the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi, seeking to circumvent the English who otherwise threatened to surround them. The sense of being outnumbered and undersold in time of peace, made them welcome the opportunity of war with England to attack the isolated posts of the Hudson's Bay Company, and to engage the Indian tribes who were still under their influence in operations of savage war against the colonies to the south of Canada.

Under these circumstances, the renewal of war in 1702 brought suffering on the subjects of Queen Anne, in a form calculated to awake their resentment against the French and their Indian allies, and to arouse the fighting spirit latent in the Anglo-American. The christianized tribes under Jesuit control were let loose upon the English frontier to perpetrate the most loathsome cruelties. Crossing the broad screen of primeval forest that still divided the English and French possessions, the redskins kept up, throughout Anne's reign,

spasmodic attacks on isolated points along the whole frontier, as far south as the Carolinas,<sup>150</sup> but most of all against outlying New England farmsteads, particularly the widely scattered settlements that lay between the forest and the shore of Maine.

In these raids horrible atrocities took place, as for instance in the destruction of Deerfield in the outlying parts of Massachusetts, in 1704, perpetrated by 300 Indian and 100 French and half-breeds, when English women and children were massacred, and some of the male victims were scalded or boiled to death to amuse the savages. The survivors were carried off to Canada to be brought up there as Roman Catholics, their conversion being accomplished by the cruel methods usually employed by Gallican propaganda under Louis XIV. These doings had an effect easy to imagine on the minds of the farming communities of Puritan New England.\*

The cry arose for vengeance. But it was not easy to be revenged on Canada, whence the offence came, for Quebec was hid in the depths of the guardian wilderness. But, since the Bostonians held their own seas, vicarious retribution might be exacted from Acadia. Its capital, Port Royal, was moreover obnoxious as 'the nest of spoilers' whence privateers issued forth against Boston's shipping; in 1707 the militia regiments of New England went by sea to take it. But the attack of the landing party was mismanaged. In the words of Parkman, while 'Canadian feudalism developed good partisan leaders,' such at this period 'was rarely the case with New England Democracy.'<sup>151</sup>

After this repulse of their unaided efforts, the Colonists applied to the mother country for help. Marlborough's scheme of war had been to defeat France in Europe, and to establish British naval control of the Mediterranean as the basis of maritime supremacy throughout the world. Colonial expeditions did not attract him, as they attracted the High Tory statesmen. He believed that if England held the seas, and if France were not allowed to dominate Europe, French Canada would be a nut in England's cheek,

\* *Parkman (Half Century of Conflict, Chaps. I-V)* gives full details, for which see also *C.S.P., America 1710-11*, pp. 73-77.

to be cracked whenever she wished. In the main he was right, but it is possible to carry even a right theory too far, and in the last years of the victorious war there was ample opportunity to do something direct for the English overseas.

Early in 1710 a Colonial deputation arrived in London, accompanied by four Mohawk Chiefs of the friendly 'Five Nations,' whose strange and romantic appearance took the fancy of the Town. It was agreed that Indians were fine fellows 'when not poisoned by priests.' The Archbishop of Canterbury presented each chief with a Bible. They were fêted at the Queen's expense, and followed everywhere by wondering crowds. After the performance of *Macbeth* at the Haymarket, a social function of the highest dignity and importance, an Epilogue was spoken in their honour, promising them that the Five Nations should be

Secured against the threats of France and Rome.

What the silent red men made of it all, is not on record ! But we may suppose they went back vaguely impressed with the reserves of English power ; the Five Nations remained loyal, thereby keeping open the land route for the attack on Montreal and Quebec.†

Their visit had been the success of the season in London, and the consequent fashionable interest in things American was not without its effect on the policy of government. The year before, Ministers had promised much but done nothing for the Colonists.<sup>152</sup> But in 1710 one of the last acts of Godolphin's government before it fell was to dispatch an expedition to North America. The result was that in September four hundred British marines and fifteen hundred New Englanders landed at Port Royal, and easily captured its small stone fort, guarded by a few hundred men. Acadia thus passed into English hands and was re-christened Nova Scotia, while Port Royal became Annapolis, in honour of the Queen.

Thus, belatedly, but effectively, the Whig government

\* I notice that in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (I, pp. 326-327, 522-524) the view is taken that Marlborough's policy was right in the interest of the Empire.

† It was only in 1722 that the Five Nations became Six Nations, as thereafter they were called.

had taken the step which caused St. John to secure Nova Scotia at the Treaty of Utrecht. Sunderland had also, with the connivance of Marlborough, laid plans for the taking of Quebec ; but they ended by leaving that more difficult task to their successors.<sup>153</sup>

It was under these circumstances that, in January 1711, St. John, as the new Secretary of State, revived his predecessor's idea of an expedition to sail up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. He first attempted to persuade Harley to co-operate :

Pray do me the justice [he wrote] to believe that I am not light or whimsical in this project. It will certainly succeed if the secret is preserved, and if it succeeds you will have done more service to Britain in half a year than the Ministers who went before you did in all their administration.<sup>154</sup>

But Harley was obdurate ; the quarrel began next month between the hare and the tortoise of the new government, and St. John would never have succeeded in launching the Canadian expedition at all, had not his rival been laid up for several weeks by the wound dealt him by Guiscard.\*

St. John chose Sir Hovenden Walker to command the squadron. He confided the secret of its destination to him but not to the Lords of the Admiralty, whom, indeed, he took elaborate pains to deceive. His object in such close secrecy was probably twofold, to prevent leakage to France through clerks and underlings, as had happened in the case of Greg ; and to ensure that 'service opposition' from the Admiralty should not put a stop to the expedition altogether, as it well might in the divided state of opinion in the Cabinet. He may possibly have been right, but it was only natural that, after disaster had overtaken Walker in the St. Lawrence, the Sea-Lords disclaimed all responsibility for the result of counsels to which they had been kept strangers.†

\* See p. 120 above.

† *Burchett*, p. 778, writes: 'The design on which they were bound was very industriously hid from them [the Lords of the Admiralty] as may appear by some letters to Sir Hovenden Walker before he sailed from Spithead, by which a *certain person* seemed to value himself very much that a design of this nature was kept a secret from the Admiralty, who, had they been consulted, would not, I am apt to think, have advised the sending of ships of 80 and 70 guns to Quebec, since the



Unfortunately he had chosen the wrong Admiral in Walker, and it therefore mattered the less that he had also chosen the wrong General in Hill ; for Walker's seamanship deprived Hill of the opportunity of displaying his military incompetence. St. John, however, succeeded in one of his main objects in the business : he laid the foundations of his political alliance with Abigail Masham, the Queen's favourite and General Hill's sister. From this moment she began to turn against her former patron Harley, because he opposed the expedition which St. John had selected her brother to command.<sup>155</sup>

Walker and Hill reached Boston near the end of June. The arrival of so considerable a military and naval force aroused the warlike enthusiasm of the Colonists to a point never reached at any other moment of the war. Not only New England and the Five Nations did their part, but the Middle Colonies sent their quotas of men, stores and ships. When a French emissary from Canada came to Boston to persuade the men of Massachusetts that the armament was intended by Britain to take away their provincial liberties, no one was in the mood to listen.

Yet even during this summer of enthusiasm and co-operation, mutual ill-will made itself felt. The Queen's officers complained bitterly that hundreds of their men were lured to desert by farmers in want of hands, and Colonel King, the Quartermaster, wrote of ' the ill-nature and sourness of these people,' whose ' government, doctrine and manners, whose hypocrisy and canting are insupportable.' Colonial opinion of the British was scarcely more flattering.

At length, after long delays and much quarrelling, two expeditions against French Canada started, late in the season of 1711. The land armament of Provincial Militia under

navigation up the river St. Lawrence was generally esteemed to be very dangerous.' This passage has led modern historians (e.g. Professor Callender in *Leake*, II, p. 365 note) to suppose that the *certain person* was Harley, always so secretive. But in fact it was St. John, as is clear from his letter of April 21 to Walker ' before he sailed from Spithead,' in which St. John says that ' *the Admiralty will be led into the error we desire* ' as to the destination of the squadron, if certain deceptive measures are taken. *Walker*, p. 179 ; see also *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 233. It is only fair to St. John and Walker to add that in 1759 Saunders took a ninety- and an eighty-gun ship up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. I am much obliged to Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for advices and information.

the able command of Colonel Nicholson, and well supported by the Indians of the Five Nations, took the land route by Albany for Montreal; while the British ships were to convey the British soldiers and more Colonials up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. If they had got so far, even Hill could scarcely have failed to take the town, which was defended by only a few hundred local militia, very different from Montcalm's army of 15,000 men with which Wolfe had to deal on a later day.<sup>156</sup>

But Admiral Walker was incapable of reaching his destination. He had left Boston without securing expert pilots for the St. Lawrence, and he neglected to use the services of Vetch, the Colonial whose local knowledge was best able to supply the want of professional guidance. In the broad mouth of the river, Walker lost his way in a fog, and according to his own account thought he was off the South shore when he was really off the North shore. He consequently gave the wrong orders, and when a storm arose, eight transports were cast on the rocks and about 700 soldiers were drowned.

There was still an ample margin of survivors to take Quebec if they could get there. But the catastrophe had shaken the nerves of the Admiral and his Captains, who had no confidence in their own powers of navigating the St. Lawrence; in spite of Vetch's offer to guide them, they decided forthwith to abandon the enterprise. They were afraid that, even if they reached their destination, the French would desert Quebec and leave them to starve there during the Canadian winter on the insufficient supply of food that they had brought. Perhaps the best thing these ill-provided and incompetent people could do was to turn back. Such at least was their decision.

When Nicholson's land expedition heard that the fleet had returned, they also retreated, for no one supposed they could reduce Canada by their unaided strength.

A disappointment so complete, after such high hopes and earnest endeavours, had the worst effect on the relations of America and England. Contrary to their usual custom, the various Colonies had on this grand occasion united their efforts, and given of their best in order to co-operate with

the mother country, and the result had been the most disgraceful of failures. To make matters worse, the British naval and military officers had not concealed their contempt for the Provincials, yet proved themselves to be wanting in all the arts of leadership. The good effects on the Colonial mind of the taking of Acadia the year before were obliterated. The Empire had not gained much by the substitution of Tory direct action for the Whig method of winning America in Europe.<sup>157</sup>

The capture of Acadia and the failure to reach Quebec were laying down the map of the North American section in the Treaty of Utrecht. The terms of peace to be made in Europe would also decide the fate of the English Hudson's Bay Company, which traded in furs in the inhospitable regions to the north of French Canada, 'in such a climate as only to be navigable once a year.' The Company had fared ill at the settlement of Ryswick, and its servants, in their isolated geographical position, were much at the mercy of the foe. Unless St. John secured them a better and more definite boundary under the new Treaty, the French would soon complete the process of seizing their last forts and extinguishing what was left of their trade. Throughout the War of Spanish Succession, the Company had been constantly petitioning successive English Ministries not to forget them at the Peace. And in fact they were not forgotten.<sup>158</sup>

The dozen years of war had done nothing to alter the allegiance of any of the West Indian Islands, except St. Kitts. Its sovereignty had hitherto been disputed between the English and French, but in the summer of 1702 it had been seized by the spirited action of the English section of its inhabitants and by a small force from the neighbouring Leeward Islands under their Governor, Christopher Codrington, who bluffed a timid French Major into capitulation.<sup>159</sup> Codrington was less fortunate in his attempt next year to seize Guadeloupe, where he failed for want of the proper kind of ships and men from home requisite for such an enterprise.<sup>160</sup> Otherwise the war in the West Indies had been confined to privateering, convoying, and

waylaying of merchantmen or at most of Treasure Fleets. The attacks on islands had seldom been more than buccaneering raids, as when in 1708 a party of French landed in the thinly inhabited Bahamas and tortured English women to make them reveal where they had hidden their wealth.<sup>161</sup>

At the end of the Queen's reign, the British West Indian Islands were reckoned to contain 200,000 inhabitants ; but of these three-quarters were negroes, and the proportion was growing larger with the increase of British slave-trading from Africa.<sup>162</sup> Sometimes, indeed, white men and women were still sold into servitude, either as criminals condemned by the law, or as victims of crimping and kidnapping, for which Bristol had an evil reputation. But the worst days of these practices were over. In 1713 died Lord Carberry, Governor of Jamaica in the reign of Charles II, of whom it was reported that he had taken out with him 'many shauntlemen of Wales, and sold 'em there as slaves, as he did his chaplain, to a blacksmith.'<sup>163</sup>

The more closely settled of the West Indian Islands were not unprosperous even in wartime, and in time of peace would, with their tobacco and sugar plantations, be a source of ever-increasing wealth to their white inhabitants and to plantation-owners and merchants in England. But the islanders depended, for supplies necessary to their very existence, on trade with the American or European continents, and therefore on the British fleet.<sup>164</sup>

Jamaica was the emporium of commerce for the islands and for the smuggling and the legitimate trade with the mainland Colonies both of England and of Spain. Above all, it was the *entrepôt* of the slave trade from Africa, in which all English and Spanish America, from Virginia southwards, was increasingly interested. The Seventeenth Century had felt few scruples about the trade in human beings, but had not possessed shipping enough to practise it on a vast scale. The Eighteenth Century, scarcely more troubled in conscience until its later years, was better equipped for the operation, and England's share in the ever-expanding wickedness was an exact measure of her supremacy in maritime commerce.

In Anne's reign the slave trade was already of the first

political and international importance. In 1713 the Mayor of Bristol declared, on behalf of his fellow-citizens, that it was 'the great support of our people,' and Liverpool, Plymouth, London and other ports, had each its group of traders increasingly engaged in the traffic.

The settlement of the Asiento at Utrecht would decide whether English, French or Dutch should have the legal right to supply Spanish America with negroes. And the Parliamentary dispute that raged round the quarrel between the English Africa Company and the free-traders or 'interlopers' from the English ports, turned on the great question of Imperial policy, how best the Colonies could be supplied with cheap slaves. The interlopers, backed by Colonial opinion, declared that a Joint Stock Company, if its monopoly were enforced, would raise the price of slaves from £15 to £50 a head and ruin the Plantations. The Company replied that nothing short of the profits of monopoly could defray the expenses of its forts, Cape Coast Castle of seventy guns on the Gold Coast, and Fort James on an island of the Gambia River. Parliament, as umpire, had decided in William's reign to throw open the African trade, but to exact a ten per cent. duty on all goods, to compensate the Africa Company for the expense of its forts and armaments. The duty was not easily levied and proved insufficient. During the wars of Anne, the Company's business was ruined, partly by the competition of the English interlopers, partly by the raids of enemy privateers.

Their French rivals, trading in the Senegal hard by, were, however, scarcely in better case. The English and French Africa Companies, both in desperate financial straits, realized that they had common interests against interlopers and privateers. They therefore made a gentleman's agreement  
1705 to live at peace with one another during the war waged by their respective nations, and to 'assist each other against the negroes and whomsoever else should disturb their trade.' This private Treaty, so strange to our present-day notions of State omnipotence, was faithfully observed by the contracting parties, but it could not save their ships and settlements from attack by those whom the Treaty did not bind. On three several occasions French privateers

took Fort James on the Gambia River and held it to ransom paid in gold and negroes. After 1709 the Company, in despair, left the fort derelict, and practically retired from business, abandoning the field to the French traders and to the English 'ten per cent. men' as the interlopers were then called.

Its prospects were, however, suddenly revived by the government's Asiento policy, when the managers of Harley's new South Sea Company\* undertook to buy from the Africa Company all the slaves that they hoped to sell in South America under the monopoly rights secured by the Treaty of Utrecht.

So the Joint Stock Africa Company and the free-traders continued their nefarious work in rivalry, after Anne's death as before. Both parties employed the same general method of obtaining slaves. They bought them on the coast from native kings, who drove down the long files of captives from the dark forests of the interior; by what cruelties and wars the victims had been there obtained, no white man had the curiosity to enquire. Then followed a period of imprisonment in a stockade on the coast, under a guard of white sailors armed with cutlasses, waiting for a ship; and after that the horrors of the 'middle passage' across the Atlantic—living human bodies lying crushed side by side in the pitch-dark, tossing dungeon. As the long weeks of the voyage drew on, many died and were thrown overboard like ballast. It was the same method in the reign of Anne as in the time of Wilberforce, only there was as yet no public man to denounce it as wrong. Posterity reads such a piece of news as this with different feelings from those with which the diarist recorded it in March 1702:

Our merchants have letters from Barbadoes, that the *Betty* frigate is arrived there from Guinea with negroes; that in this passage the negroes mutinied, killed the captain and all the ship's crew except seven, who with their scimitars defended themselves, and forced the negroes into the hold, and brought the ship into Bridgetown.<sup>165</sup>

In January 1709 the Council of Trade and Plantations was able to make the following report to the House of

\* See p. 123 above. *Add. MSS.* 25495, ff. 185-186 on the co-operation of the Companies in 1714.

Commons on the excellent effect of opening the trade, in spite of the outcry of the Africa Company :

By the Company's own account of the negro trade from 1680 to 1688 in 9 years and in a time of peace, there were but 43,396 negroes delivered in the plantations ; whereas 'tis computed by the separate traders that, since the opening of the trade, within the like term of years, notwithstanding the present war, there have been imported by the separate traders into those parts, 160,950 negroes.

Such are the blessings of an open trade.<sup>166</sup>

In England herself, though it was long since white people had been treated as slaves, neither law nor current morality forbade the ownership of blacks. Fashionable ladies had each their negro page, whose thick lips and swarthy, grinning features made an admirable foil to Beauty. And some elegant gentlemen had their black body-servants. ' Sambo ' wore an ornamental collar of servitude, and if he ran away, his master or mistress advertised for him in the newspapers as for lost property. There is no evidence that this small class of domestic slaves was ill-treated, and fortunately no one sought to introduce coloured labour into the island wholesale for purposes of industry or agriculture.

The Africa Company had been driven to the verge of ruin by the free-traders, but the Hudson's Bay, the Levant and the East India Companies each maintained the privileged position its needs required. Experience had persuaded Parliament and public opinion that merchants trading on distant coasts, beset by foreign foes and rivals from Europe, and in face of unreliable native potentates, could thrive only if they were closely organized in a Company with a strong policy of its own, and with its own stations, armaments and administrators in parts of the world beyond the reach of the arm of the English state.\*

\* A distinguished economic historian has recently written on the subject of these great Companies : ' Is it unreasonable to suggest that the distant foreign trade, so dear to the mercantilist, and, because of its privileges, so suspect to Adam Smith, was conducive on the whole to business strength, Imperial growth and general liberty ? To business strength because men had to unite closely if they were to trade in distant parts at all : so that in foreign trade was learned the potentiality of the business corporation which now dominates all business, domestic and foreign. To imperial growth, because it staked out distant claims and thus

The Levant Company, protected by Marlborough's naval policy in the Mediterranean, had in the course of the war become by far the most important European influence in Turkey and the Near East. When in 1712 the Tory Parliament charged our Dutch Allies with having failed to supply their full quota of warships in the Mediterranean, our former rivals in trade replied that the commerce of those parts had passed into our hands during the war, that it therefore was only fair that we should bear the chief burden of protecting it against the French.<sup>167</sup> Opinion at home highly approved of the Turkish trade, because the Sultan's subjects, unlike those of the Great Mogul, were purchasers and wearers of English cloth.

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Queen Anne's government was represented in the Turkish dominions by the Levant Company. Her Ambassador to the Porte was paid and, in part, chosen by the merchants. He spent nearly all his time over the Company's business, presiding in its Court at Pera in Constantinople, and settling the disputes of the merchants with one another and with their native customers. The colonies of English merchants at Angora, Alexandria, Smyrna and Aleppo all paid 'consolage' towards the Company's expenses, and recognized the jurisdiction of its Court at Pera. The close union of our Levant traders under the shield of the Ambassador, and the knowledge that the British Squadron was within call, won them excellent treatment from the Turks. Neither did there occur, during Queen Anne's wars, any such failure of the convoy system, as the loss of the 'Smyrna Fleet' to the French which had darkened the year 1693 in the lasting memory of the City of London.<sup>168</sup>

The Levant merchant lived a life more remote from home news and interests than that of the Anglo-Indian to-day.

permitted the characteristic growth of Great Britain from without inwards, from commercial world-marketing to industrial production on British soil. To economic liberty, because it was staged on the high seas which are the breath of freedom, and such trade least of all threatened the political liberties of the British people.' C. R. Fay, *The Mortality of Empires*. The Levant Company was a 'regulated' not a joint stock company, but these remarks may apply to it as well as to the Hudson's Bay and East India Companies. See *Lipson, Economic History of England*, II, pp. 339-352 on its constitution.



His lot was in many respects enviable. He belonged to a proud and privileged community, growing rich fast without fear of the envy of pashas and beys, of whom every other wealthy man lived in terror, but who themselves courted the English merchants. Letters written home by these exiles and their wives give an attractive picture of social intercourse with the Turkish ruling class and of many other amenities in life. At Smyrna they coursed hares 'with an excellent pack of hounds.' Just after the death of Queen Anne, Nathaniel Harley, who had spent the best part of his days at Aleppo, wrote thence a capital uncle's letter to his nephew, whom he wished to attract out to the Levant. After an account of a strange sort of hunting, the 'pursute of antilopes or gazels' with hawks, he proceeds :

If that I have been so long recounting to you doesn't please you, my next shall bring you a journal of hunting the wild boar, which with other sports we have here, I fancy you would like better than going to Westminster School. If you'll undertake the voyage and come hither, I'll promise that besides the sports I have mentioned already, you shall go a hunting twice a week, hawking and coursing as often as you will. And what is more you shall always ride such horses as my lord Harley's dun. Now, Robin, this is worth thinking on.<sup>169</sup>

Whereas the prestige of the Levant Company in face of the Turks derived from the presence of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the East India Company had to fend for itself. No Queen's ship rounded the Cape. No English regiment yet boasted the title 'Primus in Indis.' It was the Company's own East Indiamen of all sizes, from first-rates to frigates, who defended the goods they carried, doing battle, not always with success, against the French privateers who swarmed in the Eastern seas, and the pirates of all nations not excluding our own, who lived undisturbed in Madagascar, sole European occupants of that great island that lay along the flank of the route to India.\*

\* In January 1703 Governor Pitt wrote from Madras : 'Our seas are here infested with pirates and French privateers. . . . Two French men of war met the *Canterbury* and *Chambers* frigate in the Strait of Malacca coming from China. The former they took and brought with them to Pollecherri [*sic*], the other narrowly escaped by running in among the sands. There are two more St. Malo's

During the wars of Anne, the French confined their attacks on the East India Company to the sea, where the Dutch Company's ships now acted as our Allies. No Dupleix had yet conceived the idea of intriguing with Indian Princes for the destruction of the English settlements.

Although the French troubled them little on land even in time of war, the Company's servants were in perpetual danger from the whims and the greed of Indian rulers. The long decay of the Mogul Empire, in which process the death of Aurungzebe in 1707 marked an important step, was already exposing the English traders to the dangers of the anarchy that eventually provoked them to conquer the Peninsula.

As yet they had no such thought in their hearts. But there were already among them men who would not 'let their beards be shook with danger and think it passtime.' Thomas Pitt was now the governor of Madras. Once he had been the most notorious of interlopers, 'that roughling immoral man' as Josiah Child had called him. Now he was the great support of the Old Company's interests—a classic example of 'poacher turned gamekeeper.' In the same year 1702 when he bought his famous 'Pitt' diamond from the mines of Golconda, he successfully defended Fort St. George containing the European part of the town of Madras, against the plundering Nabob of the Carnatic, whom he had defied to do his worst rather than pay him extravagant blackmail.

By the Treaty that ended the four months' siege, Madras was to receive full renewal of its trading privileges and restoration for the wrongs done, in return for the paltry sum of twenty thousand rupees, hardly a tenth of the amount

men [French privateers] at Canton, which they say the Dutch are looking out for.' *Add. MSS.* 28093, f. 144. Governor Pitt also complains in 1702 of piracies by Arab ships, and of 'a hellish contrivance of some of our own countrymen' in attributing these piracies to the Old Company's own servants. *India Office MSS. Pitt's Diary, Fort St. George* 12, f. 15. For a very curious account of the Madagascar pirates and their unchallenged sovereignty in that island see *Add. MSS.* 17677 *WWW*, ff. 659-661. *Wheeler*, II, pp. 22-27, quotes a narrative of a typical encounter with pirates, one of the pirate vessels being the *Speedy Return*, under Bowen, the pirate who had really taken her, not poor Green (see *Ramilles and the Union*, p. 251). And see *Hamilton*, I, p. 236, for another fight with pirates in those seas.

which Pitt had just given for his diamond. Next year he proceeded to throw a defensive wall round the 'Black town' of Madras, the great settlement outside Fort St. George, where 80,000 Indians dwelt under the Company's strong and tolerant rule. It was the English policy to attract craftsmen and manufacturers to live under their protection and ply their trades at the door of the European market.<sup>170</sup>

The similar settlements at Bombay and Calcutta were essential, in the disturbed state of India, for the conduct of the Company's business in safety and quiet. That was the sole object. The English traders never dreamed of territorial expansion or political power. Nevertheless these enlarged fortresses and the settlements which they protected held the seed of future British rule throughout the Peninsula. The government of a considerable population was already being carried on within these narrow limits of space. In a petition of 1703 against a new tax, the Indian inhabitants of Madras declared

Ourselves and fathers before us have long experienced the quiet and moderate English government and hope our children's children may enjoy the like.<sup>171</sup>

And in dealing with the Indian Princes around, the English were learning the arts of war and diplomacy, two generations before Clive and Hastings.

The Company not only had its armed forts and territories at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and York Fort in the island of Sumatra, and St. Helena as port of call for ships on the voyage, but it possessed about forty lesser 'factories' in towns governed by Indian rulers. Many of them lay along the coast, but some were as far up-country as Agra and Lucknow.<sup>172</sup> In these remote stations the English often had stirring adventures in defence of their property and trade. We are told how manfully young Mr. Horden dealt with a Nabob who had burst into one of the factories at the head of an armed force. During an hour's palaver, Horden kept the muzzle of his piece at the breast of the Indian Prince, while one of the Prince's soldiers kept his

dagger against the English factor's back. From this situation, worthy of Sheridan's *Critic*, the Nabob was the first to withdraw.<sup>173</sup>

The Company's employees were paid little enough for such strenuous service. Governor Pitt drew £200 salary and £100 gratuity, out of which he certainly could not have found the 48,000 pagodas that he gave for his famous diamond! The humbler 'writers,' of whom there were thirteen in Fort St. George alone, drew £5 each a year, though, according to the Chaplain of Calcutta, 'a man can't lodge and board here tolerably well under forty rupees a month, i.e. five pounds.' But the Company's servants, high and low, borrowed money and traded, soon accumulating large sums in this way through their knowledge and opportunities as men on the spot.<sup>174</sup>

These gains were won at a terrible risk from the climate and conditions of life. The founders of British power in India were a gallant and light-hearted race. 'Two monsoons are the age of a man,' they used to say at Bombay, and one of their number described the English cemetery there as 'a cormorant paunch never satisfied with the daily supplies it receives.' In 1704 there were left alive in Bombay only eight covenanted servants of the Company, and forty English soldiers in ragged red coats, 'looking more like Bandites in the woods than military men.' Several hundred Sepoys, however, went through their exercises once a month 'with as much grace as a cow might curtsy.' In the Company's settlements in Sumatra, half the English new-comers died within two or three years of arrival.

The Anglo-Indian career was indeed a gamble with death. Riches were commonly the reward of the survivors, but death took a heavy toll of a society of Europeans who had not yet adapted their manner of life to oriental conditions, who drank as they were accustomed to drink in England, and whose masterful tempers, aggravated by climate and ill-health, led them into fierce and frequent and fatal duels. No age or rank was immune from these feuds, from the calf-jealousies of the youngest 'writers' up to the hectoring of Governor Pitt, who once threatened to 'whip

and hang ' a member of Council at Madras who had gone into opposition. His enemies retaliated by circulating false stories about the manner in which he had acquired the Pitt diamond—stories that long afterwards suggested to Wilkie Collins the romantic Indian setting of the 'Moonstone.'

Yet above the surface of these feuds, the society in the European town protected by the walls of Fort St. George presented the appearance of a patriarchal establishment. All the English in the Company's pay sat at the Governor's table and were served off his massive silver plate. And on Sundays the Council marched behind their chief to church, whatever may have been their thoughts as they surveyed his broad shoulders from behind.

Joseph Collet, successively Governor of York Fort in Sumatra, and of Madras, was less unpopular and scarcely less able as a Company's officer than Pitt. He was a Baptist, shut out therefore from office at home ; in the East he became a philosophic Unitarian, and prohibited the use of the reading of the Athanasian Creed in his territories, as he thought it beneath the dignity of the Governor to be damned by his chaplain.<sup>175</sup>

There was already a colony of English women in India. Out of thirty-eight English in the Company's pay in the town of Fort St. George in 1702, as many as seven were married to English wives and only two to Indians ; there were, besides, ten young English women unmarried, and as many as fifteen English widows—cruel testimony to the chances of life in that gallant pioneer community. Of the Englishmen not in the direct employ of the Company, a larger proportion were married to Indians. And many no doubt were, in the expressive language of Bardolph, ' better accommodated than with a wife.'<sup>176</sup>

Madras was a centre of mercantile business with other ports and capitals in the East, carried on sometimes in the 'country ships'—as the English called the craft plying the coastal trade—and sometimes in the 'Europe ships' of the Company. The ventures of merchantmen to the Persian Gulf and China, when sent out from Madras, Calcutta or Bombay, instead of from England, gave a great opportunity for the private trading that enriched the servants of the

Company in the East.\* A trade with Burmah was beginning on these lines. The trade with China was already important, though it was confined to Amoy and Canton. It suffered, indeed, under certain disadvantages, for the Chinese did not want cloth but only silver or lead, and the brutality of the Manchu conquerors and the 'monopoly and tyranny of the Mandarins' would not allow the Chinese merchants a chance to do fair business. But even on such terms there was profit to be made by the English in the purchase of silks, tea, china and 'lacquered ware,' for all of which there was a rising fashionable demand in Europe.<sup>177</sup>

The amalgamation of the Old and New East India Companies, agreed on in principle in 1702, was put into practical working order in the course of the next seven years, partly by the good offices of Godolphin and Sunderland. Thus was brought to an end the worst of the feuds that ever divided the English trading to India, which had risen so high in the reign of William as to endanger the whole future of British connection with the East.†

The settlement of this great quarrel did away with a leading motive for Parliamentary and pamphleteering attacks on the nature of the Indian trade. Public opinion, during the Queen's reign, became more and more indifferent to the complaint that English cloth could with great difficulty be sold in the Far East, and that bullion had to be exported there in large quantities in order to purchase the goods.

The demand for Indian and Chinese wares had indeed become so constant and insistent at home, that men listened more readily to the new economic theories in defence of the much abused trade. Less and less attention was paid to the

\* For example, in February 1702, Governor Pitt issued the following proclamation (*India Office MSS. Fort St. George* 12, ff. 47-49): 'We being credibly informed of Pyrats being abroad and that they have taken several ships, and whereas all country ships are of little force, so that without great difficulty they become a prey to 'em, wherefore to prevent any misfortune of that nature to the inhabitants of Madras, we hereby give notice that if silver is favourable we intend two Europe ships well manned and gunned this season to Amoy and Canton.'

† See *Blenheim*, p. 164. 'The existence of the two rival Companies would have jeopardized the interests of Englishmen in the East. The disunion that resulted, and the discreditable quarrels that took place between 1698-1700 would, if carried further, have led to the expulsion of the English from India.' *Khan*, p. 244.

outcry of the English clothiers and the Levant Company, who in 1702 told a Committee of the House of Lords that 'if silk be brought from India where it is bought cheap with bullion, it will ruin our trade of Turkey whither we send cloth for their silk.' The silk-wearing, tea-drinking, china-using public gave ear instead to the comfortable doctrine of Charles Davenant, who declared that the wealth coming into England as a consequence of trade with the Orient much more than compensated her for the bullion she exported, and that even in gold and silver she was gaining on the balance. A great part of the Eastern goods that the Company shipped to the Thames was re-exported and sold on the Continent at enhanced prices. Even before Anne came to the throne, Davenant had persuaded himself that the East Indian trade enriched England almost as much as the trade with America, and more than the European, African and Levant trades put together.

In October 1702 Governor Pitt sent home the great diamond that he had recently bought, committing it to the charge of his son Robert, whom thenceforward he pestered with minute instructions by every homeward-bound ship, about the safe-keeping of 'my great concern.'

You will see what I have wrote in my joint letter, that the chest shall stand in the Bank of England. That of blowing open or carrying away the chest may be done, but I hope my sons would not let the actors of it survive such a villainy. And I wish in showing of it (which I would have you withstand without good reasons there be

The following interesting table represents calculations made by Davenant at the end of William's reign :

* To make up the two millions national profit by trade,	
The Plantation Trade may bring in . . . .	£600,000
The East India Trade may bring in . . . .	£500,000
The European, African and Levant trade, by our own product, may bring in . . . .	£600,000
Ditto, by re-exports of Plantation goods . . . .	£120,000
Ditto, by re-exports of East India goods . . . .	£180,000
	<hr/>
	£2,000,000.'

See *Davenant*, II, p. 18, and that volume *passim*, pp. 1-162. See also *Khan*, Chap. IV ; and Defoe, *English Tradesman* (1727), II, ii, pp. 23-24 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1702-1704), p. 73.

for it) you see there be no trick played to slide it away and put a christiall in the room of the same magnitude. I charge you that you never take the stone out upon any occasion but that you yourself weigh it when you take it out and when you put it in, and that it never be out of your eye as much as in shifting one hand to another.

When in 1710 Thomas Pitt returned to Europe, Robert must have been divided between dread of the near approach of his redoubtable mentor, and relief that he would no longer be personally responsible for the guardianship of the 'Pitt diamond.' \*

Robert was an inadequate son for such a father, but in 1708 he had himself become father of a yet greater son. William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, inherited more qualities and opinions from his grandfather than from his parents. Robert was a mild and humble Tory, intervening in the family line between two most formidable Whigs. Like many of his party at the end of Anne's reign, he dabbled in platonic Jacobitism. Whereupon the returned Anglo-Indian wrote to his son threatening to have nothing more to do with any of his family who were disloyal to their country and their sovereign :

It is said you are taken up with factious caballs, and are contriving amongst you to put a French Kickshaw upon the throne again.<sup>178</sup>

But there was not much to be feared from the tentative 'caballs' of poor Robert and his like. With old Thomas and little William on its side, the illustrious House of Hanover might look forward to the future without dismay.

\* In 1717 Thomas Pitt parted with it to the Regent of France for £133,000.



## CHAPTER X

### QUEEN ANNE'S IRELAND

The reconquest of Ireland and its consequences. The Penal Laws against Catholics. The Restrictions on Trade and their injury to the Protestant interest. Ireland subject to England. Molyneux. Question of Union. Churchmen and Presbyterians. The Sacramental Test. Whig and Tory in Protestant Ireland.

IRELAND was the Achilles' heel of the Revolution Settlement. Yet even in Ireland the arrangements made after the reconquest by William lasted for ninety years unchanged. But they rested on force alone and have since been upset.

In the reign of the Roman Catholic James II, it had been inevitable that the native Irish should rise against Protestant ascendancy and the Cromwellian land settlement. The law was for once on their side, until James was dethroned in London. Then the Protestant settlers rallied in Ulster, and held out single-handed in Londonderry and Inniskillen, till England came to their rescue. Great events followed quickly : the relief of Londonderry in 1689 ; next year the Battle of the Boyne and the successful defence of Limerick by the Irish ; its fall in 1691 after the Battle of Aghrim ; and finally the Treaty of Limerick and the disregard paid to its terms by the victors. These happenings still form the main body of Catholic and Protestant tradition in the island where men live in the past. The Elizabethan and even the Cromwellian wars grew dim and far away, withdrawn behind this nearer mountain of proud and tragic memories. In Anne's day, victors and vanquished were living at the very foot of these overshadowing heights. And down to our own times the history of the Williamite wars has continued as a more lasting and potent element in the divided popular sentiment of Ireland than any memory of past events

has ever been to the less historically minded people of England.

The reason for this difference of attitude towards history is not merely a difference in national temperament, though the Englishman is famous for forgetting what is best forgot. The reason is also to be sought in the circumstance that the thoughts of Ireland were for two hundred years after the Revolution turned in upon herself, upon her own sorrows and feuds, while the thoughts of England turned outwards to great commercial, colonial, military, naval and political undertakings in every quarter of the globe. Moreover, the thoughts of the English were diverted to agricultural and industrial change and enterprise at home. Ireland, meanwhile, moodily ate her potatoes at the door of her hovel, and brooded in her savage, poetic heart over ancient wrongs still unremedied, and griefs ever fresh from year to year : the seasons returned, but brought no change. The decisions made by the sword at Derry, the Boyne, Aghrim, continued to divide Irish society and politics long after Naseby and Sedgemoor had become mere names in the English school books, of little meaning to children whose parents had found other causes of dispute.

From Charles II to George III, the statesmen of Westminster, Tory and Whig alike, when they thought of the Irish question, thought solely how England's advantage could be best served. Cromwell's wars had laid Ireland waste, but the Protector had had this merit, that he regarded the Protestants of both the British Islands as a nation with a common economic interest. The Parliaments after the Restoration cared as little as Cromwell about the Irish Catholics and a great deal less about the Irish Protestants, whose well-being they ruthlessly sacrificed to the farmers and manufacturers of England.

In taking this narrowly English line on the economic problems of Ireland, they greatly increased the political and military dangers against which they had to provide. For by reducing the wealth and numbers of the Irish Protestants out of commercial jealousy, they made it less easy to hold down the Catholics and to guard against French invasion.

The only way to meet this difficulty that suggested itself to the wisdom of Queen Anne's Whig and Tory advisers during their war with France, was to increase the rigour of the Penal Laws against Irish Catholics. No doubt these evil statutes were passed as a war-measure against Louis XIV, but as compared to that other war-measure, the Scottish Union, devised by the same statesmen, what folly and ignorance in contrast to what foresight and wisdom !

It is only fair to recognize the difficulty of the question that faced our ancestors, however much we may regret the answer they found. Their military and political task was to prevent Ireland from being made a place of arms for French attack on England and on England's commerce. To hold Ireland was as necessary to Britain's existence during the French wars of William and Anne, as during the German war of our own day. And it was not easy to maintain military control over a country where at least four-fifths of the inhabitants were Roman Catholic Jacobites, at heart in league with France. A 'garrison' of Protestant squires in every district was a substitute, on feudal lines, for a great modern army of occupation. But those over whom they bore rule must be rendered incapable of rising. If the Catholics were permitted to grow rich, educated and organized, they would, with the help of the French, soon drive the English and Scottish settlers into the sea. This was no idle fear. It cannot justify the Penal Laws, but it explains them.

Indeed, the cruel policy succeeded in its immediate object. For several generations after 1691 there was no rebellion, not even in 1715 or in 1745, so prostrate was the native race. These satisfactory results were attributed by English statesmen to the maintenance of the Cromwellian and Williamite land-settlements, which put the ownership of far the greater part of the acreage of Ireland into Protestant hands, and to the difficulties placed by the Penal Laws in the way of an attempt by priest or layman to organize or lead the Catholic peasants.

The Penal Laws passed in the reigns of William and

\* The English Parliament recognized the need to keep 12,000 troops in Ireland, over and above the English establishment.

Anne were a breach of the Treaty of Limerick made with the Irish in 1691, which had promised that Irish Catholics should retain 'the privileges enjoyed in the reign of Charles II.' Even that miserable promise was broken.\* In England the Roman Catholics were not feared and were therefore in practice tolerated; in Ireland the Roman Catholics were greatly feared, so the priests were persecuted and the liberty and property of their flocks were invaded by a hundred methods of petty and insulting ill-usage. The Penal Statutes were not fully operative, but they were enforced enough to take the heart out of native resistance for a hundred years. As Swift said, the Irish Catholics were politically 'as inconsiderable as the women and children.' So far the policy succeeded, but at what a cost to the future relations of the English with the Irish race!

The rigour of the Irish Penal Statutes against Catholics was increased by fresh legislation under Anne, once in 1703 at the instigation of a Tory Government, and once in 1709 by the Whigs. There was no difference of policy between the two parties in the matter. The object of the elaborate system of regulations and penalties enacted by these new laws was twofold: in the first place to circumscribe the number and activity of the priests, in the hope that at length they would give up the struggle and disappear from the land; and in the second place to prevent the former landlords or their descendants from recovering piecemeal the ownership of their ancestral estates, or even from acquiring wealth and influence in the liberal professions.

The legislation against the priesthood failed. Before the middle of the century the attempt to deprive the Irish peasant of the services of his religion was abandoned as impracticable and as repugnant to the latitudinarian spirit of the new age. But the attempt to keep the land, the wealth, the education and the social power of the country in the

\* It was not the laws excluding Roman Catholics from Civil Office that were complained of as the breach of the Treaty of Limerick, but the new laws subjecting priests and their flocks to further penalties and harassing and limiting them in their religious activities. This is clear in the Jacobite and Papal letters of the time, e.g. *Bodleian MSS., Carte Papers* 229, ff. 118-121 (date 1704); *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 31248, ff. 139-142; and the very interesting report to Cardinal Paolucci dated June 22, 1710 (*P.R.O., Tr. Rome*, 101, ff. 13-17).

hands of Protestants succeeded for several generations. The net result of the failure of the Penal Laws in one respect, and of their success in another, was to leave the priest as the only powerful friend and champion of the native population. It was the laws imposed by the English conquerors to depress the Catholics that rendered Ireland the most priest-led country in Europe, by destroying the classes whence her natural leaders should have come.<sup>179</sup>

But in the days of Queen Anne these ultimate consequences were not foreseen, and the attempt was still seriously being made to eradicate the Roman Catholic religion. The Penal Laws of the reign permitted a 'registered' priest to work in his parish, but allowed no Bishop to remain in Ireland to direct him or to ordain his successor. The more violently persecuting methods of Louis XIV were not imitated: no such attempt was made as in France to compel the unwilling attendance of poor human beings at rites they abhorred. On the other hand, Louis was persecuting a minority, while the English were persecuting the religion of the great majority of the population. Naturally, the attempt failed and has recoiled on the descendants of those who made it.

But the design to deprive the Irish of their religion was perhaps nearer to success in Anne's reign than at any other moment. In a curious petition to Ormonde, the Queen's Lord Lieutenant, he is asked to promote 'the conversion of the Popish natives to the Protestant religion' by means of charity schools and the distribution of the Bible and *The Whole Duty of Man* in Irish, on the ground that the population is relapsing into heathenism through the action of the Penal Laws. The petitioners mention

one statute particularly to prevent the succession of the Popish clergy, by virtue whereof the number of Popish priests is already sensibly decreased, and it is probable that in some counties the whole succession may be extinct in a few years.\*

\* *Add. MSS. (B.M.) 35933, ff. 21-23.* But Convocation in Ireland frowned on the plea of circulating Bibles and Protestant literature in Irish, because 'we ought not to do anything to encourage or propagate that language, and it was our opinion that there is not one single man in the kingdom that can read Irish, but he can read English also.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 105.

In 1710 Cardinal Paolucci at Rome was informed by his agent in the British Islands that, whereas the Roman Catholics in England had liberty in practice to conduct their religious life without disturbance, the persecution in Ireland was rendering it difficult for the Mass to be celebrated and the people instructed in religion.<sup>180</sup> Similar appeals to the Pope, like that of the Provincial of the Irish Dominicans in 1707, describing the state of affairs only too truthfully, helped to persuade Clement XI to resume the policy of the Popes of Elizabeth's time, and endeavour to dethrone the sovereign of England and Ireland by force of foreign arms.<sup>181</sup>

Nevertheless the attempt to starve the religious instincts of the Catholics to death was felt at the end of the Queen's reign to have proved a failure. Swift's friend, William King, Archbishop of Dublin, was perhaps the wisest and best of the Irish statesmen of the time. He wrote to the Lord Lieutenant the following account of the situation in 1715 :

By law the Roman Catholics are allowed a priest in every parish, which are registered in pursuance of an Act of Parliament made about ten years ago. All bishops, regulars, etc., and all other priests then not registered are banished, and none allowed to come in to the kingdom under severe penalties. The design was that there should be no succession, and many of those registered are since dead ; yet for want of a due execution of the laws many are come in from foreign parts, and there are in the country Popish Bishops that ordain many. Little enquiry of late has been made into these matters.

Does the English Government wish the law to be seriously enforced or not ?—the Archbishop enquires.<sup>182</sup>

It is remarkable that during the Marlborough Wars the French made no attempt to invade Ireland. In 1705 a memorial had been forwarded thence to the continent, urging that troops should be landed at Bantry or Kenmare, not too near the garrisons at Cork or Kinsale : a general rising is promised to assist the invaders, on an even greater scale than in the reign of James II, so that one French soldier in Ireland will be worth to Louis ten of his comrades in Flanders. It is suggested that equal rights for Protestant and Catholic should be promised, but the writer does

not see his way through the vexed question of the redistribution of the land, and admits that though the Protestant settlers would like to deliver themselves from the slavery of England, who takes away their commerce and liberty, they dare not do anything effective for fear of the Catholics whose lands they possess. But in any case the native population will rise, more than a hundred thousand strong.<sup>183</sup>

If such petitions ever reached the French War Office they carried little weight as against the recollection, exaggerated by French national pride, of the incompetence shown by the hordes of ill-disciplined Irish peasants as allies on the banks of the Boyne.

A curious picture of the dispossessed and submerged native society, as seen from above by the usurping English landlord, is given in a letter of Sir Robert Southwell in the first year of Anne's reign. The old possessors of the land or their children were still in many places living on the scene of their ancestral greatness, still honoured by the people, and hand in glove with the priest. A large acreage of land, Sir Robert declares, is often let by unwary Protestant landlords 'to some Irish gentleman that has nothing of his own, that so he may bring in his followers,' from whom he takes a double rent and 'lives idly on the overplus himself. Besides, while all these depend on his protection, they follow his bagpipe whenever disturbances happen ; and he is aided by the priest in gathering these colonies, because they pay him after-tithe which the Protestants pay only to the Minister.' In other words, these poor people, in their loyalty to the lost cause, were supporting, with double rent and double tithe, both the old and the new landlords, both the old and the new religion.<sup>184</sup>

Most of the converts made by the Penal Laws were hypocrites, seeking merely to own land or enter the professions. Some, indeed, can scarcely even be called hypocrites, for their adherence to Protestantism was confessed to be only formal, and they continued to live entirely among the Catholics and to share their views and hopes. Even before the death of Anne, the legal profession contained many such persons.

Meanwhile, the real Protestant upper class, cut off

from the population beneath in a manner utterly unknown in England or Scotland, 'were exposed,' in the words of Lecky, 'to all the characteristic vices of slave holders, for they formed a dominant class, ruling over a population who were deprived of all civil rights and reduced to a condition of virtual slavery.'<sup>185</sup> These are strong expressions. But many of the Anglo-Irish must also have acquired the virtues of aristocracy, if we may judge by later products of their blood and breeding, such as Castlereagh and those three remarkable families, the Wellesley, the Napier and the Lawrence brothers ; while Burke, Goldsmith, Sheridan and many more enriched the life and letters of England with wit and passion from the un-English island. The extinction of this breed of men might be called a logical result of the circumstances of its origin, but would be none the less a disaster.

English statesmen, from the Restoration onwards, regarded Ireland as a colony, that is to say as a place of which the commerce and agriculture were to be encouraged or checked as best suited the interests of the farmers, manufacturers and merchants of the mother country. And unfortunately the agricultural and industrial interests of Ireland happened to be precisely of the kind which most aroused the jealousy of English rivals. Ireland therefore suffered more than the American colonies from commercial restrictions imposed by England. Moreover, the Parliament men of Westminster, whether Tory or Whig, regarded the collective wealth of the neighbouring island with suspicion, as lying outside their control, and affording a source of independent strength to the Crown. This political jealousy of Ireland's well-being was strongly felt, not least by Cavalier and Tory members. James II's policy of bringing over an Irish army to dragoon England had greatly enhanced it, and William's extravagant grants of Irish lands to his Dutch friends had helped to keep it alive.

Acting on these motives, economic and political, the English House of Commons deliberately ruined the prosperity of Ireland. The partnership in the Navigation



Laws and in the colonial trade which Cromwell had extended to her disappeared with the rest of his system ; and the Cavalier Parliament took special measures that put an end to the large import of Ireland's cattle and cloth into England. Her flourishing cloth trade with foreign countries was permitted to survive till after the Revolution, but in 1699 it also was made illegal. The avowed object was to kill the manufacture of cloth in Ireland, regardless of the fact that it was in Protestant hands.

Only the linen industry of Ulster, which had no English rival, was smiled on in its infancy by the statesmen of Queen Anne, and was allowed by them to have the run of the American market.<sup>186</sup>

The Protestant section suffered most from the restrictive laws. It was the English and Scottish settlers who strove to grow rich by breeding cattle and manufacturing goods for export, and by sheep-farming on a large scale to supply the Ulster looms. It was just these classes who were ruined by the stop of trade. The native peasant, content to grow the food he ate, was less affected. But the increase in the wealth and numbers of the Protestant community was checked by the laws of the English Parliament.

One consequence was that, during the Queen's reign, Protestant emigration from Ireland to America began, several generations before it occurred to the Catholics to follow. England prevented her own children and their Scottish cousins from bettering themselves in Ireland, and as Scots and English are always determined to better themselves somewhere, they went off to the Colonies, carrying overseas a traditional desire to be revenged on England, which their descendants amply gratified at the time of the American Revolution.\*

\* Even from the narrowest point of view of the English clothier's fear of competition, it proved a mistake to have prohibited the export of Irish woollen cloth to the Continent. For the result was that Queen Anne's Irish subjects, irrespective of religion, combined to smuggle raw wool to Europe, whither also the unemployed weavers followed, taking their skill with them. Thus the cloth manufacturer threw all the more on the Continent as a result of its suppression in Ireland.

On the whole subject of the restrictive laws, see Alice Effie Murray, *Commercial Relations between England and Ireland*, Chaps. II-IV, and Rev. R. H. Murray, *Revolutionary Ireland*, Chap. X.

The constitutional basis of government in Ireland was the power claimed and exercised by the Privy Council and the Parliament of the neighbour island. The administration was entirely subject to the will of the English Ministers, and they kept the best places in Church and State for Englishmen. Even the members of the Church of Ireland, though they enjoyed the monopoly of civil, military and ecclesiastical posts against either Catholics or Dissenters, were accustomed to receive the leavings of Irish patronage, while its best places went to pay the party debts of English statesmen. If Swift had been only an Irish parson, and only a Dublin pamphleteer, he would never have been Dean of St. Patrick's.

But the English Ministry did not merely control the Irish executive and distribute the loaves and fishes. It controlled Irish legislation also under the old Poynings Law of Henry VII. The ultimate form in which any measure could pass the Dublin Parliament was determined by the Privy Council in England, who had the power to initiate, alter or reject Bills. The Irish Parliament could refuse to pass a Bill which was returned from England in an amended form, but had no power to alter it. Moreover, the Parliament at Westminster could legislate directly for Ireland, as when it passed the Act prohibiting the export of Irish cloth to the Continent and made the Schism Act of 1714 applicable against the Presbyterians of Ulster.

The first protest after the Revolution against the close constitutional bondage of Ireland was made by William Molyneux, a man of learning and moderation, member of Parliament for Dublin University. In 1698 he published a pamphlet based both on general principles and on much antiquarian lore, entitled *The Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England stated*, and dedicated it to King William. It was formally condemned by the English House of Commons whose powers over Ireland it had called in question. It set men talking and no more. But it set them talking on a theme they never again forgot. For Molyneux had claimed the full and sole competence of the Irish Parliament to legislate for Ireland on a footing of equality with the English Parliament. The subservience

of Dublin to Westminster he declared to be an English usurpation. Ireland, in his view, was not a country conquered by England, but a separate kingdom belonging to the same King.

The flaw in Molyneux's argument was that Ireland had actually been subdued by the arms of England at the Boyne and Aghrim, and her constitution was the result of that conquest. Charles Davenant, in his answer to Molyneux, pointed out that the Protestant settlers in Ireland, for whom alone Molyneux had been pleading, were a 'colony,' holding as such 'a lasting title to be protected and defended by us.'<sup>187</sup> But if they were to set up as an independent country, the native population would rise and cut their throats, as soon as the protection of England should be withdrawn. In the words of Macaulay, 'it was absurd to claim independence for a community which could not cease to be dependent without ceasing to exist.' So long as the Irish Protestants maintained the Penal Laws and the Protestant Ascendancy, they were in fact dependent on England, whatever the rights of the constitutional and legal argument might be. It was only when in Grattan's day they began a policy of conciliating the Catholics, that they were able to enforce Molyneux's doctrine of independence by the Volunteer Movement of 1782.

During the years when the Union of England and Scotland was being actively discussed and carried, it was natural that the Irish Protestants should ask themselves if they might not benefit by a similar measure. 1701-1707 Molyneux in his pamphlet had hinted at the possibility of a representation of Ireland in the English Parliament as an alternative to independence; 'and this,' he wrote, 'I believe we should be willing enough to embrace, but this is an happiness we can hardly hope for.' The good Archbishop King, leader of the 'Irish interest' among the official classes, wished for a Union, but feared England would never consent to it on tolerable terms. 'We have this disadvantage,' he wrote in 1701, 'we must just take what is given us, for we can't struggle.' The Irish Protestants were not, like the Scots, formidable enough in face of England to bargain with her on equal terms.

During the first years of Queen Anne, several pamphlets in favour of a Union were circulated in Dublin. And in 1703 a humble petition of the Irish House of Commons to Her Majesty, recounting the ruin of their trade by the recent English laws, and the consequent emigration of the Protestant population, ended with the prayer :

that your Majesty's goodness be extended towards us in such prudent and gracious methods as may afford us relief, according to the exigency of our condition, by restoring to us a full enjoyment of our constitution, or by promoting a more firm and strict union with your Majesty's subjects of England.

The petition fell on deaf ears, for English statesmen were finding it at the moment hard enough to persuade their fellow-countrymen to admit the Scots to the colonial and home markets, as the price of a Union that England urgently required for her own political safety. It would indeed be vain to propose the admission to these same privileges of Irish clothiers and cattle breeders, merely in order to promote the welfare of Ireland.

Four years later, when the Scottish Union had been accomplished, the Irish House of Commons congratulated the Queen, and added, ' May God put it in your royal heart to add greater strength and lustre to your crown by a yet more comprehensive union.' But it was not to be. England let the golden moment slip by when she could have granted a union which Ireland would have received with gratitude, which would have given the Protestants relief from the economic oppression undermining their real power, and would have created a sense of security that might early have reacted on the relief of the Catholics from the persecuting laws.<sup>188</sup>

Thus the Irish field was being plentifully and industriously sown with dragon's teeth, which would bring forth fruit in due season. But so long as the seed slumbered underground, English statesmen were satisfied. During the reign of Queen Anne they were less troubled by the major problems of Ireland—the treatment of the Catholics and the economic ruin of the Protestants—than by the minor division

of the Protestant interest itself over the bickerings of Anglican and Presbyterian. This absurd quarrel in the face of the enemy was fostered from England, because it could be manipulated as a local branch of the great faction-fight of Whig and Tory, which was the breath of their being to Rochester and Wharton, Somers and Bolingbroke.

The Irish 'Tories,' among whom Archbishop King and Swift became the leading figures, were, according to Swift, 'moderate Whigs' in their theory of government, revering the memory of William and abhorring the Pretender. Their Toryism consisted in their hostility to the Presbyterians, whose activity and turbulence they had some reason to dread. The Presbyterians were the Scots settlers in Ireland, at least as numerous as members of the Established Church in the island as a whole, and ten times as numerous in some places, for example in Londonderry. The Churchmen held the monopoly of office and most of the landed estates. But over against the officials and the squires stood a formidable democracy of farmers and merchants, organized under their ministers and elders like their kinsmen in Scotland. 'The true point,' wrote Archbishop King, 'between them and the gentlemen is whether the Presbyterians and lay elders in every parish shall have the greatest influence over the people to lead them as they please, or the landlords over their tenants.'

There was no Toleration Act for Presbyterians in that mad island. The Scots prentices who had closed the gates of Derry and made good their act against the hosts of James and Louis, had no right under the laws of William or Anne to worship God in their own way. But in fact they held their illegal services and organized their kirk sessions and assemblies as freely as their established brethren in Scotland, save when on rare occasions, as at Drogheda in 1708 and Belturbet in 1712, over-zealous Tory magistrates sought to imprison ministers, on the ground that they were establishing meeting houses where there had been none before.

The light of the Presbyterians in Ireland was not hid under a bushel. When their synods were called together, they would sometimes 'enter the town in a public cavalcade, every minister being attended by a layman on each hand,

well armed to the great terror of such of her Majesty's subjects as are of the Church of Ireland.' In Belfast, we read, 'the Dissenting party have created a Society for the Reformation of Manners,' and 'compel the constables to go round the town with them to enter people's houses and take what persons they think fit and imprison them.' So at least their enemies declared.<sup>189</sup> They circulated the Solemn League and Covenant and denounced the Episcopalians as idolaters. The Churchmen replied by preaching against 'the sin of schism.'<sup>190</sup>

The Irish Episcopalians were fain to call in 'the rusty curb of old father antic the law,' not from a desire to persecute their brother Protestants, but from the real dread in which they lived of being put down under a resurgent kirk, as their 'rabbled' co-religionists had been put down in Scotland. But they were not really in such danger. For they were not Jacobites, as were the Episcopalians of Scotland, and therefore they could rely on the support of England, more especially when the Tories were in power at Westminster.

Rochester, Anne's first Lord Lieutenant, had done his best to create in the Irish Protestant body the distinctions of 'Whig and Tory' on English lines. His successor, Ormonde, would, if left to himself, have adopted a more conciliatory policy, but Nottingham, acting from England as Secretary of State, found a way in 1704 to harass the Presbyterians by a fresh 'Test,' and so set them by the ears with the Church or Tory interest for the rest of the reign. The Irish Parliament was engaged in passing a new Penal Statute against Catholics; Nottingham, just before he left office, induced the English Privy Council to insert into it a clause extending to Ireland the Sacramental Test for secular office which had long been the law of England. This would affect Presbyterians as well as Papists. The Dublin Parliament had perforce to accept the change. Hitherto the Presbyterians, though they enjoyed no legal Toleration for their worship, had not been excluded from State and Municipal office. Henceforth they were so excluded.

During the remainder of Anne's reign a furious controversy raged round the Presbyterian demand for the repeal

of the new Test. When the Whigs came into power in England in the middle of the reign, and Wharton went over as Lord Lieutenant with Addison as his Secretary, the hopes of the Presbyterians ran high. They hardly deigned to ask for a Toleration Act, unless it were accompanied by a repeal of the Test.\* Archbishop King defended the Test with his authority and Swift with his pen.† It had not been repealed when the Whigs fell from power in 1710. Wharton was replaced by Ormonde, returning once more to Ireland amid the loud rejoicings of the Irish Tories.

The last four years of Queen Anne were almost as agitated a time in Irish as in English politics. But the activity was entirely within the ranks of the divided Protestant body; the great mass of the nation made no stir as it lay under the feet of the conquerors, indifferent to the scuffle of Whig and Tory overhead.

Ormonde, from the first moment of his return, found the Dublin Corporation given over to 'obstinacy and faction' in the Whig interest.<sup>191</sup> A series of party quarrels in that body soon developed into a national concern, when the Tory Chancellor of Ireland, Sir Constantine Phipps, encouraged by Bolingbroke, harassed the Whigs throughout the island. Moreover, the great body of Protestants, irrespective of party, soon became anxious about the Succession, and, under the influence of alarmist letters from London, began to suspect the English Tory ministers of the intention to bring back the Roman Catholic Stuarts.<sup>192</sup>

When, therefore, in the autumn of 1713 Shrewsbury succeeded Ormonde as Lord Lieutenant, he found a Whig majority in the Dublin Parliament, threatening to impeach the Chancellor, Phipps, voting supplies for three months

\* In October 1709 Somers received a letter from B. Freeman, Dublin, to the following effect: 'The Toleration which is granted in England was offered here in case it would have been accepted without repealing the Test. The long cessation that hath been of any prosecution of Dissenters in this Kingdom' [Ireland] render nugatory the mere offer of a Toleration already enjoyed in practice, and the call for repeal of the Test is loud. *Somers MSS.* In 1719 Archbishop King declared that 'As to granting the Dissenters a Toleration such as is granted them in England, it has been offered them again and again and it has been refused by their leaders.' Mant, *Church of Ireland* (1840), II, p.\*333. See *Leadam*, p. 73, and *Murray*, pp. 364-373 on the struggle over the Test.

† See p. 98 above.

only, and offering rewards for the capture of the Pretender. Shrewsbury, who seems to have gone to Ireland at Harley's behest to pour oil on troubled waters, found himself in great difficulty between a half-Jacobite Cabinet in London and a furiously Whig Parliament in Dublin attacking a High Tory Chancellor. No one of these parties had any confidence in the new Lord Lieutenant or any use for his moderation. 'I have made the figure rather of a Viceroy in a Play,' he complained to Harley, 'than of one who had the honour of Her Majesty's patent.'

But Shrewsbury's own sympathies were so strong for Hanover that in fact he inclined to the Whig side. When Anne died, therefore, the Whigs already had the upper hand in Dublin. It could not well be otherwise, for whenever the Protestant Succession was clearly seen to be in danger, Irish Tories and Churchmen perforce made common cause with the Presbyterians and Whigs.<sup>183</sup>

In the last summer of Anne's reign the Schism Act to suppress Presbyterian and other dissenting schools had been passed at Westminster, and, by an act of partisan fury that was almost insane, was specifically made to apply to Ireland. If it had been enforced in practice the result would have been a civil war between the two sections of Irish Protestants, for Ulster would never have submitted to persecution. But Anne died on the day when it was supposed to become operative. The Schism Act was repealed by the Whigs in the reign of King George.\*

But the Test Act of 1704 was not repealed even under the Hanoverian regime, and the Presbyterians of Ireland remained excluded from all civil and military offices under the Crown.

Most of the great evils of Irish politics [wrote Lecky] have arisen from the fact that its different classes and creeds have never been blended into one nation. We have already seen how fatally the division between Protestant and Catholic was aggravated by its coincidence with the division of classes. The Test Act was another great step in the path of division and it did much to make Protestant co-operation impossible.<sup>184</sup>

\* See pp. 280-284 below.



## CHAPTER XI

### ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRIVE A BARGAIN

Limits of St. John's responsibility for Utrecht. The 'Jersey' period of the negotiation. Jacobite and anti-Dutch character of the negotiations initiated by Jersey. The French Proposal, April 1711. St. John takes charge. Hard bargaining. Prior at Versailles. Mesnager in London. The Preliminaries of October 1711. England and Holland.

THE secret negotiations between England and France that resulted in the Peace of Utrecht have always been associated in the world's mind with St. John, Lord Bolingbroke. He was regarded in his own day, and he is still regarded, as the person responsible for the terms of the Treaty and for the much disputed methods by which they were obtained. Yet, in fact, he had nothing to do with the affair until it had been going on for nine months.

In the last week of April 1711 the French Minister sent over to England the first official request that the two countries should treat, on the basis of Spain for Philip, a Barrier for the Dutch and great commercial advantages for England in both hemispheres. This document, the earliest that the Whigs were able to discover when they brought the Tory ex-Ministers to account in 1715, purported to be the beginning of the whole negotiation.<sup>195</sup> But in reality it was the end of the first long stage. The French Foreign Office papers have revealed to posterity that these proposals, while appearing to emanate spontaneously from France, had in fact been collusively arranged between Jersey, Harley and Shrewsbury on the one side and Louis's Minister, Torcy, on the other.

These men, whose counsels St. John was not yet allowed to share, had, ever since August 1710, been seeking ground whereon England and France could stand together and

dictate peace to the rest of Europe. Secrecy had been essential and had been successfully observed. The English statesmen put nothing on paper, lest it should afterwards be produced against them. Neither the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, nor any of the British Ambassadors were in the secret. From August 1710 to April 1711 proceedings were confined to conversations between Edward Villiers, Earl of Jersey, and the Abbé Gaultier, Torcy's secret agent in England, who reported to his master in cypher letters, and on occasional visits to France. The French official proposals in April 1711, afterwards given to the world as the beginning of the negotiations for peace, were the outcome of this long preparation.

Already, therefore, before St. John had been admitted into the secret, the broadest outline of the Peace had been agreed on between England and France. It had already been arranged that Spain and Spanish America should remain with Philip V \*; that England should obtain great commercial privileges in the Mediterranean and Spanish America, and that a Barrier should be erected in the Netherlands sufficient to give security to Holland, but 'agreeable to England and to the good liking of the English,' that is to say not the extravagantly large Barrier promised to Holland by the Whig Treaty of 1709.

Ever since August 1710, when Jersey first got into touch with Torcy through Gaultier, Holland was spoken of by the negotiators as their common enemy, or at least as their destined dupe. It was not St. John but Jersey who first based the policy of the new Ministers on close friendship with France at the expense of Holland and the German Princes; and it was Jersey who first offered the French Minister security for the continuance of that friendship by indicating the readiness of the Tory chiefs to restore James III on Anne's death.

The responsibility for the basic principles of the terms of Utrecht, and for the policy of an exclusive friendship with France, does not lie with St. John in the first instance.

\* This had been conceded by Jersey four months before the death of the Emperor Joseph. See p. 88 above and *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 238, Gaultier to Torcy, December 23, 1710, *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1934, p. 103.

It lies with Jersey, and with Harley who left him in charge of the negotiations from August 1710 to April 1711, and with Shrewsbury who was at least a consenting party to that arrangement.

It may well be asked why a transaction so momentous was left by Harley in the hands of a Jacobite nobleman who was not at the time a Minister of the Crown. Jersey's part in the affair appears to have been begun by chance and continued through negligence. Torcy's secret agent in England during the war was the Abbé Gaultier, a priest in close touch with English Jacobites and connected with Jersey's household, particularly with his Roman Catholic wife. If, in August 1710, Harley and Shrewsbury wished to send a secret message to Torcy at Versailles, the simplest way was to send it through Gaultier. It was therefore natural that their first approaches to France took the form of asking Jersey to talk to the Abbé, who was an intimate of his household. As a beginning, that was well enough. But it was characteristic of Harley that he never afterwards bestirred himself to take the matter into his own hands, as St. John very quickly did as soon as he was admitted to the secret.

If Harley, in the autumn of 1710, had been less negligent and easy, he would have dealt with Gaultier himself or instructed Shrewsbury to act for him. In the latter case, at any rate, the negotiation would not have taken the deeply Jacobite tinge which Jersey gave to it from the first.

Did either Harley or Shrewsbury know and, if they knew, did they approve of Jersey's conduct in telling Gaultier that the new Ministers designed to restore James III on his sister's death? The Whig Duke, one may guess, was kept in ignorance; but Harley always liked to have two strings to his bow, and knew that the Jacobite vote in Parliament had been given him during good conduct.<sup>196</sup> In any case, Gaultier's written reports of his conversations with Jersey were such that Torcy saw in the negotiations of 1710 not only a path to the Peace that was so sorely required by the desperate condition of France, but the brilliant prospect that on Anne's death a Restoration would bring England back into the orbit of French diplomacy. For how, save

by close friendship with France, could James III preserve his throne against Whig and Protestant rebellion? No wonder, therefore, that in January 1711 Torcy was persuaded by Gaultier to pay Jersey £3,000 sterling a year; after all, as Gaultier wrote, it was a very small price to pay for a Peace with a Stuart Restoration to follow.\*

But the importance of Jersey soon afterwards began to wane before that of St. John. Early in March,  
 March 8 1711 Harley was wounded by Guiscard, and as Gaultier informed Torcy,

the illness resulting from this wound kept him for some time from paying attention to the negotiation, and during this interval St. John, Secretary of State, introduced himself into the affair, although the intention of those in charge of it had been to keep him in ignorance. Since he had come to know of it, it was no longer possible to keep him out of the business, though Harley wished it. Gaultier, however, says that St. John is 'well intentioned.'<sup>197</sup>

In the last days of April 1711, Shrewsbury insisted that the Queen should lay before the whole Cabinet the French official proposal for peace 'as a paper come to her hands without saying how,' and that it should be at once communicated to the Dutch Government through the ordinary channel of our Ambassador, Lord Raby, at The Hague. The Whig Duke was fond enough of secret ways, but not quite so fond of them as Harley. The depth of the deceit practised on the Cabinet and the Allies rendered him ill at ease, and he may well have suspected the uses to which Jersey was turning his monopoly of speech with the priestly French negotiator. Shrewsbury's insistence that the affair should be made known to the Cabinet and to the Ambassador gave St. John, as the most important of the Secretaries of State, the opportunity to assert his control. From this

\* Torcy (*Journal inédit*, tr. Masson, 1903, p. 404) says Gaultier reports that Jersey accepts the pension. He died in August 1711, greatly to the advantage of the House of Hanover, *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 444; 232, ff. 10-11.

For the Jersey negotiations and their Jacobite character, see pp. 92-93 above. The full evidence will be found in *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.*, Vols. 230-232. See my extracts from those papers in the *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, January 1934, pp. 100-105.

moment forward the negotiations with France passed into his able hands.<sup>198</sup>

St. John had now to carry on a policy which he had not initiated, but which was agreeable to ideas he had previously expressed. More active and ambitious than Harley, the Secretary of State relegated Jersey to his properly subordinate position, even before the Earl's death in August removed him from the scene.

It was well that a stronger man took over the negotiations, for Jersey had showed many signs of weakness as champion of England's interests ; as late as July he told Gaultier that Gibraltar and Port Mahon would be sold back to Spain.<sup>199</sup> He would have been clay in Torcy's deft hands. Fortunately, the agreement with France was still the barest outline when St. John took charge. It was his task to fill in the all-important details which would make it either a good or a bad Peace for England and her Allies. In hard bargaining he proved nearly a match for Torcy, though the Frenchman had the advantage of knowing that the Tory Ministry could not afford to break off without securing a Peace of some kind. But neither, fortunately, could France. In the end St. John obtained very great advantages for England. And if in some respects he neglected her honour and the interests of her Allies, Jersey would certainly have neglected them more.\*

In March 1711 Marlborough had given to the Hanoverian agent Robethon his views of the chief members of the Cabinet, all of whom had formerly been his colleagues or subordinates. According to the Duke, Rochester and Harley 'never spoke in a decisive manner,' and Shrewsbury was 'yet more timid than they.' 'St. John alone applies himself to business, and has the requisite vigour and talent.'<sup>200</sup>

The policy that St. John successfully carried out in the summer and autumn of 1711 was to arrange secretly with

\* As early as August 1710 Jersey went out of his way to advise France to detach Savoy from the Grand Alliance by offering the Duke good terms if he made a separate peace. This, said Jersey, would force the other Allies to treat. Such advice, given to the enemy before the other Allies had even been asked by the new English Ministry to consider terms of peace, was gratuitous treachery to the principle of the Alliance. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 306. *E.H.R.* January 1934.

France the details of the great advantages which England was to obtain, and to leave over the details of the Dutch Barrier and the rewards of the other Allies to be settled at a general Conference of Powers to be held in the following year. At that Conference England and France, being already agreed as between themselves, could dictate to the rest of Europe.

There was everything to be said for this plan as a means of securing British interests, and something to be said for it as a means of securing European peace. It might well prove the only way in which so many self-regarding States and Princes could be compelled to come to any settlement at all. The Treaty of Ryswick had been dictated to Europe in a somewhat similar fashion by an agreement privately reached between William and Louis. The substantial justice or injustice of England's treatment of her Allies would turn on the degree to which she secured their interests at the Conference. But in any case, the separate and secret negotiation with France, whether justifiable or not, was certain to be deeply resented by all the other Powers, as a breach of the Treaty of Grand Alliance, made in order that England should feather her own nest at their expense.

European resentment, supported by the Whig Opposition at home, would be formidable indeed. In view of the coming storm, it was fortunate for the English Ministers that the Emperor Joseph unexpectedly died; his younger brother 'Charles III' of Spain therefore succeeded to his Hapsburg inheritance of Austria-Hungary and was elected Emperor Charles VI. St. John and Torcy were prepared to leave him in possession of Milan, Naples and the Netherlands, on the principle of Partition of the Spanish Empire agreed on in William's Treaty of Grand Alliance. And it was difficult for anyone except an Austrian or a very passionate Whig to argue any longer that Charles ought also to be made King of Spain and the Indies, for in the new circumstances that would mean the revival of the Empire of Charles V and the overturn of the Balance of Power in favour of the House of Hapsburg. The English Ministers had in the previous December secretly promised France to leave Spain to Philip, and

before they were called upon to defend this decision in public the death of the Emperor Joseph had made their case irresistibly strong.

Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1711, St. John and Torcy went at it hammer-and-tongs, haggling over the benefits that England was to derive from the Peace. It was Greek meet Greek and blade cut blade. Each knew the other's need for peace, and each knew his own ; each had the nerve on several occasions to risk the whole negotiation, at least in appearance, in order to carry a point. Until agreement was reached at the beginning of October the bargaining was conducted in secret, for although Heinsius had been officially invited to consider the French outline proposal of April, he was not told that England was filling in the details behind his back.

St. John was the political leader of the squires. He well knew how to win the cheers of the fox-hunters on the back benches by denunciations of the rapacious 'moneyed interest.' None the less he was aware that England's future lay on the sea, that her strength was in trade, that the wealth even of the squires depended on the prosperity of our commerce. He determined to 'dish the Whigs' by serving up to our merchants such a feast of concessions as would make them lick their lips. Moreover, the privileges thus extorted from France and Spain should be denied to Holland, in spite of the clauses in the Barrier Treaty of 1709 securing equal commercial rights to the two Maritime Powers. Tory feeling against the Dutch should be gratified in the interest of the Whig mercantile class. That surely would unite the country behind the new Ministers. On these principles, the programme that St. John set out to obtain from Torcy included the Asiento or monopoly of the Spanish-American slave trade, to be taken from the French and bestowed on Harley's new South Sea Company ; the restoration of the Hudson Bay Company's forts and territories ; Acadia and Newfoundland for our fishermen ; Gibraltar and Port Mahon as permanent security for our Mediterranean commerce ; the most favoured nation treatment for English trade with the Spanish peninsula ; and

the dismantling of all the fortifications of Dunkirk, the sea-citadel of the French privateers, so long the bugbear of our merchants and seamen. It was a popular programme.

St. John was not for long contented that Gaultier alone should explain his views at Versailles. A Briton must go to present the British demands. In July Matthew Prior, in strict secrecy, went over to haggle with Torcy face to face. A better choice could not have been made. Prior was not only a man about town with a reputation as a wit and a writer of society verse; he was also an experienced diplomatist, skilled in the French language and in the arts and courtesies that paved a man's way at Versailles. For he had served King William there as Ambassador Portland's secretary. Devoted to the memory of the Stadtholder-King, Prior, though he was now a Tory, never became a Jacobite. In the following year he repulsed the efforts of the French Minister's agents to draw him into the intrigue for a Restoration, to which his English employers were deeply committed.

St. John very wisely gave Prior no commission to conclude or to yield an inch on any point. He was only to state England's claims and support them with arguments. This he did with an ability and a stiffness that surprised and dismayed Torcy, after his very different experiences during the Jersey regime. The conversations between Torcy and Prior on Gibraltar, Port Mahon, the Asiento, Newfoundland and other points have been reported by both parties and make curious reading. Torcy, aghast, declared that the English demanded 'such considerable advantages as must absolutely ruin all commerce but their own.' He also tried to induce Prior to come to an agreement in a hurry by betraying to him letters from Holland, which indicated that the Dutch might cut in and sell themselves dear to France before England had finished selling them cheap. But Prior was not to be bluffed. He had the honour of a private interview with the Grand Monarch, and then came away. He had settled nothing, but he had done what he had been sent to do, for he had convinced Torcy and Louis that the new British Ministers were in earnest in the demands they made for their own country.<sup>201</sup>



The scene of vital negotiations was now shifted back to London. Prior was accompanied home by a new French agent, Mesnager, a man well skilled in commercial affairs which formed so large a part of the bargain to be driven. St. John had the advantage over the other English Ministers of speaking excellent French at the conferences with Mesnager, and being able to write fluent French letters to Versailles.<sup>202</sup>

Throughout August and September and the first week of October, he and Torcy were fairly at grips. Twice the negotiation almost broke down : once over the demand of the English for 'cautionary towns' in the Spanish Indies to secure their trade there, which Philip V would on no account concede ; and once over Louis's demand for the restoration of Lille and Tournai in return for his destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk. On both points a compromise was reached at the last moment. The English Ministers gave up their claim for territorial security in Spanish-America in return for the extension to thirty years of the period of the Asiento monopoly granted to the South Sea Company.<sup>203</sup> And the question of Tournai and Lille was postponed till the conference, when Louis got back Lille, but finally, after a long struggle, abandoned Tournai.<sup>204</sup>

In one other particular the English Ministers consented to compromise their extensive claims. Newfoundland, Torcy said to Prior at Versailles, was 'the nursery of our seamen,' for the French as much as for the English ; and he afterwards told Shrewsbury that 'to quit entirely the fishery of Newfoundland would beggar three provinces of France.' St. John, however, insisted that this whole island should become British soil, although military superiority in the local war had been clearly on the side of the French, who, from their well-garrisoned base of Placentia had three times taken the ill-defended port of Saint John's. In order to reach an agreement, it was conceded that, if British sovereignty and military occupation were secured, the French fishermen should have the right to dry their fish on a scheduled portion of the coast. This concession was partly due to St. John's need to hasten the agreement between France and England, in order to face the indignant

Allies with a *fait accompli*. Moreover, the news of the failure of the Quebec expedition reached England in the first week of October.

The compromise on Newfoundland caused trouble between England and France for two hundred years to come. In the reign of Edward VII, Lansdowne as Foreign Minister was still engaged in picking up the ragged ends of St. John's diplomacy about that distant and fog-bound shore. Queen Anne's Secretary had made the concession with his eyes open, as a result of necessity not of ignorance; he asked and obtained a full statement of the local situation from the Council of Trade and Plantations, who reported to him that 'if the French reserve the privilege of fishing on that coast and drying on the shore, they will thereby have the same advantage in the trade of dry fish as Her Majesty's subjects, and the good end of our having New Foundland restored to us will be defeated.'

The Council of Trade and Plantations also advised him that Cape Breton should be secured and the boundaries of newly-acquired Acadia carefully defined. Here also he failed to satisfy their demands, being disarmed by Hovenden Walker's failure against Quebec. The struggle for the future dominion of Canada had therefore yet to be fought out, but the Treaty of Utrecht registered such concessions in Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland and Acadia as tilted the balance against the French in those regions. The end was not yet, but the turning point had been reached.<sup>205</sup>

On the whole an excellent bargain had been made for Britain, as set down in detail in the 'Preliminary Articles of Sept. 27 October' signed in London by Mesnager for France (o.s.) and by the two Secretaries of State for England.† Oct. 8 (N.S.) 'This agreement,' wrote St. John to the Queen, 'contains more advantages for your Majesty's Kingdom 1711 than were ever, perhaps, stipulated for any nation at one time.' He did not add that these 'advantages'

\* Swift to Stella, Oct. 6, 1711: 'The news of Mr. Hill's miscarriage in his expedition came to-day. I doubt Mr. Hill and his Admiral made wrong steps; however we lay it all to storm etc. The Secretary is much mortified about Hill, but Lord Treasurer was just as merry as usual.'

† England's chief advantages in the Preliminaries of October and subsequently at Utrecht were: *Asiento* monopoly of slave trade to Spanish-America for thirty

had been won by the Duke of Marlborough, whom the Tory party was denouncing, maligning and driving into exile from the island he had saved and glorified.

There was, indeed, one Cabinet Minister who had some prickings of conscience, not about Marlborough, but on behalf of the Allies of England whom his colleagues already spoke of almost as her enemies. At the end of August 1711 Shrewsbury had written to St. John—

Looking over the papers again, I am more of opinion there is something in them looks so like bargaining for yourselves apart, and leaving your friends to shift at a general treaty, that I am confirmed the exposing of such a paper (as it will be in the power of France to do) may create great jealousy and complaint from the Allies.

Throughout September his uneasiness grew, and he protested frequently to the Queen and to his colleagues, both as to the rights of the Allies and on the need to compel Louis to acknowledge the Protestant Succession.<sup>206</sup>

Shrewsbury's attitude was not wholly without effect. In the Preliminaries signed on October 8, beside the detailed list of special advantages for England, another paper dealt in more general terms with the rest of the business to be brought before the coming Conference. In this paper, signed by Mesnager, Louis acknowledged the Queen's title and the Protestant Succession after her; promised to provide that the Crowns of France and Spain should never be united on one head; promised a Barrier for Holland in the Netherlands but without specifying the towns; spoke also of a Barrier for the Empire and the House of Austria; stipulated that he would dismantle Dunkirk but must have an equivalent in return; and, finally, in separate articles, promised great advantages to the Duke of Savoy, the only Ally who was a favourite with the Tory Ministers.<sup>207</sup>

years; Gibraltar and Minorca; St. Kitts Island and Acadia; Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay; destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk; trade rights in Spain; Queen Anne's title and the Protestant Succession under the Act of Settlement acknowledged by Louis. The fact that the Spanish Netherlands, Italy and Sicily all passed out of the power of France was also of immense advantage to the security and the trade of England.

For the general course of the negotiations with Mesnager leading to the Preliminaries of October 1711, see *Torcy, Legrelle, Matthew Prior, Bol. Letters*. On the *Asiento*, see the 2nd vol. of Scelle, *Traité négrière*, and *C.H.B.E.*, I, Chap. XI.

No one could doubt that Holland, Austria, Prussia and Portugal would be profoundly discontented with such a document couched in such general terms, when contrasted with the specific lists of concessions already secured for England. Those concessions, the Dutch observed with indignation, excluded them beforehand from any share in the *Asiento*,<sup>208</sup> while the British annexation of Gibraltar and Port Mahon had always been opposed by Holland as destructive to her commercial position in the Mediterranean.

When the Allies, encouraged by the Whigs, hesitated to join a Conference summoned to negotiate upon such a basis, they may have been ill-advised, but they can scarcely be blamed as severely as St. John and Swift taught the English to blame them. The Dutch, in particular, had ground of complaint. The late English Ministry had promised them certain specific advantages in the Barrier Treaty of 1709—a great military and commercial position in Belgium and equality with England of trading rights throughout the whole Spanish Empire. In return for that pledge, Holland had, at the bidding of England, most unwillingly rejected at Gertruydenberg the immense offers then made by Louis.† Scarcely more than a year had passed, and now a new English Ministry had torn up the Barrier Treaty, had joined with France in putting on Holland the blame for the rejection of the terms of Gertruydenberg, and had by a secret Treaty with Louis swept the *Asiento* and many other good things off the board on behalf of England, leaving the Dutch to jostle with the Austrians for such broken meats as they could find under the Conference table.

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 380–381.

† See p. 32 above.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE BATTLE FOR THE PEACE

#### I. *At Home*

Union of Holland, Austria, Hanover and the Whigs against the Preliminaries of October. Swift's *Conduct of the Allies*. The Whig bargain with Nottingham: Occasional Conformity Bill and 'No Peace without Spain' carried in the Lords. Ministerial counter-offensive: Creation of twelve Peers at New Year 1712. Walpole to the Tower. Marlborough dismissed. Prince Eugene's visit. Sir Roger in town. The Mohocks. Restraints on the Opposition Press. Two-party system as the defender of liberty. St. John's Peerage. Marlborough goes into exile.

THE Tory Ministers had come to terms with France in the Preliminaries of October 1711. They had now to get this basis of the future Treaty of Peace accepted by Parliament, which was to meet before Christmas, and by the Allies, who were to be summoned to the Peace Conference early in the following year. In the event, the Ministers were compelled to extract this agreement by the strong hand: by putting on Swift to write down the Whigs and the Allies; by disgracing Marlborough; and by calling in the Queen to coerce the House of Lords. St. John, indeed, preferred such methods of active warfare, but Oxford regretted their necessity. And indeed it was only at the last moment that their necessity became evident. It was not certain in October that either Holland or the Whigs would altogether reject the Preliminaries and raise again, in face of fact, the belated slogan of 'No peace without Spain.'

In the early months of the Tory Ministry, the Dutch had been pacified by promises and fair words. They regretted the part they had been forced to play at Gertruydenberg at the behest of Austria and the Whigs. They were no longer wedded to the claim of Charles on the Spanish

Crown. They would even have accepted the Preliminaries of October, if England would have consented so far to modify them as to enforce the Barrier Treaty of 1709 and give Holland a share in the *Asiento* contract. But St. John regarded the terms of the Whig Barrier Treaty as injurious to British commerce both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, and moreover he knew that Louis would never give up all the towns named in that famous document—both Lille and Tournai for example—now that he had gone so far in concessions to England in other parts of the world. Even the trimming Oxford was pledged to secure the monopoly of the slave-trade in Spanish America for his own South Sea Company. The Dutch, therefore, indignant that we proposed to monopolize trade privileges we had bound ourselves by Treaty to share with them, went into opposition and concerted measures with Austria and the Whigs.\*

But as late as November 1711 it had not been certain what line the Whigs themselves would take. Throughout that month Somers and Halifax were trying to get into touch with Oxford and drive a bargain with him.<sup>209</sup> They always believed in the possibility of separating him from St. John. Earlier in the year their plan had been that he should break with the October Club, and by the help of the Duchess of Somerset persuade the Queen to hold another General Election and revive the Coalition Ministry of six years before. They had discussed this with the agents of Hanover as the best way to secure the Protestant Succession. But Marlborough, when consulted by the Hanoverian agent, declared the plan impossible because public opinion was still strong against the Whigs, and a new General Election would not yield the desired result. He warned Hanover of the strength of Toryism and even of Jacobitism in the England of the hour.<sup>210</sup>

Could Marlborough, then, be induced by Oxford to separate himself from the Whigs and support the Peace? The Ministry could do much for him, or much against him.

\* *Geyl*, pp. 26-29; *Montgomery*, pp. 187-238, especially pp. 224-225. I take the opportunity of calling attention to Mrs. Montgomery's excellent continuation of Geikie's work on the Dutch Barrier. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158-159, and IX, pp. 293-297, 324; for the Barrier Treaty of 1709 see pp. 29-31 above.

Though the Queen had dismissed his wife from all her places at Court, he himself was still Captain-General—though not ‘for life’—and held many great posts and emoluments : Oxford and he were still on terms. In March 1711 he had told the Hanoverian agent that he was pledged neither to the Tories nor to the Whigs. He had indeed little love for either of those ‘vile enormous factions,’ as he called them. But whichever way he might incline as between English parties, he was determined to preserve the favour of the future King George. Whatever formal protestations he might still make to Jacobite agents, for fear of a Restoration that he might not be able to prevent, the Duke was clear for Hanover. He gave the Elector’s representatives confidential advice, and diagnosed the English situation for their benefit with clearer insight than the Whigs.

When, therefore, George, as a German Prince acting on European motives, denounced the October Preliminaries and a Peace without Spain, Marlborough had no choice but to follow suit. He must have been specially pleased with one phrase of the Elector’s instructions to his envoy Bothmar in England : ‘The defences of France are already pierced, and after taking one more fortress the Allies will be in the heart of the Kingdom and can have what terms they will.’<sup>211</sup>

The lead given by Hanover against the Peace was certain to be followed not only by the Duke but by the Whigs, and by all who had given up hope of further favours from Queen Anne and who looked for future patronage solely to her successors. For this reason George became the pivot of the formidable league of Allies and Whigs now formed for the continuance of the war. The Elector’s belief that the foreign policy of the Tory Ministers was a betrayal of the Allied cause added fuel to the anger he felt against them as crypto-Jacobites. In return, his hostility to their foreign policy persuaded Queen Anne’s servants that he would discard them as soon as he came to the throne ; and that belief drove them ever more deeply into intrigues to bring about a Stuart Restoration in place of a Hanoverian Succession. It was a vicious circle. The cause of Peace and the cause of the Pretender became identified in the

minds of politicians. But the good sense of the English people managed to disentangle them in the end.

St. John foresaw and welcomed the coming fight for the Peace, and took early measures to prepare for the conflict. Swift's *Examiners* had marked out their author as the greatest political controversialist of the age, and his personal friendship with both the rival Tory chiefs made it peculiarly easy to employ him against a common foe. To get service out of Swift he must be treated as an equal, not as poor Defoe was always used. The easy intercourse of men of letters with the rulers of the land was brought to perfection by Oxford and St. John in the summer of 1711, when the Secretary founded his Club of 'Brothers'—Tory statesmen and authors—in rivalry to the Whig Kit-Cat. In his design their dinners were to have 'none of the extravagance of the Kit-Cat or the drunkenness of the Beef-stake. The improvement of friendship, and the encouragement of letters are to be the two ends of our society. A number of valuable people will be kept in the same mind and others will be made converts to their opinions.' In this famous London dining club, Oxford, St. John, Swift, Arbuthnot and Prior were the leading members.<sup>212</sup>

In September and October 1711 the Treasurer and Secretary often took Swift down to Windsor in their coaches, and entertained him there overnight. There St. John gave him introduction to the inner secrets of State, the most irresistible of all forms of flattery. The Ministers' Jacobite intrigue with France was never revealed to the Irish Protestant, but since he was to defend the Peace, he was in other respects let deep into its inner counsels.

Windsor. Sept. 28, 1711. [Swift writes to Stella.] I came here a day sooner than ordinary at Mr. Secretary's desire, and supped with him and Prior and two private ministers from France and a French priest [Mesnager, Du Bois and the abbé Gaultier.] We have already settled all things with France, and very much to the honour and advantage of England; and the Queen is in mighty good humour. All this news is a mighty secret; the people in general know that a peace is forwarding. The Earl of Strafford is to go soon to Holland, to let them know of what we have been doing and then there will be the Devil and all to pay; but we'll make them swallow it with



a pox. The French ministers stayed with us till one, and the Secretary and I sat up talking till two.

In this manner St. John primed Swift with material for *The Conduct of the Allies*, the greatest of his pamphlets, which came out at the end of November, a week before the meeting of Parliament, with devastating effects on the enemies of Peace.

With that cold, concentrated force with which Swift could state a case, he placed before the English world the valid arguments for a 'Peace without Spain.' He exposed the monstrous extravagance of refusing Louis's offers of 1709-10, and the futility of our conduct in the Peninsula, which Marlborough and the Whigs had treated as a primary object in diplomacy, yet as only a secondary object of their military endeavour. He carried the public mind back to the terms of William's Treaty of Grand Alliance of 1701, containing the original war aims of the Allies, which St. John made it his boast to obtain with additional advantages to England. In that Treaty, as Swift most pertinently reminded the public, there had been 'not a syllable' of engaging to drive Philip out of Spain.

*The Conduct of the Allies* materially helped to obtain peace for Europe on the only possible terms. But some of its pleadings were sophistical and unfair, particularly as regards the early years of the war. The true argument for Peace in 1711 would only have been strengthened by the admission that Marlborough had saved Europe and England from the dominion of France. The restoration of the Balance of Power, and the expulsion of the French from Bavaria, Italy and Belgium were not only great British achievements but greatly to the interest of Britain. Yet Swift thought fit to argue that we had gained no advantage for ourselves out of the war, but had been used all through as the mere tools of Austria and Holland. According to him we ought to have allowed Holland and Germany to defend themselves as best they could in Europe, while our fleet possessed itself of the Spanish colonies. We should have remained indifferent to the fate of Belgium, Italy and Germany. St. John knew better, as his past conduct and his later writings both prove. But in 1711 it was his cue to make his countrymen forget all that they owed to Marlborough, and to turn the current of popular antipathy away

from France into hatred of Austria and Holland.\* In this, with Swift's help, he largely succeeded, and so, by a false and ungrateful reading of the past, helped to secure a satisfactory liquidation of the future. It is often so 'in the corrupted currents of this world.' It is not always the truest argument for a right course that weighs the most in a party fight.

The effect of *The Conduct of the Allies* was prodigious upon the small educated public that made up the political world of that day. Eleven thousand copies were sold in a month—'a great number,' said Dr. Johnson, 'at that time, when we were not yet a nation of readers.' A week after the day of its publication, a Christ Church don wrote to Edward Harley, 'The book of the management of the Allies and the late Ministry takes, as much as you could wish it. It will put the country gentlemen in the temper you desire; they are very ready to battle it at home for peace abroad.'<sup>213</sup>

The cause of peace had need of all the help that Swift could bring, for as the Christmas session of Parliament drew near, the Opposition became more and more confident, and the Ministerialists more and more uneasy and divided. In such an atmosphere a defeat in the Lords might bring the government down if it could not depend on the hearty and unanimous backing of its great majority in the Commons.

In November Lord Poulett wrote to Oxford,

The Queen's enemies at present generally understand one another much better than her friends and servants. The adversaries have been a long time prepared for a meeting which will decide the fate of Europe as well as Britain.<sup>214</sup>

The great Tory majority in the Commons was rent by schisms. St. John, after Oxford had gone up to the Lords, was heading the party of discontent against his rule. The cry was raised that Oxford refused to turn all Whigs out of army, magistracy and civil service. Those High Tories

\* In February 1712 the Commons passed a series of Resolutions accusing the Dutch of having failed to supply their quota of men, ships and subsidies throughout the war. These complaints (*Parl. Hist.*, VI, 1090) should be carefully compared with the answer made by the States General (*P.R.O. (S.P.)* 87, 4, ff. 190-207). On the whole I think the Dutch reply has the best of the matter. In proportion to their lesser numbers and wealth the Dutch war effort had been magnificent; as a State they had crippled themselves by expenditure on the war far more than we. A much better case could have been made out as against Austria.

who had not got jobs for themselves or their relations, held that they were being cheated of the spoils due to the victors. Some who had the least claims to reward made themselves formidable by uniting in a 'March Club,' asserting that the 'October Club' men had already sold themselves to government. Oxford was fain to buy off the 'March' men with promises of favours to come. But the loaves and fishes would not go round among so many, unless the Queen and her Treasurer were prepared to dismiss every Whig and Moderate from the civil and military service, to the ruin of those establishments. This, to their credit, they refused to do, as they had refused under similar conditions nine years before.<sup>215</sup>

In these circumstances the Whig Chiefs, a few days before Parliament met, once more approached Oxford with offers of alliance. They were prepared to help him to pass an Occasional Conformity Bill in the House of Lords, where it was thought that it could not get through if opposed by the Whigs. In return, no doubt, they expected him to reconstruct the Ministry and revise the Peace terms.<sup>216</sup>

Oxford rejected the dangerous alliance. He believed in the peace policy of his own government. There was real conviction in the words he wrote at this time to the Duke of Somerset, in defence of St. John's treaty with France :

No honest or wise man will take upon him the consequences which will follow the defeating this opportunity, for if the arts and restlessness of any here should wrest this treaty out of the Queen's hands, there will be a peace, but such a one, whenever it is, as Britain will have no share in, either of honour, safety or profit.<sup>217</sup>

The Whigs had been unable to ensnare Oxford, but they had captured Nottingham. That tall, melancholy, dark-browed man, in the long old-fashioned coat with deep pockets, looked and was exactly the same honest 'Dismal' as he had been when chief Secretary of State in Anne's first Cabinet. He had resigned in 1704 on High Tory principles, but six years later Harley had left him out of the reconstructed Ministry, and he was now reported among his former colleagues to be 'as sour and fiercely wild as you can imagine anything to be that has lived long in the desert.'<sup>218</sup>

The Whigs approached this isolated but still formidable relic of a past generation, and entered into alliance with

him on terms. It was agreed that, on the day Parliament opened, Nottingham should move an amendment to the Address pledging the Lords against a Peace without Spain, on condition that the Whig Lords should allow him to pass an Occasional Conformity Bill at the expense of their non-conformist clients.\* The Dissenters were gravely discontented at the bargain, but their lordly latitudinarian patrons said the lesser must give way to the greater cause. Only thus, they argued, would the Pope be checkmated and the Hanoverian Succession secured.<sup>219</sup>

The Whigs were sacrificing their principles of religious toleration to their factious desire to overthrow the Ministry and the Peace. But Nottingham, narrow and upright as ever, had sacrificed nothing of his real opinions. He had never changed his views of ten years before in favour of the Occasional Conformity Bill, and against the cession of Spain to King Philip. He had always been singular among statesmen, Whig and Tory, in regarding the enthronement of the Austrian Charles at Madrid as the prime object of the whole war.† But though ‘Dismal’ was, as usual, consistent and righteous, it was only natural that the Tories should denounce him as a traitor, bought and sold to the Whigs for office.

Swift delighted the town with one of his scorching pasquinades :

An orator dismal of Nottinghamshire  
Who has forty years let out his conscience to hire,  
Out of zeal for his country and want of a place  
Is come up, *vi et armis*, to break the Queen’s peace.  
‘But some will cry Turncoat and rip up old stories  
‘How I always pretended to be for the Tories.  
‘I answer : the Tories were in my good graces,  
‘Till all my relations were put into places.  
‘But still I’m in principle ever the same,  
‘And will quit my best friends, while I’m *Not-in-game*.’

The Whigs, on the other hand, went round in triumph, extolling his patriotic virtue, drinking his health, and crying out in all companies ‘It is *Dismal* will save England at last.’

\* On the Principles of the Occasional Conformity Bill see *Blenheim*, pp. 277 *et seq.*

† See *Blenheim*, p. 303.

For some days all went well with the plot. Nottingham's motion that in the opinion of the Lords 'no peace could be safe or honourable to Great Britain or Europe if Spain and the West Indies were allotted to any branch of the House of Bourbon' was supported by Marlborough and the Whigs and carried by 62 to 54. Oxford, it was said had been negligent in whipping up his men ; in particular eight 'proxies' of absent Scottish Peers had not been sent in time. A few days later the Occasional Conformity Bill was hurried through their Lordships' House where it had so often before suffered shipwreck. It became law, only to be repealed under George I.

But no one in town, except Nottingham and the Dissenters, gave more than a passing thought to the Occasional Bill. It was the Lords' vote against Peace without Spain that made the crisis. To our generation it may seem strange that a hostile vote on Foreign Policy in the Lords should be regarded as a fatal obstacle to a government with a majority of two to one in the Commons. But so it was. The relative position of the two Houses and the customs of the Constitution were then such that the Ministry was regarded as destroyed unless it could reverse the vote. Even Swift declared to Mrs. Masham that Oxford and the Queen had betrayed them and that all was lost.

The Whigs are all in triumph ; they foretold how all this would be, but we thought it boasting. Nay they said the Parliament should be dissolved before Christmas and perhaps it may. This is all your damned Duchess of Somerset's doing. . . . I was this morning with Mr. Secretary ; we are both of opinion that the Queen is false. . . . Lewis believes that sooner than turn out the Duchess of Somerset she will dissolve the Parliament and get a Whiggish one, which may be done by managing the elections.<sup>220</sup>

But the Queen was not false. She and Oxford had yet a shot in their locker. At the New Year, Anne created twelve Tory Peers and the situation was saved. Jan. 1 Mrs. Masham's husband was one of the dozen. 1712 The Queen and her Treasurer had planned the *coup* without the knowledge of the other members of the Cabinet. Dartmouth, the second Secretary of State, tells us :

I was never so much surprised as when the Queen drew a list of twelve lords from her pocket, and ordered me to bring warrants for them, there not having been the least intimation before it was put in execution. I asked her if she designed to have them all made at once. She asked me if I had any exceptions to the legality of it. I said no, but very much doubted the expediency, for I feared it would have a very ill effect in the House of Lords and no good one in the Kingdom. I thought it my duty to tell her my apprehensions as well as execute her commands. She thanked me and said she liked it as little as I did, but did not find that anybody could propose a better expedient.

When Dartmouth afterwards expostulated with Oxford, he replied that he was tired of depending on the venal Scottish Lords 'for they now come to expect a reward for every vote they give.' On this occasion it was Oxford who had acted with decision.<sup>221</sup>

If some members of the Cabinet that was saved by this timely use of the prerogative thought that it was straining the custom of the Constitution, it may be imagined how furious were the Whigs. But they found that they were helpless. The spirited action of the Treasurer rallied the Tory malcontents enthusiastically round his standard—for the last time. No one could dispute the Queen's legal prerogative to make Peers; all that the Opposition leaders could do was to say it was unparalleled in our history, redolent of James II, and so forth.<sup>222</sup> But nobody marked them. Tory enthusiasm, English loyalty to the Crown and national thirst for peace were blended in a passion that overwhelmed the Whig and Allied resistance.

No political event of the reign at once excited and amused the Town to the same degree. Not only had the Ministry and the Peace been saved by an unexpected and novel stroke of policy, but twelve brand new Peers at a batch afforded a fine subject for gossip, jealousy and jokes. Wharton rose to the occasion in the Lords by asking the twelve, when they took their seats, 'whether they voted by their foreman.' Shrewsbury's Italian Duchess—so the story ran—went to call on Lady Oxford and said 'Madam, I and my Lord are so weary of talking Politics. What are you and your Lord?' The pious Lady Oxford sighed and answered that 'she knew no Lord but the Lord Jehovah.'

'O dear ! Madam, who is that ?' cried the Duchess, who had not been brought up on the Bible, 'I believe 'tis one of the new titles, for I never heard of him before.' A year later the actress Elizabeth Barry died of a fever, and in her delirium kept repeating with her last breath a line of her own composition :

Ha, ha ! and so they make us Lords by dozens ! <sup>223</sup>

A new constitutional weapon had been forged. A precedent had been created which was to slumber for more than a hundred years, but never to be forgotten. Owing to the action that Queen Anne had taken at Oxford's request, Lord Grey was able to persuade the reluctant William IV that a method other than that of revolution existed, by which the resistance of the Peers to the Reform Bill could be overcome. And the Parliament Act of 1911 was passed by the same means. In those later cases the numbers to be created were greater, and partly for that reason the threat to create was used in place of actual creation. But Oxford and Queen Anne must divide between them the credit of making our Constitution so elastic that it has been able to survive.

The country, it is to be feared, had by now had from the Queen and her Treasurer the best part of their long and great service. Oxford's habitual caution henceforth degenerated into sluggishness that refused to take decisions, accompanied by a physical deterioration that rumour associated with heavy drinking. Anne's increasing ill-health rendered her equally incapable of action. Neither were ever again on a level with the circumstances that they were called on to control.

The defeat of the Whigs was followed up and soon turned into a rout. It was determined first to strike down the two most formidable leaders of Opposition : Walpole, St. John's only rival in the House of Commons, whose place in the counsels of his party was now co-ordinate with that of Somers or Wharton ; and Marlborough, whose command of the Allied armies on the French border still gave hope to the war party in Europe of dictating Peace in Paris without the help of St. John.

In that era it was easy to charge adversaries with corruption by treating the financial irregularities permitted by the loose customs of the age as crimes in the particular case of the accused. It was usually the pot who indicted the kettle for blackness : St. John led the attack on Walpole and Marlborough for taking illicit commissions.

In the previous April an ill-prepared accusation against Walpole had completely broken down in face of the facts.\*

Jan. 12 In December a smaller but more authentic charge  
1712 against him was debated in the House of Commons,  
and a fortnight after the creation of the twelve  
Peers, he was lodged in the Tower. The Speaker, Bromley,  
had told St. John that the removal of Walpole from the  
House was the '*unum necessarium*.'

He had done a thing of which no English statesman in the Nineteenth Century would have dreamt for a moment, but which few in Queen Anne's reign really regarded as wrong. As Secretary-at-War he had assisted his relative and estate-agent Robert Mann to enjoy £1,000 out of a forage contract for the troops. Walpole himself had touched nothing directly.† He was expelled from the Commons House. But the dwindling of the majorities against him showed that many Tory members considered the proceedings vindictive. Walpole was voted guilty of corruption by 57, expelled the House by 22 and committed to the Tower by no more than twelve votes. His constituents of King's Lynn showed their sense of the proceedings by re-electing him, though the Commons voted his re-election to be void. He was extolled by all his party as a martyr. When in July he was released from the Tower he came out with an increased reputation and at once resumed his leading place in the politics of the day.<sup>224</sup>

The very similar attack on Marlborough was an affair of European importance, regarded abroad as a monstrous

\* See pp. 107-108 above.

† It seems possible, though not certain, that he benefited indirectly. Mann's son is recorded to have said in conversation that the sum 'received by Mr. Walpole out of the forage contract was intended solely for Mr. Mann's use ; who had advanced money to Sir Robert during his necessities.' Mr. Stirling Taylor (*Walpole*, p. 118) thinks this proves 'that the payment to Mann was to settle a loan.' But the words do not make this clear. Walpole may have paid the loan off before.



example of national ingratitude. It can best be defended as a measure deemed necessary in order to secure the Peace. To prevent the serious renewal of warfare next Spring, it was considered essential to replace the fighting Duke by a general more in touch with the Queen's Ministers and less in touch with her Allies, one who would be ready to exchange confidences with Villars but not with Eugene. This can be well understood. But it was unfortunate that Oxford and St. John dared not remove Marlborough in favour of Ormonde, until they had blackened his face by charges of corruption, which should complete the picture that Swift and the smaller fry of party hacks were busily painting of him for the benefit of a credulous public.

Two main charges were brought in the House of Commons against Marlborough. Sir Solomon Medina, who contracted for bread for the allied armies, stated that between 1702 and 1711 he had paid the Duke over £63,000 in commissions. The second charge was that the Duke had taken  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., amounting to over £280,000, from the pay of the foreign troops in English employ.

The affair of the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. was an entirely frivolous accusation. The Duke showed that it was the custom for Commanders-in-chief openly to receive that amount in lieu of secret service money for the purposes of war. He showed that Anne had specifically sanctioned the arrangement in his case; there indeed was the Queen's signature! And no one who knows anything of Marlborough's methods of warfare can doubt that the best 'informed' general of his age must have spent great sums on secret service.<sup>225</sup>

The other charge of receiving commissions on Medina's bread contracts was more serious, and in later times would have been regarded as corrupt. But when Marlborough declared that he had used the money for secret service, it was not possible to prove how much or how little he had so spent. Too close an accounting might have been foregone by the nation he had saved and enriched. He had served England as she had never been served before with the military intelligence he had bought, and by the splendid use he had made of it in so many glorious campaigns. Other statesmen and generals took commissions and gave the nation

nothing in return. His chief accuser had a few months before filled his pockets with illicit commissions on the Quebec expedition, without any question of paying for secret service, and without taking Quebec ! Moreover, in spite of the Duke's commissions on the bread contracts, no army had ever been supplied so well and so regularly as Marlborough's men. It was not they who grudged him his perquisites, for he had fed them and led them to victory.

As soon as the charges against Marlborough had been formulated, but before they been examined, the Queen, who owed to him the success and glory of her reign, sent Dec. 31<sup>1711</sup> him a letter of dismissal from all his offices, couched in terms 'so very offensive that the Duke flung it into the fire, though he was not a man of passion.' It was a sorry end to one of the world's famous friendships.<sup>226</sup>

The country as a whole had rather more gratitude than the forgetful Queen and the politicians fighting for their places. Many Englishmen were ashamed to see the Duke treated so. In the month following his disgrace, his levees were more crowded than ever ; and passers by cheered him in the street. From the provinces it was reported that 'Tories as well as Whigs drank to the health of the Duke of Marlborough.'<sup>227</sup>

Within a few days of his dismissal, his friend and co-rival in fame landed in England. Prince Eugene was sent over by the new Emperor, Charles VI, to use his influence Jan. 1712 to stop a Peace without Spain. He was to make the belated offer that 30,000 Austrian and Imperialist troops should be sent to the Peninsula for the campaign of 1712 : it ought to have been done years before. Eugene came to atone for the failure of the Emperor's Envoy, Count Gallas, who had openly consorted with the Whigs and whose remonstrances and intrigues against the Peace had been too audacious. The Queen had, in November, forbidden him the Court and asked for his recall. It was thought in Vienna that neither Anne nor her Ministers would dare to be rude to Eugene.<sup>228</sup>

And indeed he was received not only with respect but with universal enthusiasm. Government and Opposition vied with each other in making him welcome, and in using

him each for its own ends. The Whigs praised him as the friend and partner in war of their injured hero, come over to help him avert a disgraceful peace. The Tories hailed him no less loudly, as a greater general and a nobler man than Marlborough.\* But the friendship that bound these two soldiers of genius, singularly incapable of jealousy, was proof even against the flattery of the Tories crying out that Marlborough had slain his thousands and Eugene his tens of thousands. The prince was seen everywhere in company with the Duke, but otherwise had the wisdom to avoid the Opposition and consort with the Ministerialists, little as he liked their politics. 'The mob,' wrote Lady Strafford from St. James's Square, 'are so fond of Prince Eugene that his coach can hardly go about, and he is in some danger of being killed with good cheer.'<sup>229</sup>

Eugene's visit, as Swift had prophesied, 'came too late to do the Whigs any good.' It had no effect on our politics, but it is still remembered in our literature: for Sir Roger de Coverley came up all the way from Worcestershire to see 'Prince Eugenio,' and 'stand in some convenient place where he might have full sight of that extraordinary man, whose presence does so much honour to the British nation.' It was January, and the good Tory baronet took occasion to describe to his friend the *Spectator* his recent Christmas festivities, when he had as usual kept open house in the country and 'killed eight fat hogs,' sending 'a string of hog's puddings with a pack of cards to every poor family in the parish. He then launched out into praise of the late Act of Parliament for securing the Church of England, and told me, with great satisfaction, that he believed it already began to take effect; for that a rigid Dissenter who chanced to dine at his house on Christmas Day,

\* For an example of the Whig treatment of Eugene's visit see Mrs. Centlivre's dedication of her play *The Perplexed Lovers* to the Prince:

'Eugene and Marlboro', names to Europe dear,  
True heroes born and brothers in the War. . . .  
When shall true merit meet with due regard,  
And friends to France be England's foes declared?'

For an example of the Tory line on Eugene see *Mayor*, p. 373: 'Prince Eugene extolled for his generosity but Marlborough abused for his avarice' on the London stage.

had been observed to eat very plentifully of his plum porridge.' <sup>230</sup>

Addison had brought Sir Roger to town at a bad moment in one respect, for general alarm was being felt at the outrages of the 'Mohocks.' These gangs, called after the Red Indians who had recently visited London, consisted of young law-students joined to 'persons of quality,' who infested the streets at night, beat the watch, assaulted peaceable citizens, slit the noses of men, rolled women in barrels down Snow Hill and made themselves a terror to all. The Tories declared that they were Whigs intending to murder the Ministry, but they seem to have been only extremists of the eternal faction of Falstaff's 'Minions of the Moon,' and Milton's 'Sons of Belial, flown with insolence and wine.' \*

For fear of the Mohocks, the slow and solemn procession of Sir Roger's coach to the theatre was well guarded by his friends :

Captain Sentry bid Sir Roger fear nothing, for that he had put on the same sword which he made use of at the battle of Steenkirk. Sir Roger's servants, and among the rest my old friend the butler, had, I found, provided themselves with good oaken plants. When we had placed him in his coach, with myself at his left hand, the Captain before him, and his butler at the head of his footmen in the rear, we conveyed him in safety to the Playhouse. <sup>231</sup>

It is to be feared that in this imperfect world there were other types of country gentlemen besides those truly resembling Addison's Sir Roger de Coverley. In these same early months of 1712 a certain Herbert Jacob wrote from the innocent rural parts to a friend in the wicked town :

I cannot entertain you in so elegant a manner as you have done me, the conversaton of the country gentlemen running chiefly upon a comparison of their irregularities, in which he seems to be the most esteemed who goes the greatest lengths. An extravagant debauch generally concludes with a bottle or two of sheer brandy, and a journey of six or seven miles at midnight when you can't see your hand. <sup>232</sup>

\* A sham plot, after the fashion of Oates' had been invented by a Jacobite spy Plunket, a pupil of the Jesuits. According to this yarn Marlborough and Eugene had plotted to seize the Tower, set fire to London, and murder the Ministers. The intended victims, however, did not believe in their danger. *Leadam*, pp. 193-194; *Coxe*, Chap. CVII, pp. 491-495, ed. 1819; *Klopp*, XIV, p. 256; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 282-283, 309-311, 451-456.

These night rides home of the inebriated squire or farmer, under overhanging trees, were as much dreaded as the death-dealing smallpox, and kept anxious wives awake till the pale-faced morning, when the riderless steed grazing at the front door sent the frightened servants out to search the wayside ditches.

Meanwhile in town the pamphlet and newspaper war was raging at its height. It was the greatest moment in the literary quality of our political literature. To the genius of Swift, Addison and Defoe was now added that of Arbuthnot. The good-natured Tory doctor wrote a squib in favour of peace, *The History of John Bull*, which kept appearing in parts throughout the year 1712 ; its comparison of the War to a law suit between country neighbours can still be read with fresh delight, and it fixed for ever the name of ' John Bull ' on the Englishman. Arbuthnot's portrait of the rough, generous, irascible, obstinate but persuadable countryman was no bad type of the English public of that day, and remained so a hundred years later when Gillray and the elder Doyle immortalized his rustic lineaments in art.

Meanwhile Swift's *Conduct of the Allies* provoked many answers : the most voluminous were by Francis Hare, Marlborough's campaign chaplain, destined to Bishoprics in the piping days of Whig prosperity and Hanoverian peace. St. John, vexed with the continued enemy resistance, bethought him that a heavy tax on pamphlets and newspapers would silence the small fry of Opposition, while Government could pay Swift and their own men to continue their work. He therefore passed a Stamp Tax at the rate of a penny a sheet on newspapers and pamphlets, and a shilling on every advertisement appearing in a public print. It came into force at the beginning of August 1712, and already on the 7th Swift wrote to Stella :

Do you know that Grub Street is dead and gone last week ! No more ghosts or murders for love or money. I plied it pretty close the last fortnight, and published at least seven penny papers of my own besides some of other peoples : but now every simple half sheet pays a halfpenny to the Queen. The *Observer* is fallen ; the *Medleys* are jumbled together with the *Flying Post* ; the *Examiner* is deadly sick ; the *Spectator* keeps up and doubles its price.

As between the parties the tax made less difference than St. John had hoped, for the Whigs clubbed together and subsidized their prints. Pamphlets still rained thick as leaves in Vallombrosa, during the last two years of Queen Anne. But, for good or evil, the cheap popular press was gone, until in the nineteenth century the abolition of 'taxes on knowledge' became a policy of Liberal Governments.<sup>233</sup>

It is a remarkable proof of the degree to which habits of liberty had taken root in the island since the Revolution, that St. John never ventured to attain his object more directly by passing an Act to revive the Censorship of the Press, though it had only been abolished in 1695. Opposition writers and printers could publish whatever they liked or could afford, but they still ran the considerable risks of prosecution for sedition or libel. The government prosecuted freely, urged on by Swift :

These devils in Grub Street, rogues, that write the *Flying Post* and *Medley* in one paper, will not be quiet. They are always mauling Lord Treasurer, Lord Bolingbroke and me. We have the dog under prosecution, but Bolingbroke is not active enough. He is a Scotch rogue, one Ridpath.

But even this form of repression was limited by the fact that, under the Revolution Settlement, the Judges were irremovable except at the demise of the Crown. The Chief Justice, Parker, had been appointed just before the Whig Ministry fell : there he was fixed upon the Bench, at least until the Queen died. He refused to favour Jacobite as against Whig pamphleteers who were brought before him, and even made some attempt to discover and restrain the nominally anonymous author of *The Conduct of the Allies*. Swift was so angry that he invented and published the absurd statement that the Whig judge 'often drank the abdicated King's health upon his knees.'<sup>234</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of Parker, a good many Opposition writers and printers were sent to prison. Walpole could find no one venturous enough to print one of his pamphlets, so he issued it from a press which he had set up in his own house.<sup>235</sup> But the wonder is, not that some Opposition writers were punished and others frightened into caution, but that all were not silenced. The reason was that the

two-party system protected the infant liberty of discussion. Whether Tories or Whigs were in Opposition, they stood by their men when the Government threatened them. The smallest printer or publisher's hack could hope to have the whole Whig or the whole Tory party behind him if he was prosecuted by the State. Our formidable factions, for all their nonsense and violence, served to protect the liberty of the subject. It is only in States based on the less civilized principle that no party may exist save the party of government, that liberty of press and person can be totally destroyed, whether in the Eighteenth or the Twentieth Century. That is not the English tradition.\*

At midsummer St. John felt entitled to press for the reward of his many services. He had been promised that, if he remained to lead the Commons till the end of the session, he should be promoted to a rank higher than the 'jury' of twelve Barons who had been sent up before him to carry the Peace. At the beginning of the recess he wrote, with affected humility, to ask Oxford whether their mistress would revive in him the title of Earl of Bolingbroke, far as he said it was above his pretensions and deserts. The Queen took his humility at its face value, and made him a Viscount instead. It was a cruel blow. St. John, after a belated attempt to remain in the Commons rather than appear in the Lords with a rank below that of the Earls of Oxford and Dartmouth, took his Viscounty with an anger he no longer pretended to conceal. 'This caused a new ferment,' wrote Oxford sardonically, 'because he was not an Earl, and it rose to a great height against Lady Masham and everybody except the person who encouraged him and yet spoke against it [Lord Keeper, Harcourt?]. The Treasurer did all he could to calm this, and without any occasion Lord Bolingbroke was permitted to go to Paris to please him.' There was more 'occasion' for the chief

\* In the Record Office (*P.R.O.*, *S.P.*, 11-15) we find constant informations sent up by partisans in the country to the Secretary's office in London, denouncing words alleged to have been spoken against government by individuals—Tory words till late 1710, Whig words after the change of Ministry. But prosecutions are seldom undertaken as a result of these relations; e.g. in June 1711 (15, f. 160) enquiry is made, and the conclusion reached that 'Mr. Shanklin is a Dissenter, but a quiet man and not likely to have spoken such words.'

English negotiator to go to France at that moment than Oxford allowed. But no doubt it was some assuagement to Bolingbroke's hot fit of pride, to be received at Versailles as the great man. To the end of his life he considered he had been grossly ill used in the matter of the peerage, and in the next reign he wrote to Sir William Wyndham, 'I was dragged into the House of Lords in such a manner as to make my promotion a punishment, not a reward ; and was there left to defend the treaties almost alone. I thought my mistress treated me ill.' In October matters were made worse : as many as six Knights of the Garter were created, including the Treasurer but not the Secretary ; this, wrote Oxford, 'gave new occasion for disquiet.' Such matters may sound trivial now, but they did not seem trivial to the men concerned. The fate of the Kingdom was likely, when Anne died, to turn on the personal relations of Oxford and Bolingbroke, and they were growing worse with every month that passed.\*

During the greater part of 1712 the Marlboroughs lingered on in England, retired from the political scene, in their pleasant house of Hollywell, near St. Albans, for Blenheim was not yet ready for habitation. The Duke was ill and they were both unhappy. In September they lost their one close political and personal friend, Godolphin, who died conjuring Sarah never to desert 'the young man,' Robert Walpole. Had the dying ex-Prime Minister an instinct that this 'young man' would some day govern England as he himself had striven to govern it, with a steady eye fixed on the moderate courses that bring prosperity to a nation ? <sup>236</sup>

Godolphin, though he had been so long in control of the Treasury, had accumulated no private fortune for himself. The worst that his enemies could find to say against him on this score was that he had provided for his son by

\* Swift, on July 17, wrote to Stella : ' You hear Secretary St. John is made viscount Bullinbrook. I can hardly persuade him to take that title, because the eldest branch of his family had it in an earldom and it was last year extinct.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 194, 198, 465. See also Bolingbroke's letter to Strafford, July 23, 1712, *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 484-485 : ' I remain clothed with as little of the Queen's favour as she could contrive to bestow.'



marrying him into the Marlborough inheritance. The great financier had, in an age of corruption, served his country with clean hands. And he had done more for England than many who are more often remembered and praised.<sup>237</sup>

The Marlboroughs were not on good terms with any of the Whig Lords except Cowper, yet they were exposed to the ever-growing rage of Tory denunciation and slander. The pamphleteers no longer even allowed that the Duke was a good general—he had ‘once been fortunate’ at Blenheim ! They circulated with fresh detail every lie that had ever been invented against him. In May Lord Poulett, a Minister of the Crown, publicly accused him of having wasted the lives of his soldiers in war, in order to fill his pockets with the sale of the dead officers’ commissions. Such was the language of the hour. Many declared that he must be ‘pursued to the blood.’ A secret message was sent to Torcy on behalf of the English Ministers to assure the French King that they would ‘cut off the head’ of the man who had so often beaten his armies in the field. It is not likely they intended to carry their friendship with France so far, but they were glad to gain credit for good intentions.<sup>238</sup>

At last he took the alarm that if he stayed he might be prosecuted. By arrangement with Oxford, he obtained passports and at the end of November caught the Ostend packet and went into voluntary exile till better times. There he put himself in close touch with the House of Hanover and prepared to command the anti-Jacobite armies in case a War of Succession broke out in England, whereas if he had stayed at home, the friends of James in the Ministry might have arrested him before striking their blow.

He was joined by the Duchess in Holland, where the pair of lovers were consoled by each other’s company, and by the enthusiastic honours everywhere paid to them by the Dutch people and government, as well as by the soldiers of the allied armies whom he had so often led to victory. According to Sarah’s observation at Maestricht, even the Catholics of Holland ‘fear the power of France so much that they drink to the Protestant Succession.’ Nevertheless she wrote ‘I think ’tis much better to be dead than to live out of England.’<sup>239</sup>

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE BATTLE FOR THE PEACE

#### II. *Abroad*

Opening of the Peace Conference. Nature of the Dutch grievance. High French demands. Renewed secret negotiations between England and France. Question of the French Succession : Philip's choice of Spain. The Restraining Orders to Ormonde. The British troops withdrawn. Dunkirk and Denain. Bolingbroke's visit to France. The gains of Prussia, Savoy and Portugal. Holland submits. Final crisis of February 1713 : Bolingbroke's Ultimatum to Torcy. The Case of the Catalans. Signing of the Treaties of Utrecht. Holland and England in the new era.

By January 1712 the battle for the Peace had been decided at home, but it had still to be won abroad. Queen Anne's Ministers had still to coerce their incensed Allies into accepting a settlement of everything in Europe and America at the dictation of England, and at the same time to prevent France from recovering her power and reasserting her own claims under cover of the fierce dissensions of her opponents.

This formidable task was accomplished in the course of 1712 by the bold unscrupulous energy of Bolingbroke. It is true that the French took some advantage of the situation, and secured, in Bolingbroke's own opinion, a better fortress-frontier than they should have been allowed.\* But in the main he succeeded in imposing England's will on Europe. And in so doing he gave the world a peace that proved more suited to the needs of the new century than the post-Napoleonic Treaties of Vienna, or the Versailles Treaty of our own day.

\* *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, pp. 121-123. All through this chapter I give St. John his title of Bolingbroke, though in fact he only acquired it in July 1712.

But the actual terms of Utrecht are not the whole of the question. The methods employed to obtain them have also to be condemned or condoned. Bolingbroke's coercion of the Allies by deserting their side in the last campaign of the war was regarded by half the world as a blot on England's scutcheon, and will continue to rouse acute controversy as long as history is read. Incidentally it involved him and his personal followers more deeply than ever with the Jacobite cause at home and abroad, and fixed immovably the prejudice of the Elector of Hanover against the Tory party, with important consequences to the future government of Great Britain.

The question how far these methods were justified by necessity is not simple : it cannot be disposed of either by abusing Bolingbroke as 'a rascal,' or by writing off the Dutch as 'grasping traders.' Bolingbroke was not the first or the last statesman to do great things by questionable methods ; and the English at Utrecht 'grasped' a great deal more for their 'trade' than the Dutch were able to do. The question must be approached without passion, for it is highly complicated, and there is much to be understood before a right judgment can be formed.\*

When the Congress of Powers assembled in the pleasant Dutch city of Utrecht in the last days of January 1712, for the purpose of making a general peace, the situation might well have appalled anyone less resourceful than Bolingbroke. Each several Ally was furious with England for having secured her own interests by a separate negotiation with France, in disregard of the Eighth Article of the Treaty of Grand Alliance. Nor was the point merely formal, for now that France had conceded so much to England, she would certainly concede less to others. England had been helped first out of the dish. Even her favourite allies, Savoy and Prussia, who eventually did well enough at Utrecht, had nothing definite settled on their behalf when the Congress opened. Austria only knew that she was not to have Spain.

\* The attacks on Bolingbroke are legion. The best short defence of him will be found in Mr. Wickham Legg's Introduction (pp. xviii-xxii) to *Diplomatic Instructions, France, 1689-1721* (R.H.S. 1925). But Mr. Legg omits to state the Dutch case.

But the Dutch statesmen were in the worst plight of all. Not only had the extent of their Barrier in the Netherlands to be defined all over again, but England had secured beforehand a monopoly of trade with Spanish America, in disregard of the Dutch rights to equal treatment in this matter, which had been guaranteed to Holland by British statesmen in the Barrier Treaty of 1709. Moreover, Bolingbroke had, contrary to Dutch wishes and interests, seized the control of Mediterranean trade for England by annexing Gibraltar and Port Mahon as bases for her fleet. It was because of trade, not because of Philip's claim on Spain, that Holland in January 1712 still refused to accept the English terms of Peace.\*

Into this powder magazine of discontent and mutual recrimination among the allied powers, the French deliberately dropped a bombshell. In February 1712, as the first important event of the Congress, they presented terms so monstrous that even the English were aghast. The French proposed that the Spanish Netherlands should go to the Elector of Bavaria, and a long list of fortresses on that frontier be restored to Louis.<sup>240</sup> The proposal could scarcely have been worse for England and Holland if they had lost the battle of Ramillies. Belgium was to be given to the ally of France!

After this bad beginning, followed by counter proposals from various Powers which led to no agreement, Utrecht ceased for many months to be the true centre of affairs. 'Her Majesty is fully determined to let all negotiations sleep in Holland,'<sup>241</sup> wrote the Secretary of State. Our plenipotentiaries there, the Bishop of Bristol and Lord Strafford, did nothing in particular with becoming dignity,

\* Bolingbroke (*Defence of Utrecht*, p. 125) writes: 'That the Dutch were not averse to all treaty, but meant none wherein Great Britain was to have any particular advantage will appear from this; that their Minister declared himself ready and authorized to stop the opposition made to the Queen's measures by presenting a memorial wherein he would declare that his masters entered into them and were resolved not to continue the war for the recovery of Spain, provided the Queen would consent that they should garrison Gibraltar and Port Mahon jointly with us, and share equally the *Asiento*, the *South Sea ship*, and whatever should be granted by the Spaniards to the Queen and her subjects.' There is much other evidence that this was the Dutch attitude, e.g. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158-159, IX, p. 324; Scelle, *La traite négrière*, II, pp. 576-577.

while Bolingbroke resumed the method of secret treating with Versailles. In 1711 he and Torcy had thrashed out the terms for England : in 1712 they set themselves to bargain, with the same secrecy, on the terms to be accorded to the various Allies.

Possibly this was the only way of arriving at any general settlement at all. It had been the way in which William had arranged the terms of Ryswick with France on behalf of all Europe. But it is more open to question whether, while negotiating with France on the fate of the world, Bolingbroke should not have continued to apply military pressure upon her in concert with the Allies for whose interests he had now undertaken to bargain. He chose the opposite course, and the English army stood aside while the enemy won battles and took towns. For he was more afraid of Dutch than of French resistance to his plans.

Was this very grave decision wholly a matter of cool calculation on his part ? Was there not also an element of inclination and passion ? Bolingbroke's letters this year display contempt and anger for the Dutch and close friendliness to the French Court. ' They ne'er pardon who have done the wrong.' Since we were cheating the Dutch ' in matters of commerce,' tearing up our previous Treaties as if they had been mere ' scraps of paper,' it was necessary to malign those whom we injured. The Secretary had come to believe the things that Swift and Arbuthnot wrote at his instigation about Holland for the delighted and self-righteous English public.\*


But although Bolingbroke was wilfully blind to the Dutch case, he was shrewd enough to know that he must not withdraw the British troops from the field until he had

\* *E.g.* to Thomas Harley, Bolingbroke writes on May 10, 1712 : ' I confess I begin to wish that the Dutch may continue still dully obstinate, rather than submit to the Queen's measures, since we do not want them either to make or support the peace, and since it will be better settled for England without their concurrence than with it. Does it not make your blood curdle to hear it solemnly contested in Holland whether Britain shall enjoy the *Asiento* ?' He does not mention that we had promised in the Barrier Treaty of 1709 (Article 15) to share any such advantage ' equally ' with the Dutch ! It may have been a bad Treaty, but it bore the signature of Townshend as England's representative. *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 324, see also p. 327.

extorted one more fundamental concession from France. It was no less an English than a Dutch interest that the Crowns of France and Spain should never rest on the same head. That was laid down with emphasis in William's Treaty of Grand Alliance, which Bolingbroke now undertook to implement at Utrecht a dozen years after Marlborough had signed it at The Hague. If no provision were made against a future union of the Crowns of France and Spain, the Whigs might successfully arouse English opinion against the Peace.

Indeed, some such provision had become more than ever necessary owing to the series of domestic catastrophes that darkened the last years of King Louis. In 1711 the Dauphin had died. In February 1712 that Dauphin's eldest son and successor, the Duke of Burgundy, died also, and next month Burgundy was followed to the grave by his own eldest son.\* The heir left to the throne of France, afterwards Louis XV, was a sickly infant, by many not expected to live long. The next heir after him, in strict succession was Philip V, King of Spain.

An appalling situation had arisen, threatening once more the Balance of Power and the future peace of Europe, and



Torcy made it worse by declaring that, according to the opinion of certain French lawyers, no renunciation of the Crown by the rightful heir could be valid. Bolingbroke acted with promptitude. He refused to proceed with negotiations on any other point until this great matter had been settled to his satisfaction. With lightning rapidity he made a new and ingenious proposal. As an alternative to the renunciation of the reversion of the French Crown by Philip, let him, wrote Bolingbroke, retain his rights thereto, on condition that he at once hands over Spain and the Indies to the Duke of Savoy. In compensation, he is himself to become ruler of the Duke's territories of Savoy-Piedmont, together with Montferrat, Mantua and Sicily. If and when Philip becomes King of France, these North Italian territories are to be added to the French dominions, but Sicily is to pass to Austria.<sup>242</sup>

The acceptability of this arrangement to Spain, Austria and England was never put to the test. Philip, when compelled by Bolingbroke's insistence to choose at once, May  
1712 chose to retain the Crown he wore. He preferred the certainty of Madrid to the mere hope of Paris added to the less brilliant certainty of Turin. He abjured his reversionary claim to the throne of France, and his grandfather did all he could to legalize and implement his act.

On these lines the matter was settled at Utrecht. And since, contrary to expectation, Louis XV lived long and left descendants, the dangers prophesied by the Whigs never arose. It is probable that, in the very difficult circumstances of the case, Bolingbroke had got the best security that was to be had, in spite of the nonsense talked by some French lawyers. For if little Louis had fulfilled the fears of the world and died as a child, not only would it have been the interest of England and of all Europe to see that Philip stuck by his bargain, but the Regent of France, the Duke of Orleans, would have been in a strong domestic position to assert his own rightful claims to the succession. Indeed, his interest as next heir and his fears of a revival of Philip's claim, caused Orleans, after he had become Regent in 1715, to enter into friendship with England, and oblige King George by throwing over the Pretender's cause.

Louis XIV was sorry that his grandson preferred to stay in Madrid. He knew that there was small likelihood of the eventual union of the crowns of France and Spain in face of a hostile Europe, and he was greatly attracted by the prospect that Savoy-Piedmont and Mantua might some day be added peaceably to France. He accepted Philip's choice, but it caused him surprise and chagrin.

The decision to stay at Madrid expressed the affection that had recently grown up between the Spaniards and their King. The strong women who had moulded the weak mind of Philip, had taught him to care for Spain as an end in itself. Since he crossed the Pyrenees eleven years back, he had learned a new patriotism. The understanding between the Castilians and the Royal House, which had broken the plans of Austria and the Whigs, now frustrated the clever designs of Bolingbroke and Louis. The arrangement actually made was the simplest and proved the best.<sup>243</sup>

Something akin to Bolingbroke's active and enterprising spirit was certainly needed to carry through the tremendous diplomatic tasks of the year. They would have been beyond the power of the slow-moving Oxford. But the Secretary had the defects of his qualities in a glaring form. He now proceeded, in the hurry of his restless spirit, to take hasty steps which gravely involved the national honour. He had made up his mind that nothing could bring the Dutch to accept England's terms of Peace except the withdrawal of the British forces from the field.\* It might possibly have proved so in the end. If done at a later stage of the campaign, when Torcy had agreed to the chief items still in dispute, if done openly and with full warning to the Allies and not in a secret league with the enemy, the withdrawal of the British troops might, in conceivable circumstances, have

\* 'Our ill success in the field would have rendered the French less tractable in the congress: our good success there would have rendered the Allies so. On this principle the Queen suspended the operations of her troops.' *Bolingbroke's Defence*, p. 139.

'Le reine regarde, aussi bien que le Roi, la suspension d'armes comme absolument nécessaire pour ôter aux ennemis de la paix les moyens d'en empêcher, ou d'en retarder la conclusion.' *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 353 (St. John to Torcy, June 7, O.S., 1712).



been expedient and even right. But it was done too soon, in secret concert with the French, in a manner distinctly treacherous. The English troops had been kept in the field till everything had been yielded to England: they were withdrawn when only her Allies' interests were at stake.

The Duke of Ormonde, in whom the High Tories had once hoped to find a military rival to Marlborough, began the campaign of 1712 with every intention of doing his duty in the field. He had received no orders to the contrary when he left home. He commanded the British troops in the Netherlands, together with those foreign regiments who were in the joint pay of England and Holland. He was to co-operate with another large army of Dutch and Germans under Prince Eugene. It was hoped that the joint forces would, after taking Le Quesnoy, penetrate far into France. Since Marlborough's last campaign, Villars no longer had any formidable 'lines' to defend, though he had a large and high-spirited army in the field.

From the first, Ormonde was uncomfortably aware that Eugene and the other allied generals tended to keep him outside their innermost counsels. But his discomfort was greatly increased when he received a letter from Bolingbroke, dated April 25 (o.s.), bidding him 'be jealous of Prince Eugene's conduct' and 'be more cautious for some time of engaging in an action, unless in the case of a very apparent and considerable advantage.' He replied, as well he might, that such orders put him in a difficult position. But his position became very much more difficult when he received another letter from the same quarter, written on May 10 (o.s.), 1712, to the following effect:

It is the Queen's positive command to your Grace that you avoid engaging in any siege, or hazarding a battle, till you have farther orders from her Majesty. I am, at the same time, directed to let your Grace know that the Queen would have you disguise the receipt of this order; and her Majesty thinks that you cannot want pretences for conducting yourself so as to answer her ends without owning that which might, at present, have an ill effect, if it was publicly known. . . .

P.S. I had almost forgot to tell your Grace that communication is given of this order to the Court of France, so that if the Mareschal

de Villars takes, in any private way, notice of it to you, your Grace will answer accordingly.

What was an unhappy nobleman, who aspired also to be considered a gentleman and a soldier, to make of such orders? He could only obey or throw up his command. He obeyed.<sup>244</sup>

Such were the famous 'Restraining Orders,' which, in the next reign, figured as the most damaging of the accusations that could be proved against Bolingbroke. No other member of the Cabinet had been consulted, not even the Treasurer, although a few weeks later he defended the *fait accompli* in the House of Lords. During his own impeachment three years afterwards, Oxford denied that he 'did advise or consent that any order should be dispatched in her Majesty's name to the Duke of Ormonde, nor had he any view or design to disappoint the expectation of the Allies.' He puts it all upon the Queen's personal orders, meaning thereby that it was Bolingbroke and she who devised it between them.<sup>245</sup> Nor did Bolingbroke ever assert in writing that Oxford or any other Councillor was cognizant before the fact.<sup>246</sup> In after years he went so far as to state that he himself was at first 'surprised and hurt' when the Queen ordered him to write the Restraining Orders, as if Anne had thought of it all for herself; those who wish may believe.<sup>247</sup>

At the very best, the Restraining Orders had been sent too soon. They were rashly written before the King of Spain's answer as to the French succession had been received at Paris, and before Torcy had consented to hand over Dunkirk for occupation by the British troops in return for their withdrawal from the field. Still less had the other important questions of the peace negotiation been settled: the Dutch Barrier and the Netherlands frontier of France, the boundaries and possessions of all the minor Allies, had yet to be defined. A little more military pressure would have greatly helped the Secretary's negotiations with France, but such was his hostility to Holland that he put himself by preference into Torcy's hands.

Above all, the attempt to keep the secret of Ormonde's orders from the Allied Generals while revealing it to Villars,

was base in the extreme. It was, indeed, little short of a plot between the French and English Minister to give Villars the opportunity to defeat Eugene. On the day the Restraining Orders were written, Torcy's London agent, Gaultier, wrote to him of Bolingbroke as 'our Secretary' and of Ormonde as 'our General' :

I asked Mr. St. John what Mons. de Villars should do if Prince Eugene took the offensive with the Dutch. He replied there would be nothing to do but fall on him and cut him to pieces, him and his army.

Gaultier then repeats that Bolingbroke is most anxious that Villars should be informed of the Restraining Orders and that Eugene and the Dutch be kept in ignorance.<sup>248</sup>

It is small wonder that Bolingbroke in September wrote to Prior the proud boast :

I will not say this order saved their army [the French] from being beat, but I think in my conscience it did.

And it is no surprise to find the last stage of treachery reached in October, when Oxford and Bolingbroke together sent word through Gaultier to Torcy

that they have been informed this morning by a courier that Prince Eugene has resolved to surprise Nieuport or Furnes. This advice has been given by a spy they have about the Prince, whose services he is to use on the expedition. 'I am warning Marshal Duke of Villars of it,' Gaultier takes care to add.<sup>249</sup>

This letter would have proved a useful piece, if the Whigs had got hold of it for the impeachments.

In June Bolingbroke promised Torcy that, if he would put Ormonde in occupation of Dunkirk, 'Her Majesty will not hesitate to conclude a separate peace, leaving the other Powers a period in which to submit' to the plan agreed between France and England.<sup>250</sup> According to Torcy it was only the opposition of Oxford that prevented a separate peace being signed by the English Ministers that summer.<sup>251</sup> The Treasurer had felt the pulse of the House of Lords in the debate held on the Restraining Orders, when he calmed their Lordships' uneasiness by assuring them that

nothing of that nature was 'ever intended ; and that such a peace would be a base, knavish and villainous thing.' <sup>252</sup>

But the full flavour of the affair could be smelt, not in the Cabinets of statesmen or in the decorous debates in the House of Lords, but in the camp where Marlborough's men received the orders to desert in face of the enemy their comrades of so many glorious campaigns. For that was the way in which the affair struck those simple souls.

For some weeks Ormonde had endeavoured to carry out his unpalatable orders and preserve from his Allies the secret of his defection, while corresponding about it with the enemy commander. Eugene soon saw that he was prevaricating, when he made one lame excuse after another for not taking any active part in the operations of war. The position grew intolerable for a man of honour, and Ormonde wrote letter after letter to the Treasurer appealing for fresh instructions ; but Oxford would not wash Bolingbroke's dirty linen, and characteristically left the letters unanswered.\*

At length when a temporary armistice had been arranged by Torcy and Bolingbroke, the truth became known in full, and the British army marched away from the front. A storm of anger swept through the Allied camp, and the veterans of twenty nations cursed England, her Ministers and her General. The foreign troops who were in the joint service of the two Maritime Powers, sacrificed the British half of their pay in order to stay by their comrades in the field. Bolingbroke made this another terrible grievance against the Dutch and Eugene : he described the latter as ' a beggarly German General ' causing the troops in Her Majesty's pay

\* Ormonde to Oxford, June 14, 1712 : ' This is the fourth letter that I have done myself the honour to write to your Lordship without hearing from you, which I believe the multiplicity of business is the cause of. I send this to let your Lordship know that I have done all that I could to keep secret and to disguise the orders that I received from her Majesty by Mr. Secretary St. John, but it is above ten days since I received the Queen's pleasure, and now I can't make any more excuses for delaying entering upon action. When I was pressed to it, I made my Lord Strafford's sudden journey to England my excuse, and desired that I might hear from England before I undertook anything. I have been again pressed this day.' *H.M.G. Eliot-Hodgkin*, 1897, p. 203. *Ormonde Memoirs*, 1738, pp. 140-156 ; *Pelet*, XI, pp. 462-463, Ormonde's letters to Villars, May and June.

to desert.<sup>253</sup> But that was not the view of the matter that the British soldiers took ; many of them wept for very shame. With nobler feelings was mingled bitter disappointment at missing the rich plunder of France, ' which they reckoned they had dearly earned ' by a decade of wounds and victory.

At length the hour for their final parting from the Allied regiments had come. ' As they marched off that day,' we are told, ' both sides looked very dejectedly on each other, neither being admitted to speak to the other, <sup>July 1<sup>st</sup> 1713</sup> to prevent reflections that might arise.' We can well believe Captain Parker when he tells us that his men ' often lamented the loss of the *Old Corporal*, which was a favourite name they had given the Duke of Marlborough.'<sup>254</sup>

Further humiliations were in store for them on their retreat through Belgium. The towns they had conquered with their blood in ten victorious campaigns, were closed against them by their Allies ; ' at some places with much ado they handed over their walls to us some things which our men most wanted.' To find harbourage for his disgraced and wandering army, and to exact a pledge for the good behaviour of the Dutch, Ormonde seized on Ghent and Bruges. They were the only towns ' Marlborough's rival ' ever took. Oxford wrote to him ' Your Grace's march to Ghent is a *coup de maître*.' The ' stroke ' had been arranged between Ormonde and Lord Strafford in close secrecy, to prevent the Allies from throwing in garrisons beforehand, ' for there is nothing they apprehend more than the English having Ghent and Bruges.'<sup>255</sup>

Tory tavern songs celebrated the event :

Whilst Ormond he most orderly  
Did march them towards Ghent,  
The German dogs, with great Dutch hogs  
Their towns against them pent.

Were we not mad to spend our blood  
And weighty treasure so ?  
Do they deserve that we should serve ?  
Adad we'll make them know.

They'll be afraid of Peace and Trade  
And downfall of the Whigs ;  
Our glorious Ann, with France and Spain,  
Will dance them many a jig.

If they have a mind, 'fore Peace be signed  
To own great Anna's power,  
Such terms she'll get as she thinks fit,  
And they shall have no more. <sup>256</sup>

Bolingbroke had issued the Restraining Orders before coming to terms with Torcy—a mistake of which the French Minister took full advantage. After more than a month of slow bargaining, the Armistice was at length arranged, on condition that Dunkirk should be occupied by a British garrison until its fortifications had been destroyed and its harbour filled up. The Secretary believed that he could persuade his countrymen to acquiesce in the withdrawal of the British troops, if he could point to the Union Jack flying on the walls of the hated privateer stronghold, as the firstfruits of the friendship with France. On his side, Torcy believed that, if once the English entered Dunkirk, they would be effectively pledged not to take further part in the war.

On July 8 (o.s.) 1712, a small force of troops from England under the redoubtable Jack Hill, landed from Admiral Leake's squadron and were welcomed into Dunkirk by the French authorities as guests and friends. 'The Union Jack was hoisted in three several places of the town.' Ormonde soon afterwards sent in six battalions from Ghent. The civil government remained in French hands, and the garrison was so ill-supplied from home that they depended on French goodwill for their continued occupation. A disease known as the 'Dunkirk fever' greatly reduced their strength. But they held on until the work of demolition demanded by English mercantile opinion had been effected in the stronghold that had so long been the dread of our seamen.

The French, indeed, delayed the destruction of the port while they appealed to their English friends to let them off proceeding further with so odious a task. In December

1713 they were still trying to save Dunkirk through the agency of Lady Masham. But she reported that the Queen 'would not dare even to think of it.'<sup>257</sup> The next French artifice was to reconstruct, at the neighbouring Mardyck, another harbourage for their privateers. Bolingbroke, who during his last months in office was negotiating an Alliance with France against his old Allies, was in no position to put a stop to these tricks, which were effectually dealt with by Stanhope after the accession of George I.

The entry of the British troops into Dunkirk had been permitted by Louis as a sure means of binding the English not to resume the war. It was a 'pledge' of French good faith to England and equally of English good faith to France. It further broke up the Alliance. It encouraged Villars to take the offensive against the allied army still in the field.<sup>258</sup>

Le Quesnoy had already been taken by the Allies before the complete withdrawal of Ormonde's troops. Eugene, now left with forces inferior to the French, rashly undertook the siege of Landrecies. Villars outmanœuvred him and inflicted on him at Denain such a defeat as the Allies July <sup>11</sup>/<sub>11</sub> had never suffered under the command of Marl-  
1712 borough. Before the campaign was over the French had retaken Le Quesnoy, Bouchain and Douai. Bolingbroke's object was accomplished: the Allies had been taught that they could not carry on the war without England. Holland would now 'submit' at Utrecht.

The armistice, made in the first instance for two months, would require renewal, and many matters were still to be settled between Torcy and Bolingbroke before negotiations could be usefully resumed at Utrecht. Louis was still claiming the Spanish Netherlands for the Elector of Bavaria, and Tournai as well as Lille for France; the territories of the Duke of Savoy and the King of Portugal had still to be agreed upon, as well as the Dutch Barrier and the details of the Anglo-French agreement in North America, not to mention the delicate question of the further residence of the Pretender in France. In August 1712 Bolingbroke went to Paris, taking Prior as his Secretary. The armistice was

there renewed, and though the visit did not finally settle many of the outstanding questions, it was needed and it was useful.\*

Bolingbroke was made much of by the Grand Monarch and his courtiers ; with his fluent French and easy wit he was formed to shine in that society, whose approval was to him the most insidious of flatteries. Perhaps his unfortunate flight back thither in 1715 was in part due to the recollections of these halcyon days of 1712. When he returned to England at the end of August, he left Prior behind him as caretaker.

The rumours that reached home of the Secretary's fine doings at Versailles caused a fresh access of jealousy in Oxford, who declared that his foreign trip had 'added new fuel to his vanity.' In September an unjust and futile attempt was made to substitute Dartmouth in his place as the official negotiator, on the ground that the correspondence with France was the Province of the *Southern* Secretary of State. But Dartmouth was not equal to the task, and soon shrank from the anger of his fellow-Secretary, who claimed that since Oxford was too lazy to undertake the work of peace-making himself, he must leave it to the only Minister with the requisite industry and talent.<sup>259</sup>

Throughout the autumn and winter of 1712 negotiations continued, and one question after another was settled by hard bargaining on both sides. The Dutch had 'submitted' after the catastrophes of the campaign and were ready to take what Bolingbroke could procure for them. His power to bargain with France had been injured by the defeat of the Allies in the field, which he had himself caused in order to overcome the obstinacy of the Dutch ; and he afterwards confessed that the French received back too many frontier towns—Lille, no doubt, in particular.<sup>260</sup> But he stiffly refused to give Tournai again to France, and after a fierce diplomatic struggle Louis ceased to demand the great fortress. In spite of the efforts of French Ministers, neither Belgium nor Sicily was yielded to the Elector of Bavaria, who had to content himself, sulkily enough, with a return to Munich and his former territorial

\* See pp. 206–207 above.



rights in Germany.<sup>261</sup> Belgium remained to the Austrian, now Emperor Charles VI.

The Dutch 'Barrier,' carved partly out of Charles's dominions and partly out of fortresses won by Marlborough from France, was arranged in a new Treaty signed between England and Holland in January 1713, which took the place of the Whig Barrier Treaty of four years back. The Dutch were again bound to fight for the Protestant succession in England. But the new list of towns for their occupation was not as imposing as that of 1709, though it was a great advance on the old Barrier destroyed by French aggression in 1701, and the tariffs of the Southern Netherlands were so arranged that England and Holland together could exploit them to the full.\*

The Dutch had gained some measure of safety by the substitution of Austria for decadent Spain as ruler of the buffer State between themselves and France. But their own 'barrier' towns inside that State were to prove in 1745 of little military avail against French invasion. The system of Dutch garrisons in isolated foreign towns may have been better than nothing when there was no one but Spain to protect Belgium against France. But at best the system was militarily unsound and to a large extent a cloak for commercial advantage. The Dutch and English exploitation of the 'Austrian' Netherlands by tariffs drawn up in the interest of the Maritime Powers, weakened the strength of Belgian resistance to France, and made Austria much less anxious to defend the land than if it had been fully her own.†

Upper Guelders, which the Whig Treaty had promised to Holland, was awarded by Bolingbroke to Prussia. 'The

\* The new Dutch 'barrier' was to consist of Furnes, Fort Knocke, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur on the outer line; Ghent for communication with the United Provinces, and the Forts of Perle, Philippe, Damme, and various minor forts. (Fort Knocke lay between Furnes and Ypres, and must not be confused with Knocke-sur-mer) Forts Philippe and Perle guarded the entrance to the Schelt below Antwerp. See *map of Netherlands at end of this book*, and inset note about the final Treaty of 1715. The Barrier destroyed in 1701 is enumerated in *Blenheim*, p. 138 note. *Lamberty*, VIII, pp. 34-42; *Montgomery*, p. 298.

† *Mrs. Montgomery* (pp. 368-370) has some very good remarks on this head.

King of Prussia,' wrote the Earl of Strafford from Utrecht in April 1713, 'thinks himself extremely obliged to the Queen for his acquisition of Guelderland, and a very little caressing will entirely bind him to her interest; he is certainly, after the Emperor, the most considerable prince in the Empire. . . . 'Tis only this King and the Duke of Savoy who really think themselves obliged to her in this negociation.' <sup>262</sup>

Victor Amadeus of Savoy-Piedmont was, indeed, the prime favourite chosen from among the Allies by Queen Anne's Tory Ministers. In case Philip and his line failed, France agreed that he was to inherit Spain. And he reaped at Utrecht the reward of twenty years of lion-like courage and fox-like cunning, in a territorial expansion that did much to secure the future greatness of his House. Savoy and Nice, which the French had seized during the war, were restored to him, and he obtained a strongly fortified frontier along the Piedmontese watershed of the Alps. Moreover the island of Sicily became his. Bolingbroke had to fight hard with Torcy for these things, but he won. He knew the nature of his country's naval and commercial interests, and, just as he had secured the retention of Gibraltar and Port Mahon by Britain, so too he insisted that Sicily should go, not to a protégé of France like the Elector of Bavaria, but to the Duke of Savoy, a friend to England with no naval pretensions of his own.

Sardinia had been seized by the English fleet in 1708 on behalf of Charles III of Spain, and at Utrecht it was secured to him as Emperor Charles VI. In 1720 Savoy gave Sicily to Austria in exchange for Sardinia. British policy and arms, under Anne and George I, successfully prevented either island from passing under the influence of naval powers like France or Spain. <sup>263</sup>

Portugal, too, was an ally to whom we were deeply obliged. But she was not such a favourite with the Tories as Savoy, and was in any case more completely dependent on England for her trade, and for her very existence now that a Bourbon reigned in Madrid. She must be treated well, but need not be humoured to the top of her bent. The expansion of territory against the Spanish border that

had been promised to Portugal was not obtained, but Bolingbroke fought Torcy to secure her rights in Brazil against encroachment on the Amazon from French Guiana. He won the Portuguese case there by his famous *ultimatum* in February 1713, threatening Torcy with a renewal of the war.

The French, trusting that the Tory Ministers were now in their hands, had adopted a policy of procrastination and obstinacy on many points such as the Portuguese rights in Brazil and English rights in Acadia, and they were attempting to retain Luxemburg for the Elector of Bavaria by a subterfuge. Bolingbroke brought them to book by his very able and uncompromising dispatch of February 17, 1713, giving them the choice of concluding peace at once or seeing Anne ask Parliament 'for such supplies as may be necessary for carrying on the war.'<sup>264</sup> Torcy surrendered, the fence was cleared and the Treaties of Utrecht between the various powers were signed in March and April 1713. The Treaty, signed by Lord Strafford and the Bishop of Bristol for Great Britain and by Auxelles and Mesnager for France, bears the date March 31 Old Style, April 11 New Style.\*

Bolingbroke had a keener sense for his country's interests than for her faith and honour. He had shown it in his dealings with Holland; nor was that the only instance. We had used the Catalans to fight our battles in Spain, and had pledged ourselves to secure those provincial liberties which, century after century, have always meant more to them than any other cause. In March 1713 our plenipotentiaries at Utrecht signed a Treaty with France on the subject of Spain, in which it was stipulated that on the evacuation of Barcelona and Majorca by the Allied troops, an amnesty should be granted to the Catalans by Philip, and, more vaguely, that France would give assistance to England in her endeavour to secure a grant of their ancient 'privileges.'<sup>265</sup> But Bolingbroke exacted nothing of the sort in the Treaty he made with Spain herself, by which many advantages

\* The various Treaties of Utrecht will be found in Lamberty's *Mémoires*, 1736, Vol. VIII.

were secured for England but little indeed for Catalonia. Philip was left free to declare, in the high Castilian manner, that, if the Catalans would lay down their arms, they could enjoy their lives and properties on the same political terms as the inhabitants of the other Provinces of Spain. France had no wish and England no further power to plead their cause. If they had been wise they would have submitted: much to Bolingbroke's indignation they preferred to be heroic and to die sword in hand.

It would not, indeed, have been expected that we should indefinitely continue the war in Spain for the constitutional rights of another race. But we might have made more diplomatic effort in the matter before shipping off our troops and those of the other Allies from Spain. And Bolingbroke, who had now identified our interests with those of France, made no protest when Louis, contrary to his pledge to act with us on behalf of Catalan liberties, sent his own armies to help Philip besiege Barcelona. And the whole world cried shame upon England, when her over-zealous Secretary ordered the squadron under Sir James Wishart to harass and threaten the defenders of the town. That was a gratuitous insult to the brave population who had fought so many years at our side, who were merely continuing to defend rights we had ourselves guaranteed.

Deserted by all, the Catalans rose to the fiercest pitch of patriotic fanaticism. Besieged by the armies of France and Spain, and with English ships cruising to  
1714 blockade the port,<sup>266</sup> the men and women of Barcelona defended their city until half of it was laid in ashes by Berwick's siege guns. Catalans and Spaniards displayed the utmost cruelty and courage that the spirit of civil faction can engender in the hot-blooded natures of the South. Berwick marvelled at the resistance of the town. At length, more than a month after the death of Anne, Barcelona fell, and for another space of years the Catalan question, as immortal as the Irish, was buried under the bloody sod.

English opinion was shocked and shamed. The desertion of the Catalans was one of the questions upon which, in the last year of the Queen, the Whig debating power in

Parliament was able to damage the government in the public eye.<sup>267</sup>

Bolingbroke had showed his usual insensibility to the point of view of those who stood in his way. Dartmouth had tried to help the Catalans, but his brother Secretary had snubbed him and had instructed our plenipotentiaries at Utrecht that 'it is not for the interest of England to preserve the Catalan liberties.' It would, however, be unjust to lay the whole blame for the tragedy at the door of one man. The fate of Barcelona, like the destruction of the French Royalists at Quiberon in a later age, stands as a warning of the moral dangers that attend the policy of inciting the enemy's subjects to rebel. It may sometimes be justified by that general abnegation of altruistic scruple which the state of war implies, but it is not to be undertaken with a light heart.

At the end of March and the beginning of April 1713, the series of Treaties signed by the Powers represented at Utrecht gave a general peace to the world. Only the Emperor consulted his honour and dignity by holding out for one more summer of sluggish war on the Rhine. But Villars and Eugene were soon better employed in negotiating a peace, which was signed at Radstadt in March 1714 between Louis and the Emperor Charles. This Treaty fixed the Alsatian frontier: France gave up Kehl and other fortresses east of the Rhine, but retained Landau and Strasbourg.

The rejoicings over the Treaty of Utrecht, held in England during the summer of 1713, were hearty enough. Bonfires were lit all over the country, and nowhere dared the Whigs attempt any counter-demonstration. 'Last night,' writes Lady Barnard, 'we had a vast number of bonfires in every village. The mob likes the peace, although the great do not.'<sup>268</sup> But 'the great,' also, were divided in opinion, and the General Election that August gave a fresh lease of power to the Ministry that had put an end to the war.

It is here that History must say farewell to Holland as one of the Great Powers. That she had ever been such is

a measure of the qualities of her remarkable little folk ; that she should cease to be so was inevitable, and was not primarily due to Bolingbroke. Even the Whig Barrier Treaty could not have maintained her as the equal of England. The long wars with France, during which she had borne a burden far beyond her strength, hastened a process that could not have been much longer delayed.

In an age of tyranny Holland had been the asylum of intellectual freedom, and her burghers for a while had led Europe in many of the sciences and arts. Then she had almost succumbed to the rude violation of her liberties by Louis XIV, but had been saved first by William and again by Marlborough. She was now made safe for her less ambitious voyage through a new era. Though her greatness had departed, she still maintained a quiet and attractive form of life. Three years after Utrecht, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu wrote :

The whole country appears a large garden : the roads all well paved, shaded on each side with rows of trees and bordered with large canals, full of boats, passing and repassing. Every twenty paces gives you a prospect of some villa and every four hours a large town so surprisingly neat I am sure you would be charmed with them. . . . Here is neither dirt nor beggary seen. One is not shocked with these loathsome cripples, so common in London, nor teased with the importunities of idle fellows and wenches that choose to be nasty and lazy. The common servants and little shopwomen here are more nicely clean than most of our ladies. The shops and warehouses are filled with an incredible quantity of merchandise, much cheaper than we see in England.

The wars of Marlborough and the Treaty of Utrecht had secured the greatness of England and the safety of Holland. But not easily would their statesmen again confide in one another. When the Dutch found that the Whig Ministers of George I had no intention of reviving the Barrier Treaty of 1709 on their behalf, they considered that England had deceived them, and though common interest held the two countries together in an unequal partnership, there was never again the true understanding and friendship that had united Marlborough and Heinsius during the heroic era of Blenheim and Ramillies.

With the signing of the Treaties of Utrecht, Bolingbroke's one great achievement in the world of action was accomplished. The rest of his political career, after a Niagara leap into rebellion, was to be lost in shallows and in miseries. But he stands in history as the man who, by courses however devious and questionable, negotiated a Peace which proved in the working more satisfactory than any other that has ended a general European conflict in modern times.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII

### THE MILITARY BETRAYAL OF THE ALLIES

#### FROM THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES

- I. *Aff. étr. Angleterre*, 238, f. 73, Gaultier to Torcy. May 21 [N.S.], 1712, from London (describing the despatch of the Restraining Orders to Ormond).

Hier sur les neuf heures du soir la Vigne arriva icy avec vos depeches. Ce matin le grand Tresorier et Mr de St Jean ont fait la lecture de vos lettres à la Reine. Sa Majesté en a esté si contente et si satisfaite qu'elle a commandé sur la champ a Mr de St Jean de depecher un courier au duc d'Ormond pour luy ordonner expressement de sa part de ne rien entreprendre contre l'armée du Roy ny directement ny indirectement jusqu'à nouvel ordre, et de traverser ceux qui voudroient le faire. J'ai veu et leu la lettre du secretaire à ce général. Elle est dattée au 10<sup>e</sup> de ce mois vieux stile, elle partira ce soir par la voye d'Ostende. . . .

J'ay demandé a Mr de St Jean quel party il faudroit que Mons. le M. de Villars prit, si par hazard Mr le Prince d'Eugene conjointement avec les Hollandois, vouloit faire quelque tentative. Il m'a respondu qu'il n'auroit point d'autre chose à fair qu'à luy tomber desous et la tailler en pièces, luy et son armée. Souvenez vous, s'il vous plait, qu'il n'y a que le Duc d'Ormond et le M. de Villars qui doivent estre informés et scavoir ce que j'ay l'honneur de vous mander aujourd'hui de la part de notre Ministre et qu'il faut bien prendre garde que le Prince Eugene n'en sache riefi non plus que les Hollandois qui n'auront nulle connoissance de la lettre que notre secretaire escrit ce soir a notre general.

- II. *Aff. étr. Angleterre*, 240, f. 79, Gaultier to Torcy. October 29 [N.S.], 1712, from London (Oxford's and Bolingbroke's betrayal of Eugene's military intentions to France).

MONSEIGNEUR,

Je vous envoie cet exprès pour votre avis que M. le Comte d'Oxford et milord Bolingbroke viennent de m'avertir qu'ils ont esté informé ce matin par un courier que le Prince Eugene a resolu de faire surprendre *Nieuport ou Furnes* et pour mieux cacher son dessein il doit faire semblant de fortifier Diximude. Cet avis leur a esté donné par un espion qu'ils ont aupres du Prince, et du qu'il doit servir dans cette expedition ; j'en donne aujourd'hui avis a M. le Mareschal duc de Villars et je lui marque que vous lui en écrivez. Il mande aussi aux commandans de ces deux places, qu'ils prennent garde à eux et d'être surpris. Il faut bien garder le secret, car si le Prince venoit a scavoir que vous avez été averti, il ne pourroit soupçonner d'autre que celui qui nous a averti, à qui il ne manquerait pas de faire mal passer le tems.



## CHAPTER XIV

### SCOTLAND AGAIN

Unpopularity of the Union. Its first economic consequences at Glasgow and elsewhere. The Hamilton Peerage. The Case of Mr. Green-shields. The jurisdiction of the House of Lords over Scotland. The Toleration Act and the Restoration of Patronage 1712. Linen and Malt. The motion to repeal the Union 1713. Jacobites, Presbyterians and Tory Ministers, at the moment of Anne's death.

THE Union of England and Scotland,\* which eventually brought the two peoples together in friendly partnership and enabled the Scots to escape from the valley of the shadow of poverty, seemed at first to be accomplishing neither the one nor the other of these ends. The year before Anne died the more faint-hearted of the statesmen who had carried the Union proposed that it should be repealed as a proven failure, and it is not unlikely that, if the Queen's life had been prolonged, the two parts of the island would have once more enjoyed separate Parliaments and armies, separate commercial systems divided by prohibitions and tariffs, and, not impossibly, the rule of separate monarchs.

Scotland had been persuaded to give her grudging consent to the Union in view of the economic blessings that were to be its immediate outcome. But for two or more decades these benefits hung fire. Scotland as yet had neither the capital nor the business organization to make use of the long-coveted trade with the Colonies. Meanwhile, goods from 'South Britain' flooded her home market, and the Scottish manufacture of fine cloth was gravely injured by English underselling. The removal of the Parliament and of many of the higher nobility to London lessened the demand for home products, besides hurting the pride of the

\* See *Ramillies and the Union*, Chaps. X-XIV and XVII.

ancient capital. All along the east coast the small port-towns tended to decline in prosperity as the Queen's reign drew towards its close.<sup>269</sup>

But in the West, hitherto the more backward side of the country, the advantages of the Union were more quickly realized. For, whereas ships from Leith and Dundee, built for the German and Scandinavian trade, had to sail round by the Channel or Cape Wrath in order to enjoy the newly-opened trade with America, Glasgow and Dumfries were on the Atlantic seaboard. Their immediate advance towards prosperity was an earnest of the advantages which all Scotland would presently reap from the opening of the markets. In the very summer when the Treaty of Union was ratified, a company of Glasgow merchants hired a ship  
1707 at Whitehaven in Cumberland, loaded her with merchandise well suited to the needs of the Colonists, sent her to Virginia and received her back with a rich freight of sugar and tobacco. Two years later an English visitor to Glasgow wrote :

This city is generally reckoned to have gained most by the Union. Its traffic is much advanced and its wealth increased by reason of its standing so well for the West India and Plantation trade.

Some of the West country Whigs, who had been transported in the days of Claverhouse, had survived the hardships of slavery and risen to places of trust in the tobacco plantations ; they now acted as advisers and agents for their kinsmen and co-religionists trading from home. Soon after Anne's death a number of Glasgow-owned ships were regularly plying across the Atlantic, and by 1735 the tonnage of the Clyde was four times what it had been under King William.<sup>270</sup>

But elsewhere in Scotland the first economic consequences of the Union gave rise to grave and very excusable discontent. It took the form of smuggling as a patriotic exercise, carried out with the connivance of the Scottish-born authorities. Magistrates refused their support to the unpopular custom-house officials, who had invaded the country under the Act of Union, and who caused scandal equally by trying to enforce the law and by expecting

permission to attend Anglican services and to be buried by Anglican rites. The Scots upper class, whether Presbyterian or Jacobite, were at one with the popular feeling against these unfortunate officers who tried to stop French wine and brandy entering in time of war. One of them was smartly reprimanded by the Lord President for venturing to search the house of the Earl of Stair for brandy  
 1708- run off the coast. Others, who made a seizure,  
 1709 were 'barbarously wounded so that they were frightful to look at.' And if any smuggled goods were successfully brought into court, the magistrates imposed fines so small as positively to encourage the illicit wine trade with France.<sup>271</sup>

In the world of religion, the Reverend Thomas Wodrow wrote to a correspondent in 1709 :

Such is the temper of the people at this juncture that they cannot hear the Act of Union spoken of by ministers, even by way of narration, but they stumble at it, as if we were approving that alteration.<sup>272</sup>

If this was already the popular feeling even among Presbyterians in the days of the Whig Government, matters were to grow worse in the last years of the reign.

The Scottish nobility had played a leading part in passing the Union, and they were scurvily rewarded by the English Lords who had been their partners in the work. In 1711 the Queen made the Duke of Hamilton a Peer of Great Britain with the title of Duke of Brandon. As such he proposed to sit in his own right, and not as one of the sixteen elected Scottish Peers. To his astonishment, and to the universal indignation of all Scots, the House of Lords challenged his right to sit, on the ground that under the Union Treaty Scotland was to be represented by no more than sixteen Peers. The application made was a legal misreading of the words of the Treaty. Nevertheless, his brother Peers prevented Hamilton from taking his seat as Duke of Brandon, in spite of the fact that Queensberry had, since the Union, been created Duke of Dover and had sat in that capacity unchallenged. He also was now declared to have no right to sit.

The most disgraceful circumstance in the affair was that the prime movers of this injustice to Scotland were the Whig Lords who had most keenly promoted the policy of the Union that was to reconcile the two peoples. Their motive was fear lest the Crown should swamp the Upper House with Tory creations. But they were joined by some Tories, including the Secretary of State, Lord Dartmouth, jealous for the rights of the English Peerage. Oxford, indeed, and most of the Ministerial party stood up for the Queen's prerogative, but in spite of her presence at the debate as an interested party, their Lordships voted by fifty-seven to fifty-two

that no patent of Honour, granted to any Peer of Great Britain, who was a Peer of Scotland at the time of the Union, can entitle such a Peer to sit and vote in Parliament or to sit upon the trial of Peers.

This grave injustice remained unremedied until it was reversed by a decision of 1782. The indignation of the Scottish nobles without distinction of party was one of the causes why the political fever of Great Britain continued unabated for several years to come.<sup>273</sup>

In spite of much popular feeling among ministers and congregations, the leaders of the Presbyterian body, guided by the sage counsel of Carstares, had in 1707 prevented the Church Assembly from laying its veto on the passage of the Union.\* They had done so because they believed that only the Union could ensure the Hanoverian Succession, and that only the Hanoverian Succession could ensure the continuance of the Presbyterian Establishment. The validity of this train of reasoning was brought forcibly home to all Presbyterians on Anne's death, and rallied them in 1715 to fight for the Union which they so much disliked. But during the last four years of the Queen's reign they were more profoundly alarmed than the Jacobites by the consequences of losing their own Parliament. In the eyes of faithful watchers in Scotland, the Prelatic assembly at Westminster appeared to be disarming and disintegrating their national church with a view to her present destruction. These fears were mainly aroused by two Acts passed by

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 279-280.

the Tory Parliament in 1712, the Toleration Act and the restoration of Patronage.

The incident that set these balls rolling was the affair of the Reverend James Greenshields. When the Queen's reign began, the services conducted in the Episcopal meeting-houses differed little from those in the Parish church.\* But in the course of the reign the practice of using a Form of Prayer similar to the English began to be common among Episcopalians. As early as 1706 thousands of Prayer Books had been sent over the Border into Scotland. It was a real and significant change in the religious life of an important section of the people, particularly among the upper classes, and it caused corresponding resentment among the followers of Knox. 'The English service is setting up busily in the north,' wrote Wodrow in August 1709, 'at Inverness, Elgin, Aberdeen, Montrose and many other places, to the great grief of many of our brethren, and the weakening or rather ruining of our discipline.' It must be remembered that 'in the north' many of the Parish churches were still served by Episcopal ministers.<sup>274</sup>

No Toleration Act protected the services of Episcopal congregations in Scotland, but in practice they remained undisturbed, even when using the Prayer Book, until in 1709 Greenshields read the English liturgy in a meeting-house he had set up opposite to St. Giles, Edinburgh, the citadel of Scottish Presbyterianism. It was in answer to this challenge that he was prosecuted, in spite of the fact that he had taken the oaths, while in a dozen less prominent places in Edinburgh the same service was being read by non-Jurors and avowed Jacobites, without any interference from the authorities.<sup>275</sup>

Carstares, who objected to a legal or theoretic enactment of Toleration, but loved it in practice, deprecated the proposal to prosecute Greenshields.<sup>276</sup> But for the nonce his brethren had had enough of his moderation. The Presbytery cited Greenshields to appear. He denied  
 Sept. its jurisdiction over him. He was suspended  
 1709 from officiating as a minister without warrant, and for violating the uniformity of worship. He refused

\* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 183-184, 206-209.

compliance. The Edinburgh magistrates, called in to enforce the ruling of the ecclesiastical court, threw him into prison. He appealed to the Lords of Session who upheld the action

of the magistrates. Thereupon Greenshields took  
Dec. his case to the House of Lords.  
1709

He had appealed to Caesar, greatly to the astonishment of those who thought that the matters of their own law were no business of Caesar's. But it was more than a year before his case was heard in London. And during that year the great Tory reaction took place in South Britain. In Scotland the fears of the Presbyterians were aroused by the Sacheverell uproar beyond the Border, and national feeling was further alarmed by Greenshields' appeal to a tribunal whose jurisdiction over Scotland had not hitherto been popularly recognized as implicit in the Treaty of Union.\* In these circumstances the years 1710-1711 witnessed a number of riots and persecuting actions against Episcopalian clergy in various parts of Scotland, particularly against those who used the Prayer Book. The tacit mutual understanding by which the Episcopalians, though not tolerated by law, had been tolerated in practice, began to break down. There was need for an Act of Parliament to defend the Episcopalian services in Scotland as the Non-conformist services were defended in England. Bishop Wake's Edinburgh correspondent, a man of moderate views, informed his patron that such an Act was necessary in order to avert a Jacobite rebellion.<sup>277</sup>

In March 1711 the House of Lords tried the case of Greenshields. The right of jurisdiction over Scotland had first to be proved, as it was denied by the counsel for the Edinburgh magistrates and Lords of Session. 'There never was any appeal to the House of Lords in Scotland,' argued Sir Joseph Jekyll. There never had been, till by the terms of the Treaty of 1707 such a jurisdiction was implicitly conceded as a consequence of Union. In that sense their Lordships decided by 68 votes to 32, and that ruling has ever since been accepted in Great Britain.

The question of competence being thus settled, the

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 266.

Lords proceeded to exercise their new jurisdiction in the case of Greenshields. And after a short debate it was

ordered and adjudged by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the said sentence of the Magistrates of Edinburgh and the Decree of the Lords of Session in North Britain, made against the said James Greenshields, shall be, and they are hereby, reversed.

This judgment overrode the findings of the ecclesiastical court, whose decision the Scottish civil magistrates had merely enforced. Henceforth the House of Lords was judge of the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Scotland.<sup>278</sup>

Scottish opinion was doubly outraged. The discovery that the House of Lords was the final Court of Appeal for the whole island, a fact cleverly concealed from notice in the wording of the Union Treaty, came as a severe shock to national pride. And the particular decision in favour of Greenshields seemed, perhaps rightly, to be a misconstruction of the existing law. But if it were so, there was all the more reason for a statutory change in the law that should make the services of the Scottish Episcopalians legal beyond all doubt. In the following year Parliament passed an Act of Toleration for their relief.

March  
1712

The alarm and indignation with which this measure was greeted was one half of it sheer bigotry. But it also represented a fear that the half-Jacobite Parliament in London was preparing the way for an overturn of the existing system of Church and State in Scotland, and that this was one of the first steps. Almost all Scottish Episcopalians were Jacobites. It was this consideration that misled a fundamentally tolerant man like Carstares to oppose the measure. Aided by the English Whig Lords, he was able to induce the government to insert into the Bill an Abjuration of the Pretender as a condition of Toleration for the Episcopalian clergy. But the Tories imposed, by way of reply, a similar condition on the ministers of the Establishment. They, indeed, were ready enough to abjure the Pretender, but they objected to the Anglican implications of the oath as it was worded, and their tender consciences were shocked at being compelled to swear anything by a Prelatic

Parliament as a condition of their ministry, which was in their view an entirely religious function. The horror of erastianism in which the Scottish conscience was nurtured could not be understood by Englishmen. The Abjuration Oath long continued to be a stone of stumbling to the clergy of both religions in Scotland, though for very different reasons in the two cases.<sup>279</sup>

Immediately on the heels of the Toleration Act followed the restoration of Patronage, which became law on May 1, 1712. The democratic element in the appointment of ministers to parishes was regarded by many Presbyterians as an essential point of religion ; and apart from all theory, there was practical danger in presentation by patrons many of whom were latitudinarians, Episcopalians or Jacobites. For these reasons patronage had been abolished by law after the Revolution ; by the Act of 1690 the Protestant heritors and elders should ' name and propose ' a minister to the whole congregation, which if dissatisfied might appeal to the Presbytery, whose decision should be final. But now, in 1712, the ' prelatie ' Parliament of Westminster altered this law, in defiance of the spirit of the Union Treaty, though with full legal competence to do exactly as it pleased with Scottish religion. The right of presentation was restored to the old patrons, unless they were Roman Catholics.

The results of this change in the law were not very great for the first generation after its passage. But its later consequences were momentous indeed. It was the root cause of a long series of secessions of Presbyterian bodies from an Established Church bound by this State-made law.

Perhaps, indeed, the consequences of the Act were not wholly bad. In the Eighteenth Century the rights of the patrons were often exerted to place moderate-minded ministers in parishes of zealots, who objected to their intrusion, yet benefited by their mild ministrations. Readers of Galt's *Annals of a Parish* will not forget that in the first year of George III's reign the excellent Mr. Balwhidder was thus intruded, ' for I was put in by the patron, and people knew nothing whatsoever of me, and their hearts were stirred unto strife on the occasion.'

In the Nineteenth Century the consequences of the



Patronage Act of 1712 culminated in the secession of the Free Church under Chalmers, a protest on behalf of evangelical liberty which is one of the great facts in the history of Scotland. At length, in 1875, the measure so lightly passed in Queen Anne's reign was reversed, and in our own day the reunion of the Church was able to take place as a result of the final abolition of Patronage.<sup>280</sup>

The Toleration and Patronage Acts together did much to disgust Presbyterians with the Union.

I am told [wrote Wodrow] that when the Bill of Toleration was passed last year, my Lord Somers had this expression 'Now the foundation of the Church of Scotland is sapped.' If he had joined this and Patronages together, I think he would have said this and much more. And for my own part I am of opinion that the Patronages are yet a more severe thrust at our constitution than the Toleration.<sup>281</sup>

In all matters concerning Scotland, Lord Oxford was far removed from the general sentiments of his party. He remained, as he had been at the time of the Union Treaty, much under the influence of Defoe and Carstares, who kept him posted as to Scottish opinion. In 1709 he had written to Carstares in the language of a fellow-Puritan: 'My soul has been among lions, even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongues sharp swords'; after this exordium, brother Harley proceeds to lament the tendency of the Whig Cabinet Ministers to favour Deists, and ends with a proposal, very unusual at that period, for an alliance of English Episcopalians and Scottish Presbyterians against infidelity! And now that he was in office, he went far in his attempts to placate the Scottish Church. He deprecated the bringing of Greenshields' appeal before the House of Lords, and he tried to prevent the introduction both of the Toleration and the Patronage Acts. He was more loyal to the maintenance of the Union than the Whig Lords whom he had helped to pass it, and he took a totally different view of Scotland from that prevalent among his own partisans. It formed one of their many grievances against him.<sup>282</sup>

While the religious policy of the Tory Parliament alienated the Presbyterians but pleased the Episcopalians of

Scotland, its economic policy aroused the deepest resentment of both parties. And unfortunately the English Whigs failed to oppose the economic ill-treatment of North Britain, although their principles and past actions ought to have led them to do everything to make the Union a success. In 1711 a duty was imposed on the export abroad of British linen. It fell with undue severity on Scotland, because linen was her staple industry, as cloth was the staple industry of England; yet by Article Fourteen of the Act of Union it had been promised that new imposts should be made 'with due regard to the circumstances and abilities of every part of the United Kingdom.'

This promise seemed to the Scots to be even more grossly violated when in the spring of 1713 a tax was voted of sixpence a bushel on all British malt, regardless of the fact that Scottish malt was of inferior quality and lower price than English. Moreover the same clause of the Act of Union had expressly stipulated that 'malt to be made and consumed in that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall not be charged with any imposition upon malt during this present war.' But when the tax was imposed the last of the Peace Treaties, that of England with Spain, had not yet been signed, though fighting had ceased.<sup>283</sup>

The anger roused in Scotland by the Malt Tax was so strong and universal that while this feeling was at its height the Scottish members at Westminster combined to demand the repeal of the Union. Argyle himself declared that it had failed to achieve its object of drawing the two peoples together in friendship, and Englishmen of all parties agreed. But the other object of the Union had been to secure the Hanoverian Succession on Anne's death. How would that be affected by its repeal? The question was not altogether easy to answer at that moment of time, but it was a consideration at the back of everyone's mind in their dealing with the question. Fears for the Hanoverian Succession made both English and Scottish Whigs doubtful, and more or less insincere, in their demand for repeal.

Nevertheless, several of the chief architects of the Union—Somers, Argyle and Seafield—did, in words at least, demand the destruction of the measure which is their best

claim to the gratitude of posterity. The Scottish Peers were very angry at the Malt Tax and other indignities, and very much afraid of opinion in their own country, while the English Whigs were playing to embarrass the Ministry and to curry favour in Scotland against the approaching General Election. It is doubtful if the Junto seriously intended to repeal the Union,<sup>284</sup> and they were certainly opposed to its repeal unless accompanied by further securities for Hanoverian Succession in Scotland, which they failed to obtain.

Oxford on this occasion played a more direct and manly part. He believed sincerely in the Union and he used all his strategy to save it. But many of his followers had little love for it, though now called upon to save it from the Whigs.

It is very comical [Erasmus Lewis wrote to Swift] to see the Tories, who voted with Lord Treasurer against the dissolution of the Union, under all the perplexities in the world lest they should be victorious; and the Scotch, who voted for the bill of dissolution, under agonies lest they themselves should carry the point.<sup>285</sup>

There was so much finessing and cross-voting that it is impossible, in the absence of a proper Parliamentary report, to make out what precisely occurred. But in any case the motion for leave to bring in Repeal was  
 June 1  
 1713 defeated in the Lords, and was never introduced into the Commons.\*

\* *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1216-1220, gives the date wrong (it was June 1 not May 28) and is vague as to the actual purport of the division. Compare with it *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 556. In *More Culloden Papers*, II, p. 34, a letter from Duncan Forbes (from Edinburgh) describes the precise nature of the motion that was carried by four votes only: 'The Whigs had promised to stand by our [Scottish] members in that matter provided that a clause were consented to be inserted in the Act for the Dissolution of the Union, whereby the Succession should be secured; but our people were so rash as to make the overture before they had commenced with the Whigs upon that security, by which means the Whigs were necessitate to propose a delay, until such time as they could get assurance from our people of that satisfaction they expected. This want of a full understanding being understood by the Treasurer [Oxford], he proposed to go on to the motion instantly, and the question after a considerable struggle put *proceed* or *delay*, it carried *proceed* by four votes. Thereafter the question was put whether leave should be given to bring in the Bill [for Repeal of the Union] or not, and it carried in the negative by a vast majority, all the Whigs voting against it because it was proposed out of concert before they had time to prepare it.' This account of the proceedings in the Lords differs from the ordinary accounts, but it is borne out by *L'Hermitage* (*Add. MSS.* 17677 GGG, f. 204), and is quite compatible with the two divisions mentioned in

As the life of Queen Anne drew visibly near to its end, all thoughts in Scotland were turned to the question of her successor. The Queen and her government up in London were universally supposed to be preparing a Restoration, and at the distance of Scotland from the capital no distinction of policy was recognized in this respect between Bolingbroke and Oxford. Even the Scottish Jacobite members at Westminster were convinced that the Queen had determined to do her brother right at last, probably by promoting a legislative repeal of the Act of Settlement. And the Whigs, in their anger and alarm, fostered this belief by their attacks on the Jacobitism of Ministers.<sup>286</sup> When Oxford paid £4000 to some Highland clans, most of whom were Jacobite,

Argyle denounced it in Parliament as money given  
 March them to arm for the Pretender, although the  
 1714 Treasurer declared he was only paying them to remain quiet, according to a well-known policy of King William's time.<sup>287</sup>

Queensberry, the Third or Scottish Secretary of State,\* died in July 1711, and for two years the post was not filled up, the government of Scotland remaining chiefly in the hands of Bolingbroke as Northern Secretary of State. In September 1713 Oxford, jealous of his rival's power, renewed the Third Secretaryship and placed Scotland under the Earl of Mar, former unionist and future Jacobite rebel, whose policy was as uncertain as the Treasurer's own.<sup>288</sup>

This change did nothing to affect the glowing and confident expectations of the Jacobites of Scotland, who, in the belief that the game was being prepared in London by sure hands in Court and Parliament, refrained from continuing those warlike preparations on their own part which under the Whig Ministry they had always kept on foot. They were, therefore, taken by surprise when King George was peacefully proclaimed in London, Bolingbroke attending at the ceremony which the Scots had believed he would never permit to take place. This was a main reason why the trial

*H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 556, and is consistent with Halifax's speech as reported in *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1219. See also *Lockhart*, I, pp. 429-437; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 148-150, and Onslow's note; *Mathieson*, pp. 292-293; *Wodrow, Anal.*, II, pp. 236-237.

\* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 394.

of strength in the North did not take place on Anne's death, but a year later in the Rebellion of 1715.

It was in these last years of the Queen's reign that the London *Spectator* began to influence the Scottish upper class, and that the fame of a certain Edinburgh wig-maker, Allan Ramsay by name, and his turn for verse, epigram, and good companionship began to spread in Jacobite literary circles—the first streak of dawn to the splendid day of Eighteenth Century Scottish letters.

\* On October 16, 1714, one of Oxford's Scottish informants wrote to him from Edinburgh: 'I have lately had occasion to talk freely with some of the chiefs of the Jacobite party here and I find that they have been strangely surprised and taken unawares at the Queen's death, which is the true reason of their doing nothing for their young master, as they call him. They say that so long as the Whigs had the Ministry in their hands and they thought their master's interest in danger, they were at a great deal of pains and some charges too, to be always on their guard, by having arms and horses both for themselves and followers always at hand, by holding an intercourse one with another by letters, messengers, or personal meetings sometimes at what they call their Highland Huntings; but when the Tories came into the Ministry they thought their master's interest secure, and they became so too, giving over all their care and diligence, and reckoning that they had nothing then to do but to wait and obey the orders which they expected to be sent from above when any opportunity offered, specially such a one as the Queen's death, which when it happened their expectation was at the crisis, where it continued till they saw that grand opportunity lost.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 498-499. Defoe bears this out in his *White Staff* (1714), Pt. II, pp. 14-22, and *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476-483, is not inconsistent with it.

## CHAPTER XV

### AFTER THE PEACE

The Mohun-Hamilton duel. Anglo-French Ministerial intrigues for a Jacobite Restoration. Addison's *Cato*, April 1713. Swift's return to Ireland. Faults of the Spanish Commercial Treaty. The French Commercial Treaty lost in the Commons. Bolingbroke's faction against Oxford. General Election, August-September 1713.

IN the autumn of 1712 the English Ministers had determined to send an Ambassador Extraordinary to France, to hasten and dignify the last stages of bargaining for Peace. Matthew Prior, who had the strings of the negotiation in his hand, could not receive his proper reward either as Ambassador to France or as plenipotentiary at Utrecht, because the Queen considered a man of humble origin unfitted to hold such dignified posts : a year before, she had written of Prior, 'I doubt his birth will not entitle him to be envoy.'<sup>289</sup> A grandee of the first order of magnificence was required to fill the part at Versailles which the Earl of Portland had filled so well at the close of William's war. On this occasion the choice of the Queen's Ministers significantly fell on the Duke of Hamilton, leader of the Scottish Jacobites. His appointment as Ambassador aroused the fiercest party feeling, for it was hoped and feared that he was going to Paris not only to hasten the Peace but to prepare the Restoration. His weak character and uncertain policy might have made his mission a disappointment to ardent Jacobites, as his leadership of the parties opposed to the Union had formerly proved. But the matter was never put to the test, for he never left the British shore.

Lord Mohun, who in his youth had been a rake-hell and a murderous brawler, had taken to politics as a Whig orator in the Lords, and had partially reformed his manner of life. Hamilton and he were opponents in a protracted

law-suit, about which they had recently had words. A message was taken to the Duke on Mohun's behalf, which he construed as a challenge: evidence differs as to which side provoked the duel. A meeting was arranged on the eve of the Ambassador's departure for France.<sup>290</sup>

Maccartney, who acted as Mohun's second, had been one of Marlborough's generals, recently broken for his politics by the Tory Ministers. Though he was a good soldier he was a gambler who had run through his own and his wife's fortune, he had got into various scrapes, and had for years past enjoyed a bad reputation among his brothers in arms.<sup>291</sup> The Duke's second was a Colonel John Hamilton of the Scots Foot Guards.

The four men met in Hyde Park in the early morning of November 15, 1712. The principals rushed at one another 'desperately like wild beasts, not fencing or parrying.' The Duke killed Mohun, and Mohun gave the Duke a wound which, in the opinion of the doctors, was the cause of his subsequent death. Meanwhile the seconds also, as the custom of the age allowed, were exchanging passes, and Colonel Hamilton had been lightly wounded below the calf of the leg; but when he saw the Duke lying prostrate over the body of Mohun, he ran to his assistance. So far there is little dispute as to the facts. What happened next is more doubtful.

Three days later, Colonel Hamilton swore before the Privy Council that, as he held the wounded Duke in his arms, Maccartney came up 'with a sword' and 'made a push at him.' The Colonel 'thought when he saw Maccartney push at the Duke it had been at him and asked him what he meant, but he made no answer but got away.' A surgeon, according to Colonel Hamilton, then came on the scene and opened the Duke's coat, 'and found a wound upon his left breast which never bled, though it was a large orifice, which he took to be the wound given him by Maccartney.' This story of Maccartney's stabbing the Duke was not confirmed by the servants who were looking on at the duel and who came up to assist the fallen men. Colonel Hamilton's uncorroborated statement, which is not itself very clear or convincing, is rendered yet more doubtful

by the fact that he made apparently no attempt to arrest Maccartney on the spot or to accuse him before the spectators. Modern opinion, from Sir Walter Scott onwards, has held that Maccartney did not stab the Duke. But all good Tories were at the time convinced that the Queen's Ambassador had been assassinated by a premeditated Whig plot, and the belief was not unnatural in view of the bad previous characters of Mohun and his second.

Maccartney fled for his life : he would indeed have run great danger before a jury of his countrymen in the feeling of the hour. But after the accession of George I he returned, stood his trial at the King's Bench, and was acquitted of the charge of murder. The famous Earl of Chesterfield sat through the trial, and though he considered Maccartney 'very capable of the vilest actions,' was convinced of his innocence. 'There did not appear,' writes Chesterfield, 'even the least ground for a suspicion of it ; nor did Hamilton, who appeared in court, pretend to tax him with it.'

At the time of its occurrence, the duel aroused party rage to the highest pitch. When Maccartney fled abroad, the attempt was made to have him extradited, and when the hunt for him was at its height, Swift sent over a droll story to entertain his lady friends in Dublin :

Was it not comical for a gentleman to be set upon by highwaymen and to tell them he was Maccartney ? Upon which he brought them to a justice in hopes of a reward, and the rogues were sent to gaol. Was it not great presence of mind ? <sup>292</sup>

Hamilton's place at Paris was taken by Shrewsbury, who was the least likely of all the Ministers to countenance Jacobite intrigues. He performed his part with dignity and grace, but he did not like the atmosphere of too close friendship with France. Possibly for that reason he did not stay there long after the signing of Peace. In 1713 he was sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant : his doings there have already been described. Prior remained on in France, as the maid-of-all-work, indispensable but ill paid.

It was perhaps as well for the House of Hanover that Hamilton never went to France, and that Prior extricated himself from an attempt of Torcy and Gaultier to draw him



into the Jacobite intrigue.<sup>293</sup> For the conspiracy of the French and English Ministers to effect a Restoration on Anne's death took on fresh vigour after the signing of the Treaties of Utrecht.

As early as October 1712 Bolingbroke had felt himself on good enough terms with the Pretender to ask him, through Torcy, for a list of the Whigs who had made protestations of Jacobite loyalty ! James cautiously replied that, since the correspondence with Marlborough had been intermitted two years ago, he had had no traffic either with Whigs or Tories but that of which Bolingbroke himself was well aware. Berwick's comment was 'Your Majesty's answer upon that point was very generous and just, and ought to have a good effect with the present Ministry, who by that will see *they* run no risk in trusting Your Majesty.'<sup>294</sup>

As soon as the Treaties of Utrecht were safely signed, the Jacobite Restoration became the first object of Torcy, of Gaultier and Ilberville his agents in England, and of the Duc d'Aumont, sent as French Ambassador to London.<sup>295</sup> Their correspondence, now open to historians in the French Foreign Office, was not available to the Whigs when they impeached Oxford and Bolingbroke in 1715. If it had then been published, it would have proved what was so strongly suspected, that the two English Ministers, from the Treaty of Utrecht to the death of Anne, were in constant communication with the Pretender through French agents, and were plotting with the French Ministers to bring him to the throne on the Queen's death.\* Bolingbroke was the more deeply committed and the more earnest and active of the two : Oxford was only playing one of his innumerable double games, insuring himself against the Restoration if it should prove inevitable, as it well might in case the young man changed his religion ; meanwhile he secured the Jacobite vote in Parliament, and was able to keep an eye on Bolingbroke's dealings with James.

Oxford would never lend himself to any practical plan

\* A good selection of the most important of the relative documents from the French Foreign Office Archives will be found in the *English Historical Review*, July 1915, edited by Mr. Wickham Legg. Others will be found at the end of *Salomon*, and others in App. E, pp. 336-340 below, in this volume. See also *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*.

to effect the Restoration, and Bolingbroke's ideas on that point never went further than his design to man the public service and officer the army wholly with High Tories and Jacobites. In that policy he met with constant opposition from Oxford, backed, until the last week of her life, by the Queen. Bolingbroke and Oxford were, however, agreed on one point : they both told James that it was necessary that he should turn Protestant. Then, no doubt, they could have carried a repeal of the Act of Settlement through Lords and Commons and so put the law on the Jacobite side. It is possible that Anne hoped for this outcome, but she never gave clear expression to any view about her successor, except that, whoever he might be, he was not to land in England while she was alive.

James, for his part, never once contemplated the possibility of a change in his religion, and had therefore no desire to be restored by a bargain with Parliament. In April 1713 he wrote to Torcy desiring that no proposal about him should be made to either House, and expressing a wish to come to England during the recess ; then his faithful subjects 'animated by my presence' might, 'by an unexpected stroke,' place him on the throne when Anne was dead.<sup>296</sup> It is the plot described in *Esmond*, but it never materialized outside the pages of fiction, for James never came to England.

Such, however, was his idea of a Restoration, wholly without conditions. It might suit Atterbury, but it seemed to Bolingbroke impracticable and to Oxford undesirable. And so things drifted on, season after season, to the final catastrophe not only of the Jacobite but of the old Tory cause.

In March 1713, on the eve of the signature of Peace, Oxford declared to Gaultier that he was in the Pretender's interest and was fast bringing the Queen round. On this occasion his avowal of Jacobite loyalty was made confessedly with the object of inducing James to trust the English Ministers so far as to take their advice and travel in Italy, Bavaria or Switzerland.<sup>297</sup> Anne's servants wanted to remove her brother thus far afield, in order to avoid the charge made against them by the Whigs of abetting his continued residence on French soil. Under the terms of Utrecht

Louis acknowledged Anne and the Protestant Succession after her, and gave a formal promise not to assist the Pretender. At the time of the Dunkirk armistice James had been compelled to quit France, but he would go no further away than Lorraine, where, under the Duke's friendly protection, he settled down at Bar-le-Duc on the border of France to watch how matters went. In July 1713 Lords and Commons both addressed the Queen, asking her to bring pressure on the Duke of Lorraine to expel his guest: these addresses, though initiated by the Whigs, had been carried unanimously, because no member of either House wished openly to mark himself as Jacobite.<sup>298</sup>

A few days before Oxford made to Gaultier his not very sincere declaration of loyalty to James, the good young man had written forty-five letters to thirty-nine Cardinals!<sup>299</sup> The cause of a constitutional, Anglican Jacobitism was a dream of English country-houses and had no root in the realities of the exiled court overseas; the Whigs always said so, and Bolingbroke was one day to discover by personal experiment that they were right, and to declare so in the most forcible terms in his *Letter to Sir William Wyndham*.

The rage of faction throughout the last four years of Queen Anne set its dividing mark on most aspects of life and letters in London. But there was one pleasant interlude, wherein the Whigs and Tories vied with each other only in the applause they gave to Addison's tragedy of *Cato*. It was impossible for anyone completely in his right senses to feel bitter against Addison; and for two years past the creator of Sir Roger de Coverley had seldom dipped his pen in the political inkpot, though all men knew that he was still a staunch Whig. In the weeks following the signature of the Treaties of Utrecht, his tragedy, of which all save the last act had been written ten years before, was at last permitted by the modest author to appear upon the stage. The goodwill displayed towards him was astonishing in that tense moment of public affairs. On April 3, 1713, the day that the news of the signing of the Peace reached England, he dined with Swift and Bolingbroke and discussed the vexed question of the hour.

We were very civil [writes Swift to Stella], but yet when we grew warm, we talked in a friendly manner of party. Addison raised his objections and Bolingbroke answered them with great complaisance.

Three days later the friendly foes met in the wings of Drury Lane Theatre :

I was this morning [writes Swift] at the rehearsal of Mr. Addison's play. There were not above half a score of us to see it. We stood on the stage, and it was foolish enough to see the actors prompted every moment, and the poet directing them ; and the drab that acts Cato's daughter [Mrs. Olfield] out in the midst of a passionate part, and then calling out *what's next ?*

On April 14, 1713, the first public performance was given of the long expected play, with the most powerful and brilliant society in the world as audience. The party that had won the war and the party that had dictated the peace were both there in force to do honour to the bard. The tragedy was in the fashion of the time and was acclaimed as the greatest of Addison's works : to posterity it seems one of his feeblest, in spite of a few passages of real dignity not unworthy of the man who had just written 'The spacious firmament on high.' Cato's soliloquy at the beginning of the last act faintly echoes Milton and Shakespeare ; but most of the play echoes the French classical theatre and not overwell. A writer in Steele's *Guardian* pronounced that *Cato* 'exceeded any of the dramatic pieces of the ancients,' but as scarcely anyone in Europe except Bentley was capable of reading the Greek drama with ease and intelligence, the *dictum* only means that it was as good as Seneca.

The play, though extravagantly praised by almost everyone, was dull, and it managed to infect Pope himself with its dullness. That rising young poet, who had recently delighted the town with his first version of *The Rape of the Lock*, enjoyed the extreme honour of being asked to write the Prologue for *Cato*. He did not mean to be political, but the Whig half of the house broke into raptures over his couplet :

Here tears shall flow for a more generous cause,  
Such tears as Patriots shed for dying laws.

The Prologue then proceeded with some remarkable rhymes in praise of the dramatist :

He bids your breasts with ancient ardour rise  
And calls forth Roman drops from British eyes.  
Virtue confest in human shape he draws,  
What Plato thought, and godlike Cato was.

With honest scorn the first famed Cato viewed  
Rome learning arts from Greece, whom she subdued.  
Our scene precariously subsists too long  
On French translation and Italian song.

Again rounds of clapping from the Whigs, who had always denounced the Italian opera as Popish and French influence as unpatriotic. And when, after the curtain had gone up on the play itself, Cato declared that

When vice prevails and impious men bear sway,  
The post of honour is a private station,

all the Whigs who were fighting to get back to office shook the theatre with their applause. But the Tories would not suffer the occasion to be snatched from them thus. After hissing the Prologue, they decided to applaud the play. They declared that the vile military tyrant Caesar was intended for Marlborough, and that 'Cato must mean either the Lord Treasurer or Bolingbroke' ! The master-stroke was Bolingbroke's own, when he sent for Cato's impersonator, Booth, and gave him a purse with fifty guineas for acting so well the part of the patriot 'who defended liberty against a Perpetual Dictator' : Marlborough's demand for the Captain Generalship for life had not yet been forgotten. And so 'the numerous and violent claps of the Whig party on the one side of the theatre were echoed back by the Tories on the other.'

Both parties continued to attend the performances in this schoolboy mood, and the piece ran for twenty nights, then accounted a very long run. After a fortnight of this entertainment, a Whig Lord wrote to his private friends recording his conversation with the Tory Lord Chancellor's son :

I asked him how he liked our play. '*Your play ! my lord, 'tis ours,*' says he ; '*or at least you will allow Cato to belong to us, by reason Mr. Booth is one of us.*' Very good, quoth I, take him in God's name : you purchased him at the rate of fifty-four guineas which Lord Bolingbroke collected among you young gentlemen at the play the other night. They might make the best of their player, since we had our poet ; and bribe him if you can.<sup>300</sup>

It is small wonder that so popular a play, which was published and read throughout the land after its run of the stage, should have added to our common stock of phrases some that are still alive, though their origin has been long forgotten. The best known is the gallant sentiment of Portius :

'Tis not in mortals to command success,  
But we'll do more, Sempronius ; we'll deserve it ;

or Marcia's sententious warning to her sex :

The woman that deliberates is lost.

While *Cato* was still upon the stage, Swift's life-sentence was passed by the Queen ; the Deanery of St. Patrick's, Dublin, was assigned to him. Like so much else at the time it was a compromise, not on this occasion between the views of Oxford and Bolingbroke who would both have gladly kept their friend with them as an English Dean, but between the Queen's dislike of Swift, nourished by the Duchess of Somerset and the Archbishop of York, and her sense of duty to her Tory Ministers.\* Swift accepted his fate as inevitable, writing to Stella :

Neither can I feel joy at passing my days in Ireland ; and I confess I thought the Ministry would not let me go ; but perhaps they can't help it.<sup>301</sup>

To another friend he wrote :

The prints will tell you that I am condemned to live again in Ireland ; and all that the Court or Ministry did for me was to let me choose my station in the country where I am banished.

\* See pp. 117-118 above, and Sir C. Firth's pamphlet, *Dean Swift and Ecclesiastical Preferment*, reprinted by Sidgwick and Jackson from *Review of English Studies*, Jan. 1926.

For his health's sake, and to avoid the slow jolting of the coach in the ruts, he rode a-horseback through the June weather from London to Chester, hoping there to take ship for Ireland. From Chester he writes to Stella :

I am here after six days. A noble rider, *fais !* And all the ships and people went off yesterday with a rare wind. This was told me, to my comfort, on my arrival. Having not used riding these three years made me terribly weary. Yet I resolve on Monday to set out for Holyhead, as weary as I am.

But he thought better of it and did not venture the journey through the Welsh hills. So by slow stages he returned to his Irish exile, poorly rewarded, as he thought, for all his services. Indeed he had done more during three years' residence in London to settle the immediate fate of parties and nations than did ever any other literary man in the annals of England.<sup>302</sup>

In June 1713 the Whigs won their first popular and Parliamentary success since their downfall three years before, in causing the rejection of the commercial part of the Treaty with France. They had ceased to represent the general opinion of the country on the issue of peace and war, but they still represented it, not only as to the Succession, but on most commercial questions. The vested interests of existing manufacture and commerce, and the popular economic theory of the day as to the balance of trade, were championed by the Whigs in their attack on the Spanish Commercial Treaty as insufficient, and on the French Commercial Treaty as undesirable and dangerous.

Bolingbroke's policy in the Treaties he had made with France and Spain was to dish the Whigs by winning such great commercial advantages for England at the expense of Holland and other countries, that the Tories would appear as the true benefactors not only of the landed interest but of the mercantile community also.\* In this he was partly, but not wholly, successful.

The old-established trade with the Spaniards, both in Europe and America, was regarded by all sections in England as of vital importance. We had engaged in the

war very largely to prevent France from shutting us out of its benefits. Spain bought our goods, cloth from England and dried fish from the Newfoundland banks, and sold us in return choice wool, dyeing goods and other materials for our manufactures. Bolingbroke, in the Treaties of Utrecht, won territorial and political protection for this trade and for our Turkey and Mediterranean commerce in general by securing Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and by getting the *Asiento* monopoly of the South American slave-trade. But the old immunities, that English merchants had enjoyed in Spain herself under the excellent Treaty of 1667, were not properly secured by the Commercial Treaty that Lord Lexington negotiated at Madrid with Philip V's Ministers and the Princess des Ursins. For want of proper advice on this technical and difficult subject, Bolingbroke in 1713 accepted a Commercial Treaty which at once broke down in practice. Before the Queen died, the whole trading community in England, without distinction of party, was up in arms about the ill usage of our merchants in Spain, and a new Treaty had to be negotiated under George I. This failure on a question of detail was one of the reasons why public opinion, particularly in the towns, began to turn against Bolingbroke and the Tories in the last year of Queen Anne.<sup>303</sup>

The French Commercial Treaty, on the other hand, was objected to for the opposite reason—not that it made trade too difficult but that it made it too easy. Bolingbroke's political and dynastic policy was to make an Alliance with France against the European Allies with whom we had been working ever since the Revolution. To strengthen this new diplomatic orientation, he desired to create a new vested interest in trade with France, and did not like it the less if it was made at the expense of the Commercial Treaty with Portugal, so dear to the Opposition. Claret was Tory, port was Whig.\*

\* The political flavour of the two wines appears in the literature of the day, e.g. in Mrs. Centlivre's *Gotham Election*. In spite of tariffs there must have been a great deal of claret drunk by the upper classes in England; e.g. in the *Gotham Election* (1715), the innkeeper says: 'Most of our gentry for this last vour years, dye mind, will touch nothing but French claret. There are zome that like your Port wines still, but very few, and those of the poorer sort too.'



The Whigs, with a diametrically opposed foreign policy, were correspondingly fearful lest a good trade with France should render an alliance with the patron of the Pretender popular in the City of London. Hitherto they had been able, by duties and prohibitions, to prevent such a trade from growing large. In the battle they had now to fight for political reasons against the commercial clauses of the Utrecht Treaty with France, they had economic advantages that decided the event. The popular theory of the balance of trade, as well as the vested interests of commerce and manufacture, stood opposed to the sacrifice of the Portuguese trade for a trade with France.

The Portuguese, under the Methuen Treaties of 1703, had for the past decade been buying our cloth in great quantities and paying for it partly in port wine and partly in Brazilian gold. This exchange now amounted to a great vested interest, in which wool-growing farmers and squires were involved, together with weavers and cloth merchants. And since we imported gold from Portugal, it was regarded as a sound trade because the 'balance' was the right way. The French, on the other hand, would sell us claret and silk goods, and would not take cloth in return, but, it was alleged, principally gold. 'French wines had to be bought for money, those of Portuguese growth could be obtained for goods.' French trade, therefore, would be a bad trade according to the economic ideas of the time; and certain practical results would flow from it: clothiers and sheep farmers would be injured; our rising silk manufacture at home would be checked by French competition; our Turkey and Italian trade would suffer, as we bought silk from those countries in return for cloth, and if now we bought silk from France instead, we should sell less cloth in the Mediterranean. Finally the Portuguese would put up high duties against our cloth, because, by the Methuen Treaty, they were privileged to sell their wine to us at a duty one third lower than the French; this condition would be annulled by the proposed Treaty with France, and the Portuguese would therefore be free to recoup themselves in any way they chose.

It is difficult to say how far these fears were exaggerated,

since the matter was never put to the test. For the same reason it is impossible to say how great a benefit a freer trade with France might have proved. Scotland and the American colonies would certainly have benefited respectively by trade with France and with the French West Indian Islands. But in fact the Scottish members voted sixteen for the Commercial Treaty and sixteen against.<sup>304</sup>

Bolingbroke, whether he was right or wrong as an economist, had miscalculated as a politician : he desired to promote English trade, but he was not in close touch with the mind of the trading community, as were the Whig leaders. The first opposition made in Parliament to the commercial clauses of Utrecht was, indeed, voted down on May 14th by a majority of over a hundred on a straight party vote. But in the course of the next month a formidable agitation arose in the country and Tory members were put under strong pressure by their constituents.\* Deputations of clothiers and silk merchants, traders with Portugal, Italy and Turkey thronged the lobbies and gave alarmist evidence to Parliament. A riot in London of silk-workers, dismissed by their masters in fearful expectation of the flood of French silks, had to be suppressed by the militia.

The finishing stroke was given by Sir Thomas Hanmer. That worthy Baronet realised the old Tory ideal of an independent country member : he sat for Suffolk and had refused office. Swift spoke of him as 'the most considerable man in the House of Commons.' When, at the last moment, he changed his mind and came out against the Treaty of Commerce, he sealed its fate. His Toryism was beyond reproach or question : as a High Churchman he had voted for the 'Tack' in 1704, and as an October Club man he had taken a leading part in the movement for the Treaties of Utrecht. In November last he had been in Paris, where the French had treated him with the highest consideration, and where the Jacobites had courted him in vain.<sup>305</sup> On trade, and on the Succession, he found himself, much

\* E.g. the *Shakerley MSS.* (kindly shown to me by Mr. Arthur Bryant) reveal the pressure put on Shakerley, the Tory M.P. for Chester, by his constituents regardless of their politics. Chester, as the emporium of the Portuguese wine trade, would have suffered by the reduction of the duties on French wine.

against his will, on the Whig side, and on both questions his leadership of a strong Tory group was of decisive importance. These dissidents became known as the 'Whimsicals' or 'Hanoverian Tories.'

Oxford, who cared little about Bolingbroke's pet projects, had attempted in vain to get the commercial clauses withdrawn without a division, but a vote was taken and the Ministry was beaten by 194 to 185, in the same  
 June 18 House which a month before had given them a  
 1713 majority of over a hundred on the same question. Nearly eighty Tories voted against the Government. Only one of the four Tory Members for London dared to vote for trade with France. As the Commons refused to implement the commercial clauses, they had to be cut out from the Treaty of Peace.<sup>308</sup>

In this controversy the power of the pamphlet press had been conspicuous, but Swift, busy with his move to Ireland, had taken little part. Defoe had stood up for the Ministry in the *Mercator*, but a very formidable rival review had been started by the opponents of the trade with France, called the *British Merchant*, subsidized by General Stanhope and Lord Halifax. It was well primed with statistics and arguments that carried the day with a public brought up on the Balance of Trade theory, to which the Tories had no clearly defined free-trade theory to oppose. Of lighter weight was Addison's *Trial of Count Tariff*, a playful Whig parable of the same general type as the Tory Dr. Arbuthnot's *John Bull* of the year before.\*

Bolingbroke was bitterly chagrined, the more so as the Dutch, whom he so hated, seized the opportunity of the English rejection of trade with France to increase their own.

\* Mr. H. O. Meredith, in his outlines of the *Economic History of England*, p. 190, says: 'The Tories, though willing to break up the commercial policy of the Whigs, were not prepared to secure for England the advantages of a simple free trade tariff. They held so much of the balance of trade doctrine that it was difficult for them to answer the positions of the Whigs, viz. that the trade with Portugal was a gain, that with France a loss to England. Their argument that we ought not to refuse trade with France because they were our enemies, though sound so far as it went, did not touch the economic case of the Whigs, viz. that we traded with France at a loss.' I think this is borne out by a study of the Tory arguments in *Mercator* (May 26, 1713, to July 14, 1714), of which a copy will be found in the British Museum Newspaper Room.

They were overjoyed at it and laughed openly at us [he wrote] ; they are going to take off the small duties they have on French goods particularly on silks.<sup>307</sup>

His anger was turned chiefly against Oxford, who had been lukewarm in the matter, and whom, moreover, he and his friends suspected of an intrigue with the Whigs. At the end of March the Treasurer had gone openly to dine with Lord Halifax, though the town gossip declared that the other members of the Junto had refused to share the repast.<sup>308</sup> The same week Swift, devoted as he was to Oxford, wrote regretfully of his unwisdom in 'not refusing to converse with his greatest enemies.'<sup>309</sup> Indeed, throughout his whole period of office, Oxford continued to receive letters from Halifax, offering him advice on financial questions ; congratulating him on his achievements, among others on the Peace of Utrecht ; and from the spring of 1713 onwards adumbrating a combination of the Whigs with the Lord Treasurer to save the Hanoverian Succession—opposition to Bolingbroke being implied though not expressed.<sup>310</sup> Probably Oxford wrote nothing in answer to these letters, but he talked with Halifax and he did not discourage his suggestions. The Treasurer seems to have been at least as loyal to his Ministerial colleagues as Bolingbroke, but he characteristically kept open two possible lines of movement for the future, one of advance to Jacobitism if the Pretender should turn Protestant, the other of alliance with the Whigs to save the Act of Settlement.

Rumours of Oxford's dealings with the Whigs, followed by the defeat of the Treaty of Commerce, stirred the High Tories to fresh efforts to seize control. Lists were circulated showing the scandalous number of Whigs still left in the army, the Lord-Lieutenancies, the magistracy and the civil service, whom Oxford refused to dismiss. Atterbury, whom the reluctant Queen had made Bishop of Rochester in June 1713, joined with Lord Chancellor Harcourt who had procured his elevation, and with Bolingbroke, who was head of their cabal, in a campaign against the Treasurer as being 'no sincere Churchman.' 'If your brother will not set himself at the head of the Church party, somebody must,' said Bolingbroke to Oxford's brother Edward. To meet

the outcry, the Treasurer agreed, in August, that his own friend, Lord Dartmouth, should be superseded as Southern Secretary by the High-Church leader, Bromley. Dartmouth became Privy Seal in place of Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, who was promoted to the see of London for his services at Utrecht.<sup>311</sup>

But what Oxford gave with one hand he took back with the other. While he persuaded the Queen to appoint

Bromley, he also persuaded her to take Scotland out of Aug.- Bolingbroke's management by reviving the Third  
Sept. Secretaryship of State in the person of the Earl of  
1713 Mar, and making the Earl of Findlater and Seafield  
Chancellor of Scotland. 'These things,' wrote Erasmus  
Lewis, 'make Lord Bolingbroke stare.'<sup>\*</sup>

Early in September, the Treasurer went down to Wimpole† for the marriage of his son Edward, and Bolingbroke, after writing him profuse congratulations and professions of friendship, 'took advantage of his absence' in the country to push the intrigue for his removal from office.<sup>312</sup> Lady Masham was set to work on the Queen; according to the Harley family, Bolingbroke bribed Abigail with shares in the Asiento Company and by other illicit transactions. Oxford already felt his position undermined; when he left office a year later he wrote to Swift: 'I have had no power since July 25, 1713.'<sup>313</sup> Conscious of his own increasing ill health, and inattention to business, of which Bolingbroke complained, sometimes in reasonable and justifiable language,<sup>314</sup> the Treasurer at one moment in the autumn determined to resign. But he was persuaded to change his mind by his friends Lord Trevor and Lord Dartmouth. Having reluctantly decided to stay on, he wrote to Dartmouth on November 25, 1713 :

I received your kind and compassionate letter and return you hearty thanks for the instances of your friendship. I will hasten, according to your admonition, to return to my duty. But I hope

\* See p. 243, above, on the Third Secretaryship; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 318.

† This famous Cambridgeshire seat, pronounced and generally spelt 'Wimple' in those days, came to Edward Harley junior by his marriage with the daughter of the Duke of Newcastle. He sold it to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 1740 for £100,000. Edward was the name both of Oxford's brother and of his son and heir.

those who desire my place, if they looked upon it with the same eyes I do, would not take it up if they might.

That autumn Oxford's friend, Erasmus Lewis, wrote :

I find by all the pamphlets, they give up the distinction of Whig and Tory, and bend all their thoughts to make new distinction between the Tories themselves, as Hanover Tory and Pretender Tory, English Tory and French Tory, for trade and against it.<sup>315</sup>

In these circumstances it was a serious matter for the supporters of government that the time of the old Parliament had run out and that another Election was due under the Triennial Act. They managed, however, to go once more to the polls as a united party, and to be returned to power for one more eventful year.

The General Election of August and September 1713 was fought with spirit by both sides. The Whigs were more united and in better heart than three years before, and 'in the northern parts had the better management.'<sup>316</sup> Their partisans, all over England, marched about wearing wool in their hats, and parading wooden shoes, to symbolize the ruin of the cloth trade by the Tory Commercial Treaties, and the betrayal of the country to France. Above all they declared that the Ministers intended to bring in James upon Anne's death. Trade and the Protestant Succession were popular cries, and had a majority in the new House, thanks to Hanmer and his Hanoverian Tories. But the Whig party vote was not much increased.

For the Tories, whether they followed the banner of Bolingbroke, of Oxford or of Hanmer, united to fight the Election on two issues : gratitude to the Queen and her Ministers for making Peace, and fear for the Church in danger. The Sacheverell wave had not yet spent its force. Above all, the power and patronage of government were on the Tory side, and in the reigns of Anne and her successor these influences never failed to carry a general election.\*

\* In Mrs. Centlivre's *Gotham Election*, written in 1715 and referring as much to the Election of 1713 as to that of 1715, we read :

'Enter a mob with their candidates at the head of each Party, one bearing a

In the Cornish pocket boroughs, since Godolphin's death, the High Tory influence was again supreme. Bishop Trelawny liked to be well with the Government of the day, and after some hesitations and loyal regrets for his deceased friend Godolphin, was persuaded by Oxford to support Tory candidates in Cornwall. By the middle of September Lord Lansdowne boasted, with only a little exaggeration, that he had procured the Tories there a majority of ten to one, and that he would have prevented any Whig being returned for a Cornish constituency if the Lord Treasurer had sent yet more money and distributed yet more places among wavering voters.<sup>317</sup> To 'cornwallise'\* became an electoral term for corruption, intimidation and falsification of electoral lists; these arts were confessedly employed by both sides all over the country, but in this election the majority of the returning officers were Tory partisans.

From Cornwall to Cumberland, Oxford was abused for not turning every Whig out of every post in government pay, to speed the good work of the elections. Sir Charles Musgrave complained bitterly that he had not been made Governor of Carlisle instead of the Whig Earl who took his title thence; but Musgrave was elected for the town in spite of that disadvantage.<sup>318</sup> Civil servants, magistrates, army and navy officers, tide waiters and innumerable humble folk who did not happen to be Tories, were protected by the obstinate justice of Oxford and his royal mistress. In saving the country from too close an application of 'the spoils for the victors,' they served the State well, and set an example behind which the Tories were glad enough to find shelter when George I came to the throne. Indeed, even from the party electoral point of view the Treasurer may have been right, for his incorrigible moderation had its uses in retaining for the Tories the allegiance of

Pope and wooden shoes with wool in their hats; the other a Tub with a woman preacher in it and laurel in their hats.

\* The Whigs cry "No Pope: No Perkin."

\* The Tories "No tub-preaching; no Liberty and Property men."

\* Whigs "No Fire and faggot! No wooden shoes! No trade-sellers! Down with that Frenchified dog! No High Boy."

\* Half a score fall together by the ears and exeunt fighting.

\* 'If he could have *Cornwallised* it by scattering some guineas illegally'—Sir Robert Price on the Weobley election, Sept. 3, 1713. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 327.

many Hanoverians and men of the middle way. Bishop Trelawny had yielded only to Oxford's personal appeal for support in the Cornish boroughs. And Hanmer and his following had to be kept in the party fold.

In the Wiltshire boroughs the election was fiercely and unscrupulously conducted. The Duke of Somerset, now on the Whig side once more, was offering annuities of fifty pounds and upwards to certain voters in Marlborough, but a larger number took the bribes of the Tory family of Bruce, who carried the day.<sup>319</sup> In Ludgershall the Tory agent wrote unabashed to Lord Bruce that 'several good old votes that were allowed upon the last poll were struck off now, because they would have voted for Mr. Skylling,' the Whig candidate, and 'many new sham votes were made and allowed to pass by the bailiff because they voted for General Webb and Mr. Fern,' who were duly returned in the Tory interest.

Hardly less frank is the same Tory agent's account of the election for Wilts county conducted in the Cathedral town :

Sir Richard Howe and Mr. Hyde [Tories] carried the election against Mr. Aske and Mr. Pitt by a majority of near 600 votes. The Whig party appeared, all of them, with wool in their hats at the place of election. The Tories hooted them, called them wolves in sheep's clothing, surrounded them by parcels and whipped many of them, and knocked down others, insomuch that the Whigs were soon forced to pull all the wool out of their hats. Mr. Penruddock and Mr. Thomas Burnet had a quarrel, and a challenge passed, but the Bishop [Burnet of Salisbury] locked up his son the next morning and Penruddock swears he'll post him.\*

Underneath the rivalry of the great families, the corruption and the horseplay of which Wiltshire elections appeared to consist, lay the undying feud of Anglican and Puritan, of Church and Dissent. When, on the accession

\* This same boisterous Thomas Burnet wrote during the heat of the election some lines expressive of more filial affection than reverence :

' We drank to the Bishop, old Gilbert of Sarum,  
The Tories he'll baffle, in pulpit ne'er spare 'em,  
And show the blind geese that their sense is but *parum* '

Clarke and Foxcroft's *Life of Burnet*, p. 464.



of George I, the Duke of Marlborough rode through the town from which he took his title, he was welcomed by

three of his officers and a mob consisting of about twenty or thirty Presbyterians, Anabaptists and Independents, shouting *God bless the Duke of Marlborough*; but as they rode along the street the Church people crying out *God bless the Church, the King and Dr. Sacheverell* drowned the other noise.<sup>320</sup>

In the autumn of 1713 all men knew that a Tory victory at the polls would mean in the new Parliament an attack on the Dissenting interest in some form—the form actually taken was the Schism Act to destroy their schools. For this reason, though the election was declared by the Tories to turn on their own merits as the peace-makers of Europe, the Society of Friends felt a more lively concern about Toleration than about Peace. In the Sussex County Election, nine Quakers voted for the Whig candidates and only one for the Tories: in the contest for Buckinghamshire fifty-three Quakers voted for the Whigs and only three for the Tories.\* But there were exceptions. At Minehead in Somerset, where the right of every voter to vote had to be shown by a Parish Certificate kept in the Church Chest, the Whigs complained that

the Rev. Mr. Moggridge the Vicar and one Joseph Alloway, a Quaker and Overseer of the Poor, . . . upon the poll produced only such Certificates as were for their advantage and suppressed all those which would have disqualified any of their own voters.

In this way these two men of God secured the return of the Tory candidates, Sir Jacob Banks and Sir John Trevelyan of Nettlecombe.<sup>321</sup>

The Tories once more held the Parliamentary keys of power, and would hold them so long as the Queen should

\* See Poll Books for these contests, 1713. *Bodleian MSS. Willis* 54 and 56. It is possible to tell how Quakers voted, because in the poll books the word *affirmat* is written opposite their names. They and they alone were allowed by the law of William's reign to affirm instead of swearing the declaration of Allegiance and Supremacy required of every voter. On May 29, 1713, the House of Commons had divided on the question whether to deprive Quakers of the privilege of affirmation—a Tory act of revenge for their Whig voting. But it was defeated by 148 to 58. It was said that, if it had been carried, a move would have been made to deprive other Dissenters of their votes. *L'Hermitage, Add. MSS.* 17677 GGG, ff. 197–198.

live. But it was known that her days were numbered. The time was short. What would they do with it? If they healed their own divisions, appeased the fears of moderate men and joined frankly in preparing the way for the accession of the House of Hanover in accordance with the law of the land, they would be in a position to exact a large share of power in the new reign. But if their party were to be broken in half by the quarrels of its leaders; if the House of Hanover, already deeply suspicious, were to be further alienated by a half Jacobite policy that let 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would'; and if at the same time the attempt were made to eradicate Whiggery and Dissent by forcible measures, the rebound in the new reign might be fatal indeed. Oxford, in the muddy depths of his mind, saw the situation truly, but was every week becoming less capable of action, or even of intelligible speech. Bolingbroke could act, but his one idea of action was ever more violent partisanship, in a national crisis that needed other remedies and a different spirit.

## CHAPTER XVI

### QUEEN ANNE'S LAST PARLIAMENT

The Queen's dangerous illness, Christmas 1713. The English Ministers ask James to change his religion; his refusal, February–March 1714. The Hanoverian Tories take alarm. Argyle. Marlborough's position. Defoe. Steele's *Crisis* and his expulsion from the House. The vote on the Succession in danger. The writ for the Duke of Cambridge. Death of the Dowager Electress Sophia. The Schism Act. Proclamation against the Pretender. Last scene in Parliament July 1714: accusation of corruption against Bolingbroke's agent, Arthur Moore. Bolingbroke's projected alliance with France, Spain and Sicily.

AFTER the election, but before the meeting, of her last Parliament, Queen Anne took ill at Christmas and nearly died. Her danger proved a touchstone of the attitude of parties in relation to the Successor, and might well have served, more than it actually did, as a warning to Ministers of their precarious position and their want of any preparation for the future. While Anne lay between life and death at Windsor, Oxford was carelessly absent and Bolingbroke stood at her bedside in a cold sweat, praying 'God in his mercy to these Kingdoms preserve her.' In town, where the rumour ran round that she was dead, the Tories were 'out of their wits,' while the Whig chiefs bustled around in their sedan chairs to one another's houses, in a pleasurable excitement, which it was impossible altogether to conceal and for which their enemies bitterly reproached them after the recovery of the Queen.<sup>322</sup>

All agreed that the Pretender's plans were not ready, and that if Anne had died Sophia of Hanover would have been raised to the throne. The Act of Settlement, passed by the Tories themselves in 1701, still stood unrepealed, and there was no Jacobite majority in either House of Parliament unless and until James turned Protestant. Nor were his

partisans yet sufficiently in control of the military and executive power to attempt to overthrow the law by force. On December 14, Gaultier had written to Torcy bidding him pray that Anne should live 'some years' yet, or the Stuart cause was lost. Yet in the same letter he related how Oxford had just said to him that he would never endure that a German should rule in England, and that Parliament would change the Succession if James would imitate his uncle Charles II in his easiness about religious profession. Gaultier added that Victor Amadeus of Savoy and Sicily was ready to have his son brought up as a Protestant if the young man could succeed to the British Crown as great-grandson of Charles I; and that, if the House of Stuart refused to oblige in the point of religion, Bolingbroke was not indisposed to seek in the House of Savoy another bolt-hole by which to escape from Hanoverian rule.<sup>323</sup>

Oxford, while declaring to Gaultier that he was more faithful than his rival to the Stuart as distinct from the Savoyard interest, would take no practical steps to secure the succession of the exiled Prince. In the previous May he had promised to send over a secret agent to reside at his Court, a point on which James laid great stress; but the promise, though repeated in the winter, was never fulfilled.<sup>324</sup>

The danger that the Ministers had run at Christmas moved them to take in February at least one practical step which, given their views and policy, they ought to have taken more than a year before. They no longer hinted but demanded that James should join the Anglican Church. Their message was forwarded with zeal and weighted with additional arguments by the agents of the French Government, Gaultier and Ilberville, who saw in James's accession to the throne on any terms a means of bringing back England into the orbit of French diplomacy. Gaultier, though an abbé, was of opinion that London was well worth a sermon. In a remarkable letter of February 6, he advised James to 'ask God to enlighten you as to the part you should take.' This most worldly churchman told James outright that he would never

Feb.—  
March  
1714

sit on the English throne unless he 'dissimulated his religion or changed it entirely.' He should also treat Whigs and Tories equally well. And Gaultier added that even if he came to the throne he would not keep it unless, after promising to observe the laws, he 'kept his word better than the King his father kept his.' The programme, both in its baseness and in its wisdom, was utterly unpalatable to the young man. On February 26 he replied with indignation telling Gaultier that he and the English Ministers were asking him to play the knave and that he would rather forfeit his inheritance. Next week he wrote a more polite refusal in three well-expressed English letters to Anne, Oxford and Bolingbroke.

All the just securities that can reasonably be asked for your religion, liberties and properties I shall be most willing to grant, and as that can be expected from a man of principle and true honour I am ready to comply with it, and you have I know too much of both to require more of me.

Torcy observed sardonically that the abbé Gaultier deserved to be made Archbishop of Canterbury for his proselytizing zeal, and James complained to Cardinal Gualterio that the abbé had wanted him to desert his religion 'and had even the effrontery to ask me to write to the Pope,' on the point of conscience.<sup>325</sup>

James III was an honest man : he would not profess one faith while believing another, like his uncle Charles ; nor did he, like Henri Quatre, regard religion as an affair of politics. By refusing to equivocate, he saved England from another age of trouble and revolution, and confined the arena of possible civil war to the North of the Island. Our country owes him a great debt.

In the last days of February 1714, Oxford became very precise, promising Gaultier that if James would turn Protestant he would persuade the Queen to name him heir in her will, and would move Parliament to repeal the Act of Settlement.<sup>326</sup> But it was too late. The angry reply was already on its way from Lorraine, and early in March the Queen and her Ministers knew that the essential condition could not be fulfilled.

What were they to do now ? The logical consequence of the demand they had sent to James and of his peremptory refusal would seem to be that the Tory Ministers should make their court to Hanover instead, and outrival the Whigs in preparing the way for the now inevitable accession. The interests of their party and the peace of their country alike demanded it. If they had spent the last months of Anne's reign in retracing their steps out of the Jacobite slough, they might have reached *terra firma* in time.

But there were obstacles to this obvious course. The Queen would not endure to hear talk of the Succession, and would not suffer a Hanoverian Prince to be received in the island before her own death. She was a sick woman, and no longer able to bring her mind to bear on the problems that would confront her Ministers and subjects as soon as she was gone. Moreover, Bolingbroke's Francophil policy had been carried so far that it was difficult and dangerous to draw back. The French and the Jacobite Courts could, if incensed, publish damning evidence against the Tory Ministers ; and the House of Hanover was already so much enraged against them that it would be difficult at this late date to effect a reconciliation. Bolingbroke could not abandon the hope that somehow James might yet find his way to the throne and choose him as Treasurer ; while Oxford, broken in health and staying himself with flagons, was sunk in an apathetic torpor, a caricature of his old method of cautious non-committal.

And so the two Ministers left the problem of the Succession alone as insoluble, and engaged instead in their fatal feud with one another. On April 26, 1714, Gaultier wrote to James :

Lords Oxford and Bolingbroke are not on good terms, but they have both separately sworn to me this morning that after the Queen they will recognize no King but you.<sup>327</sup>

Such assertions were now merely a confession of impotent waiting on events, in the hope that something would yet turn up to forestall inevitable fate.

If Bolingbroke and Oxford had, even at this eleventh hour, united to put themselves openly at the head of the

Hanoverian interest, they could have swung the central bulk of the Tory party, which was hanging, uncertain and undirected, midway between its Jacobite and Hanoverian wing. The feelings of many a squire of the old Cavalier tradition are touchingly expressed in a letter written by Peter Shakerley, Tory M.P. for Chester, to his half-brother.

I am sorry there should be any cause for making such severe reflections on the ingratitude of the Family of the Stewarts, and wish it had been less apparent. And though there is so much truth in it that I think neither the old cavaliers (if any of 'em are living) nor any of their sons will ever risk lives and fortunes for their sakes, yet these instances of their ingratitude administer such sourings to the once loyal party as will I fear make the overthrow of the monarchy too easy whenever it may be attempted ; and under pretences of securing it, it is to be feared that a Standing Army will always be kept up.<sup>328</sup>

Such was the central Tory feeling, conducive to a melancholy inaction. The sons of the Cavaliers could not be brought into the field on behalf of a Roman Catholic Stuart ; they would reluctantly have followed a clear lead for Hanover, if given by their accredited chiefs. But Oxford and Bolingbroke vouchsafed no clear sign, and their followers were left a prey to rumour and divided counsel.

Meanwhile one section of the party acted without waiting to be led. The Hanoverian Tories, called ' Whimsicals ' by their enemies, were men who had made up their minds that England's Church and laws would be in greater danger under a Roman Catholic Stuart than under Queen Sophy or King George. This view was held not only by avowed moderates, but by a large body of strong High Churchmen, such as Nottingham, Hanmer and Dawes who had just succeeded Sharp, as Archbishop of York. These men bestirred themselves to agitate for the House of Hanover, in and out of Parliament. They drew together in consultation with the Middle Party of Shrewsbury, Somerset, and Argyle.

The Tory Bishops, all save two, showed by their votes in the Lords that they feared above all other things a Roman Catholic King. Trelawny wrote, ' I can't but fear the Pretender is next oars ; if so the coffin is bespoke for the

Queen, for Popery is always in haste to kill when they are sure of taking possession.' And a great mass of lay opinion, opposed to the Whigs for four years past, listened with approval to the song :

Whoe'er is in place I care not a fig,  
Nor will I dispute between High Church and Low,  
'Tis now no dispute between Tory and Whig,  
But whether a Popish successor or no.

'The generality,' wrote a Tory Peer in March 1714, 'thinks of nothing after the Queen but the House of Hanover, . . . there is such an aversion to Popery.'<sup>329</sup>

The approaching crisis of the Succession brought Argyle out against the Ministers whom he had helped to put into office. Already alienated by their conduct towards him in Spain,\* the Campbell chief was not the man to sit still while a plot was being hatched to place the enemy of his house and clan on the throne of Britain. Old fundamental feelings were stirred up, deeper than his recent quarrel with the English Whigs, deeper than his feud with Marlborough. He swore that if the Pretender made any attempt, he would deal him out the measure that the House of Stuart had twice dealt out to the heads of the House of Argyle.<sup>330</sup> And at Christmas he had reconciled himself to Marlborough. In April 1714 he was removed from all his places in the army and in the State. Only, like his ally the Duke of Somerset, he was still Privy Councillor, and that might yet have import on occasion.

Marlborough, as usual, was playing a double game, but with more skill and more knowledge of his real intentions than can be traced in Oxford's vague duplicities. The Conqueror of France made himself a humble petitioner to Louis and James, for fear of eventualities which if possible he intended to prevent. In October 1713, on the news of the result of the General Election in England, he asked his nephew Berwick and James II's widowed Queen to solicit Anne and Oxford in his favour by means of Louis XIV, to prevent the new Parliament from depriving him of his wealth ; for he feared lest he should be called on to refund the moneys which it was said he had embezzled on

\* See p. 114 above.



commission. In March 1714 he asked for a pardon from James III, which Berwick contemptuously advised his half-brother to grant, 'as one may give to those sort of people as good as they bring, that is words for words, for I see nothing else in all Marlborough says, and indeed he has never behaved himself otherwise.' <sup>331</sup>

These insurances against a possible Jacobite restoration, which he had been taking out ever since the early years of William, and of which Berwick for one was now heartily sick, have a little lowered him in the estimation of mankind. Others, it is true, did likewise, but few so regularly; and by no means all, either of Whig or Tory statesmen, joined in the ignominious game. It must always be a cause of regret to posterity that John Duke of Marlborough so often stooped to imitate the occasional shuffling of Shrewsbury and Somers in this matter, rather than the consistently straightforward conduct of Nottingham, Stanhope and Walpole. It did him no good, and by keeping alive the suspicions of the Hanoverian agents <sup>332</sup> perhaps helped to prevent him from being named as one of the Regents on Anne's death and from holding the first place in the counsels of King George.

It was the more unnecessary because, alike by interest and conviction, Marlborough was bound to the House of Hanover. He was not, as Bothmar suspected, merely waiting to see who would come uppermost. He went so far as to offer a loan of £20,000 to the Elector of Hanover to help to secure the Succession, which he of all men would never have done if he had had any real doubt on which side he stood.\* He was, moreover, fully prepared to lead his veterans and their Dutch comrades against the Jacobites and French if it came to a war of Succession. He and Cadogan arranged with the Hanoverian Court that on Anne's death Marlborough should, in the name of the new sovereign, present himself to the English troops still in the Netherlands and lead them to England to secure the Act of Settlement. But they agreed to reject the mad proposal of coming with armed force to England during Anne's life, a premature step which Bolingbroke was praying they would take; it

\* *Coxe*, III, Chap. CXI, ed. 1819, p. 561.

was the one thing that would have arrayed Queen and country on the side of James.<sup>333</sup>

Sharing Marlborough's life in exile, and ever close to his heart, was one with more than all his zeal for the Protestant interest, who would, if she could, have stopped his insincere approaches to the Jacobites. Probably, indeed, Sarah knew nothing about them; to tell her would have taxed even Marlborough's courage. From their exile she wrote home to a friend :

Having done so much for the cause of liberty and for the good of England, I had much rather have him suffer upon that account than change sides, for that would look as if what he did in the Revolution was not for justice, as it really was, but to comply with the times. . . . If one must hazard, it should be in the cause of liberty, for if one was ruined for that, one had the satisfaction of having performed a right part. And I was born with a great aversion for fools and tyrants.<sup>334</sup>

In the growing excitement over the danger to the Protestant Succession, it was not likely that either Daniel Defoe or Richard Steele would keep silent, or that either would fail to get into trouble ; the frankness of Steele and the roundabout methods of Defoe proved equally dangerous in such a heat of party passion as now raged through England.

Defoe was still earning his pittance in Oxford's employ, writing hard to prove to a sceptical public that the Government of which his patron was the nominal head, had at heart the true interest of the Dissenters and of the Protestant Succession. Defoe himself was a stout Hanoverian and wrote three pamphlets in that cause bearing remarkable titles : *What if the Queen should die ? Reasons against the Succession of the House of Hanover*, and *Some considerations of the advantages of the Pretender's possessing the Crown of Great Britain*. The incorrigible man again adopted the method of irony which had cost him so dear ten years back over the *Shortest Way with Dissenters*.\* He pointed out how much to our advantage it would be that the Pretender should come to the throne, because then we should never again have to make war on France, as our King's interest would be identified with that of Louis ; and that the restoration of

\* See *Blenheim*, pp. 281-283.

James would relieve the nobility of the burden of attendance at Parliament—and so forth.

Everyone knew that such arguments were ironical, but the Whigs, who were furious with Defoe for deserting their party and defending the Peace, pretended not to understand.

One of them at his own charges instituted proceedings against the printer and publisher for attacking the Hanoverian Succession. The accused men revealed the identity of the author, which had never been a real secret. Defoe was arrested and, pending his trial, was committed to Newgate by the Whig Chief Justice Parker. He only escaped from prison by the intervention of the Ministers, who procured him a pardon from the Queen.

Defoe's rage against the Whigs and Dissenters was so highly provoked by this incident that thenceforth he constituted himself delator against their pamphleteers and was as eager as Swift to induce Ministers to prosecute. In March 1714 he urged the Government to indict Steele for making 'insinuations of the danger of the Succession under her Majesty's administration ;' so bitter had the quarrel become between Defoe and the party that was fighting for the cause he had at heart.<sup>385</sup>

Steele had a rare courage. Other writers, including Swift and Defoe, published their pamphlets without their names, hoping, sometimes in vain, thus to avoid enmity or prosecution. But Steele had, in 1713, published a pamphlet under his own name, called *The Importance of Dunkirk considered*, complaining that the French were not demolishing its fortifications and that the English Ministry connived at the delay. Early in 1714 he published *The Crisis*, his famous pamphlet on the danger to the Protestant Succession, and put on its title page 'By Richard Steele Esq.' He was now a Member of Parliament, having last summer resigned his post of Commissioner of Stamps in order to take an active part against the Government.\*

\* The letter to Oxford in which he resigned, dated June 4, 1713 (*Lansdowne MSS.* (B.M.) 1236, f. 263) is a characteristic document. Steele expresses his want of confidence in the Treasurer's policy and adds: 'Share, my Lord, your good fortune with whom you will. While it lasts you will want no friends, but if an adverse day ever happens to you, you will find, I think, myself obliged to be your friend and advocate.'

*The Crisis* was less bitter and provocative than much party writing on both sides that escaped under the shield of anonymity. But that a Member of Parliament should under his own name declare the Succession not safe in the hands of Ministers, was unendurable, particularly as it was true. Steele was expelled from the House of Commons. The majority for this act of discipline was nearly a hundred ; only a few of the Hanoverian Tories, including Lord Finch, the Earl of Nottingham's son, spoke or voted in opposition. Walpole, returned to the new Parliament for King's Lynn, made a powerful speech as Whig Leader.

The effect of the affair was to ventilate the question of the Succession and to increase the growing uneasiness of the man in the street.

*The Crisis* had been answered by Swift's *Public Spirit of the Whigs*, which has long survived Steele's piece in our national literature. The Dean was back on a visit from Ireland, deeply anxious about the growing estrangement between Oxford and Bolingbroke, but stone-blind to the Jacobite intrigue conducted by his two friends, rumours of which he continued to regard as a Whig lie. The *Public Spirit of the Whigs* contained, among other matter, an attack on the Scottish nobility as beggars and parasites whom the Union had planted out on England. The Scots Lords addressed the Queen against the libel, and Ministers who needed their votes could save Swift from prosecution only by the pretence of anonymity, which deceived no one. The incident makes Steele's avowal of his own writings the more praiseworthy by contrast.<sup>336</sup>

Steele as author took revenge for Steele as Member of Parliament. A week after his expulsion, a skit on Oxford appeared in number 14 of *The Lover*. The Puritan origins of the Harley family are first described, and then Steele continues :

I can assure you the family is now grown much more polite. But having been bred in such strictness and formality both Anthony [Oxford] and his brother Zachariah come into a wench's chamber with the same air they used to enter a congregation of saints. It is a hard thing to unlearn gestures of the body, and though Anthony

has quite got over all the prejudices of his education, not only as to superstition but as to religion also, he makes a very queer figure, and the persecuted sneak is still in his face, though he now sets up for a persecutor.

This picture of Oxford gave equal pleasure to the promoters and to the victims of the Schism Act.

In the following month a series of debates and divisions took place in both Houses on the questions whether the Protestant Succession was safe under the existing Ministry, and what steps should be taken to make it more secure. In the Commons, Walpole's Whig phalanx was joined by the flying squadron of Hanoverian Tories led by the Speaker Sir Thomas Hanmer, who, when the House went into Committee on the safety of the Succession, gave April 15 voice to his fears in uncompromising terms. The 1714 blow to Tory unity was the more serious, because Hanmer had been chosen Speaker of the new Parliament by Oxford's influence, with a view to attaching him more strongly to the Ministers whom he had opposed on the Treaties of Commerce. The usual government majority of over a hundred in a large division shrank to less than fifty.<sup>337</sup>

In the Lords a series of similar debates demonstrated the same rent in the Tory garment. On April 5 the Protestant Succession was voted to be not in danger by a majority of only twelve ; ' Lord Treasurer, you carried it by your dozen,' said Wharton to Oxford, referring to the recent creation of Peers. On April 13 another motion in the Lords on measures to be taken against the Pretender was opposed by the Ministry but was defeated by only two votes. It was in the highest degree significant that not only all the Whig Bishops, but all the Tory Bishops except Atterbury and Crew, voted against the Government. The sound Tories who had just been put into the Sees of York and London turned against their Ministerial friends on this question. The prelates who were about to urge on the Schism Act against Dissenters were in grave alarm at the prospect of a Popish King, and in that matter had less than no confidence in Bolingbroke.<sup>338</sup>

The debates on the danger to the Succession had strengthened the House of Hanover and had drawn its most active friends in the different parties together in a formidable coalition. But in the following week occurred an incident, known as 'the Duke of Cambridge's Writ,' which raised the Jacobite hopes high, for it was interpreted in England, in Hanover and in France as indicating that the Queen was in a plot with her Ministers to secure the Succession for the House of Stuart.

Such, however, was not the case. There is no indication that Anne ever wished to be succeeded by a Roman Catholic King. She could not stultify her whole past life by such a betrayal of the Church of England. Since 1711 her brother had been appealing to her family feelings in a series of letters of 'tenderness,' but without obtaining reply.<sup>339</sup> On the other hand she had no liking for the House of Hanover; she had all Queen Elizabeth's jealousy of a successor, half feminine, half politic; and she was still as determined as she had always been that no Prince should be allowed to set up court among her subjects during her own lifetime.\*

This feeling on her part extended itself even to the young Electoral Prince, afterwards George II. He had been made Duke of Cambridge, and as such had a right to be summoned to take his seat in Parliament as a Peer of the Realm. The Hanoverian leaders in England, Whig and Tory alike, were persuaded that he ought to come over at once in that capacity, so as to be present as representative of his grandmother Sophia and his father the Elector in case the Queen should suddenly die. There was much to be said for the plan, and if the Queen had encouraged it, it might have solved many difficulties. But her personal feeling rendered this hopeful scheme a very bad mistake.

The Hanoverian agent in England at the moment was Schütz, a man of diplomatic family, but of little experience in great affairs. He made the not unnatural error of associating only with the Hanoverian partisans and neglecting to court Oxford and the Queen, whom, like other Hanoverian agents, he wrongly regarded as definitively in the interest of James. His impatience for action was encouraged by the

\* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 90-92.

sprightly eagerness of the octogenarian Dowager Electress : Sophy's one remaining desire was that ' Queen of England ' might be inscribed on her tombstone, even if she was too old to cross the sea. The race between herself and Anne made them at this moment bitter rivals in the secret of their hearts. Without consulting her son the Elector, she wrote to Schütz in terms which might be construed as an order to demand the writ of summons for her grandson the Duke of Cambridge.\*

A wiser agent would have consulted Oxford or the Queen in private before making the demand, or would have referred the matter back to Hanover for further instructions, possibly for confirmation by the Elector. Schütz, instead, consulted the Hanoverian party : the Whigs Devonshire, Somerset, Orford, Somers, Cowper, Halifax, Wharton and Townshend ; the Tories Anglesey, Nottingham and Hanmer ; and the Duke of Argyle. They one and all besought him to demand the writ and to fetch the young Prince over at once, on the ground that whichever side had its representative on the spot at the moment of the Queen's death would secure the Succession. They were wrong, as the event proved, for the Act of Settlement and the Regency Act automatically decided the issue in the absence of the candidates.

On April 12, 1714, Schütz went to the Chancellor Harcourt and demanded the writ for the Duke of Cambridge. Harcourt, taken by surprise, changed colour, looked down and said he would consult the Queen. After a painful silence, he ended the conversation by an assurance that he was not refusing the request, and that an answer would be given when the Queen's pleasure had been taken.

A Cabinet Council was held that night in Anne's presence, and lasted till after midnight. The Queen was furious, and Bolingbroke played for her favour by supporting her view that the writ should be refused. But the law made it necessary that it should be issued, and Oxford and the other Ministers saw visions of impeachment in the

\* ' Je vous prie de dire à Mons. le Chancelier My Lord Harcourt qu'on est fort étonné ici qu'on n'a pas envoyé un writ à mon petit-fils le Prince Electoral. . . . Je crois qu'il ne trouvera pas mauvais que vous le lui demandiez et la raison.' Schütz might have replied that Harcourt would find it very bad indeed. *Michael*, p. 328.

next reign, if they could be accused of having broken the law in the Pretender's interest. Oxford's stand in this matter was a chief cause of his loss of favour with the mistress he had served so long and so well.

The writ was handed to Schütz, but he was forbidden to come to Court, and Sophia and her son were informed that the Queen was very angry and that it would be highly impolitic to send over the Electoral Prince. Oxford had a trusty agent in Hanover, his relation Thomas Harley whom he had sent there to keep himself in favour with the House that was, after all, the more likely of the two to obtain the Crown. In an excellent letter to Thomas, written the day after the Cabinet Council, Oxford made the whole position clear. The Elector George understood. His mother Sophia had not consulted him in demanding the writ, nor had he any particular desire to be represented in England by his son, of whom already he was to some degree jealous. The Elector repudiated the whole affair, insisted on the recall of Schütz and sent over once more the experienced and politic Bothmar. So far as was possible, George retrieved the situation. But the Hanoverian interest had suffered a serious set-back, and the chance of Bolingbroke ousting Oxford had been greatly increased.

Hard on these events, the Dowager Electress died, at the age of eighty-four. She would have made a good and popular Queen Sophy, if Anne had died a few years earlier. But she had lost the race. George took his own affairs in hand with patience and wisdom. He made no false step but bided his time, which was not to be long. He revised the list of Regents who, under the Regency Act, were to carry on the government after Anne's death until his own arrival in England.\* Thirteen out of his eighteen nominees were Whigs, to counterbalance the Tory Ministers who would serve as Regents *ex officio*.<sup>340</sup>

Unable for the moment to find any policy to pursue in the vital matter of the Succession to the Crown, Bolingbroke attempted the great diversion of the Schism Act. A Bill,

\* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 92-93.



after the heart of Atterbury and Sacheverell, to persecute Dissenters, would serve a double purpose : it would embarrass and perhaps destroy the moderate Oxford, the would-be Tory patron of Dissent ; and it would reunite the party under his rival's leadership. The attack on Nonconformist liberties would rally most at any rate of the ' Whimsical ' Tories who had asserted their independence in the matters of the Commercial Treaty and the Protestant Succession.

For these tactical objects, the Schism Act answered its purpose. But behind the immediate gains, in Parliament and within the ranks of the party, which would follow from the introduction of the measure, were envisaged the ends to be obtained by the provisions of the Act itself. Confessedly it was meant to extirpate Dissent or ' Schism ' in times to come, by putting down the academies and schools where the rising generation of pastors and their congregations were brought up. The more fanatical of the Church clergy, not only Sacheverell, but better men like Sharp the late Archbishop of York and Samuel Wesley, had for years past been urging that Dissenters' schools should be suppressed for religious reasons, and the Lower House of Convocation had so petitioned in 1704-1705.<sup>341</sup> But the avowed object of the lay supporters of the Schism Bill in Parliament was political. The Nonconformist vote at elections was the strength of the Whigs, and in the debates on the Bill, Bromley, the member for Oxford University, offered that it should be withdrawn if the Whigs would consent to the disenfranchisement of the Dissenters themselves, in lieu of the destruction of their schools. To abolish the Nonconformist vote would be to kill the Whig party even more rapidly than the Schism Act could achieve that end. This alternative was much discussed, but was naturally rejected by the Whigs.<sup>342</sup>

Schools and academies of the kind that it was proposed to suppress had existed under great difficulties and dangers after the Restoration. After the Revolution, in a more tolerant era, they multiplied and modestly flourished in the light of day. The Dissenters had every right to keep up such establishments at their own expense, for they were excluded by law from the only two Universities of England,

and by law or custom from most of the secondary schools. Moreover, they wished to bring up their children in a Non-conformist atmosphere, and particularly to give their future ministers a proper education. There appears to have been no substance in Sacheverell's charges of Republicanism and fanaticism in these establishments. What we know of them in the reign of Anne shows them as places of moderation, piety and scholarship ; and in the coming Hanoverian era they added an important and valuable element to the national education, particularly in science and in other studies conducted in the English instead of the Latin tongue.<sup>343</sup>

Oxford and Cambridge in the Eighteenth Century were at a low ebb both for numbers and teaching, partly because of their exclusively denominational character as Anglican seminaries, partly because of their high fees. The humbler dissenting Academies remained for many Englishmen, not all of them Nonconformist in religion, the only available path to higher education. That path the Schism Act proposed to block up.

In Anne's reign there were many of these small schools and academies all over the country, some conducted by a single master, generally a dissenting clergyman. There were some on a rather larger scale, like the Taunton Academy, where, just before his death in 1706, the Headmaster Warren told Defoe ' that there were three score and twelve ministers then preaching, whereof six had conformed to the Church, the rest were among the Dissenters, who had been his scholars.' <sup>344</sup>

The Schism Act which was passed in June 1714 aimed at the suppression of these academies and schools ' down to the meanest.' The Act rendered it illegal, under pain of imprisonment, for anyone to teach, either in institutions or in private houses, unless he had obtained a licence from his Bishop, and unless he qualified by taking the Sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England and by making a declaration that he would conform to her liturgy. For fear of the laxity of Whig Bishops, the episcopal licence to teach was not to be granted until the candidate had produced his ' sacrament certificate.' By a consummation of

folly, against which Shrewsbury as Lord Lieutenant protested in vain, the Act was deliberately extended to Ireland, where half the small Protestant garrison were Dissenters of a type not accustomed to bow to the yoke of 'Prelacy.' One mitigation was inserted to pacify the alarm of the industrial and mercantile interest, which in London was formidably opposed to the Act ; it was conceded that reading, writing arithmetic and the mechanical arts might be taught by a Dissenter, but not in a school kept by such an one. Cultural or religious teaching remained prohibited.<sup>345</sup>

The debates on the Schism Bill were hotly conducted in Parliament, for the Whigs felt their existence as a party to be at stake. And the attempt to turn the flank of the Act of Toleration aroused generous indignation and alarm. Oxford and Bolingbroke were reminded that they both had received part of their education from Dissenting ministers. Most of the Hanoverian Tories, indeed, including Hanmer, Anglesey, and several of the Bishops, rallied to the banner of persecution, but the old High Church leader, Nottingham, who had laid the Toleration Act on the table of the Lords in 1689, declared that since the passing of the Occasional Conformity Act the Church was now secure and that

he thought himself in conscience obliged to oppose so barbarous a law as this which tended to deprive parents of the natural right of educating their own children.

On the principle that two blacks make a white, the Tories pointed out that this natural human right was in the same degree denied by law to Roman Catholic parents, and that Englishmen training for the Roman priesthood were educated in foreign seminaries ; this argument caused General Stanhope in the Commons to declare that the laws against Papist education in England ought to be mitigated—the first sign of the later liberal view of the Whig party on Catholic disabilities.

Shrewsbury, who had come back from his post in Ireland to use his influence with Queen Anne and to watch over the interest of the Protestant Succession, opposed the Schism Bill, and so did Bishop Wake of Lincoln, besides all the

Whig Bishops. Most significant of all, Oxford's brother, Edward Harley, was one of the very few Tories in the Lower House who voted in opposition.<sup>316</sup>

Oxford was a man of moderation who saw the nation's interest as a whole. He had for years been endeavouring, through Defoe, to persuade the Dissenters that they would be secure as his clients and might safely abandon their connection with the Whig Lords. This policy was ruined by the Schism Bill, which he hated from every personal and public point of view. Yet he dared not openly oppose a measure that the Queen and the Tory party so ardently advocated. To have done so would have been to court instant dismissal. He knew that, as Defoe said, 'The Schism Bill was a mine dug to blow up the White Staff'—as the Treasurer was called from the symbol of his office. Lest the mine should explode he preserved a sulky silence, and sat, during the debate in the Lords, 'dumb and swelling with a discontent that visibly spoke his affections to the Bill.'<sup>347</sup>

Meanwhile, Bolingbroke, happy in the sight of his rival's sour humour, was at the top of his form, eloquently announcing to their Lordships that the suppression of Dissenting Seminaries would make a united Nation, by 'stifling for the future the divisions amongst us.' Deism and the free thought of a libertine were not, we must suppose, held by him to be incompatible with the doctrine of the Established Church. While he was edifying the House of Lords with these pious orthodoxies of debate, his followers entertained one another with stories of his debaucheries, how

he himself bragged that in one day he was the happiest man alive, got drunk, harangued the Queen, and at night was put to bed to a beautiful young lady, and was tuck'd up by two of the prettiest young Peers in England, Lord Jersey and Bathurst,

both great supporters of the Bill. His friend Swift, while condemning his 'criminal pursuit of pleasure,' marvelled how he mixed it with an amazing industry, 'plodding whole days and nights like the lowest clerk in an office,' in contrast to the growing negligence of Oxford, the man of morals and system.<sup>348</sup>

The Schism Bill was carried by a majority of 111 in the Commons and of 5 in the Lords. It was to come into force on August the First. On that day, by a coincidence which Puritan tradition long regarded as providential,<sup>349</sup> Queen Anne died and the whole edifice of persecution fell crashing to the ground. Even so, the Act was not repealed until the winter of 1718-19. But during the interim it was very laxly enforced under a King who found in the Protestant Dissenters the most actively loyal section of his subjects. Two or three academies were closed as a result of the Schism Act; and, Atterbury, in his diocese of Rochester, insisted that teachers in grammar schools should come to him for licences. But the wholesale suppression of the Dissenting schools and academies, which would certainly have taken place under a High Tory, and still more under a Jacobite, administration, vanished through the gate of bad dreams.<sup>350</sup>

The passage of the Schism Act into law immensely exacerbated party feeling and redoubled the hopes and fears of all men as to what would follow upon Anne's death. Some of the Puritans avowed that they would fight as their fathers had fought rather than yield up their liberties and their children to Prelatists. Bolingbroke eagerly hoped to provoke them to rise in arms before the Queen's death, and laid plans with the French agents that in case of a Whig rebellion, French troops should be sent over to suppress it, and that the Pretender should follow in their train. Louis offered to send troops at once, but, except in the case of an actual rebellion against the Queen, Bolingbroke did not dare to consent. He hoped, indeed, that the rashness of his enemies would put him in position to accept the aid of the Grand Monarch.\* The Whigs refused to oblige. They were neither such knaves nor such fools as to rebel, when a few months would put the law on their side. In vain is the snare set in the sight of the bird.

Meanwhile, the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke became every day more bitter, and the Cabinet and party were

\* See the very important letters of May-June 1714, printed in the footnote of *Salomon*, pp. 305-306.

dividing on the issue. Swift, finding all efforts to reconcile his friends were vain, retired, not indeed to Ireland but to a Berkshire village, to await the catastrophe. Of the two men he loved Oxford the best, but at the present juncture he blamed him the most. For, as Swift and all others bear witness, the Treasurer was no longer fit for his office, and could not apply himself to the daily routine. Moreover, he had ceased to exercise his old arts of managing men, which had raised him to the head of the State. 'He began,' wrote Swift, 'to be soured and to suspect his friends; and perhaps thought it not worth his pains to manage any longer.' He would not even open his mind to the colleagues who were most devoted to him, like Dartmouth, still less ally himself with the Hanover Tories and Shrewsbury to secure the Protestant Succession. He had no plan but to wait in sullen apathy for the Queen's death.

So Oxford held fast the Treasurer's staff 'with a dead gripe,' as Arbuthnot wrote on July 10. Even Swift advised him to resign at the end of the Session and leave the field clear for Bolingbroke. If the Dean had known that the Secretary was waiting for his chance to bring over the French troops and the Pretender, he might have thought Oxford the lesser evil of the two.<sup>351</sup>

Swift still declared with perfect sincerity his opinion that 'the two points of the highest importance' should be first to crush the Whigs and Dissenters so that they could never rise again, and secondly to bring in the House of Hanover.<sup>352</sup> He did not perceive that the two policies were mutually destructive. How could George be brought in by his worst enemies to reign in an island where his best friends had been crushed, never to rise again? Swift's vindictive temper against Whigs and Dissenters, and his blindness to the fact of Jacobitism in the High Tory ranks made him useless as an adviser at the Crisis. He did well to go down into dignified philosophic retirement in Berkshire.

Oxford's dull resistance was inspired rather by personal anger against his intriguing rival than by any clear design to save the Hanoverian Succession. For he was still in close touch with the Pretender through the French agents. Gaultier, who was going back to the Continent with a budget

of Jacobite plots, confessed to Torcy his growing embarrassment as the recipient of the confidences of the two rival statesmen :

Bolingbroke [he wrote, on June 14], in whom I have an entire confidence, wishes me to tell him the sentiments of the Treasurer about the Chevalier, and the Treasurer absolutely forbids me to let anyone know of what he is going to say to me when I depart. If I keep his secret I shall disoblige Bolingbroke who is entirely devoted to James, and if I tell him and Lord Oxford gets to know it, he will no longer trust me.\*

Jacobite hopes rose high after the Schism Act. The refusal of the House of Commons to vote pay to the Hanoverian troops who had refused to follow Ormonde's secession from the field, was regarded as a further rebuff to the House of Hanover and a proof of Jacobite inclinations. In fact it only showed that the Tory party, while not prepared to oppose the advent of the Hanoverian Successor, could not swallow its pride enough to court him beforehand. According to Defoe, Oxford had favoured the payment of the Hanoverian troops, but Bolingbroke had insisted that the motion must be opposed. The town was alive with rumours of French troops ready at Havre to embark for England. The Pretender's agents were actually enlisting men in London and Westminster. The Jacobite press was active, but Charles Lesly did the cause little good by frankly announcing, in a pamphlet published in the summer, that James would never change his religion.

Parliament took alarm, and Ministers thought it necessary to make a demonstration in favour of Hanover. On June 23 the Queen issued a proclamation offering £5000

\* See Appendix E, p. 338, below. It has been suggested that Oxford was wholly insincere in his protestations of loyalty to James, and that he meant only to keep an eye on Bolingbroke's intrigues with the Pretender's agents, lest his rival should monopolize the confidence of the Jacobite Court and take him unawares with some *coup* from that quarter. Somerville's *Q. Anne*, pp. 591-592. It is hard to fathom duplicity so reticent. The shrewd Leibnitz wrote on June 7, 1714 : ' I am ready enough to believe that my lord Oxford will not lend his hand easily or heartily to bring in the Pretender ; for I do not think he would mend his position that way but rather make it worse. *But I fear that for the sake of maintaining himself he may be obliged to pretend to give in to it, and so let matters go so far that it will be difficult to remedy them.*' Kemble, p. 505.

for the person who should arrest her brother on his landing in the Kingdom. The Whigs grumbled that the reward was a small one for so important a service, but, as a formal homage done by the Ministry to the Act of Settlement, the Proclamation had its effect in checking the landslide towards Jacobitism. The adherents of the House of Stuart, who had come to regard the Queen and her servants as their own, were staggered, and some of them began to fear that Bolingbroke was either timorous or false. But it was generally understood that the Proclamation was the act of Shrewsbury and Oxford, under pressure from Hanmer and the Hanoverian Tories.<sup>353</sup>

The session of Parliament was now drawing to a close. On the floor of the House and in the counsels of the Whig party, the wisdom of Walpole and the honest vigour of Stanhope had begun to raise them to the front place. The influence of the old Lords of the Junto, though still great, was no longer supreme. They had governed the party during two stormy reigns, but it was younger men who were to reap the harvest under King George. Halifax, Wharton and Somers all died less than two years after Queen Anne. It was well that their leadership could be satisfactorily replaced, since the country was destined to a long period of Whig rule.

The final scene in the House of Commons on the eve of its prorogation, was scarcely edifying and was ominous of  
 July 8 the want of internal harmony and moral weight in  
 1714 the high places of Government. Nottingham and  
 the Whig Lords, acting on information supplied by the indignant shareholders of the South Sea Company, accused Bolingbroke's agent, Arthur Moore, of corruption, the implication being that with his help Bolingbroke and Lady Masham had lined their pockets at the public expense. As the South Sea Company was under Tory management, the accusation was the more heeded. Moore was said to have attempted to trade privately to South America contrary to the Company's regulations, by bribing the Captain of the Company's ship, and to have been supported in the attempt by sinister Ministerial influences at work through



the Admiralty. He was also accused of having been bribed to sacrifice the interests of British merchants in negotiating the Spanish Commercial Treaty at Madrid. Bolingbroke opposed an enquiry by the Lords into these charges, which it was said would have involved both himself and Lady Masham, but Oxford advised the House to proceed, and hinted at grave matter behind.\* To stop an investigation that might prove damaging to her Secretary and her favourite, the Queen came down on July 9 and prorogued her last Parliament, that never met again till she was dead. The condition of the Tory Government and party was not enviable, divided Hanover against Stuart and cross-divided Bolingbroke against Oxford, with Anne's life a matter of months, if not of weeks. Swift's simile was apt :

A ship's crew quarrelling in a storm, or while their enemies are within gunshot, is but a faint idea of this infatuation.<sup>354</sup>

It was characteristic of Bolingbroke's restless and in some ways admirable energy, that during June and July 1714, while every day engaged more ardently in the struggle to wrest the Treasurer's staff from the obstinate grasp of his rival, he should have initiated a new line of foreign policy for England, and pushed a new Treaty almost to its conclusion at the moment of the Queen's death.

In June he instructed Prior to negotiate a Defensive Alliance between England, France, Spain and Savoy-Sicily, to defend Victor Amadeus' new Sicilian possessions against possible attack by the House of Hapsburg. The Emperor Charles VI considered that Sicily should have gone with Naples, which had passed into his possession. But the British fleet held the island at its disposal, and England had allotted it to Victor Amadeus of Savoy. France had wanted

\* As the affair was not probed to the bottom it is impossible to say whether Bolingbroke was guilty of corruption in this case. The South Sea General Court declared themselves satisfied of the guilt of Moore 'which censure made a great noise and was highly resented by Lord Bolingbroke who countenanced Arthur Moore.' Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain*, pp. 12-13. But the alleged connection of Bolingbroke with Moore in the matter was never examined. He had, at least, no higher standards than Marlborough, Somers or Walpole : in January 1714 he wrote to the Treasurer asking in black and white for half a year's secret service money to pay off a mortgage on his estate. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 379.

it for the Elector of Bavaria but had been forced to submit, and France was now to be brought in to protect the Savoyard rights against Austria. Bolingbroke heaped obligations on the House of Savoy, partly because he thought it conceivable that he might some day place a converted Prince of that line on the throne of Britain.\*

The new Alliance had the further attraction to Bolingbroke that it would array England, France and Spain against the Whig ally, Austria, and thus ratify and complete the whole trend of Tory policy for the last four years. At the same time he was alarmed by rumours that Philip V of Spain did not intend to abide by his renunciation of the French crown if Louis XIV's next heir died without children. Only three days before Anne's death, Bolingbroke sent Torcy a warning, couched in vigorous terms, that any attempt to unite the crowns of France and Spain, contrary to the public law of Europe as established at Utrecht, would infallibly revive the old system of alliances between England, Germany and Holland.

Bolingbroke, however, saw a chance of security in the personal interest that the Duke of Orleans had in maintaining his own reversionary right to the throne of France. Orleans would be Regent when Louis XIV died, and King if Louis XV died without children—unless Philip's claims were revived contrary to the Treaties of Utrecht. It was the Tory Secretary who, in the last days of his power, initiated the policy of an understanding with Orleans.†

The negotiations for the Treaty with France, Spain and Sicily were dropped upon Anne's death. But the policy of friendship with France and with Orleans was, after an interval, resumed by the Whigs in the reigns of George I and Louis XV. There was, however, one important change:

\* See pp. 225, 267 above.

† See pp. 213–215 above. On July 29, 1714, Bolingbroke wrote to Prior: 'Some way should be found of applying to the Duke of Orleans, who is in interest so much concerned, and who has sense and spirit enough to know and pursue that interest. The matter is delicate, and must be handled accordingly, but it would be of great use that this Prince should know that he may depend on her Majesty's Friendship, and on the utmost assistance which this nation can give him to support him in that Rank and in those Rights which by the Treaties of Peace he has the justest Title to.'

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Stanhope, in 1716, set a price on England's friendship which Bolingbroke had not demanded from France. Orleans was compelled not only to complete the long-delayed destruction of the harbour and fortifications of Dunkirk, but to abandon the cause of the Pretender, not only in form but in fact.<sup>355</sup>

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE CRISIS AND THE DEATH OF ANNE

The Tory split. The dismissal of Oxford, July 27, 1714. Bolingbroke's two days of power. His position and probable intentions. The dynastic question as viewed by Church, Army and People. Jacobite purge of the Army. Bolingbroke's dinner to the Whigs and Stanhope's conditions. Whig preparations. The Queen in extremity, July 30. Somerset and Argyle in the Privy Council. Shrewsbury made Treasurer. Privy Council and Cabinet. Measures to secure the Hanoverian Succession. Death of Anne, August 1, 1714. The dead Queen.

THE last months of Anne's reign were for her the most unhappy. Widowed ; without a friend left to whom she cared to unbosom herself, or a statesman whom she any longer felt she could trust ; her ears filled, not with the murmur of wise counsels for the safety of the land, but with the shrill invective of servants who thought more of their quarrels than of their duty or of her peace ; in pain of body and confusion of mind, she awaited her deliverance by the friend of all.

Neither Lady Masham's 'malice of a bedchamber woman' now turned against Oxford,\* nor the more dignified exhortations of the Duchess of Somerset in the Hanoverian interest, could be to Anne what Sarah's company and Godolphin's sage advice had been in happier years. She had long trusted Harley, but now she noted with indignation Oxford's inattention to business, his torpor of mind and body, his recourse to drink of which she complained that he carried the symptoms into her presence. Even his friends noted the change in him with alarm.

\* This expression of Marlborough's about Abigail in earlier years was now again justified by her language against her second benefactor, Oxford, to whom she owed only less than what she had owed to Sarah. See her letter to Swift of July 29, 1714, *Swift's Letters*, II, pp. 200-201, and *ditto*, pp. 182, 190.

'I have long thought his parts decayed,' Erasmus Lewis wrote to Swift, and the Dean, though he preferred Oxford personally to Bolingbroke, told him he should retire.<sup>356</sup> But retire he would not. The one thing that could still rouse 'the Dragon,' as his intimate friends and foes now agreed to call him, was the defence of the Treasury against Bolingbroke and Abigail, whom he had come to regard as thieves, leagued to enrich themselves at the public expense. 'The Dragon dies hard. He is now kicking and cuffing about him like the Devil,' wrote Dr. Arbuthnot on June 26. For a month after that, the Treasurer still held the fort—a month fatal to his enemies because it proved to be the last of the Queen's life. 'If he would have taken half so much pains to have done other things,' wrote Arbuthnot, 'as he has of late to exert himself against the Esquire [Bolingbroke] he might have been a Dragon, instead of a Dagon.'<sup>357</sup>

So June and July were spent not in paving the way for King George or for King James, but in splitting the Tory party into two embittered factions under its two famous chiefs. Such quarrels of colleagues have often repeated themselves in our history, and have often proved the most irremediable of all. The reason why in the reign of George I the Tory party failed to rally and reunite, was that in the last weeks of Anne's life the division on the dynastic question had come to correspond with the bitter grievance of Oxford and his supporters against the man who supplanted him, and the hatred of Bolingbroke and his friends for the man who kept them waiting till it was too late.<sup>358</sup> Oxford and his personal following joined Shrewsbury and Hanmer in active support of the Hanoverian, who would at least save them all from Bolingbroke: while Bolingbroke, Ormonde, Wyndham and Atterbury became Jacobites, to be revenged on Oxford and the Whigs. None but the Tories themselves could have brought about the long Whig hegemony that followed the death of the Queen.

From May to July 1714 the exiled Court of the Stuarts and the English enemies of Oxford co-operated to secure his dismissal. The Jacobite interest was arrayed against the Treasurer, by a bargain struck between

Bolingbroke and Lockhart, member for Edinburghshire.\* Berwick, from abroad, instructed the Duke of Ormonde to persuade Anne to dismiss her unprofitable servant. Ormonde, who commanded the army, and the Duke of Buckinghamshire, who presided over the Privy Council, were both now deep in the Jacobite plot.<sup>359</sup> Those who fought hardest against their fellow-Tories to secure the removal of Oxford, regarded it as the necessary step towards a Restoration. But they knew that it would be the first step only and that if the Queen died too soon they would have, for awhile at least, to make the best of King George.

On July 27 Anne at last gave way and dismissed her Treasurer. She was not thereby aiming at her brother's Restoration, though men of all parties thought so. But she had never forgiven Oxford for urging the necessity of the formal issue of a writ to the Duke of Cambridge.† She resented the sullen negligence of her servant's manner, and she was fairly worried into dismissing him by the ceaseless importunities of Lady Masham, Bolingbroke and their partisans. 'They say the Queen was very loath to part with the Treasurer,' wrote a Tory Peer, 'but was teased into it. Most of those called Tories were very warm against him, not thinking him enough of their side.'‡

The final scene was one of rude passion. Regardless of the presence of their mistress, who sat drooping with bodily pain and weakness in the chair, the rivals denounced each other with unseemly violence across the Council table, and the outgoing Treasurer accused the triumphant Secretary of financial corruption. The words sank deep into the Queen's ear. She knew that Godolphin and Oxford had never robbed the Treasury to enrich themselves. But could she trust this brilliant profligate, always in financial straits, with the

\* Bolingbroke promised Lockhart that if the Jacobite vote were given to enable Ministers to wind-up the business of the session, Oxford should be dismissed during the recess and preparations made for a Restoration. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476-478. Edinburgh City returned the Whig, Sir Patrick Johnstoun. In this Parliament the Scottish members were not unequally divided between Whigs and Jacobites.

† See pp. 278-279 above. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 662.

‡ *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 412-413; Edward Harley also wrote: 'Her Majesty was at last prevailed upon by a perpetual teasing to come to a resolution to part with him.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 480.

keeping of the public purse? Already she had twice interfered to protect him against enquiry, once in the matter of the Quebec contracts, and that very month over the South Sea. This uncertainty, and the certain knowledge of his debaucheries, which like Wharton he flaunted in the world's face, prevented the Queen from handing on the White Staff to Bolingbroke. 'His character is too bad to carry the great ensigns,' wrote Erasmus Lewis to Swift; 'for the man of Mercury's bottom is too narrow, his faults are of the first magnitude.'

Anne had withdrawn her confidence from Oxford, but she had not given it to his foe. There remained a shadowy third, who might yet prove the *tertius gaudens*. Shrewsbury was a Cabinet Minister, but being a Whig he kept out of the fierce domestic quarrel which rent the Tories, though he quietly inclined towards Oxford.<sup>360</sup> Three days were yet to pass before he emerged from the shadow, where he was an adept at lingering till the moment was ripe.

Oxford, who had fought with fury till driven from his post, thereupon accepted defeat with philosophic resignation, which he must needs express in poetry as bad as his prose. This strange man, who had decided the fate of nations, announced his fall to Swift on the day it took place, in a school-boy jingle which it pleased him to call an 'imitation of Dryden.'

To serve with love,  
And shed your blood  
Approved is above.  
But here below  
Th' examples show  
'Tis fatal to be good.\*

His letters and actions in the days and weeks that followed indicate that leisure soon restored his health of body and balance of mind. Once out of office, he knew how to be patient and to wait, an art which his rival, to his own ruin, failed to learn.

\* *Swift's Letters*, II, pp. 198-199; he was so much pleased with the rhyme or the sentiment that he sent it also to his sister two days later. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 477.

The Queen, who had retired sick in body and in spirit, from the angry scene in the Council Chamber, gave Oxford that afternoon a long and kindly interview of farewell, treating him better than she had treated Godolphin on a like occasion.\* Two days later, on the morning of July 29, she 'complained of a pain in her head,' was pronounced by the doctors to be in grave danger, and was 'relieved by cupping.' The gout, which had long been torturing her legs, had 'translated itself upon the brain.'† The end was drawing near.

It thus came about that Bolingbroke enjoyed only two full days of power as Secretary of State with no Lord Treasurer over his head. He had not time to form, still less to carry out, a plan of action, and posterity has since been left guessing what he would have done if the Queen had lived. Something at least can be said with confidence. In the first place he prepared to form a Cabinet of would-be Jacobites like himself, for the very good reason that no one else would join. Neither the Whigs nor the Hanoverian Tories nor the friends of Oxford would co-operate with him. The colleagues ready to his hand were Wyndham, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was to be put at the head of the Treasury Commission; Harcourt, Lord Chancellor; and Ormonde in command of the army and the fortresses of the Realm. Bishop Atterbury would try to manage the Church on their behalf and it was announced that he would take the place of the Hanoverian Dartmouth as Lord Privy Seal.<sup>361</sup>

That these men would have restored the Pretender if they could, is made more than likely by their subsequent conduct in the reign of George I. But it does not follow that, if left at the head of affairs under Anne, they would have dared to make the attempt. There are many indications that they were waiting on events to guide their course. They could not have secured a majority in the House of

\* See p. 66 above. This friendly interview with Oxford, not without political significance, has been too little noticed by historians. The fact is proved by *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 480-481, and *L'Hermitage, Add. MSS.* 17677 HHH, f. 323.

† *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), p. 222, Dr. Shadwell's opinion. This is borne out by the report made to the Privy Council on July 30 by Shadwell, Sloane, Arbuthnot and four other doctors attending the Queen. *P.R.O. (P.C.)* 2, 84, f. 375.



Commons to repeal the Act of Settlement for the benefit of a Roman Catholic,\* even if they could have persuaded the Queen to make a Jacobite majority in the Lords, by creating several score of Peers, which she certainly would not have done. However long Anne had lived, it is probable that at her death the law would still have stood against James ; and in the England of that day the law was nine points of possession. Moreover there would have been ranged in support of the law all the Whigs, the Dissenters and the moneyed interest, half the Tories, all save two or three of the Bishops, and last but not least Marlborough's veterans, even if Bolingbroke had had time to turn them all out of the army and replace them by Jacobites. In such circumstances Bolingbroke might, as rebel, have raised a civil war with the help of French troops. But it is very likely that he would have shrunk from an attempt so bold ; and if he had tried it, Ormonde, even with Villars to aid, would probably have been beaten by Marlborough and his men with the law of England and the wealth of London behind.

There are indeed indications that the would-be Jacobite Ministers were awed by the difficulties in the way of Restoration. Wyndham blurted out to his fellow-Jacobite, Lord Lansdowne, that the Pretender 'was an impracticable man and would never be brought in.'<sup>362</sup> And stories were afterwards afloat among the Jacobites, purporting that Bolingbroke betrayed them at the crisis from fear and a cold heart.<sup>363</sup> He cannot be blamed for his prudence, when the more experienced and cool-headed of the agents who were watching affairs in the Pretender's interest confessed that the country had recently turned against his claims since it had become known that he held out no hopes of changing his religion. Not only French Gaultier and Ilberville but Plunket and other British Jacobites declared in these critical days that James had lost his chance by going out of his way

\* It is true that there was an old Jacobite tradition (recorded in some detail in *Add. MSS.* 9129, ff. 17-19) to the effect that '300' members of the House of Commons had agreed to support a motion to repeal the Act of Settlement, and that some of them held a meeting to arrange the matter with Bolingbroke, which he promised to attend but did not. But the evidence, as we have it, is late and not first-hand. I am certain there were not '300' members who would have voted for a Roman Catholic king.

to declare he could never become a Protestant. He might, they grumbled, at least have been silent on the subject.\*

Loyal churchmen could not face the prospect of a King who had so recently and so emphatically declared that he would never separate from Rome. Some parsons, particularly in the West and North, preached against the 'Lutheran heresy'<sup>364</sup> and in Staffordshire and the Welsh border told their parishioners ridiculous stories against the German Prince who was to be forced upon England.<sup>365</sup> But most of the clergy and their congregations, little as they relished the idea of a Hanoverian Succession, liked the alternative still less. The 'Lutheran heresy' would not prevent the King from conforming to the Anglican ritual, as he was bound to do under the Act of Settlement, and would not divide him from his subjects by a hedge of confessors and priests.

During his two days of power, Bolingbroke seems to have been uncertain what game to play. On the one hand he prepared to form a Cabinet of Jacobites, and to speed the work of weeding out Whigs and Hanoverian Tories from the army and the fleet. On the other hand he tried to negotiate with the Whigs.

The purge of the army had been going on for four years past, with increasing rapidity during the last few months. Marlborough's favourites had long ago disappeared from the service, and early in 1714 Argyle and Admiral Byng had been dismissed, together with dozens of colonels and other officers of the Guard and Line suspected of Hanoverian inclinations. In April, two Colonels of the First Regiment of Foot Guards had been forced to sell out, and had been replaced by two Roman Catholics, contrary to the law. Given another few months, the armed forces of the Crown, by sea and land, might be placed wholly under Jacobite control. There lay the best hope for a Restoration.<sup>366</sup>

Yet, as things stood in July 1714, military feeling and professional skill were on the side of Hanover and 'the old Corporal.' The dismissed officers were better soldiers than the men who were supplanting them, and might prove

\* See Appendix E, pp. 339-340 below.

at a pinch to have more influence with the rank and file, whom they had so often led to victory over the French. For four years past the Tories had been vilifying Marlborough's army and belittling its achievements. The Ministers had done their best to break up its personnel, and to humiliate it with 'restraining orders' in face of the armies of Europe. Could they now rely on the red-coats they had traduced and dishonoured to help them break the laws of England, and carry out, with French help, a rebellion in favour of a Popish King? <sup>367</sup>

No wonder that Bolingbroke had his doubts. He was a man of tireless energy, but by no means of iron nerve. Slow Oxford was the less easily frightened of the two. And so on July 28 the Secretary astonished the town by giving a dinner to the Whig chiefs! With 'the Dragon' and the moderate Tories he could never again hope to make terms; but what about the Whigs? After all, he had no sure majority of his own either in Lords or Commons. An adverse vote next autumn was certain in the Lords and not improbable in the Commons, if Parliament re-assembled before the basis of the Ministry had been broadened. <sup>368</sup>

Bolingbroke therefore determined to throw out a feeler towards the Whigs. A coalition with them might keep him safe from the revenge of Oxford, till his plans had had time to mature. No doubt he hoped before long to dispense with the Whigs and enforce the Schism Act to their ultimate ruin, but it would be useful for a time to keep them quiet by courtesies and fair words. Moreover, if Anne, by cruel mischance, were to die upon his hands at once, he had better have friends at the new Court. Such, we may guess, were his reasons for this strange negotiation.

Stanhope, Craggs and William Pulteney, the wealthy and witty member for a Yorkshire borough, came to his dinner; Walpole, who was also invited, was out of town. The 'man of Mercury' waxed eloquent on his devotion to the House of Hanover. His guests sat, grim, polite, incredulous. When the last course had been eaten and wine had begun to warm their spirits, Stanhope

replied for his colleagues. Let Bolingbroke, he said, put the army and navy into hands loyal to Hanover: the Whigs did not ask for office, but they asked for that. Let Russell, Lord Orford, command the fleet that was to bring over George and keep out James and the French troops. Let Marlborough command the army and the fortresses of the realm. On those terms, said Stanhope, the Whigs would readily see Bolingbroke and his friends monopolize the gains of office till the Queen's death, and afterwards they would share with him the favour of King George. Let him join the Whigs to bring in Hanover. Or let him join France and try to bring in James. There was no third part. Let him choose.

Bolingbroke, who above all things wished to put off the hour of choice, was struck dumb by these plain, soldierly words. His embarrassment was patent to his guests. He could answer them nothing and the dinner-party broke up.<sup>369</sup>

It is to be observed that, although some Jacobite and some Hanoverian agents at this time thought that Marlborough might even yet sell himself to effect a Stuart Restoration,<sup>370</sup> the Whigs at this critical conference made his acceptance as Captain-General the acid test of Bolingbroke's devotion to the Hanoverian cause.

So there was to be no Whig alliance. It is usually supposed that, in a few hours that still remained to him as first Minister of the Crown, the Secretary contemplated entrenching himself in a complete control of the armed forces and the magistracy, so as to be able to make terms with King George, if King James proved impossible. Anne and Oxford had, in spite of the continued remonstrances of hot partisans, left a dozen shires in the hands of Lords Lieutenant of Whiggish views, who should be removed at once if there was to be no Whig alliance.\* It is not unlikely that Bolingbroke hoped to have time to replace these and all other moderates in the public service by men of his own choice, and then as man in possession bargain with Stuart

\* See the list of Lords Lieutenant to whom the Privy Council addressed its orders on July 30, *P.R.O. (P.C.)* 2, 84, f. 380. The Whig Lords Lieutenant still left were moderate Whigs—Kent, Scarborough, Carlisle, Cholmondeley, Shrewsbury, Henry Boyle. Several counties were left in charge of Pembroke, neutral between Whig and Tory but certainly staunch for Hanover.

or Hanoverian. But we know nothing of what he intended, and quite possibly he was no wiser himself.

Unlike the embarrassed Secretary, the Whigs had a straightforward path before them, and they took it. United on a policy that they were not ashamed to announce to the world, without equivocation or compromise they stood up for the Protestant Succession as fixed by law, and displayed in that cause an ability and zeal which earned them the confidence of George and of plain-dealing Englishmen. As Atterbury wrote with envious admiration :

They have, as they boast themselves, the game in their hands ; and, to do them justice, they act like men in earnest, who are resolved to play it to purpose.<sup>371</sup>

The Lords of the Junto, indeed, were tired veterans, most of them on the very verge of the grave. But the rising Whig leaders in the House of Commons, the men with whom Bolingbroke attempted to negotiate over the dinner-table, the men now in the prime of life who were to govern England in the coming era as a result of this week's work—Stanhope, Pulteney, Walpole—were fully equal to the Crisis, and had their plans for the safety of England and the fortune of their party well in hand.

None of these younger Whigs had, like Marlborough, Shrewsbury, and Somers, ever corresponded with the Jacobites, or secretly begged the exiled King for pardons which they had no intention of earning. They put their lives and fortunes freely at stake for the Protestant Succession, to win or lose it all. They were not hampered by any hope of forgiveness by James III if he attained the Crown, or by any prospect of recovering Queen Anne's favour by slighting the Electoral House.

They believed the Crisis to be even more dangerous than it was in truth, because they supposed that Queen Anne had joined in her Ministers' plot to secure the Stuart Succession after her death.\* They feared that she would leave

\* At the prorogation of Parliament early in July, judging from the Queen's speech which contained no reference to Hanover, Stanhope drew this conclusion and told Lockhart as much, in a curious conversation held between two honourable enemies in Westminster Hall. *Lockhart*, I, p. 479. Lockhart, like most Scottish Jacobites, believed the Queen was doing their business for them. See pp. 243-244 above.

a will bequeathing her rights to her brother, and although such a document could not legally override the Act of Settlement, it would have an effect on opinion. The moment she was dead, her Ministers, so the Whigs feared, would proclaim James III.

But even if this should happen, the law would still be on the side of King George. Neither Monarch nor Ministers, but only Parliament, can dispose of the Crown. And the Whigs were determined that the law of the land should not fail for lack of armed support. They hoped for Marlborough's aid, but, if he did not reach England in time, Stanhope was prepared to lead forces loyal to the Crown against rebel Ministers of a dead sovereign. He was in touch with a large number of dismissed veterans in London, who had arms in their houses and were prepared to fight. In the Scottish capital a similar policy was pursued: A Whig Association in Edinburgh and the neighbouring countryside had for months past been storing arms and privately enlisting the services of Marlborough's disbanded soldiers, 'whether Serjeants, Corporals or single sentinells [privates] who may be thought well affected or prudent.'

Stanhope's kinsman, the famous Lord Chesterfield, long afterwards reported that a detailed plan of action had been formed; that the Hanoverian partisans were to assemble in the duelling fields behind Montagu House; that Cadogan would seize the Tower and Stanhope would secure the persons of the leading Jacobites. They would then have no fear of proclaiming King George in the City of London, which was certain to support the Act of Settlement.<sup>372</sup>

But it never became necessary to resort to these stern measures. Anne was not so Jacobite nor her Ministers so bold as the Whigs imagined. The day before Anne died, Ilberville, who was in the inmost secrets of the plot against Hanover, wrote to King Louis describing 'the inaction of the Queen and the cooling of various Jacobites for several months past,' due to the Pretender's over-rigid declaration of his religious faith.<sup>373</sup> Time was in any case required to mature any possible plan in James's interest, and time was not granted. Anne had served England well in her life; and her last service was rendered by the opportunity of her death.

On the morning of July 30, the Queen's illness took a turn that would clearly prove fatal, and those members of the Privy Council who usually attended its meetings under the existing regime were hastily called together at Kensington Palace where she lay ill. Among the more important of the members who received and answered the summons, only three were strong Hanoverians—Shrewsbury, Robinson Bishop of London and Oxford's friend Lord Dartmouth. But the leading Jacobites, Bolingbroke, Wyndham, Ormonde, Buckinghamshire and Lansdowne, who were all present, had no plan of action ready. Of the less influential Councillors some, like Thomas Coke, were for George, and those who inclined to James were not at the moment prepared to show their sentiments without strong reason to suppose that they would prevail.\*

What would have happened in this assembly of frightened and embarrassed men if the Hanoverians had come equally unprepared, it is hard to say. But a lead was given from without. As soon as the news of the Queen's relapse had been known that morning, a great step had been taken—probably on Shrewsbury's advice, though of that there is no proof positive. The Dukes of Argyle and Somerset had gone to the house of Bothmar, the Elector's new but experienced agent, had told him that the Queen was dying, that they were going to the Privy Council to secure his master's interests, that the moment Anne was dead they would let Bothmar know and ensure the proclamation of King George.<sup>374</sup>

From Bothmar's house, the two Dukes drove to Kensington Palace, and, exercising their indisputable rights as Privy Councillors, entered the chamber to take part in the meeting to which they had not been summoned. The Council had not met till noon and there is no record in the minutes of any business having been transacted before the arrival of the two Dukes. Shrewsbury made them welcome. Their coming did not strike him with the surprise or chagrin with which it may have struck Bolingbroke.

It is to be observed that those Lords of the Whig Junto

\* See p. 308 below, for the Privy Council Register record of the most important of the events of that morning, from the *P.R.O. MSS.*

whose names were still on the Privy Council list—Sunderland, Somers and with them Cowper—made no attempt to come till the next day.<sup>375</sup> The decisive action of July 30 was prudently left to the Middle Party of Shrewsbury, Somerset and Argyle, who had put the Tories into office four years before, and were now to bring King George to the throne, in a manner that not even the most prejudiced could describe as a Whig *coup d'état*.

The Middle Party, chiefly consisting of the three Dukes, was weak in voting strength in the factious Houses of Parliament. But it was strong in that it held the balance between Whig and Tory, and that it spoke out boldly at this Crisis the real sentiments of the nation at large. The instrument ready to its hand was the Privy Council. The existing Cabinet had no dynastic policy which it cared to announce. Moreover the Cabinet was a meeting of the confidential servants of the Crown unknown to law, and drawing its authority from the presence of the Queen as its chairman. When therefore she was incapacitated by grave illness, the Cabinet lost much of its customary prestige. On this great occasion it made no attempt to assert itself. In normal times the Privy Council was gradually yielding power to the smaller and more partisan body. But when, during the recess of Parliament and the mortal sickness of the Monarch, sudden action of the highest importance had to be taken in the name of the laws and for the safety of the Realm, the old constitutional power and authority of the Privy Council stood England in good stead.

There is no report, official or unofficial, of the debates in the Privy Council of July 30, but only of its acts. The first of its officially recorded decisions, taken in the first hour of its sitting, was that from which all the others flowed. It was unanimously agreed 'to move the Queen that she would constitute the Duke of Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer.'

He was the man of the moment. Both the Whigs and the Bolingbroke party preferred his Treasurership to the chance of a resuscitation of Oxford.\* The Tories in

\* It was held that, if the Treasurership was not filled, Oxford would be Treasurer again on the demise of the Crown, and as such one of the Regents under the Regency Act. *Michael*, p. 364.



majority on the Council would not recommend a Treasurer from the Whig Opposition, or choose Argyle or Somerset whose tempers they feared. And they were sadly aware that neither George nor the nation would trust Bolingbroke or any of themselves to preside over the great impending change. Shrewsbury, who was agreeable both to Hanover and to England, was yet one of their own Cabinet, and he was an honourable and kindly man, who would be no party to their persecution in the new reign. The best hope that Bolingbroke and the Tories had of retaining a place in the counsels of King George, was to appear before him as Shrewsbury's friends.

Probably for these reasons, Bolingbroke readily fell in with the lead given by Argyle and Somerset. He himself proposed Shrewsbury to the Privy Council as the right man to be Treasurer and went at the head of a deputation to carry the unanimous advice to the dying Queen.<sup>376</sup> With him went Harcourt as Chancellor, Dartmouth as Privy Seal and Powlett as Lord Steward. The Council had first sent for the seven doctors in attendance on Anne, who had assured them that 'Her Majesty was in a condition to be spoke to.' The Duchess of Somerset was about the Queen's bedside and certainly made all things as easy as she could for the Hanoverian game that her husband was playing in the other room. Of the conduct and whereabouts of Abigail, Lady Masham, on this day, nothing is told.\*

It will never be possible to say how much the Queen understood of what she was doing. But the point is not vital, for if she had been in a state to form decisions for herself, her thought would almost certainly have coincided with the recommendation of the Council. We read that :

The Queen about one o'clock gave the Treasurer's staff to the Duke of Shrewsbury, my Lord Chancellor holding her hand to direct it to the Duke.†

\* See pp. 308-309 below, for P.C. Register. See also *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 902, on the Duchess of Somerset that day.

† *Wentworth Papers*, p. 408. Tradition seems divided as to how far she was conscious. Some say she told Shrewsbury to use the staff for the good of her people. But during the Regency discussions of 1788 the Marquis of Buckingham wrote that 'Queen Anne's consent was undoubtedly never given, but only supposed,

Then the Privy Council settled down to work under the leadership of the new Treasurer. Adjourning occasionally for meals and rest, they sat on till midnight, issuing with lightning speed the orders that made Great Britain and Ireland and the British seas armed and ready to receive the lawful successor and to repel the invader or the rebel. Half the men at the Privy Council board were in some sort or degree Jacobites, but for that very reason they must seem the more eager in the business. No murmur of opposition was heard as letters were expressed to the Judges, to the Lords Lieutenant, to the Lord Mayor of London and the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, to all Mayors of Corporations, to Ormonde the Captain-General, to the Governors of garrisoned towns and forts, and last but not least to the commanders of the fleet on which all depended. The Privy Council clerks must have been busy during those twelve hours. An embargo was laid on all shipping in the ports ; the Tower, Edinburgh Castle and other strongholds were revictualled and the garrisons increased ; the troops were fetched home from Dunkirk and Flanders ; the London militia were called out ; horse and dragoons were concentrated round London ; all over England and Scotland the horses and arms of Roman Catholics were ordered to be seized ; and Bothmar was officially apprised of what was toward. All afternoon and all night messengers were starting one after the other from Kensington Palace gate, and galloping along the roads with the fateful letters in their bags. Wherever they arrived, men learnt that the Queen was dying and that Protestant George would assuredly be the next King, as the signatures of Shrewsbury, Bolingbroke and half a dozen Tory Privy Councillors made clear beyond all shadow of doubt.<sup>377</sup>

to the staff of Treasurer which the Duke of Shrewsbury brought out of her bed-chamber, and you will remember, in that case, the assumption and exercise of the power by the Council.' *H.M.C. Fortescue* (Dropmore), I (1892), p. 364. On the other hand Lansdowne, who was present at the scene, wrote that day that she had given her staff to Shrewsbury, 'being perfect in her senses.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 477. Sunderland wrote to Nottingham that night: 'I must not forget telling your Lordship that as soon as the Queen could just know people, the Council begged her to give the Treasurer's staff to the Duke of Shrewsbury, which she did immediately.' *History of Burley-on-the-Hill*, by Pearl Finch, p. 196.

Next day, July 31, the Privy Council met again for another prolonged sitting, broken by adjournments. That morning Oxford reappeared at the board, and Somers, Sunderland and Cowper came to represent the official Whig Opposition, now wholly reconciled to Government. After consulting the doctors on the Queen's state, the Council's first act that day was to send for Bothmar and explain to him all the steps they had taken to secure his master's succession, and to ask him if there was anything else he could suggest. He declared himself perfectly satisfied, as well he might. A letter was then written to the Elector, warning him of the Queen's expected demise, recounting the steps taken, and asking 'that you would vouchsafe upon the first notice to favour this nation by your immediate presence.' This letter was signed by all the Privy Councillors in attendance, who that day represented every shade of political opinion and party division. It was dispatched to Hanover by the hand of a hearty Whig, James Craggs. A private letter from Bothmar to his master recommended him not to reward Craggs with gold but to wait till he was King and give him a good post.

The same day the Council sent to warn the States General of the Queen's condition, and to remind them of their Treaty obligation to support the Protestant Succession in Great Britain with Dutch forces, if occasion should arise. Further and more specific orders were sent to Ormonde and Admiral Leake. Having done all, the Council adjourned till eight o'clock next morning, Sunday, August the First.<sup>378</sup>

But even that early hour proved too late. At six o'clock Dr. Shadwell aroused the clerks of the Council and told them that the Queen could not live another two hours. Messengers were hurried off to London to summon the Councillors at once. They were, it is to be supposed, deep asleep after two nights of vigil, but Shrewsbury and half a dozen others quickly arrived, to be presently informed that the Queen had died at half past seven o'clock. The Council at once adjourned from what was now a house of mourning, to meet in fuller numbers at St. James's Palace, there to proclaim King George.<sup>379</sup>

The windows were darkened in Kensington. Silence lay heavy in the courtyard and in the long suites of dark panelled chambers, through which the life of a Kingdom had so lately pulsed. The gate had shut on the last coach rumbling off through the fields to St. James's, to be in time for the Proclamation. The awed and tearful waiting women heard from far away the shout of an immense multitude hailing the successor, and the salvoes of cannon proclaiming the triumph of English liberty, religion and law. These things were well, and the woman lying on the great bed had, by her fifty years of dutiful, painful, harassed life, and her heart so 'wholly English,' helped much to bring them about. But she was tired and would sleep. Not, like royal Elizabeth, contending to the last with Death as if he too had been by right her subject. Not, like the King who had died twelve years before in this same Palace, haunted to the last by the thought of great schemes for the salvation of Europe that he must needs relinquish. Those great schemes had been accomplished in the name and by the choice and command of this simple woman, because she had known how to choose her friends. But then clouds had descended and friendship had turned sour. Left to her own guidance—for her well-loved husband too had died—she had chosen new friends and given her people peace. Then the clouds had descended again and with weakening body and brain she had of late failed to see through them into any future she desired. All she longed for was to be at rest, and now, as always, she had her way. There lay the Queen of Great Britain, the last Stuart to rule the island, and, for all her simplicity, the wisest and most triumphant of her race.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII

MINUTES OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, JULY 30, 1714

THE following are the minutes of the Privy Council held on July 30 up to the appointment of Shrewsbury as Lord Treasurer (*P.R.O. (P.C.)*, 2, 84, f. 371). Explanatory names, etc., in square brackets, are added by me.

At the Court of Kensington the 30th of July 1714.

Tuesday twelve at noon and continued by several adjournments till late at night.

*PRESENT.*

Lord Chancellor [Harcourt].  
 Lord Treasurer [Shrewsbury appointed during the meeting].  
 Lord President [Duke of Buckinghamshire].  
 Lord Privy Seal [Dartmouth].  
 Duke of Somerset.  
 Duke of Northumberland.  
 Duke of Ormonde.  
 Duke of Argyle.  
 Lord Steward [Lord Powlett].  
 Earl of Rochester.  
 Earl of Marr.  
 Earl of Loudown.  
 Earl of Findlater.  
 Earl of Portmore.  
 Viscount Bolingbroke.  
 Bishop of London [Robinson].  
 Lord Lexington.  
 Lord Guernsey.  
 Lord Lansdowne.  
 Lord Bingley.  
 Chancellor of the Exchequer [Sir W. Wyndham, Bart., M.P.].  
 The Vice Chamberlain [Thomas Coke, M.P.].  
 Mr. Boyle.

Her Majesty having this morning at ten of the clock been taken dangerously ill, their Lordships mett in Council Chamber and considering the Present Exigency of Affairs were unanimously of an Opinion to move the Queen that she would Constitute the Duke of Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer.

The Physicians were then called in and asked if Her Majesty was in a condition to be spoke to. And they all agreed that she was, viz. :

Dr. Laurence	Dr. Arbuthnott	Dr. David Hamilton.
Dr. Shadwell	Dr. Sloane	Dr. Richard Blackmore.
		Dr. Read.

Whereupon the Ld. Chancellor, the Ld. Privy Seal, the Ld. Steward and the Ld. Visco<sup>t</sup>. Bolingbroke at the request of the Board having waited upon Her Majesty to acquaint her therewith, the Duke of Shrewsbury was forthwith commanded to attend Her Majesty And returned to the Board after having received from Her Majesty's hand, the staff as Lord High Treasurer of Great Brittain. And His Grace then took the Oaths appointed and his seat at the Board accordingly.

Upon considering the dangerous condition of Her Majesty's Health, it was thought fit to give the following Orders for securing the Peace and Quiet of Her Majesty's Dominions.

[Follow many pages of the orders issued to magistrates, army and navy.]

#### NOTE

The excellent and kind-hearted Dr. Arbuthnot, who attended the Queen in her last illness, wrote to Swift on Aug. 12 :

‘ My dear mistress's days were numbered even in my imagination, and could not exceed certain limits ; but of that small number a great deal was cut off by the last troublesome scene of this contention among her servants [dismissal of Oxford]. I believe sleep was never more welcome to a weary traveller than death was to her.’

## EPILOGUE

### UNDISPUTED ACCESSION OF KING GEORGE

#### SOME REMARKS ON THE CHARACTER OF THE WHIG HEGEMONY AND THE HANOVERIAN CONSTITUTION

ALL the world was hurrying to St. James's Palace, on foot, in chairs, or by coach-and-six. Power and fashion, Whig and Tory, all the Lords and Commoners who were left in London during the recess, thronged that morning to greet the rising sun of Hanover, and bask, if possible, in its beams.

But it was also a 'Sabbath morn,' and in the sober City, before the news had been told, vast congregations of business men and their employees had gathered in the Dissenting places of worship, in an agony of fear and hope. For it was the day on which, by statute, the Schism Act came into force, to destroy their schools and usher in, as they believed, another age of persecution—unless the Queen should die. Their friend Bishop Burnet, gone westward early in the morning to hunt for news, had agreed to send a message, if the great change took place, to Mr. Bradbury, the Independent minister of Fetter Lane. As the preacher began his sermon, he looked up from the pulpit to the gallery, and saw a man push his way to the front and drop a handkerchief into the body of the hall. It was the Bishop's signal. Bradbury broke off his discourse to announce to his hearers that no longer Queen Anne but King George was their liege sovereign. The sea of upturned, anxious faces was transformed in a moment by the action of joy, and at the bidding of the preacher they rolled out a psalm of thanksgiving to the God who had delivered them once more. They all knew now that the Schism Act was born dead; that their persecutors would be hurled from power, and that they

and their children would be allowed to live as freemen, the most loyal of all the subjects of King George.\*

While these humbler folk were rejoicing, 'the great' were busy at St. James's. Bothmar and Kreienberg, the Hanoverian Ministers, were summoned to be present. Time was needed to draw up the proper form in which to proclaim the new King, and while this was being done in one room, in another the important work was in process of naming and swearing in the Regents or 'Lords Justices,' who were to bear rule in the island till George in person should arrive. Under the Regency Act they were to consist of seven great officers of state, and eighteen more persons named by the Successor. Three sealed documents, each containing the list of his choice, were solemnly opened, one after the other, and found to correspond. They revealed a few Hanoverian Tories and a goodly number of moderate Whigs, but neither Somers, Sunderland nor Wharton : George was not in the pocket of the Junto.†

Bolingbroke, as mere 'Secretary,' was not one of the *ex officio* Regents and he had not been named by King George. His day was over. But Archbishop Tenison, in whom the High Church Queen had never confided and who had during the Tory regime retired from all the Councils of State, came over from Lambeth Palace to take a leading part in that day of triumph for the tolerant and moderate principles which in his thought were proper to the Church of England.

The other Privy Councillors treated with regal ceremony those Regents who were present among them, and messengers were sent off to those who were at their country homes to bid them come up to town and rule the land.

\* Clarke and Foxcroft, *Life of Burnet*, pp. 469-470. When, after George's arrival in England, the Dissenting ministers went in their black gowns to read him an address, a courtier asked Bradbury : 'Pray, Sir, is this a funeral?' 'Yes, Sir,' was the reply, 'it is the funeral of the Schism Act and the resurrection of Liberty.'

† The *ex officio* Regents were Tenison, Archbishop of Canterbury; Harcourt, Lord Chancellor; *Shrewsbury*, Lord Treasurer; Buckinghamshire, Lord President; Dartmouth, Lord Privy Seal; Earl of Strafford, First Lord of the Admiralty; and Parker, Lord Chief Justice—three Whigs to four Tories.

George had named *Shrewsbury*, *Somerset*, *Bolton*, *Devonshire*, *Kent*, *Argyle*, *Montrose*, *Carlisle*, *Scarborough*, *Orford*, *Townshend*, *Halifax*, *Cowper*, Whigs, and Anglesey, Abingdon, Nottingham and Roxburgh, Hanoverian Tories, and the unattached Earl of Pembroke. In some lists *Pomfret* is put instead of Pembroke, but the P.R. Register is clear on the point.



Meanwhile the Proclamation had been prepared, and was eagerly signed not only by the Regents and Privy Councillors but by many Lords, Bishops, Members of the Lower House, and officials such as Sir Christopher Wren, Surveyor General. A hundred and twenty-seven names in all were appended to the Proclamation, of which perhaps half were Tory, including not only the Hanoverian Tories but Bolingbroke, Wyndham and Ormonde. It was a national act.

These formalities had taken up the morning hours, but between one and two o'clock the patience of the vast crowd waiting in front of St. James's Palace met its reward. They saw appear first the Regents, then the Privy Councillors, the Lord Mayor, and the throng of nobles and gentlemen who had signed the Proclamation. The kettledrums rattled and the trumpets spoke; every man present bared his head; and the Herald read the Proclamation:

We therefore, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the Realm, being here assisted with those of Her Late Majesty's Privy Council, with numbers of other principal gentlemen of quality, with the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of London, do now hereby with one full voice and consent of tongue and heart, publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Prince George Elector of Brunswick Lunenburg is now by the death of our late sovereign of Happy Memory, become our only lawful and rightful liege Lord, George, by the Grace of God King of Great Britain, France and Ireland.

When he ended with the words 'God save the King,' a great and joyful shout went up, spreading in waves up St. James's Street, through the Mall and along the Strand. Again the kettle-drums and trumpets sounded, and far away the batteries of the Tower told the City and the river that George was King.†

\* See the list in *P.R.O. (P.C.)* 2, 85, f. 2. For the proceedings about the Regency and the Proclamation that day my authorities are the Privy Council Register in the Record Office (2, 85) and *Michael*, pp. 366-367 for the Hanoverian reports.

† The hour of the Proclamation is noted in *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 482. The Houses of Parliament met that very afternoon, but as the Commons' Speaker, Sir Thomas Hanmer, was away in Wales, both Houses adjourned till August 5, when they proceeded to pass loyal addresses and to consider the Civil List. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. 3-6.

The night was a night of cheering crowds, illuminations and bonfires in all the streets of London. There was ample space in the great squares where the nobility had their mansions, and each magnate had his bonfire kindled by his servants before his door. One of the largest was Bolingbroke's, before his house in Golden Square, which caused much amusement to the Hanoverian and Harleian Tories, who observed that their enemies, so 'rampant' a few days ago after Oxford's dismissal, 'began to turn upon their heel very quickly.' Oxford, elated at his rival's downfall, broke again into execrable and ungrammatical verse, writing on August 18 to his friend Dartmouth : .4

And for those who did conspire  
For to bring in James Esquire  
Now hope to be saved by their own Bonfire.  
Doctors agree they are never the higher.  
Teste Jonathan.

The late Lord Treasurer, helped by 'Jonathan' Swift, had already persuaded himself that he for one had never been in favour of 'James Esquire.' Possibly he never had been at heart, but in that case the Abbé Gaultier and his young correspondent in Lorraine had been the more deceived.\*

Bolingbroke kept up his spirits bravely for awhile. Two days after the Queen's death he wrote to Swift :

The Earl of Oxford was removed on Tuesday ; the queen died on Sunday. What a world is this and how does fortune banter us. . . . I have lost all by the death of the queen but my spirit ; and I protest to you I feel that increase upon me. The Whigs are a pack of Jacobites ; that shall be the cry in a month if you please.

So wrote the 'man of Mercury.' Swift replied with greater insight into the situation :

Your machine of four years modelling is dashed to pieces in a moment ; and, as well by the choice of Regents as by their proceedings, I do not find there is any intention of managing you in the least.<sup>380</sup>

\* *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 321 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 198 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 408-409. It is possible that the expression 'Queen Anne is dead' originated from the excitement caused by her death and the issues that hung on it. Delaune, the ruffianly President of St. John's, Oxford, ordered King George to be prayed for on August the First. It was objected that it was not certain Queen Anne was dead. 'Dead !' he exclaimed, 'she is as dead as Julius Caesar.'

Indeed there was no desire to keep terms with Bolingbroke. The Regents treated him not as a power to be propitiated but as a culprit to be examined, and before the end of the month he was curtly dismissed from the Secretaryship, before ever the King reached England. And when at last George arrived he gave the coldest reception not only to Bolingbroke but to Oxford. The hangers-on of the late Ministry were soon in distress. Lady Masham was a private person once more. And Mrs. Manley, the libeller, wrote a begging letter to Oxford on August 30:

I have nothing but a starving scene before me, Lord Marlborough and all his accomplices justly enraged against me. Nothing saved out of the wreck.<sup>381</sup>

Meanwhile the Marlboroughs returned from exile. They had decided to come home before they knew that the Queen was dangerously ill.<sup>382</sup> But they had chosen the right moment. On the evening of the day of the Queen's death they arrived at Dover to meet the news, and were received at their landing with every sign of popular enthusiasm. On August 4 they made triumphal entry, side by side in their glass coach, over London Bridge and through the City to Marlborough House, 'amid the acclamations of the people as if he had won another battle at Hochstet.' Before them rode an improvised escort of 'two hundred horsemen three in a row,' with a company of London train-bands marching behind, through shouting crowds, though hooting was mingled with the cheers.

George had offended Marlborough by failing to name him as one of the Regents, but the first document he signed in Hanover as King of England, only five days after the Queen's death, made the Duke once more Captain-General. Even Bothmar, lately suspicious of his loyalty, wrote on that day, 'He will be of great service if the Pretender makes any attempt.' He was again England's magnificent arm of defence, but his political influence was never revived in the counsels of State. For if he was no longer a Tory, neither was he a Whig, and the Whigs were now supreme. In old age and with failing powers, he enjoyed the domestic leisure and happiness at Blenheim for which he had so often sighed

in years gone by, when writing his letters home to Sarah from the field.<sup>383</sup>

The King had seen no reason to make haste to England. There was no danger to his throne. Not a mouse had stirred against him in England, in Ireland or in Scotland. When Anne died, Bolingbroke, Ormonde and other Jacobites told Ilberville that at all costs civil war must be avoided, that at present they were loyal to King George and that the French King must accept the situation.\* Louis XIV, who had no wish for another war, acknowledged the fact of the Protestant Succession and repulsed the attempt of the Pretender to come to Paris and embroil France and England. Berwick, the ablest Jacobite, was besieging Barcelona a fortnight away from news. Nothing was anywhere attempted on James's behalf. Queen Anne had left no will ; only a mysterious packet of papers was found, with directions upon it in her handwriting that it should be burnt unopened, as it duly was by the Regents in Bothmar's presence. Some have surmised that it contained her brother's appeals to her, to which she had not responded as he hoped ; but there is in fact no evidence save the merest rumour as to what the packet contained.<sup>384</sup>

And so, having set his German affairs well in order, and said a slow and sorrowful farewell to beloved Hanover, promising often to come back, the elderly German gentleman proceeded by leisurely stages towards his new inheritance. It was not till September 18 that he landed at Greenwich, where he was received in state by a loyal nobility and people. It was not so dramatic an affair as Charles II's landing at Dover or Napoleon's return from Elba, but, alone of the great dynasties of Europe, his race has continued ever since to occupy the throne without losing possession even for a day. Our country is still ruled by King George under the terms of the Act of Settlement.

<sup>383</sup> The Whig hegemony that continued for forty years, as a result of the happenings during the four last years of Queen Anne, was caused by the divided state of the Tory

\* See Appendix E, p. 340 below.

party and its uncertain loyalty to the throne. The first two Georges had no choice but to take Whig servants and had therefore to accept their terms. They could not, like William and Anne, play off one party against the other, and for that reason the independent political power of the Crown still further declined. When Bolingbroke and Ormonde, alarmed and provoked by their impeachment, fled to France and joined the Pretender in 1715, when Wyndham plotted in vain to raise Western England, and when Scotland was actually rent by an evenly contested Civil War, it was made more than ever impossible for George I or his son after him to look with favour on the Tories. His subjects, too, craved for quiet and an end to the long round of civil wars and persecutions of a century past. If the Whigs could give men security they could be permitted to bear rule, riding the country on a light rein. Most of the Hanoverian Tories or their children became Whigs of one kind or another. The Tories who still followed Wyndham in Parliament, dwindled to a mere group. And Bolingbroke, in spite of his speedy and complete renunciation of Jacobitism after six months' experience as the Pretender's Secretary, was never admitted back into the House of Lords. All he could do was to turn pamphleteer and preach the 'moderate' doctrine of his old rival Oxford, as his own new philosophy of 'the Patriot King' above all party divisions.

When Bolingbroke fled to France, Oxford, with the cool courage that was the finer part of his phlegmatic nature, remained to stand his trial. Fortunately the French archives were not available to the prosecution; and the House of Lords, always at this period a moderator of party heats, acquitted him as it had acquitted Somers sixteen years before. In so doing, it served England well, for the use of impeachments against fallen statesmen is unsuited to a constitutional regime. In civilized society men cannot be expected to serve their country with ropes round their necks.

The outstanding fact in political history under the first two Georges is the abeyance of the Tory party as an effective force in Parliament. The two-party system did not die but it slept. There were always avowed Tories in Parliament, but they were not numerous enough either to take over the

government when a change was needed, or to act alone as an Opposition. They usually worked with that section of the Whigs who happened to be opposed to the Whig Government of the day. Since there was no rival party which the Whig aristocracy as a whole had cause to fear, it grew negligent of public opinion, and relied more and more on perfecting the corrupt machinery of elections, instead of appealing on points of principle to the electorate. Where there are no effective Tories there can be no proper Whigs. As the struggle for power ceased to be political it became personal, a scuffle of the rival 'great houses' for the power to distribute the good things of Church and State.\*

The question in Parliament from 1715 to 1760 was not whether 'the Whigs' should be turned out, but only which Whigs should be turned out and which Whigs should take their place. The principles for which the party had stood in old days, such as Toleration of Dissenters and the limitation of the Power of the Crown, were no longer in the forefront of controversy, largely because they had been realized and had become an essential part of the political structure of the land, and partly because they were forgotten amid the personal rivalries of 'the great.' In the last years of this regime, the elder Pitt appealed to the country over the heads of the degenerate Whig oligarchy of the day, and in the great crisis of the Seven Years War revived the old popular spirit of Whig nationalism, in a call to Britons to defend

\* The aristocratic character of ordinary patronage in the eighteenth century is amusingly illustrated by the following epitaph, recorded in Nichols' *Literary Anecdotes*, III, p. 52.

Here rest all that was mortal of  
Mrs. Elizabeth Bate,  
Relict of the Reverend Richard Bate,  
A woman of unaffected piety  
And exemplary virtue.

\* \* \* \* \*  
She was honourably descended,  
And by means of her Alliance to  
The illustrious family of Stanhope,  
She had the merit to obtain  
For her husband and children  
Twelve several employments  
In Church and State.

She died June 9, 1751, in the 75th year of her age.

their religion, liberties and commerce against the House of Bourbon. Neither Walpole as Prime Minister nor Newcastle after him had made any such appeal.

The Jacobite danger was the real strength of the Whigs. Neither the King nor the electors would turn the Whigs out to bring in James. Even Bolingbroke had learnt by his brief personal experience at the Pretender's Court that to make him King would be to make Roman Catholic priests once again the directors of royal policy. To restore such a regime would merely lead to another Revolution. The existence of the dynastic question which had ruined the Tories in 1714, continued to divide and distract them, and to render them suspect to powerful classes who would otherwise have been on their side.

Security and liberty were obtained under the Hanoverian Constitution, because, under Walpole, the Whigs became, what they had not always been, the 'moderate men.' At bottom their famous 'moderation' was due to the fact that they were a minority in the island; they were normally the weaker party, holding office by the accident of the dynastic question and the division of the Tories on that supreme issue.

Before the Industrial Revolution, England was still mainly agricultural. Therefore the squires and the rural clergy were more powerful, when united and aroused as in 1710, than the Dissenters and the business and professional classes who had rallied round the Whigs and the House of Hanover in 1715. If the Whigs were wise, they would never injure the interests or alarm the prejudices of the clergy and squires. The Whigs could monopolize power, if only they would leave the Tory classes alone. Walpole, as he grew older, fully grasped this principle, and acted upon it for many years as Prime Minister, with complete success. His motto was *quieta non movere*, 'Let sleeping dogs lie.'

In ecclesiastical affairs great care was taken not to give cause for another cry of 'Church in Danger.' Through the help of the able manager, Bishop Gibson—himself an actively loyal Hanoverian but not a Low Churchman—the Whig Ministers brought about an understanding between

the House of Hanover and the Established Church. That was the true basis of Eighteenth Century peace and stability in England.

In pursuance of this 'moderate' policy in matters ecclesiastical, the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts of Anne's reign were repealed in George I's reign, but no further concession was made to the Dissenters. The Test and Corporation Acts were left untouched. Those Non-conformists who refused to qualify by taking the sacrament according to the rites of the Established Church, were still excluded from municipal and State office.

Owing to the moderation of the Whigs in doing no more for their Nonconformist clients and nothing more to provoke the clergy, there was no repetition of the popular outcry of 'Church in Danger' that had done the Whigs such harm in the days of Dr. Sacheverell. The growing spirit of Latitudinarianism, characteristic of the educated classes in the Eighteenth Century, helped Whig statecraft gently to lay the spirit of High Church enthusiasm.

So the Whig attempt to come to terms with the Church was successful under the first two Georges, far beyond what could have seemed possible in the fervid days of William and Anne. Nor was the Whig policy of 'moderation' confined to the religious field. The Tory squires were left unprovoked. Many of them were placed on the Bench as Justices of the Peace. Fielding in *Tom Jones* represents Squire Western as a magistrate. He had been placed on the Bench by those Whig Lords and 'Hanover rats,' of whom he said 'I hate the very name of themmum'; he had no thought of joining the Pretender in 1745. So too, academic liberties were rigidly respected by the Government, who never interfered with the extreme Toryism of Oxford.

After long generations of trouble, persecution and hatred, England had at last won through to a period of domestic peace and individual freedom. It was not a period of avowed idealism; it was not a period of legislative reform. But neither idealism nor reform is the whole of life for men or nations. The vigour and initiative of Englishmen, at



home and overseas, in all branches of human effort and intellect, were the admiration of Eighteenth Century Europe. The greatness of England in the Hanoverian epoch was made by men acting freely in a free community, with little help indeed from Church or State, but with no hindrance. The great art of letting your neighbour alone, even if he thinks differently from you, was learnt by Englishmen under Walpole, at a time when the lesson was still a strange one elsewhere. Some European countries have not learnt it to this day or are rapidly unlearning it again. The manners and customs of English political and ecclesiastical controversy were softened between 1715 and 1760, and this change left a lasting mark on life and politics.

It has been calculated that there were about seventy 'great Whig families,' who, under the early Hanoverian Kings, formed the Government and led the Opposition. Each of these great families usually had its titular head snugly in the Upper House, while its heirs and cadets sat for family boroughs and made their reputations in the faction fighting in St. Stephen's Chapel.

This is the system which Disraeli termed 'the Venetian Oligarchy.' An oligarchy in some sense it was ; but it was the very opposite of Venetian. The methods of the rulers of Venice were despotism, inquisition, enforced silence, and secret political justice. But the 'Whig Oligarchy' was submissive to the rule of law, and the English laws gave to the Executive no power to suppress speech or writing that attacked the Government. Unless the Law Court found a critic of Government guilty of sedition, Ministers could do nothing to silence him. The Law Court, not the Government, decided what was libel, blasphemy or sedition. And the Judges were independent of the Executive, and the Juries were often hostile.

The highly civilized conception of law as a power superior to the will of the rulers was strong among the Eighteenth Century English. The Law of England had triumphed in the great battle with the Stuart Kings ; the idea of the rule of law—as propounded by Coke and Selden—had been victorious on the field of Naseby ; had been

muddled away by the quarrels and outraged by the violence of its Puritan champions ; had been restored in 1660, imperilled in the later years of Charles II, destroyed by James II, but had finally triumphed at the Revolution. The King had then been made definitely subject to the law. The prerogative that claimed to be above the law had been killed dead. The Whig oligarchy, after 1714, made use of the powers of the Crown as defined by the Revolution of 1688. But those powers so defined were closely limited. The irremovable judges could no more be removed by the Whig nobles than by the King.

Modern criticism of this regime and its mentality is not that it interfered too much, like a 'Venetian Oligarchy,' but that it interfered too little, allowing law to grow antiquated and out of date, while society was being reborn by industrial change. Not tyranny but an exaggerated conservatism was the weakness of the Walpoles and of the Pelhams after him. *Quieta non movere* is not the motto of a Reformer, but neither is it the motto of a Tyrant.

The specific work of the early Eighteenth Century in England, on the line down which it was launched by the events of Anne's reign, was the establishment of the rule of law, and that law a law of liberty. On that solid foundation the reforms of succeeding epochs have been based.

If England between the Revolution and the death of George II had not established the rule of the law of freedom, the England of the Nineteenth Century would have proceeded along the path of change by methods of violence, instead of by Parliamentary modification of the law. The establishment of liberty was not the result of the complete triumph of any one party in the State. It was the result of the balance of political parties and religious sects, compelled to tolerate one another, until toleration became a habit of the national mind. Even the long Whig supremacy that was the outcome and sequel of the reign of Anne, was conditional on a vigilant maintenance of institutions in Church and State that were specially dear to the Tories, and a constant respect for the latent power of political opponents, who were fellow subjects and brother Englishmen.

# THE QUEEN'S PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE, 1709-1714

(*Whigs are printed in italics.*)

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Lord Treasurer	. . .	1709 Sidney, Lord Godolphin	1710 Godolphin dis- missed Aug. 1710. No Ld. Treasurer till following May	1711 Robert Harley, Earl of Ox- ford, May 1711	1712	1713	1714 Oxford dis- missed July 27. <i>Shrewsbury</i> succeeds July 30
Lord President of the Council	. . .	<i>Lord Somers</i>	Earl of Rochester, Sept. 1710, ob. May 1711	John Sheffield, Duke of Buck- inghamshire, June 1711 ( <i>Duke of New- castle</i> ob. July)			
Lord Privy Seal	. . .	<i>Duke of Newcastle</i>	. . .	. . .	. . .	William Legge, Earl of Dart- mouth, Aug. 1713	
Chancellor of the Exchequer	. . .	<i>John Smith</i>	Robert Harley, Aug. 1710	Robert Benson, June 1711	. . .	Sir William Wyndham, Aug. 1713	
Lord Chancellor	. . .	<i>Lord Cowper</i>	Sir Simon Har- court (Lord Keeper only)	. . .	. . .	Sir S. Harcourt became Lord Harcourt and Chancellor, April 1713	
Secretary of State (Northern)	. . .	<i>Hon. Henry Boyle</i>	Henry St. John				
Secretary of State (Southern)	. . .	<i>Charles Spencer, Earl of Sun- derland</i>	Wm. Leggs, Lord Dartmouth	. . .	. . .	Wm. Bromley, Aug. 1713	
Third Secretary (Scotland, etc.)	. . .	<i>Duke of Queensberry</i>	. . .	Queensberry dies July 1711. Post vacant two years		Earl of Mar, Aug.-Sept. 1713	

# THE QUEEN'S PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE, 1709-1714—continued.

(*Whigs are printed in italics.*)

Lord Lieutenant of Ireland	1709 Thomas, Earl of <i>Wharton</i>	1710 James Butler, Duke of Ormonde	1711 . . . . .	1712 . . . . .	1713 <i>Charles Talbot,</i> <i>Duke of Shrews-</i> <i>bury, Sept. 1713</i>	1714
Lord High Admiral	. . . . .	Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke; succeeded by <i>Russell, Earl of Orford,</i> Nov. 1709	(First Ld. of Admiralty) Sir J. Leake	(First Ld. of Admiralty) Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford		
Secretary at War	. . . . .	<i>Robert Walpole</i> Nov. 1709	George Granville, created Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 1711	Sir William Wyndham, June 1712	Francis Gwyn, Aug. 1713	
Master-General of the Ordnance	. . . . .	Duke of Marlborough	. . . . .	Richard Savage, Earl Rivers, Jan. 1712, died Aug. 1712		
Master of the Horse	. . . . .	<i>Duke of Somerset</i>	. . . . .	Jan. 1712, died Aug. 1712, <i>Somerset</i> dis- missed		
Lord Chamberlain	. . . . .	<i>Marquis of Kent</i>	<i>Charles Talbot,</i> <i>Duke of Shrews-</i> <i>bury, April</i> 1710			
Lord Steward	. . . . .	<i>Duke of Devonshire</i>	John Sheffield, Earl of Poulett, Duke of Buckinghamshire, Sept. 1710			

# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

STATE OF FINANCES AT END OF SESSION, JUNE 1711

*A. Appropriation of supplies by House of Commons for the year 1711.*

*(Add. MSS. 17677 EEE, ff. 236-237.)*

	£	s.	d.
For 40,000 sailors of R.N. for 13 months . . .	2,080,000	0	0
For the R.N. ordinary expenses . . .	120,000	0	0
For 40,000 men in Flanders . . .	919,092	3	6
For augmentation of 10,000 men in Flanders . .	177,511	3	6
For 3000 Palatines in service of H.M. and States General . . . . .	34,251	13	6
For 4639 Saxons in same service . . .	43,251	13	6
For Bothmar's Hanoverian Dragoons . . .	9,269	16	6
For the augmentation of troops in Flanders, 1709	220,000	0	0
For garrison, pensioners and marines . . .	546,108	17	8
For land artillery . . . . .	130,000	0	0
Interest on a year's Irish debentures . . .	49,357	17	2
For transport of troops . . . . .	144,000	0	0
For subsidies to H.M.'s Allies . . . . .	478,956	16	7
For Spain and Portugal . . . . .	1,500,000	0	0
For extraordinary expenses of war . . . . .	292,369	2	4
Exchequer Bills . . . . .	45,000	0	0
Annual funds for the lottery of 1,500,000 . .	135,000	0	0
Annual funds for the lottery of 2 millions . .	186,670	0	0
Total appropriations . . . . .	7,110,839	4	3

(Inaccurately added up as 7,070,939 in the MSS.)

B. *Funds assigned towards these appropriations.*

	£
Four shilling land tax . . . . .	1,900,000
Tax on malt . . . . .	650,000
[Borrowings] { Lottery of £10 tickets for 1,500,000 . . . . .	1,500,000
{ Lottery of £100 tickets for 2 millions . . . . .	2,000,000
	<hr/>
[A million short.]	£6,050,000
	<hr/>

C. *Public debts for which Parliament assigned funds during session of 1711.*

	£	s.	d.
Admiralty debt [to Michaelmas, 1710] . . . . .	5,130,539	5	5
Ordnance debt [to Michaelmas, 1710] . . . . .	154,324	15	8½
Debt for transport of troops [1710] . . . . .	424,791	5	4½
Irish debentures . . . . .	1,018,656	17	9
Deficient Tallies, up to 1710 . . . . .	12,025	1	0
Navy debts (Michaelmas to Christmas, 1710) . . . . .	378,859	5	8½
Debt to Elector of Hanover for certain subsidies . . . . .	9,375	0	0
	<hr/>		
Total . . . . .	£7,128,571	10	11
	<hr/>		

D. *Extraordinary money grants.*

	£	s.	d.
To the inhabitants of the Islands of Nevis and St. Christopher for their losses during the French invasion of 1705. . . . .	103,003	11	4
For building 50 new churches in London and Westminster . . . . .	350,000	0	0
	<hr/>		
	£453,003	11	4
	<hr/>		

## APPENDIX B

### SOME CORRESPONDENCE OF MARLBOROUGH, GODOLPHIN AND THE WHIG MINISTERS BEFORE AND AFTER THEIR FALL IN 1710

OF these letters Nos. 1 and 3 show how little either Somers or Godolphin ever contemplated the desirability of making peace on terms which France would accept (see p. 61 above). The Duchess's note endorsed on No. 1, describing Somers' intentions, is not far off the mark. No. 2 refers to the ungracious manner of Godolphin's dismissal by the Queen. No. 4 shows the fears of one of Godolphin's friends that he and Marlborough would be impeached and executed as a sequel to their fall ; some of the October Club members were, in fact, clamouring for such measures (*Wentworth Papers*, p. 161, and *Journal to Stella*, February 18, 1711), but in vain.

#### NUMBER I

*Add. MSS. 9109, ff. 71<sup>r</sup>-72<sup>r</sup>*

*Lord Somers to the Duke of Marlborough*

<sup>6</sup>/<sub>17</sub> June 1710.

My Lord

I have been confined to my chamber for near a month, and as in that time I have seen several things pass and feared many more likely to pass at home so I have had full leisure to consider alone the critical circumstances of affairs abroad, which cannot but be much influenced by what is doing in England. Our Enemies will not be in good earnest for peace, when they see us so busy in doing their business for them, and our friends can never think it reasonable to depend upon so wild a people. While the expectations of the Campagne amuse the world, everybody is in suspense, but as soon as that draws towards an end, and the time of preparation for another year comes near, the dutch will begin to speak after their old manner of their being exhausted, and what language we shall be able to use for their encouragement or our own I fear is too easy to foresee. Whatever way I can turn my eyes, I can discern no hopefull appearance but from the army which Your Grace commands, and for no longer time than till that army must go into winter quarters. You have done wonders for us ; and I hope you are reserved to complete them and I am sure you will do all that is possible. It is very natural to say then why

is the Duke of Marlborough so impertinently interrupted when he has the care of all Europe upon him? I have (I must confesse) but little to say for myself, unless it be the owning as I have done already, that I can see no reasonable ground of hopes, but from what Your Grace is able to perform this Summer, and therefore to beg you that you will have that just regard to the glory you are possessed of as not to let any resentment or any contrivance how artificial soever, put you out of the way of carrying it on to all the perfection it is capable of receiving. That will be to gratify your enemies. The most effectual and the most certain way of finally disappointing them and punishing them, is to take no notice of what they do, but to go on to make the utmost use of the opportunity, that so by God's blessing you may bring peace with you and come home crowned with laurels; and then you may despise them, and restore us once more to our senses. These I hope are your purposes, and that they may have this Issue, is the most sincere desire of him who is with all sincere respect. My Lord, &c. &c.

*Endorsed by the Duchess of Marlborough.*

A very good letter from Lord Somers in June 1710 not to take notice of the contrivances and malice of those in power for the good of the common cause; and I believe it was sincere as to his wishing him good success in the war, though I cannot doubt but he would have joyned with Abigail to put him out when that service was completed and as he did contribute to bring her into full glory; to have compassed his own ends he would have served with her or under her, notwithstanding the great obligations he had to me.

#### NUMBER 2

*Add. MSS. 28055, f. 432*

*Godolphin to the Queen*

Tuesday the 8th of *July* 1710.

[error for *August*]

May it please Your Majesty

I have received this morning the honour of your Majesty's Letter with your Comands in it to break my staff, which I have done with the same duty and satisfaction in what relates to my self as when I had the honour to receive it from your Majesty's hands.

Since your Majesty is not pleased to allow me to wait upon you, I must humbly beg leave to take this last occasion to assure your Majesty in the most sincere as well as the most submissive manner, that I am not conscious of the least undutifull act,—or of one undutifull word to your Majesty in my whole life, and in the instance which your Majesty is pleased to give I have the good fortune to have severall witnesses of undoubted Credit. I should never bee able to forgive myself if I had not always served your Majesty with the most particular respect and duty, as well as with the greatest zeal and integrity.

I shall only presume to add that my heart is entirely sensible of all the honours and favours your Majesty has done mee and full of the most zealous



wishes for your prosperity, and happyness, in this world and in that to come, which I beg leave to assure your Majesty shall always bee the hearty and constant prayer of

May it please your Majesty,

The most humble and most dutiful

of all your Subjects,

GODOLPHIN.

NUMBER 3

*Letter of Godolphin to 'No. 126'*

*Add. MSS. 28055, f. 434*

December 17th, 1710.

My Lord

having had time to reflect, Since our last Conversation upon the present posture of the Queens affairs abroad, I find my mind so much affected with the dangerous circumstances in which to mee they appear to bee, that I am not able to keep my self, from laying my thoughts of them before your Lordship as plainly and as briefly as I can upon so copious a subject, being very sensible that you have all the same duty for her Majesty, and the same zealous good wishes for her Service that I have my self, with the addition of a better, tho' not a more impartiall judgment; but before I enter upon any particulars, I think it not improper to remove some prejudices, which may otherwise lie against any thing that comes from mee upon this subject;

in the first place therefore I beg leave to assure you, upon my honour and upon my truth, that if I lament the measures taken at present in relation to the forreign Affairs, it is so farr from the least view or thought of being employd again my self that I know no temptation upon earth powerfull enough to oblige mee to it,

secondly I repeat the same assurances to you, that I have not the least resentment or animosity against any one person whatsoever, whom I either know, or think to bee in her Majesty's Confidence, and trust; but having the same zeal and dutifull affection for her person and Interests that I ever have had, and the same tender Concern for her future quiet, and the security of this kingdome which she governs, and is therefore in some measure answerable for, I can not reflect upon the present posture of her Affairs without the greatest uneasyness upon my own mind, and as great apprehensions that misfortunes are coming faster upon her Majesty than she seems to bee aware of. God send she may bee able to find the way, if there bee any, to avoyd them. My Lord, I take her Majesty's future quiett and security to depend upon a good determination of the present Warr, and nothing is more evident than that the great and constant successes with which it has pleased God to bless her Majesty's arms through the whole course of it had layd a certain foundation for bringing it to a happy period, even before this time, if the disorders and divisions at home, and the disgrace of such Ministers as had always appeared most zealous for the Common Cause, had not so much encouraged *france*, that though quite exhausted, it has given them new life. Though their Armys have been beaten for 7 years together, the Warr is yett to begin

afresh, and they are become so haughty and insolent as wholly to lay aside all thoughts of accommodation by a generall peace ;

there are 3 particulars, which seem chiefly to have encouraged, and Confirmed them in this insolence ;

first the blow given to the publick Credit ;

secondly the dissolution of the parliament upon it ;

thirdly, the assurances sent to France, by the Jacobites and french partisans here, that the Duke of Marlborough shall bee removed from the Com[m]and of the Army ;

I take the first of these not to have been, in it self, wholly irrecoverable, for the strength of the publick Credit, did not, in my opinion turn so much upon the personall influence of that Minister who had the chief management of it [Godolphin himself] but upon the knowledge and experience which the whole Alliance abroad had justly Conceived of his firm Adherence to the Com[mon] Cause, which made them very naturally inferr, that the laying him aside was a plain indication that the Interest of the Allys was declining in Great Brittain ; and the Consequence is as plain that the publick Credit which had been raised at first, and supported chiefly upon that foundation must necessarily decline with it.

Now the publick Credit being once broken, it is not, with great submission, in the power of the Queen and parliament in conjunction, to restore it again, without the help of more time than our present circumstances will, I doubt, allow ; nor can it bee restored even with the help of time unless that time bee employd in creating the same Confidence in the Allyes abroad, of the Ministers, her Majesty pleases to employ, as they had in those that went before them, which was the true and solid foundation of bringing the publick Credit to so great a height in England.

The second particular, viz : the dissolution of the last parliament, had not much effect upon the forreign affairs, otherwise than as it was a great confirmation of the former stroak given to the Credit, and looked upon by the Allys to proceed from the same cause, which consequently did very much increase their distrust and jealousy of the brittish counsellors.

From this distrust and diffidence it is, that I apprehend all the ill consequences imaginable to the Queen's affairs, I see no step made to remove them, since the meeting of the parliament but rather the contrary, talking never so big nor voting never so well, signifies very little towards carrying on the Warr with effect, if there bee not an entire conjunction and harmony betwixt her Majesty and the Allys abroad as it has been hitherto, and if, as the french have been already gratified in the two first poynts they must also have the further satisfaction of seeing the assurances from their friends here made good by the Duke of Marlborough's not serving any more, this must needs give the finishing stroak to the droopping Alliance, and make it fall to pieces immediatly ; nor, when this is more certainly known, will france so much as hearken to any proposalls for a generall peace, but expect the Allys shall treat separatly, as they certainly will be obliged to doe, for they always looked upon the Duke of Marlborough as the great *Cement* by which the whole Confederacy was held together, and the States will not trust any other subject of the Queens with the Command of their Army but will rather, as

well as the rest of the Allys, make the best terms they can for themselves ; and when the Allyance is once broken, can it enter into any bodys imagination that the Queen and the brittish Nation will have any terms from france, but what shall bee in favour of the pretender ! is it not also to bee apprehended, that if the Nation sees it self driven to such a plunge, it may putt the parliament upon addressing to the Queen, to give the Command of her Army to the Elector of Hannover, and what a difficulty that would bring upon her Majesty either in granting or refusing, I leave you to judg ?

There is yett one consideration behind ; worse than all the rest which is, that when the Queen is brought under such difficultys, it suggests but too much encouragement to attempts against her person, according as it shall appear to bee for the advantage of either faction at that Conjuncture ; this is the most melancholly reflexion of all, for Wee are all bound up, as one may express it, in the Queens life, which God Almighty long preserve, and direct her for the best in all things ; this shall bee in all events the Constant prayer of your Lordships most obedient humble servant.

[Endorsement] this Letter was shewn to 42 [the Queen]  
by 126 upon the 21st of December 1710.

## NUMBER 4

*Add. MSS. 28055, f. 440<sup>r</sup>*

*Letter to Godolphin from a friend unnamed*

June 25th [1711]

My Lord

Though I know your Lordship has many more able Counsellors, yet I am sure you have no servant more faithfull or sollicitous for you than me : and this fear makes me presume thus at a distance and unasked, at the hazard of your opinion of my discretion to throw in my mite towards the preservation of what I love and esteem. The Papists are every where admitted into the secret at this time relating to the family of Hanover and the person who pretends to obstruct that succession (as tis now the mode to call him mildly), the Warr that is to be with the Dutch, and the Offensive league with France &c. : These people as well as the Jacobites cannot so well contain themselves but that now and then in the heat of argument or wine, they lett dropp what they know and think, and tis not only my own remark but that of other Gentlemen in this country that their principal malice is levelld against the Duke of Marlborough and your Lordship ; but especially the Duke who (the gentlemen of that persuasion say) must of necessity be pursued even to blood : I do not question but they have many more in view fit to accompany him though none whom they own so openly to wish so heartily ill to : now my Lord I do not doubt, as this plott thickens which it will do very fast many who think likely to obstruct it will be seized and sacrificed, and you may be sure they will begin with the persons they esteem most dangerous and able to controll them. Were it not good then (whilst tis time) to think of some secure shelter till the storm be overblown ? The considerations of mony, Estate or relations ought not to be put in any Ballance with that of Life, which once

lost can never be retrieved : I am aware of the dilemma in this case ; that by such an action a person seems to own himself guilty. But to avoyd this what if leave were first asked to retire ? to go to Aix la Chapelle ? &c. the doubt is, this leave (though assurances or suretyes shoud be given of not ingaging in a contrary party) woud not be given ; and then the very asking for it woud hasten the execution of what is intended.

I am therefore most humbly of opinion that this case ought to be maturely and speedily discussed by the best freinds you have : and the safest method pursued, whatever sinister constructions it may bear, for time (which the living allwayes have and the dead never) will set all those to rights agen. When one is safe one may publish manifestos : and those who are masters of summes of money, need be less sollicitous what becomes of Lands and Pensions. Every thing that is lawless, cruell, violent, rash or tricking is now to be expected and to come to the sad circumstance of a *non putaram* is what woud be very unbecoming wise men. Tis not innocence, though ever so clear, that will prove any protection rather the contrary, and what cannot be done with collour of Law will be done otherwise.

My Lord *Liberavi animam meam* and heaven direct you : methinks I see danger of this kind very plain and very near, but perhaps I speak as a fool. However I am sure I am

Your most faithfull humble Servant.

[Addressed :] To the Right Honourable the Earl of Godolphin at St. James's.

[Endorsement :] June 25 No name or date. [Seal : A lion (?) rampant.]

## APPENDIX C

### DE FOE ON SACHEVERELL

DE FOE's letter to General Stanhope, one of the Managers of the Impeachment of Sacheverell, 1710 (from Lord Stanhope's *Chevening MSS.*).

Sir,

As it is my misfortune not to have the honour to be known to you, so at this time it may be some loss to the public interest in the affair of Sacheverell, which you are managing (pardon me the word) with so much applause.

I was moved to give you this trouble, Sir, upon my being informed you had sent for some *Reviews* \* to furnish something of the Doctor's character. But, as I will not deceive you, Sir, in what I am writing, so neither will I in the person writing, and therefore, after asking your pardon for the rudeness of this, I have plainly subscribed my name.

Nothing, Sir, has withheld me from blackening and exposing this insolent priest but a nicety of honour, that I thought it dishonourable to strike him when he was down, or to fall on when he had other enemies to engage. But since his defence is made of false suggestions as to his being for the Revolution, and his character is part of his applause among this rabble, and particularly since I find it necessary to represent him right to those who are his Judges, I chose rather to be impertinent, which I ask your pardon for, than that you should not be let a little way into his character, to the truth of which I will at any time appear and produce sufficient testimony, at the same time running the venture of the indignation of the Doctor and his rabble, with which I am severely and openly threatened.

First, Sir, as to his morals, I do not say there are Members in your House who have been drunk with him a hundred times, and can say enough of that to you, because I know it would be said to press gentlemen to betray conversation. But if you please to converse with Mr. Duckett, † a Member of your House, or with Coll. Oughton of the Guards, they will (especially the first) furnish you abundantly on that head (or at least can). Then, Sir, as to his favouring the Revolution, that he has drunk King James's health upon his knees. That he has spoken so scandalously of the Government, that some strangers have asked him if he had taken the oath to the Queen, and being

\* Viz. back numbers of the *Review*, edited by De Foe.

† George Duckett, M.P. for Calne in the Parliament of 1708-10. Stanhope was then in the House of Commons ('your House').

answered by him that he had, have expostulated with him how it was possible either that talking in that manner he could take the oath, or that taking the oath he could talk in that manner.

And lastly (as to the Revolution also) I shall name you two persons : Samuel Eberall of Birmingham, and the minister of Birmingham (I think his name is Smith, but can come to a certain knowledge of the name),—these can make proof even to conviction that in their hearing he said with an oath in the late King William's reign—He (Sacheverell) believed that he (the King) would come to be *De-Witted* and that he hoped he would live to see it.

These words Mr. Eberall affirms he heard him speak and will justify that fact in his tooth. And these things I thought it my duty to acquaint you of, that you may make such use of them as you shall see cause. If I had the honour to know you, Sir, I might give you larger accounts, and if you think it for your service I shall do it when ever you please.

Asking your pardon again for this freedom,

I am, Sir, your most humble and obedient servant,

DE FOE.

Newington Near Hackney,

March 8, 1709 [= 1710 by modern reckoning].

I print this letter of De Foe's as a curiosity, not necessarily as the truth. Indeed it may be considered more injurious to De Foe than to Sacheverell. Of the charge of drunkenness I know no confirmation. The charge of wishing King William 'De-Witted' appeared in the following December in the Rev. William Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* (= Sacheverell). However that may have been, there are various indications that Sacheverell was at heart a Jacobite, e.g. in 1713 when he was the principal figure at a banquet where *The King shall enjoy his own again* was played with immense and significant applause. *English Thinkers of the Augustan Age* (ed. Hearnshaw), p. 101 note.

## APPENDIX D

### BRIHUEGA

#### I. *Colonel Michel Richards' Letter on Brihuega*

THE following (from *Stowe MSS. (B.M.) 476*, ff. 2-4) is a letter written to Craggs by Colonel Michel Richards, who commanded the British train of artillery which was with Starhemberg's column, present therefore at Villaviciosa but not at Brihuega. It is interesting to note that in Richards' opinion the plundering done by our troops, due to want of supply, was a great cause of the catastrophe.

BARCELONA, 9th of Jan. 1711 [N.S.]

I don't doubt but you have been very uneasy to know what has occasioned or contributed to so extraordinary and sudden a change in our affairs in Castile and particularly to the loss of our friends. Different people will give different reasons and constructions. In the Marshall's [Starhemberg's] account printed here, and that he has sent to England, he goes no farther than to give his reason for fighting, and that want of provisions, obliged the several nations to take several routes, and perhaps as some people think, he endeavours to insinuate that the English kept too great a distance. But I don't think the question lyes here, but rather how it should be that the enemy should assemble so considerable an army and bring them 150 English miles without our knowing that they had either foot or cannon with them. We supposing them only a consider(able) detachment of about 2000 horse that would endeavour to make us uneasy in our retreat. This want of Intelligence must proceed from the disaffection of the people, or otherwise our General [Stanhope] must be very hard of beleife. I believe 'twas the first, for our army not having been pay'd since our coming into the country and as ill provided with bread was fallen into great disorder beyond the remedy of the Generals. And I believe that no one will wonder that an army composed of so many different nations, ill provided with bread and worse with mony, should doe so; for as for the Castillans it will be allowed by everybody that from our entering the country till our retreat we found them beyond what we expected. Nor can we say they hurt us till then; for having beat their invincible Army for so many leagues before us, from whom they expected the reduction of Catalonia, they changed their tone; till they found by their emisarys that we should not be so soon supported as they from France, and when they see there army follow

our retreat, tis no wonder that a people who had suffer'd so much by us should take up arms. And according to the present View of affairs, of the enemys superiority on both sides and we without mony or magasins of provisions which is worse, I wish that timely releife may come in these so materiall points, least the Catalans should change their mind too, for they have suffer'd very much and now more.

## II. *Criticisms of Stanhope*

The stories put about afterwards by Stanhope's enemies that he was at Brihuega contrary to Starhemberg's orders (*e.g. H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 219), have no foundation, though repeated by *Parnell*, p. 290. Stanhope, in his dispatch written in captivity to Dartmouth on January 2, 1711, says: 'The Headquarters were that night [December 3-4] at Villarejo, where it was agreed that the English should make three marches to Brihuega and the Imperialists to Cifuentes.' *Add. MSS.* 9117, ff. 172-177, printed in *Mahon*, p. cxviii. The fact that Stanhope was acting according to orders in going to Brihuega is confirmed by Captain Cosby's letter, printed in Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), p. 466.

Stanhope has been blamed by some for not sending away his cavalry and dragoons. They might perhaps have escaped, but not certainly for they were surrounded by greatly superior numbers of horse. Moreover, Stanhope used them, especially the dragoons, in the defence of the town, which he hoped to protect till Starhemberg should arrive; and he was short-handed for holding the walls. It is true that some of his officers thought that he should have confined his scheme of defence to the citadel, and so needed fewer men and less ammunition, in which he was perilously short (Boyer's *Queen Anne*, p. 465). I am quite unable to judge whether or not it would have been better to have held the citadel alone.

Stanhope's real responsibility for the defeat at Brihuega lies first in his policy of invading Castile at all, especially without proper supplies; and secondly, in failing to keep out enough scouting parties to warn him of the approach of Vendôme's infantry and guns.



## APPENDIX E

### THE MINISTERIAL JACOBITE INTRIGUE, AS REVEALED IN THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES

FROM the beginning of the negotiations with England in the summer of 1710 to the death of Anne in August 1714, Gaultier and the other French agents in England wrote to Torcy at Versailles not only on the questions of peace and alliance with England but on the means of effecting a Jacobite restoration on Anne's death. Louis undertook by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht not any longer to aid the Pretender, but in fact the activities of his Minister at Versailles and of his Ambassador and agents in London were redoubled on James's behalf as a result of the signing of peace. Nor can this be wondered at, since both Oxford and Bolingbroke entered into the plot. English Ministers wrote nothing direct to the Pretender, but they sent him continual messages and promises and received his answers through the agency of Gaultier and Torcy. The degree of their sincerity, especially in the case of Oxford, is open to endless question, but the facts of this intrigue are to be found in the French Foreign Office Archives (*Affaires étrangères, Angleterre*), in the Quai d'Orsay.

The student will find very important parts of this correspondence printed from this source by Mr. Wickham Legg in *English Historical Review* (July 1915), and by myself in the same periodical (January 1934); also in *Salomon*, Appendix and notes. Transcripts made for Sir James Mackintosh from the same French archives will also be found in the British Museum, *Add. MSS.* 34493-34497. The story as it appears in the French Archives is borne out by the correspondence of James and his friends, printed in *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, I, 1902.

In this Appendix, I now make a further contribution to the printing of this evidence, once more expressing my gratitude to the courtesy of the archivists of the French Foreign Office.

I. The visit of the influential Tory M.P., Sir T. Hanmer, to Paris; he was afterwards a leader of the Hanoverian Tories.

(*Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 192.) Gaultier to Torcy, November 29, 1712 [N.S.].

Le Chevalier Hanmer est un gentilhomme de merite. Il est entierement des amis du Comte d'Oxford, de milord Bolingbroke, du Duc D'Ormond et de tous ceux de ce partis là. Vous ne devez attendre aucune confidence ny ouverture de sa part, et de votre costé vous ne luy en devez faire aucune ; car il n'est absolument point dans notre secret [= 'J. III,' note says] : il scait que les choses s'avancent, et se feront ; mais il ne scait ny quand ny comment et vous pouvez compter qu'il ny a rien de mystereux dans son voyage et dans son sejour à Paris.

II. The Duc d'Aumont, French Ambassador to London after the peace, writes to Torcy, April 18, 1713 [N.S.] (248, f. 373).

Vendredi dernier M. le Comte de St. Jean, Mons. frère du Viscomte Bol., apporta à la Reine la traité de paix signé avec tous les alliés à l'Archiduc prez. Cette nouvelle a esté receue par le peuple avec de grandes acclamations et des demonstrations de joies bien marquées. La cour de France qui [cypher begins here] dans le cours de la negociation de la paix n'a voulu rien entamer sur les interets du Chevalier de St George dans l'apprehension ou elle estoit que cela ne donnât lieu a quelque incident qui fu tort au dessin principal, va sans doute prendre quelques mesures en faveur de ce Prince.

Et il y a lieu de croire, que comme on a toujours aprehendé pour la santé de la Reyne et que cette Princesse ne peut pas aller loin, le Conseil de France en cas que ce malheur arrivait, a fait son plan et ses arrangements. J'ay prist ous les eclaircissements necessaires pour l'exécution des ordres de sa Majesté en cas quelle jugeasse à propos d'entrer dans une affaire dont certainement il sera question dans ce pays cy par la rivauté des partis qui y regnent et qui vont bientôt changer d'object sans changer de sentiments.

III. As the Succession question looms larger, Argyle takes a strong Hanoverian line and he and Marlborough tend toward reconciliation.

(247, f. 80.) Torcy to Gaultier, November 25, 1713 [N.S.].

On dit que le Duc d'Argill a dit qu'il falloir envoyer le chevalier de St Georges ou son Père [James II] avoit envoyé le grand père de luy Duc d'Argill [viz. to the scaffold]. Il le reconnoit donc pour fils du Roy Jacques.

(247, f. 159.) Gaultier to Torcy, December 20, 1713 [N.S.].

My Lord Grand Tresorier m'a dit de vous mander que depuis peu le Duc de Marl. s'estoit reconcilié avec le Duc d'Argill. Vous savez les sentimens de le dernier touchant le chevalier.

[For the important negotiations of Oxford and Bolingbroke with James in January-March 1714, and their unsuccessful attempt, aided by the Abbé Gaultier, to persuade him to declare himself a Protestant, see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, and *Salomon*, Appendix, and *Macpherson*, II, pp. 525-526.]

IV. As the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke comes to a head in the weeks before the Queen's death, neither abate their

protestations of loyalty to James, whatever Oxford's real sentiments may have been.

(256, ff. 176-177.) Gaultier to Torcy, June 14, 1714 [N.S.].

Mons le Cte d'Oxford me dit encore que la Reyne avoit pris depuis dix jours de nouvelles mesures pour empesher que le Duc de Cambridge, qui en a grande envie, ne passe en Angleterre et qu'elle en avoit écrit fortement au Duc et Duchesse de Hannover. Il m'a aussi assuré qu'en douze jours je partiroy bien instruit, et par écrit de tout ce qui regarde le Chevalier. . . . Le Cte D'Oxford et My Lord Bolingbroke sont plus mal ensemble que jamais. Ce dernier, en qui j'ay une entière confiance, veut que je luy dise avant mon départ les sentimens du Tresorier sur le Chevalier, et le Tresorier me deffend absolument de faire connoistre a qui que ce soit aucune chose de ce qu'il me dira quand je partiray. Mandez moi s'il vous plait, Monseigneur, ce que je dois faire et quel parti il faut que je prenne dans un tel cas. Car si je garde le secret je desobligerai un homme [Bolingbroke] qui est entièrement dévoué a Montgoulin [the Pretender], et si je le revele et que My Lord Oxford vienne à le scavoir, il n'aura plus confiance en moi.

M. le Comte d'Oxford vien de me dire de mander de sa part que M. le Duc de Lorraine trahit le Chevalier, et que, par le moyen de ce Duc, L'Empereur et le Duc d'Hannover scavent tous ce qui se passe à Bar le Duc.

V. The French agents describe Whig fears and policies on the eve of Anne's death.

(257, f. 122.) Ilberville to Louis XIV, July 19, 1714 [N.S.].

Les avis que le Pretendant avoit été vu au Havre prest à s'embarquer avec des troupes de Vostre Majesté ont été donnez pour estre sûrs dans la Chambre Haute par M. de Scarborough et par son fils dans la basse [Earl of Scarborough and his son Lord Lumley the Whig member for Arundel]. Vous savez, Sire, a quoy tout cela tend.

(257, f. 123.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 19, 1714 [N.S.].

Ce discours de ceux qui tiennent en meme tems que le Chevalier se prepare a passer en Angleterre sont a dessein de accoutumer le peuple a voir venir le Duc de Cambridge avec des Troupes.

(257, ff. 175-176.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 30, 1714 [N.S.], describes Whigs and Hanoverian Tories (Hanmer, etc.) drawing together and actively agitating popular opinion against the Pretender.

VI. The French agents report to Torcy the progress of the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke, the fall of Oxford and the Queen's fatal illness, in the light of the chances of a Jacobite Restoration. It is important to observe the stress still laid on the necessity of James pretending to turn Protestant.

(257, f. 155.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 23, 1714 [N.S.].

My Lord Chancelier [Harcourt] s'est hautement déclaré contre My Ld d'Oxford et parlé plus d'une fois a la Reyne sur la necessité de songer a son

salut et de tous ses serviteurs en congédiant My Lord D'Oxford. . . . On vient de m'assurer que la Reyne en reprenant la bague de G. Tresorier donnera a My Lord d'Oxford le titre de Duc de Newcastle.

(257.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 5, 1714 [N.S.].

Le bruit public est que ce soir ou demain My Ld Oxford sera destituée. Je reviens de Kensington ou j'ay affecté d'aller a luy a l'ordinaire et au retour j'ay recontré en chemin My Ld Bolingbroke qui y alloit avec un visage fort gay. Je ne doute que my Ld Bolingbroke, s'il en a la teste de Ministère comme il ne faut pas douter, ne luy conseille d'executter ses desseins au plutot, connoissant très bien le peril qui se trouve dans le retardement.

Le Seigneur Plunket [Jacobite and Roman Catholic] qui m'est venu voir ce matin a l'ordinaire, après m'avoir parlé du changement prochain dans le Ministère en ennemi déclaré de Ld Oxford, et m'avoir étalé ses services passez, m'a fait part des avis importants qu'il dit vous avoir donnez et à M. de Berwick sur les moyens absolument necessaires pour mettre le Chevalier sur le trone d'Angleterre. L'un est le changement de religion au moins en apparence, de concert avec le Pape, l'autre que le Roy sacrifie cent ou deux cens mille pièces [livres sterlings] pour gagner des voix dans le Parlement. Il m'a avoué qu'il ne vous a pas trouvé ny m. le Duc de Berwick disposez a gouter ses propositions, mais il ne cessera de les repeter. Voyons, dit il, plus clairement que jamais que sans cela il n'y a rien a esperer.

Il se figure que my Ld Marlborough pouvoit bien approuver de bonnes intentions pour le Chevalier, et cite à ce propos le Duc de Berwick qui le croit très capable de revenir à son devoir. Un retour sincère de sa part seroit bon a gagner quelques officiers reformés ou cassés qui luy sont attachés. Mais c'est selon moy tout ce qu'on en devoir attendre. Le party Wigh ne manquera pas d'autres generaux pour commander les revoltez en cas de guerre civile, comme le Duc d'Argill, mess. Cadogan, Stanhope, etc.

VII. Bolingbroke's policy and position after the fall of Oxford.

(257, f. 252.) Gaultier to Torcy, August 7, 1714 [N.S.].

J'ay eu l'occasion de luy [Bol.] faire mon complement sur la victoire qu'il a remportée sur le Tresorier, et de la faire resouvenir qu'il m'avoit dit, il y a plus d'un mois, que ce ne devoit pas songer a partir que la Reyne ne se fût déterminé, parcequ'il estoit asolument necessaire que le Chevalier sceut a quoy s'en tenir. Il ne l'avoit pas oublié et il m'a assuré de nouveau qu'il étoit toujours dans les mêmes sentimens à l'égard de Montgoulin [the Pretender] pourveu qu'il pris les mesures qu'il m'en diroit davantage la premiere fois que nous nous verrions.

(257, f. 259.) Ilberville to Torcy.

Il paroît qu'il n'y a rien a craindre dans la Chambre Basse, mais la deffection de 7 ou 8 Seigneurs dans la Chambre Haute mettoit la Reyne dans la nécessité de faire encore des nouveaux remedes au dangereux mais necessaire état où elle se trouve. On a remarqué que des 12 nouveaux que M. de Oxford fit faire y a deux ans trois ou quatre ont voté avec les Wights dans les derniers temps.

(257.) Memoir by Ilberville, dated August 11, 1714 [N.S.] (the day before the Queen died).

Il paroît inutile à l'heure qu'il est de faire des réflexions sur les causes de l'inaction de la Reine et du refroidissement que plusieurs Jacobites ont fait paroître depuis quelques mois. Je n'ay garde de dire que le Chevalier a mal fait de ne pas changer de Religion, et de n'en donner aucune esperance à la Reyne et à ses Ministres, mais je diray avec plusieurs Thorys Catoliques et Protestans fort raisonnables sur ce Chapitre qu'il n'estoit pas necessaire de repondre avec affectation qu'on ne devoit pas s'attendre qu'il le fit jamais, et que rien au monde ne pourroit l'y obliger. Je sais ce que My Ld Bolingbroke a dit à M. l'Abbé Gaultier des lettres qu'il a écrites en ce Pays depuis peu à diverses personnes. Un Ecossais des plus zélés pour luy, après avoir déploré la malheur de ce Prince, a ajouté qu'il en est en partie la cause, par la profession de foy Catolique sans necessité, et ce m'il venoit de voir une lettre dans ce sens entre les mains d'un Jacobite de distinction, qui le prevenoit de ce qui vient arriver, par la reflexion qu'il n'y auroit jamais eu rien à faire pour luy, quand même la Reyne auroit vecu.

VIII. French and Jacobite policy in view of George I's unopposed succession.

(257, f. 314.) Ilberville to K. Louis, August 14, 1714 [N.S.].

[Some Jacobites want Louis to launch Pretender on Scotland. Wiser ones say wait.]

Mylord Bolingbroke m'a averti qu'on m'observoit beaucoup et me priait de me souvenir que l'interest de Votre Majesté et celuy de tout l'Europe exigeoit qu'on ne fournist a vos enenemys aucun prétexte de recommencer la guerre. J'ose assure votre Majesté que je regleray si bien ma conduite et mes discours que je ne donnerai aucune prise aux Wights.

(258, f. 16.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 16, 1714 [N.S.].

M. le Duc d'Ormond avec lequel je fus enfermé deux heures avant hier pense comme my lord Bolingbroke et les autres Jacobites bien sensez que vôtre interest, celuy des Anglois bien intentionnés et celuy mesme du chevalier et celuy de toute l'Europe est qu'il se tienne en repos presentement; ce sentiment est fondé sur ce que l'on n'a pas vu la moindre demonstration en sa faveur dans tout ce qui s'est passé ici, et qu'il revient de conter qu'il en a esté de mesme dans les Provinces ou les pretendens Jacobites se sont contentés de marquer du regret de la Reyne sans donner aucun signe d'affection pour luy, tres satisfaits de se voir garantis de la guerre civile.

(258.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 28-30, 1714 [N.S.].

M. Bolingbroke ne croit pas qu'il soit absolument impossible au Roy d'Angleterre de se servir de ce qu'il y a de meilleurs sujets dans les deux partys. . . . En faisant cela il pourroit avec le temps faire cesser la division qui reyne entre les Anglois, mais s'il ne le fait pas il doit s'attendre à voir former une Ligue du party qu'il aura negligé.

## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

### MSS.

*Add. MSS.* = British Museum, *Additional MSS.* (*B.M.* = British Museum, other collections).

*Aff. étr. Ang.* = Paris, Foreign Office MSS., Quai d'Orsay, *Affaires étrangères, Correspondance politique Angleterre* (see Appendix E, pp. 336-340 above, and my communication to *English Historical Review*, January 1934).

*Althorp MSS.* = MSS. belonging to Earl Spencer in Althorp House, Northants. Some papers of Sarah Duchess of Marlborough among others.

*Argyle MSS.* = Correspondence of the Duke of Argyle from Spain, 1711, in the Cambridge University Library, Add. 6570.

*Bodleian MSS.* = MSS. in the Bodleian, Oxford.

*Chevening MSS.* = General Stanhope's Papers at Chevening, belonging to the present Earl Stanhope.

*Dartmouth MSS.* = MSS. of Lord Dartmouth, property of the Earl of Dartmouth at Patshull, supplemental to the documents from this collection which were printed in *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, 1887.

*India Office MSS.* = MSS. in the India Office, *Factory Records*.

*P.R.O.* = MSS. in the Public Record Office (*S.P.* = State Papers; *Tr.* = Transcripts).

*Shakerley MSS.* = Correspondence to Peter Shakerley, Tory M.P. for Chester (seen by the courtesy of Mr. Arthur Bryant).

*Somers MSS.* = A collection of Lord Somers' correspondence, public and private, property of the Reigate Corporation (seen by the courtesy of the Steward of Reigate Manor and Dr. W. Hooper of Redhill).

*Wake MSS.* = Archbishop Wake's MSS. in the Christ Church Library, Oxford.

### PRINTED MATTER

*Adams* = James Truslow Adams, *Revolutionary New England*, 1691-1776.

*Ailesbury (Rox.)* = *Memoirs of Earl of Ailesbury*, Vol. II (*Roxburgh Club*, 1890).

*Arbuthnot* = G. A. Aitken, *Life and Works of John Arbuthnot*, 1892.

*Ashton* = J. Ashton, *Social Life under Queen Anne* (1882).

*Atkinson* = *Marlborough*, by C. T. Atkinson.

*Bacallar* = *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire d'Espagne sous le règne de Philippe V*, par D. Vincent Bacallar y Sanua, Marquis San Phelipe. Traduits de l'Espagnol (Amsterdam, 1756).

*Berwick* = *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick*, ed. 1778.

*Blackader* = *Life of Col. Blackader of the Cameronian Regiment*, 1824.

*Bol. Letters* = *Letters and Correspondence of Lord Bolingbroke*, 4 vols., 1798.

*Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht* = *Bolingbroke's Defence of the Treaty of Utrecht*, with an Introduction by G. M. Trevelyan (a reprint of Letters VI-VIII of Bolingbroke's *The Study and Use of History*), Cam. Univ. Press, 1932.

- Burchett* = Josiah Burchett, *Transactions at Sea*, 1720.  
*Byng Papers* = *The Byng Papers* (Navy Records Soc., 1930-31).  
*Calamy* = J. T. Rutts *Life of Edmund Calamy*, 1830.  
*Carstares' Letters* = *State Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares*, 1774.  
*C.H.B.E.* = *Cambridge History of the British Empire*.  
*Chambers* = W. and R. Chambers, *Domestic Annals of Scotland*, 1861.  
*Collet* = *Private Letter Books of Joseph Collet, sometime Governor of Fort St. George, Madras*, 1933.  
*Conduct* = *Account of the Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough* (by herself), 1742.  
*Cowper* = *Private Diary of William, 1st Earl Cowper* (Rox. 1833).  
*Coxe* = Archdeacon Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough* (page references are to the edition of 1819).  
*Coxe's Walpole* = *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, by William Coxe, Rector of Bemerton (later Archdeacon of Wilts), 1798.  
*C.S.P.* = *Calendar of State Papers* (*Dom.* = Domestic; *Am.* = America and West Indies; *Tr.* = Treasury).  
*Cunningham* = W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ed. 1903.  
*Defoe* = Defoe's *Tour through Great Britain*, ed. i, reprint by G. D. H. Cole, 1927.  
*Dispatches* = *Marlborough's Dispatches*, ed. by Sir G. Murray, 1845.  
*Drake* = *Memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake* (Dublin, 1755).  
*Edgar* = Rev. Andrew Edgar, *Old Church Life in Scotland*; I = 1st series, 1885; II = 2nd series, 1886.  
*Egerton* = H. E. Egerton, *Short History of Colonial Policy*, ed. 1920.  
*E.H.R.* = *English Historical Review*.  
*Feiling* = Keith Feiling, *History of the Tory Party*, 1924.  
*Feldzüge* = *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, 1879.  
*Fortescue* = Sir John Fortescue, *Hist. of the British Army*, I, 1899.  
*Geyl* = *Nederland's Staatkunde in de Spaansche Successieoorlog*, Prof. Geyl, 1929.  
*Goslinga* = *Mémoires de Sicco van Goslinga*, 1857.  
*Granville* = *Granville the Polite* (Lord Lansdowne), by Elizabeth Handasyde, 1933.  
*Hamilton* = Alexander Hamilton, *A new account of the East Indies*, 1727.  
*Hanmer* = *Correspondence of Sir Thos. Hanmer*, edited by Sir Henry Bunbury, Bart., 1838.  
*Hedges* = *Diary of William Hedges*, Vol. III (Hakluyt Society, 1889), containing contributions to a biography of Thomas Pitt, Governor of Fort St. George.  
*Hervey*, L.B. = *Letter-Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol*, 1894.  
*H.M.C.* = *Historical MSS. Commission* (*R.* = Report).  
*H.C.J.* = *House of Commons Journals*.  
*H.L.J.* = *House of Lords Journals*.  
*H. of L. MSS.* = *MSS. of House of Lords*, printed under authority of the H.M.C.  
*Hume Brown, Scotland* = P. Hume Brown, *Hist. of Scotland*, 1909.  
*Kemble* = *State Papers from the Revolution to the accession of the House of Hanover*, edited by J. M. Kemble, 1857.  
*Khan* = Shafat Ahmad Khan, *The East India Trade in the 17th century* (Oxford, 1923).  
*Klopp* = Onno Klopp, *Fall des Hauses Stuart*, Wien, 1875-1888.  
*Lamberty* = G. de Lamberty, *Mémoires*, 1736.  
*Leadam* = *Longmans' Political History*, Vol. IX, by J. S. Leadam.  
*Leake* = *Life of Sir John Leake* (Navy Records Soc., 1920).  
*Lecky, Ireland* = Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century* (Cabinet edition).  
*Lediard, Marl.* = Thomas Lediard, *Life of Marlborough*, 1736.

- Legrelle* = A. Legrelle, *La Diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*.  
*Lockhart* = *The Lockhart Papers* (ed. 1817).  
*Macky, Scotland* = *A Journey through Scotland*, John Macky, 2nd ed., 1732.  
*McLachlan* = H. McLachlan, *English Education under the Test Acts* (Manchester, 1931).  
*Macpherson* = James Macpherson, *Original Papers*, 1775.  
*Mahon* = Lord Mahon, *War of the Succession in Spain*, 1836.  
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*Mathieson* = *Scotland and the Union*, William Law Mathieson, 1905.  
*Matthew Prior* = *Matthew Prior*, by L. G. Wickham Legg, 1921.  
*Mayor* = J. E. B. Mayor, *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, 1911.  
*Michael* = Wolfgang Michael, *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, I.  
*Miller* = O. B. Miller, *Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford* (Stanhope Essay, 1925).  
*Millner* = John Millner, *Journal of Marches, etc.*, 1733.  
*Montgomery* = *The Dutch Barrier*, by Geikie and Montgomery, 1930. (The part of this valuable work referred to in this volume was written by Miss Montgomery.)  
*Murray* = R. H. Murray, *Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlement*, 1911.  
*Parker* = Capt. Robert Parker's *Memoirs*, 1746.  
*Parkman* = Francis Parkman, *A Half Century of Conflict* (Centenary edition, 1922), Vol. I.  
*Parl. Hist.* = Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*.  
*Parnell* = Col. Arthur Parnell, *The War of the Succession in Spain*, ed. 1905.  
*Pelet* = General Pelet, *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'Espagne*, 1835.  
*Priv. Corr.* = *Private Correspondence of the Duchess of Marlborough*, 1838.  
*Remembrance* = *The Remembrance, Scots Brigade in the Netherlands*, Vol. III, 1901.  
*R.H.S.* = *Royal Historical Society* publications.  
*Rox.* = *Roxburgh Club* publications.  
*Salomon* = F. Salomon, *Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums Königin Annas*, 1894.  
*Somerville, Q. Anne* = Thomas Somerville, *History of Great Britain during the Reign of Queen Anne*, 1798.  
*Swift, Letters* = *Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, edited by F. E. Ball, 1911.  
*Swift, Prose Works* = *Swift's Prose Works*, edited by Temple Scott (Bohn's Library, 12 vols.).  
*Taylor* = Frank Taylor, *The Wars of Marlborough*, 1921.  
*Tindal* = Tindal's continuation of *Rapin's History of England*, ed. 1744.  
*Torcy* = *Memoirs of the Marquis of Torcy*, by himself, 2 vols., 1757. Translated from the French.  
*Verney* = *Verney Letters of the Eighteenth Century*, 1928.  
*Walker* = Sir Hovenden Walker, *Journal of the Late Expedition to Canada*, 1720.  
*Ward's Sophia* = A. W. Ward, *The Electress Sophia*, 1909.  
*Wentworth Papers* = *The Wentworth Papers*, 1705-1739, edited by J. J. Cartwright, 1883.  
*Wheeler* = J. T. Wheeler, *Madras in the Olden Time*, 1861.  
*Wodrow Anal.* = *Analecra*, by the Rev. Robert Wodrow (*Maitland Club*, 1842-1843).  
*Wodrow Corr.* = *Correspondence of the Rev. Robert Wodrow*, 1842.



## NOTES

## CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> P. 2. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 87-88; G. N. Clark, *Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession in the British Year Book of International Law*, 1928, pp. 77-78; *Burchett*, pp. 726-727.

<sup>2</sup> P. 4. *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 6-28; *Lavisse, Hist. de France*, VIII, pp. 116-118; *Blenheim*, p. 321.

<sup>3</sup> P. 4. *Lavisse*, VIII, pp. 115-116; *Torcy*, I, pp. 382-407.

<sup>4</sup> P. 5. *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> P. 7. *H.M.C. Chequers* (1900), pp. 198-199; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 520, 572; *Tatler*, No. 59 (original editions); *Millner*, pp. 262-274; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 455-483; *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 35-38; *Goslinga*, pp. 103-104, asserts that Marlborough wanted to besiege Ypres instead of Tournai, but was overruled.

<sup>6</sup> P. 10. Cf. *Parker*, p. 138, to Orkney in *E.H.R.*, April 1904, p. 318; Kane, *Campaigns*, 1745, p. 84.

<sup>7</sup> P. 11. *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 86-87, 93, 343.

<sup>8</sup> P. 14. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, p. 319.

<sup>9</sup> P. 15. R. Cannon's *Historical Records, First or Royal Regiment of Foot*, pp. 117-118, 269; ditto, *The Buffs*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>10</sup> P. 15. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, p. 319; the absence of any serious resistance by the enemy in defence of the 'redans' is confirmed by *Blackader*, p. 351, as also by *De la Colonie*, p. 341, on the French side.

<sup>11</sup> P. 16. *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 497, 513-516, 520; *Tindal*, IV, 136-137.

<sup>12</sup> P. 16. *Parker*, pp. 138-139.

<sup>13</sup> P. 18. For Malplaquet, see *Feldzüge, Serie 2, Band II*, on the German side; on the French side, *Pelet*, IX and *Villars, Mémoires* and *De la Colonie*, pp. 335-346, and *Feuquières, Mémoires* (1741), IV, pp. 27-48; and H. Sautai, *Bataille de Malplaquet* (French official account, 1904).

*Coxe*, Chaps. LXXXI-LXXXII; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 591-597; *Parker*, pp. 136-139; *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, pp. 316-321 (Orkney, the best single authority); *Remembrance*, pp. 485-499; *Blackader*, pp. 348-351; *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 382-389; *Millner*, pp. 271-281; *Tindal*, IV, 136-139 (map misleading); *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 489-545; *More Culloden Papers*, II, p. 15; *H.M.C.*, R. 5, p. 188; *H.M.C. Hare*, p. 229. Dalton, *English Army Lists*, VI, pp. 297-397, the 'Malplaquet roll'.

*Goslinga*, pp. 108-110, stops short of the battle itself. The Blenheim tapestry, in the manufacture of which the Duke took a special interest, shows the character of the entrenchments; the Grenadiers' Company in their tall shakos in the front line of the regiment about to attack; and other details. Of secondary authorities, *Taylor, Atkinson, Fortescue, Belloc* and *Malplaquet, and Wars of Marlborough*. For the best modern professional account see Major A. H. Burne in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Apr. 1933.

<sup>14</sup> P. 18. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, pp. 320-321.

<sup>15</sup> P. 18. Eugene reported 16,000 to the Kaiser, see *Feldzüge, Serie 2, Band II, Supplement*, p. 259; the official estimate in *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 501, makes it over 18,000.

- <sup>16</sup> P. 19. *Priv. Corr.*, II, p. 383; *Dispatches*, IV, p. 597.  
<sup>17</sup> P. 19. *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 501; *Millner*, p. 280.  
<sup>18</sup> P. 20. *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 387-391; *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 881; *Hervey, L.B.*, I, pp. 259-260.  
<sup>19</sup> P. 21. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 526-527; *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 265; *Durfey's Pills*, I, pp. 58-60; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 271 and 273, L'Hermitage on Whig and Tory attitudes.  
<sup>20</sup> P. 21. *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 391-392.  
<sup>21</sup> P. 23. *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 475, ff. 128-133, Richards' last letters and papers; *Tindal*, IV, p. 141 and map opposite; for the less favourable view of Richards' conduct see *Boyer's Anne* (1735), p. 393, copied in *Chamberlen's Anne* and elsewhere; *Parnell*, Chap. XXIX. *Parnell*, p. 262, says that Richards wrote on Feb. 25, 1709, to his brother, Col. Michael Richards: 'Goodnight, Micky. God send us a merry meeting.' But, in fact, the word 'goodnight' refers to the pay for his Portuguese troops and his fear of Portuguese courtiers' avarice: 'I hope you have secur'd the money which I suppose my Major D. Eman. De Barrios has brought from Lisbon for my Regiment's Account, for if that once gets into the hands of the courtiers, good night Nicolas. Pray God send us a merry meeting' (*B.M. Stowe MSS.* 475, f. 131).

## CHAPTER II

- <sup>22</sup> P. 28. *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 91.  
<sup>23</sup> P. 29. See the important State Paper in *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 87, 4, ff. 190-207, especially 202-205 (the Dutch answer to the Tories' charges in 1712).  
<sup>24</sup> P. 30. See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 380-381; *Geikie*, pp. 147-152, 160-162, 180-182; *Feldzüge, Serie 2, Band III, Supplement*, p. 32, Eugene to Charles, Mar. 26, 1710.  
<sup>25</sup> P. 31. Noorden, *Europä. Gesch.*, III, pp. 602-604; *Geikie*, pp. 175-184; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 667, 673-674; *Klopp*, XIII, p. 351.  
<sup>26</sup> P. 34. *Burnet*, V, p. 398; *H.M.C. Dartmouth* (1887), p. 300; Charles King's *British Merchant* (ed. 1721), III, pp. 19-20 and *passim*; *Luttrell*, VI, p. 668.  
<sup>27</sup> P. 34. For wheat prices 1701-1714, see p. 437 of *Blenheim*; see also *Verney*, I, p. 278, Jan. 7, 1710.  
<sup>28</sup> P. 34. *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, f. 38 (*L'Hermitage*).  
<sup>29</sup> P. 35. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 197; *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 866; *Turberville's Shrewsbury* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 167-169.  
<sup>30</sup> P. 36. *Somers MSS.*, copy of Portland's letter of March 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ , 1709 [= 1710?].  
<sup>31</sup> P. 38. *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, f. 254 (*L'H.*); *H. of L. MSS.* (1708-1710), pp. 285-286; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 780-783; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 96; *Burnet*, V, pp. 399, 425, VI, pp. 33-35; *H.M.C. Verney*, R. 7, p. 507; *Leadam*, pp. 141-143; *Add. MSS.* 28946, ff. 35-37, on conduct of the Elector Palatine to his Protestant subjects; *C.S.P., Tr.* (1708-1714), pp. xv-xvi, 257, 267, 331, 475; *Burnet's Anne*, III, pp. 116, 180-182; *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 34, 11, f. 44; 14, f. 32. *The Palatines' Catechism* (1709), a fairly impartial discussion of the question. For the Palatines in Ireland see *Lecky's Ireland*, I, pp. 351-352; *Murray*, pp. 359-362; *Add. MSS.* 35933, ff. 12-20; *Irish Commons Journals*, III, pp. 857-861; *Somers MSS.* contain a batch of official and semi-official correspondence on the Palatines, that bears out evidence from other sources.  
<sup>32</sup> P. 38. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 195-196.  
<sup>33</sup> P. 39. *Taiter*, No. 63; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 167 note and 190; *Journal to*

*Stella*, July 3, 1711, and Jan. 28, 1712; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 541. Mrs. Manley's letter to Harley of May 10, 1712, implies, I think, that she had not been put on by him to write the *New Atlantis*.

<sup>34</sup> P. 40. *Add. MSS.* 9118, ff. 246-248, 270, Mr. Mainwaring to Sarah, and App. B, p. 327 above, Sarah's note on Somers' letter of June  $\frac{1}{7}$ , 1710. *Althorp MSS.*, Sarah to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744; *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 148-161; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 542; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 198.

<sup>35</sup> P. 40. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

<sup>36</sup> P. 41. *Coxe*, Chap. III, ed. 1819, pp. 135-136 (end of Chap. LXXXV).

<sup>37</sup> P. 42. Mainwaring's letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, *Add. MSS.* 9118, f. 246.

<sup>38</sup> P. 42. *Conduct*, pp. 224-226; *Coxe*, III, ed. 1819, p. 130 (Chap. LXXXV); *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, R. 8, p. 43; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 83; Mrs. Kathleen Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 202-204; on Abigail's character, see her fellow-Tory Dartmouth's note, in *Burnet*, VI, pp. 32-33 note.

<sup>39</sup> P. 43. The story told by Lord Coningsby (*Archaeologia*, XXXVIII, pp. 9-12), which makes Somers and Godolphin positively treacherous to Marlborough in this matter, lacks confirmation. Sarah never suspected Godolphin of betraying her husband. But as we have Harley's evidence that Somers was intriguing to supplant Godolphin in August 1710, it is possible he may have had the same idea in his head as early as January. See *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

<sup>40</sup> P. 43. *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVI; *Atkinson*, pp. 414-415 and note; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 102-104; *Felting*, p. 416.

### CHAPTER III

<sup>41</sup> P. 46. See App. A, p. 324 above, and *Lansdowne MSS.* 829, ff. 123-125, *Representation by the Lords' Commissioners of the Treasury of the state of the revenue for 1710: Stats. of Realm* (ed. 1822), IX, pp. 148-243; *R.H.S.*, 1910 (Leadam on Godolphin's finance), pp. 22-26; *Dowell*, II, pp. 75-76; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 650; *Plunder and Bribery, a memorial to the British Parliament* (1712), pp. 35-43, for the sailors' grievances; *C.S.P.*, *Tr.* 1708-1714, pp. xv, 298, 300, 323, 352, 360-361.

<sup>42</sup> P. 46. *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 374, 389 (L'Hermitage); *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 84; Ashton, *Social Life in Reign of Anne*, I, pp. 114-116; *H.M.C. Rutland*, p. 189; *R.H.S.* (1910), pp. 25-26; Swift, *Journal to Stella*, Sept. 15, 1710; *Verney*, I, p. 291; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 126-129; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 658, Halifax on the lottery.

<sup>43</sup> P. 47. *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 320, III, p. 65; *Blenheim*, pp. 51, 277. See Appendix C, p. 332 above, De Foe's letter to Stanhope on Sacheverell.

<sup>44</sup> P. 48. C. E. Mallet, *History of the University of Oxford*, III, p. 36.

<sup>45</sup> P. 49. Swift, *Memoirs relating to the Change in Queen's Ministry in 1710*; *Althorp MSS.*, the Duchess's letter to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, V, p. 429.

<sup>46</sup> P. 50. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 99-100; *H.M.C. Townshend*, p. 334; *Ailesbury, Mems.*, II, p. 620.

<sup>47</sup> P. 51. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 110-113; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 401, 418-419, 421-422; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 535; *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 444; *H.M.C. Sackville*, I (1904), p. 35; *Burnet*, V, pp. 431-432 [543]; *Leadam*, p. 166; Colley Cibber's *Apology*, 1740, p. 347.

<sup>48</sup> P. 54. Reports of the speeches for and against Sacheverell will be found in

*State Trials*, XV, *Parl. Hist.*, VI, and Boyer's *Queen Anne*. For the passages I specially refer to in the text see *State Trials*, XV, pp. 41-43, 79-83, 97, 109-116, 126, 196-201, 225, 364-368. A more out-and-out defence of Sacheverell can be found in Smalridge's *Thoughts of a country gentleman upon reading Dr. Sacheverell's tryal* (1710). For moderate Tory comment on Harcourt's speech see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 533-535.

<sup>49</sup> P. 54. Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), p. 433.

<sup>50</sup> P. 55. *State Trials*, XV, p. 97.

<sup>51</sup> P. 55. *A Hundred Years of Quarter Sessions; the government of Middlesex 1660 to 1710*, E. G. Dowdell (1932), pp. 19-24.

<sup>52</sup> P. 57. *State Trials*, XV, pp. 521-702; Ned Ward's *Vulgar Britannicus* [sic] or the *British Hudibras*, 1710, very curious; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 533-534; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 34, 12, ff. 5, 14, 16; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 416-417; Andréades, *History of the Bank of England*, p. 126; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 418-419, 421-422; *Calamy*, II, p. 228.

<sup>53</sup> P. 58. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 537-538; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 443-444; *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVII (II), pp. 162-164, ed. 1819.

<sup>54</sup> P. 58. *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, p. 468; J. E. B. Mayor, *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, p. 384; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 539, 550; *Leadam*, p. 169; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 34, 12, ff. 1, 43; *Aylesbury, Memoirs*, II, p. 621; Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* (Dec. 1710), pp. 4-8.

<sup>55</sup> P. 59. *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 84-101; *H.M.C. Aylesbury* (R. 15, App. 7, 1898), pp. 201-202; *Aylesbury* (Rox.), p. 621; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 537. For the furies of the Sacheverell controversy see the Rev. William Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* [= Sacheverell] and the *Letter in answer to the Modern Fanatick*; *The Priest turned Poet* (a rhyming parody of Sacheverell's sermon). *The Dialogue of a Sacheverelite Parson and a Hoadlean Gentleman, or Both Sides Pleased*, is more decently written than most of the pamphlets on either side.

## CHAPTER IV

<sup>56</sup> P. 63. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, pp. 219; *Feiling*, pp. 418-420; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 133; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 11-12, Onslow's note; *Faults on Both Sides* (1710), expressing 'moderate' views.

<sup>57</sup> P. 63. *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 295-298, Sarah's first record of the interview, from which I think she must have drawn her account in *Conduct*, pp. 236-245; Mrs. Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 207-210. I note that Sarah's epitomes of the Queen's letters of April 1710, printed in italics on pp. 237 and 238 of the *Conduct*, are true representations of the actual letters, which can be found in the *Althorp MSS.*

<sup>58</sup> P. 64. *Conduct*, pp. 248-253; *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 305-306, II, pp. 421-423; Turberville's *Shrewsbury*, pp. 171-175; *Coxe*, Chaps. LXXXIX-XC; *Burnet*, VI, p. 7, Hardwicke's note.

<sup>59</sup> P. 65. *Burnet*, VI, p. 8, Dartmouth's note; *Coxe*, Chap. XCI; *Coxe's Walpole*, II, pp. 24-30; *Conduct*, pp. 257-259. Onslow's note in *Burnet*, VI, pp. 11-12, is interesting, but lacks confirmation; the correspondence of the Whig leaders themselves, such as we have, does not indicate that they would have refused to meet Harley half-way if he had really made such offers as Onslow says.

<sup>60</sup> P. 66. *Coxe's Walpole*, II, p. 31, Marlborough's letter of July 5, 1710.

<sup>61</sup> P. 67. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

<sup>62</sup> P. 68. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 550, 562, 584-585, 597, 616, 629-631.

<sup>63</sup> P. 68. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213; *Cowper*, p. 43.

<sup>64</sup> P. 69. *Althorp MSS.*, the Duchess to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744.

<sup>65</sup> P. 69. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 618-624, 635-636; Atkinson's *Marlborough*, pp. 431-434; Moderate Tory Pamphlet, *Reasons why the Duke of Marlborough cannot lay down his command*, Aug. 1710; see *Add. MSS.* 9110, f. 92, for Shrewsbury's continued protestations of friendship to Marlborough, end of August 1710: 'He did confess there were a great many things that might make the D. of Marlborough uneasy, but hoped for all that he would have no other thought but going on,' *viz.*, as commander in the field.

<sup>66</sup> P. 69. See *Blenheim*, pp. 206-207; *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 163-164; *P.R.O. T.*, 38, 737, and 48, 15 give at regular intervals the names of the Treasury clerks. The continuity of Treasury personnel through the changes of Ministry is remarkable.

<sup>67</sup> P. 70. See Appendix A, p. 324 above; *Lansdowne MSS.* (B.M.) 829, ff. 123-135; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 545, 637; *R.H.S.* (1910), pp. 26-31, Leadam on Harley's finance.

<sup>68</sup> P. 70. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 551, 579, 590, 592, 599, 608, 611, 632; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 300; *Dartmouth MSS.*, letter of Duke of Beaufort to Dartmouth, Sept. 21, 1710: 'I find that not having the list of Deputy Lieutenants with the Queen's approbation will be of ill consequence to our elections.'

<sup>69</sup> P. 70. *H.M.C. Bath*, III (1908), p. 437; *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 219, IV, pp. 551-552, 561, 578; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, f. 595.

<sup>70</sup> P. 71. Nichols (John), *Literary Anecdotes*, I, pp. 396-397, VIII, p. 369; *Notes and Queries* (3rd ser.), III, p. 409.

<sup>71</sup> P. 71. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 151; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 607; *H.M.C. Bath*, III, p. 440; *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 903.

<sup>72</sup> P. 72. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 612-613; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), pp. xvii, 258-259.

<sup>73</sup> P. 72. As to the two members returned by Newcastle for Boroughbridge, we know Stapylton was a Tory (*B.M. Stowe MSS.* 223, f. 454), and we know Peyton was a Tory at that time in fact, whatever he may have been sometimes called (*B.M. Lansdowne MSS.* 1236, f. 255). For Aldborough see *Portland*, IV, p. 612, where he put in Monkton and Jessop, both Whigs.

<sup>74</sup> P. 72. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 149; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 592; *H.M.C. Aylesbury* (1898), pp. 201-202; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 595, 641; *Cowper*, P. 50.

<sup>75</sup> P. 72. *Bodleian MSS. Ballard* 15, f. 96.

<sup>76</sup> P. 72. *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 88-100.

<sup>77</sup> P. 73. *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 903; Basil Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 125-127; J. E. B. Mayor's *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, p. 396; *Add. MSS.* 17677 DDD, ff. 615, 671; *Granville*, pp. 109, 121, 127.

<sup>78</sup> P. 74. In *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 223, ff. 453-456, is a very interesting list of Whigs, Tories and a few 'Doubtfuls.' It is not wholly accurate, and can be contrasted with the list of the Parliament elected in 1705 (*Stowe MSS.* 354, f. 161), where the Members are grouped in a number of different categories, and with the passage in *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 291, where Harley analyzes that Parliament of 1705. Compare also the list (again not wholly accurate) of Tories, 'Whimsical' Tories and Whigs as then divided on the Commercial Treaty with France in 1713, given at the end of *Letter from a Member etc. on the Bill of Commerce* (1713). *Feiling*, p. 422, without being inaccurate, uses words that leave an impression of Whig defeat in Cornwall and Bucks greater than was actually the case, and his suggestion on p. 423 that the Tory majority was about three to one makes it too big. It was nearer two to one.

## CHAPTER V

<sup>79</sup> P. 76. *Coxe*, III, Chap. LXXXIV (ed. 1819, pp. 122-123); *R.H.S., British Diplomatic Instruction, Sweden*, pp. xiv-xvi, 40-47, and *ditto, Denmark*, pp. xi, 31-33. On England's Baltic policy see *Blenheim*, pp. 9-10, and *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 288-293.

<sup>80</sup> P. 77. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 177.

<sup>81</sup> P. 79. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 9117, ff. 155-159, Stanhope's dispatch to Walpole. It had been printed in *Somerville, Q. Anne*, p. 637, but wrongly in one very important word; the *Stowe MS.* shows that Somerville's 'a little hill behind us' should be 'between us.' See also *Mahon*, pp. cxxi-cxxvi, Lenoir's Journal; B. Williams' *Stanhope*; *Parnell*, Chap. XXXI; *Tindal*, IV, p. 176; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 459-461; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 336-341. The narrative printed in Tindal shows that Parnell is wrong in implying that the killing of the Spanish General by Stanhope is not mentioned by anyone who took part in the battle. Moreover, Queen Anne presented Stanhope with a gold medal, commemorating the event, which she would scarcely have done if it had not really occurred. It is now at Chevening.

<sup>82</sup> P. 79. St. Simon established the date of Vendôme's commission and departure as prior to the arrival of the news of Saragossa at the French Court.

<sup>83</sup> P. 81. B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 96-97; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 638-639; *Tindal*, IV, p. 178 (a personal narrative); Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 461-462 (Col. Harrison's narrative); *Mahon*, pp. 305-312 and cxv-cxvi Appendix; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 345-354 (confuses right and left wings, but important on the morale of the Spanish army before the battle); *cp. Dalton, Army Lists*, VI, p. 385.

<sup>84</sup> P. 82. Geikie, *The Dutch Barrier*, p. 138, letter of Aug. 26, 1709.

<sup>85</sup> P. 84. *Ailesbury (Rox.)*, II, p. 629.

<sup>86</sup> P. 84. *Bacallar*, II, pp. 314-400; B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 100-105; *Mahon*, pp. 314-330; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 401-402. On the plundering and outrages by the Allies we need not believe all the stories in *Bacallar*, but they give the Spanish point of view, and are to some extent confirmed by Col. M. Richards' letter to Craggs printed in Appendix D, p. 334 above.

<sup>87</sup> P. 84. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 25, 1710, referring to a conversation 'two months ago'; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 152; B. Williams' *Stanhope* on the intention to replace him by Argyle, entertained before Brihuega.

<sup>88</sup> P. 87. For Brihuega see B. Williams' *Stanhope*, which gives far the best account of it from a careful collation of all sources. See also *Stowe MSS. (B.M.)* 476, ff. 2-4; *Add. MSS.* 9117, ff. 172-177, printed in *Mahon*, App., pp. cxvii-cxx; *Coxe*, Chap. XCVI, note at end of chapter for General Pepper's accusations against Stanhope, on which see B. Williams; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 180-181; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 405-420; *Klopp*, XIII, p. 544; *cp. Dalton, Army Lists*, VI, pp. 386-387, for English prisoners taken; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 465-466, and see App. D, p. 335 above.

<sup>89</sup> P. 88. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 230, Gaultier's letters to Torcy of Oct. 7 (N.S.) and Dec. 23 (N.S.), 1710.

## CHAPTER VI

<sup>90</sup> P. 90. *Bol. Letters*, III, p. 78; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 240, f. 79 (printed App. to Chap. XIII, p. 231 above), Gaultier's letter to Torcy, Oct. 29, 1712 (N.S.).

<sup>91</sup> P. 91. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 218.

<sup>92</sup> P. 91. *Salomon*, p. 249, note 3, Jan. 28, 1714.

<sup>98</sup> P. 91. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, Jacobite correspondence 1712-14; *Salomon*, pp. 331-343; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers* (1902); *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 31255, ff. 6-15; *Macpherson*, II, p. 525.

<sup>99</sup> P. 92. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 511-517.

<sup>100</sup> P. 93. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 230, ff. 205-323, especially f. 319 (see excerpts in my article in the *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1934). Some of these important letters between Torcy and Gaultier, July-Oct. 1710 *et seq.*, were transcribed by Mackintosh from the archives in Paris, and the transcripts are now in the British Museum, *Add. MSS.* 34493; *Legrelle*, IV, p. 583.

<sup>101</sup> P. 93. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 187, 202-203; *Stowe MSS. (B.M.)* 223, ff. 448-449; *Cowper*, p. 49.

<sup>102</sup> P. 93. *Macpherson*, II, p. 264, Nov. 7, 1711. Buckingham is sometimes called Buckinghamshire, as he was Duke of the County of Buckingham. *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 399-401; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 126.

<sup>103</sup> P. 93. *Ward's Sophia*, *passim*; *Coxe's Walpole*, II, p. 32; *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 224, 225, Raby's letters to the Electress, e.g. 224, ff. 303-305, and other correspondence between Hanover and England; and see *Macpherson* for 1710-12.

<sup>104</sup> P. 94. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 630, V, pp. 42, 78; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 239, 258; *Boyer's Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 511-513; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 235, ff. 286-287.

<sup>105</sup> P. 95. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 536. The letter refers to the Secretaryship at War, which St. John had formerly held, which Walpole held then, and was at one moment intended for Cardonnell.

<sup>106</sup> P. 95. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. iii, 231-232, 234-235; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 45.

<sup>107</sup> P. 95. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 152; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 640, 658, 674-675, 687, V, pp. 115-116, 120, 125.

<sup>108</sup> P. 97. *Journal to Stella*, Feb. 18, Mar. 4, 1711; see also *Leadam*, p. 180; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 161, 180, on the impeachments demanded by the October Club, especially its younger members. A good account of the differences between Harley and the October Club as to policy in 1710-11 will be found in *Lockhart*, I, pp. 322-324.

<sup>109</sup> P. 98. On the First-Fruits and Twentieths see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 609-610; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 201-203, 212-213; *Add. MSS.* 4804, f. 32, Swift's commission from the Irish bishops to deal with the First-Fruits question, Aug. 31, 1710.

<sup>110</sup> P. 99. *Journal to Stella*, Sept. 9 and 30, Nov. 8; *Swift, Letters*, I, p. 194.

<sup>111</sup> P. 100. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 641.

<sup>112</sup> P. 100. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 94, Sept. 1711.

<sup>113</sup> P. 103. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1025-1026 and note; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), p. 251; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 185; *Luttrell*, Mar. 8, 1711; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, f. 204. The 'penny post' operated within the London area, see *Blenheim*, p. 91.

<sup>114</sup> P. 103. *H.M.C. Clements*, p. 251; *Hervey, L.B.*, I, p. 301.

<sup>115</sup> P. 104. *Hervey, L.B.*, I, pp. 287, 290; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 166, 172.

<sup>116</sup> P. 104. *Somers MSS.*

<sup>117</sup> P. 105. *Spectator*, No. 3, Mar. 3, 1711; W. R. Scott, *Joint Stock Companies*, III, pp. 283, 293.

## CHAPTER VII

<sup>118</sup> P. 107. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 928-932; *Cowper*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>119</sup> P. 107. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1000, 1001, 1014; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 657; *H.C.J.*, XVI, pp. 471, 610, 611; *H.L.J.*, XIX, pp. 284, 287.

<sup>115</sup> P. 108. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1016-1019; *Leadam*, p. 180; *Stella*, Apr. 27, 1711; *Swift's Letters*, I, pp. 74 and 253 and notes; *Coxe's Walpole*, I, pp. 32-36; *The Debts of the Nation Considered* and *The Thirty-five Millions accounted for*, two pamphlets of 1711.

<sup>116</sup> P. 108. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 167; *H.C.J.*, XVI, pp. 432, 440; *Burnet*, VI, p. 36, Onslow's note; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 103-104. The full title of the Qualification Act is 'An Act for securing the freedom of Parliaments by the farther qualifying the members to sit in the House of Commons.'

<sup>117</sup> P. 109. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 637, 662-663.

<sup>118</sup> P. 109. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 167.

<sup>119</sup> P. 109. *Add. MSS.* (*L.H.*) 17677 *EEE*, ff. 103-104; Swift, *Examiner* No. 35 (No. 34 in the reprint); *Burnet*, VI, pp. 35-36.

<sup>120</sup> P. 110. Muralt's *Letters on the English*, translated from the French ed. 1726, p. 9.

<sup>121</sup> P. 112. Spencer Walpole, *Hist. of England*, Chap. V (ed. 1902, Vol. I, pp. 388-390).

<sup>122</sup> P. 112. On the subject of the new London churches I am grateful for help from Mr. H. M. Walton, of Queens' College, Cambridge, who has made a special study of the affair. See *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1004-1005, 1012-1013; *Tindal*, IV, p. 208; *H.C.J.*, Apr. 6, 1711; *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Bk. V, pp. 52-53; J. E. Smith, *St. John the Evangelist, Westminster* (1892), Chap. II; William Maitland, *History of London* (1756), I, p. 509; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 159, 195, 237.

<sup>123</sup> P. 113. On the debates see *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 935-993; *Luttrell*, VI, pp. 677-678; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 170-179; *Account of Earl of Gakway's Conduct in Spain*, 1711.

<sup>124</sup> P. 113. *Lansdowne MSS.* (B.M.) 1236, f. 261.

<sup>125</sup> P. 114. Argyle's letters from Spain will be found in the Cambridge University Library (Add. 6570). Quotations from them are made in a communication by Professor Temperley to the *Cambridge Hist. Journal*, 1924. In the MSS. themselves, *sub* July 2, 1711, will be found details of the quarrel of Charles and the Catalans. See also *H.M.C. Eliot-Hodgkin* (1897), pp. 86-87; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 687, V, pp. 17, 240-241; Robert Campbell's *Life of Argyle* (1745), pp. 69-72; *Burnet*, VI, p. 55, Dartmouth's note.

<sup>126</sup> P. 114. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.

<sup>127</sup> P. 115. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 162-165; *Tindal*, IV, p. 195.

<sup>128</sup> P. 115. *Coxe's Walpole*, II, pp. 36-37; Bolingbroke, *Study and Use of History*, Letter VII; *Ramilles and the Union*, p. 327; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.

<sup>129</sup> P. 115. *Tindal*, IV, p. 196; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 623-624; *H.M.C. Bath* I (1904), pp. xi, 203-207; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 177-178; *Cowper*, pp. 49-52; *Coxe*, Chaps. XCVIII-XCIX.

<sup>130</sup> P. 116. Sarah's defence will be found in full in *Add. MSS.* 9121, ff. 1-20, written while she was abroad in 1712 or 1713. See also *Conduct*, pp. 263, 272-316; Churchill's *Marlborough*, I, p. 563; *Coxe*, Chap. XCVIII; *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough*, 1875 (to Mr. Jennings, Dec. 4, 1710), pp. 18-24, 123-125; *Other Side of the Question*, 1742 (Tory answer to *Conduct*), p. 465; Mrs. Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, 1932 (the best biography of her), pp. 216-228; see *H.M.C. Buccleugh* (1899), I, pp. 360-361, for a detail of Sarah's official accounts.

<sup>131</sup> P. 117. *Althorp MSS.* Sarah's letter to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744. Lord Cowper 'came to see me twice a week, though the Queen had servants [in St. James's Palace] that had windows into my court of Marlborough House that saw him. And when I went out of England he sometimes wrote to me.'

<sup>132</sup> P. 118. *Burnet*, VI, p. 32, notes by Dartmouth and Onslow; Sir C. Firth,



*Dean Swift and Ecclesiastical Preferment*, reprinted from *Review of English Studies* of Jan. 1926, by Sidgwick and Jackson, a masterly and decisive piece on Swift's fortunes. Swift's attack on the Duchess of Somerset, the *Windsor Prophecy*, will be found among his Poems, and the reader will be able to understand its references to Thynne and Koningsmark if he reads the article on the Duke of Somerset in the *Dic. of Nat. Biog.*, or consults *State Trials*, Vol. IX, pp. 1-128. See also *Swift's Prose Works* (ed. T. Scott), V, p. 463, and *Stella* journal for Dec. 1711.

<sup>133</sup> P. 118. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 464, and pp. 311, 326, 360, 369.

<sup>134</sup> P. 119. *Portland*, IV, pp. 656, 675-676, V, pp. 464-465, 655; *Leadam*, pp. 182-183; *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. 188-190.

<sup>135</sup> P. 120. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 666-670, V, p. 655, 'dying request,' etc.; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 185-187; *Stella*, Mar. 8-25, *passim*; *Examiner*, No. 33 (32 in the reprint), *Swift's Prose Works*, IX, pp. 207-214; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 39-40 (Dartmouth's note); *Tindal*, IV, pp. 201-202; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, f. 142; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 238-242.

<sup>136</sup> P. 121. *Stella*, Mar. 8, 1711; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 655; *Luttrell*, VI, p. 700; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1006-1009.

<sup>137</sup> P. 121. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 674.

<sup>138</sup> P. 123. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 189-190; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 140, 155-156, 161, 167.

<sup>139</sup> P. 124. On the South Sea Act see *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 178, 193-194, 216; W. R. Scott, *Joint Stock Companies to 1720*, III, pp. 291-298; E. S. Roscoe, *Robert Harley* (1902), pp. 145-151; R.H.S. (1910), pp. 28-32 (*Godolphin's Finance*); *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1021-1023; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 158, on the Dutch attitude.

<sup>140</sup> P. 127. *Monk's Bentley*, I, pp. 282, 289, 308-309, 334, 356.

<sup>141</sup> P. 127. For Atterbury at Christ Church see *H.M.C. Portland*, VII *passim* (the quotation is from p. 137), but compare it with Chap. VI of Beeching's *Atterbury*; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 165, on the Queen's attitude to Atterbury and Sacheverell.

<sup>142</sup> P. 128. *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 299.

<sup>143</sup> P. 128. *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 447.

## CHAPTER VIII

<sup>144</sup> P. 133. *Lansdowne MSS.* (B.M.) 1236, f. 259. The 'project' there mentioned is the siege of Le Quesnoy (Letter of Oct. 2, 1711).

<sup>145</sup> P. 133. For the forcing of the Lines and taking of Bouchain see *Fortescue*, I, pp. 540-548; *Atkinson*, pp. 439-453; *Coxe*, Chaps. CII-CIV; *Pelet*, X, pp. 419-421 and *passim*; *Parker*, pp. 149-170; *H.M.C. Hare*, pp. 232-233; *Marchmont*, II, pp. 77-79; *Goslinga*, pp. 126-136; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 643-647; *Lediard, Mar.*, III, pp. 132-192; *Millner*, pp. 315-341; *Dispatches*, V, pp. 428-437; *Bouchain, a dialogue between the late Medley and Examiner*, 1711.

## CHAPTER IX

<sup>146</sup> P. 138. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 199-200; *C.S.P., America 1702-3*, p. 673; *Egerton*, Bk. II, Chap. IV, and *Adams*, Chaps. I-VI *passim*.

<sup>147</sup> P. 138. *Parkman*, p. 161.

<sup>148</sup> P. 139. Wyatt Tilby, *The American Colonies 1585-1763*, p. 216. Some contemporary estimates put the number in French Canada even lower; see *C.S.P., America 1708-9*, pp. 41-45, 163-164, and *ditto*, 1710-11, pp. 329-331.

- <sup>149</sup> P. 140. See J. Nelson's letter to Shrewsbury in *H.M.C. Buccleugh* II, 2 (1903), pp. 724-729, 734; *C.S.P., America 1708-09*, pp. 163-164; *C.H.B.E.*, VI, Chaps. III and IV (pp. 79-81).
- <sup>150</sup> P. 141. For the Indian war in the Southern colonies see *C.S.P., America 1711-12*, pp. 277-281.
- <sup>151</sup> P. 141. *Parkman*, p. 126; *Adams*, pp. 71-81.
- <sup>152</sup> P. 142. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 32694, ff. 108-130.
- <sup>153</sup> P. 143. *Parkman*, Chaps. VI-VII; *Tatler*, No. 171; *Spectator*, Nos. 50, 56, and note p. 336, Vol. I, ed. of 1897; *Adams*, pp. 77-81; *Burnet*, VI, p. 61; Dartmouth's note; *C.S.P., America 1710-11*, pp. vii-xii and *passim*. On the plans of the Godolphin Ministry to take Quebec in 1709-10 see *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 32694, ff. 108-136; *C.H.B.E.*, VI, pp. 85-86.
- <sup>154</sup> P. 143. Letter of Jan. 17, 1711, *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.
- <sup>155</sup> P. 144. *Macpherson*, II, p. 530.
- <sup>156</sup> P. 145. See Major Livingstone's report on the garrison and defences of Quebec, *C.S.P., America 1710-11*, pp. v-vii, 329-331.
- <sup>157</sup> P. 146. *C.S.P., America 1711-12*, with Cecil Headlam's excellent Preface, prints most of the relative documents about the Quebec expedition, including the Journals of Hill, Vetch and King, referred to by *Parkman*, p. 182 note. See also *Walker, passim*, especially pp. 124-125 and 275-280. Walker was hardly treated in the reign of George I, but his mismanagement of the expedition is made clear, even on his own evidence. See also *Parkman*, Chap. VIII; *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 32694, ff. 101-107; *Adams*, pp. 81-83; *Burchett*, pp. 778-781; *Leake*, II, pp. 364-367; Boyer's *Q. Anne* (1735), pp. 507-510 (on which the account in Chamberlen's *Q. Anne* is based); *Lediard, Naval Hist.* (1735), II, pp. 851-856; *C.S.P., America 1710-11*, pp. 329, 556-560. On Nicholson's expedition see *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 89.
- <sup>158</sup> P. 146. *Cunningham*, pp. 281-282; *C.S.P., America 1702-3*, p. 80; *ditto*, 1708-9, p. 305; *ditto*, 1711-12, pp. 178-179.
- <sup>159</sup> P. 146. *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 78, 173 (*France* 1699-1704), ff. 234-243; *C.S.P., America 1702*, pp. xlv-xlv, 441-442; *ditto*, 1711-12, pp. 17-18.
- <sup>160</sup> P. 146. Boyer's *Q. Anne* (1735), pp. 51-52; *C.S.P., America 1704-5*, pp. 32-33.
- <sup>161</sup> P. 147. *C.S.P., America 1708-9*, pp. xxxi, xxxv, 122-123, 318.
- <sup>162</sup> P. 147. *C.H.B.E.*, I, p. 267; *C.S.P., America 1708-9*, p. 212.
- <sup>163</sup> P. 147. *H.M.C. Verney*, R. 7, p. 508.
- <sup>164</sup> P. 147. *C.S.P., America 1702-3*, p. 817; *ditto*, 1708-9, p. 47.
- <sup>165</sup> P. 149. *Luttrell*, Mar. 5, 1701-2.
- <sup>166</sup> P. 150. *C.S.P., America 1708-9*, p. 212; see *ditto*, pp. xvi-xvii, 177-179, 209-213; and *ditto*, 1710-11, pp. xvii, 352-353; *H.C.F.*, XVI, pp. 275-276; *Cunningham*, p. 278 note; Ch. Davenant's *Works*, ed. 1771, V, his *Reflections on the African Trade*; *H.M.C. Kenyon* (1894), pp. 432-433; *Egerton*, pp. 109-111; *C.H.B.E.*, I, Chaps. XI and XV; *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 78, 153, f. 267. Above all I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the late Miss Thora Stone, and to her thesis (in the University Library, London), *The Struggle for Power on the Senegal and the Gambia 1660-1713*.
- <sup>167</sup> P. 151. *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 87, 4, f. 94.
- <sup>168</sup> P. 151. *P.R.O. (S.P.)* 105, 178, *Levant Co. Chancery Register 1702-7*, *passim* for the system at work; *R.H.S. (1927)*, *Diplomatic Service under William III*, pp. 96-97; *Cunningham*, p. 252; De Foe's *English Tradesman* (1727), II, ii, p. 65; *H.M.C., R. 10*, App. IV (1885), p. 414, Mr. Salwey's MSS.
- <sup>169</sup> P. 152. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, pp. i, xi, 256-259; *H.M.C., R. 10*, App. IV (1885), pp. 414-415; *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's Letters from Turkey*, 1717.

<sup>170</sup> P. 154. *Wheeler*, I, pp. 358-406, II, pp. 17-18 ; Basil Williams' *Chatham*, Vol. I, Chap. I ; *India Office MSS.* (Pitt's diary, *Fort St. George Records* for 1702). From Pitt's letter of Nov. 8, six months after the raising of the siege (*Hedges*, p. lxxix), it would seem he had not paid the 20,000 rupees, presumably because this was conditional on certain restorations that had not been fulfilled. For the Treaty that ended the siege see *Wheeler*, I, p. 405. For an account of Madras towards the close of Anne's reign see *Hamilton*, I, pp. 358-368 ; he declares that there were 500 Europeans and as many as 80,000 Indians in the Company's Madras territory. The Indians were sometimes estimated at an even higher figure.

<sup>171</sup> P. 154. *Wheeler*, II, p. 21.

<sup>172</sup> P. 154. *Factory Records of the E.I. Co. preserved in India Office* (1897), p. viii, gives a list of the factories of this period ; *Collet, passim*, on Fort York.

<sup>173</sup> P. 155. *Hamilton*, I, pp. 372-377.

<sup>174</sup> P. 155. *India Office MSS., Fort St. George*, 12, list at end of vol. ; *Collection of Letters from the Protestant Missionaries in the East Indies*, Pt. III (1718), p. 187.

<sup>175</sup> P. 156. *H.M.C. Fortescue* (1892), pp. 38, 48-49 ; B. Williams' *Chatham*, I, pp. 20-22 ; *Hedges*, pp. cxxv-cxl ; Henry Dodwell, *Report of the Madras Records ; Bombay in the days of Queen Anne*, Hakluyt Soc., 1933, pp. xvi-xxiii, 12-13, 25 ; *Collet*, pp. xiv, xxii-xxiii and *passim*, for Sumatra and Madras, E.I.C., life and death and *Collet's* career.

<sup>176</sup> P. 156. *India Office MSS., Fort St. George*, 12, end of the volume.

<sup>177</sup> P. 157. *East India Co. trading to China*, H. B. Morse, Vol. I, *passim* ; *H.M.C. Rutland* (1889), p. 165 ; *Early English Intercourse with Burmah*, D. G. Hall (1928), Chap. X.

<sup>178</sup> P. 159. *H.M.C. Fortescue*, pp. 36-37, 52 ; B. Williams' *Chatham*, I, p. 23.

## CHAPTER X

<sup>179</sup> P. 164. See *Lecky, Ireland*, Vol. I, Chap. II, and *Murray*, Chap. IX, on the Penal Laws.

<sup>180</sup> P. 165. *P.R.O. (Tr.) Rome*, 101.

<sup>181</sup> P. 165. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 31248, ff. 139-142.

<sup>182</sup> P. 165. Bp. Mant's *Hist. of Church of Ireland* (1840), II, p. 212.

<sup>183</sup> P. 166. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 20311, ff. 68-74.

<sup>184</sup> P. 166. *H.M.C. Egmont*, II (1909), p. 209.

<sup>185</sup> P. 167. *Lecky, Ireland*, Vol. I, Chap. II, pp. 282-283, ed. 1902.

<sup>186</sup> P. 168. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702-1704), pp. xxxv-xxxvi, 343-351.

<sup>187</sup> P. 170. *Davenant's Works* (1771), II, p. 250, 'Of the Land of England.'

<sup>188</sup> P. 171. *H.C.J. Ireland* (Dublin, 1753), Oct. 20, 1703, and July 9, 1707 ; *Murray*, pp. 335-339, for Archbishop King's views on Union ; *Lecky, Ireland*, I, pp. 442-444 ; *H.M.C., R. 2*, App., p. 244, Annesley's letter of 1706 ; W. Molyneux, *Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England*.

<sup>189</sup> P. 173. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 254-255, 339-340 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 126-127, footnote on Drogheda ; *Leadam*, p. 72 ; *Swift, Letter concerning the Sacramental Test*, 1708.

<sup>190</sup> P. 173. *Lecky, Ireland*, II, pp. 426-427 ; Mant, *Church of Ireland* (1840), II, pp. 333-334.

<sup>191</sup> P. 174. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 65, 239-240.

<sup>192</sup> P. 174. *H.M.C., R. 7* (*Egmont Papers*, I), p. 238 (Feb. 23, 1713).

<sup>193</sup> P. 175. *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 241-246 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 339-340, 370-371, 377 top ; *Feiling*, p. 462 ; *Leadam*, p. 214 ; *Turberville's Shrewsbury*, pp. 197-205.

<sup>194</sup> P. 175. *Lecky, Ireland*, I, p. 429.

## CHAPTER XI

- <sup>195</sup> P. 176. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, p. ciii, 'First Proposals of France,' dated Apr. 22, 1711.
- <sup>196</sup> P. 178. *Berwick*, II, p. 127.
- <sup>197</sup> P. 179. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, f. 44.
- <sup>198</sup> P. 180. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 201-202; *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 172-174.
- <sup>199</sup> P. 180. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, f. 43.
- <sup>200</sup> P. 180. *Klopp*, XIV, p. 673, App. I, *Archiv der Stadt Hannover*.
- <sup>201</sup> P. 183. For Torcy's account of Prior's visit see *E.H.R.*, July 1915 (Mr. Wickham Legg's printing of *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 233, ff. 43-58), and *Torcy*, II, pp. 128-136. Prior's account is in *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 34-42. See also Mr. Wickham Legg's excellent life of *Matthew Prior* (1921), pp. 149-161; see also *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, ff. 87-88; for Prior's refusal to be drawn into the Jacobite intrigue see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 505-507, and *Matthew Prior*, pp. 217-218.
- <sup>202</sup> P. 184. See Bolingbroke's autograph letters in *Aff. étr. Ang.*, *passim*; *Torcy*, II, p. 153.
- <sup>203</sup> P. 184. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, ff. 243-248, 251-258; *Torcy*, II, pp. 155-156.
- <sup>204</sup> P. 184. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, pp. 208-210; *Matthew Prior*, pp. 163-164; *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 375-376 note; *Torcy*, II, pp. 154, 168 (viz. the second 168, pagination wrong in this edition).
- <sup>205</sup> P. 185. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 36; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 228-229; *C.S.P., America 1711-12*, pp. vi-ix, 254, 256-257; *G.H.B.E.*, VI, pp. 87, 136-138; *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 380 note. The actual details of the French fishing rights on the Newfoundland shore were settled only in the final Treaty. The preliminaries of Oct. 1711 left the question open.
- <sup>206</sup> P. 186. *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 337; *Torcy*, II, p. 165; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 210-214; *E.H.R.*, Oct. 1932, pp. 646-647.
- <sup>207</sup> P. 186. The preliminary articles are printed in *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. cvii-cxiv, and *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 374-381, 403-406 and notes.
- <sup>208</sup> P. 187. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158-159.

## CHAPTER XII

- <sup>209</sup> P. 189. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 108, 115-116, 120.
- <sup>210</sup> P. 189. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 672-677, from *Archiv der Stadt Hannover*.
- <sup>211</sup> P. 190. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 688-692, *Mémoire instructif pour le Baron de Bothmar*, Nov. 7, 1711; *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 400-401; *Salomon*, p. 125; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 263-264.
- <sup>212</sup> P. 191. *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 246-247, Letter to Earl of Orrery, June 12, 1711.
- <sup>213</sup> P. 193. *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 79.
- <sup>214</sup> P. 193. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 119.
- <sup>215</sup> P. 194. See *Blenheim*, pp. 206-207; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 365-366.
- <sup>216</sup> P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 120, Halifax' letter to Oxford of Dec. 2, 1711.
- <sup>217</sup> P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 120, Oxford's letter to Somerset, Dec. 1, 1711.
- <sup>218</sup> P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 119, Poulett to Oxford, Nov. 1711.
- <sup>219</sup> P. 195. *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, f. 10.
- <sup>220</sup> P. 196. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 5, 8, 9, 1711.
- <sup>221</sup> P. 197. *Burnet*, VI, p. 87, Dartmouth's note.

- <sup>222</sup> P. 197. *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, f. 17.
- <sup>223</sup> P. 198. *Burnet*, VI, p. 88; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 263; Colley Cibber's *Apology for his Life* (1740), p. 134; Mrs. Barry died in 1713.
- <sup>224</sup> P. 199. Coxe's *Walpole*, Chap. VI; *H.C.F.*, XVII, pp. 29-30, 128; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1067-1068; G. R. Stirling Taylor's *Walpole*, pp. 114-119; *Case of Mr. Walpole in a letter from a Tory Member*; *Leadam*, p. 191; *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, f. 30; *Parade of the Triumphant Criminal, in a letter to Robert Walpole now a prisoner in the Tower* (1712).
- <sup>225</sup> P. 200. *H.M.C.*, R. 8 (*Marlborough Papers*), p. 16, July 6, 1702, Anne's grant of 2½ per cent.; p. 41, May 1 and Nov. 16, 1702, further agreements on the subject; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1049-1059, 1076-1088; see also *Add. MSS.* 9113, ff. 137-138.
- <sup>226</sup> P. 201. *H.M.C.*, R. 8 (*Marlborough Papers*), p. 16.
- <sup>227</sup> P. 201. *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, ff. 20, 25-26, 28.
- <sup>228</sup> P. 201. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 175-184, 682-683; *Journal to Stella*, Oct. 29, 1711.
- <sup>229</sup> P. 202. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 244, 258; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 243-249, 292-301; *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 156, 163-164; *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, ff. 22-23, 26, 78.
- <sup>230</sup> P. 203. *Journal to Stella*, Jan. 6, 1712; *Spectator*, No. 269, Jan. 8, 1712.
- <sup>231</sup> P. 203. *Spectator*, No. 335, Mar. 25, 1712; *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, p. 113; *Journal to Stella*, Mar. 8-9, 1712; *Ashton*, Chap. XXXVII.
- <sup>232</sup> P. 203. *Add. MSS.* 35359, f. 12.
- <sup>233</sup> P. 205. Fox Bourne, *English Newspapers* (1887), I, pp. 80-84; *Stats. of Realm* (ed. 1822), IX, pp. 616-617 (10 Anne, c. 18, secs. cv, cxiii).
- <sup>234</sup> P. 205. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 13, 1711, Oct. 28, 1712; *Public Spirit of the Whigs* (Swift, *Prose Works* (ed. Temple Scott), V, p. 353); Campbell's *Lives of Chancellors* (Macclesfield), IV, p. 515.
- <sup>235</sup> P. 205. Coxe's *Walpole*, I, pp. 42-43.
- <sup>236</sup> P. 207. Coxe's *Walpole*, I, p. 42.
- <sup>237</sup> P. 208. *Burnet*, VI, pp. 133-134, and Dartmouth's note; Churchill's *Marlborough*, I, p. 499.
- <sup>238</sup> P. 208. *Add. MSS.* 28055, f. 440, printed in App. B, p. 330. For pamphlets against Marlborough in 1712, see (e.g.) *The perquisite monger*; *No Queen, no General*; *Oliver's Pocket Looking-glass*; *Burnet*, VI, p. 95 [593]; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1137; *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, f. 1, letter of Jan. 1713 about cutting off Marlborough's head.
- <sup>239</sup> P. 208. Coxe, Chap. CIX (III, pp. 531-532, ed. 1819); *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, ff. 400, 406, 423; Mrs. Campbell's *Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 227-229; *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough* (Murray, 1875), pp. 26, 64; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 135-137 and notes; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 477-478.
- For Marlborough's correspondence with Berwick, 1713-14, see *H.M.C. Stuart Papers* (1902), pp. lx, 278-279, 286, 307-308.

## CHAPTER XIII

- <sup>240</sup> P. 211. *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 642-643.
- <sup>241</sup> P. 211. *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 327.
- <sup>242</sup> P. 214. It is strange that Torcy (II, p. 297) says that Bolingbroke also offered Naples to Philip. He did not, as is shown by *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 284 and *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 669-670.
- <sup>243</sup> P. 215. *Torcy*, II, pp. 286-305; *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 662-677; *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 204-205, 221-230, 235-237, 244-255, 275-293, 314-317.

- <sup>244</sup> P. 217. *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 274, 320-321; *Memoirs of the Life of Ormonde* (London, 1738), pp. 134-140.
- <sup>245</sup> P. 217. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, p. 175.
- <sup>246</sup> P. 217. Lord Hardwicke (*Burnet*, VI, p. 119 note) writes that Bolingbroke 'used to say,' in after years, that Oxford proposed the Restraining Orders to the Council. But he never said so in writing, and all the evidence is against it.
- <sup>247</sup> P. 217. *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, p. 130.
- <sup>248</sup> P. 218. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 238, f. 73 (see p. 230 above, App. to Chap. XIII).
- <sup>249</sup> P. 218. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 79, Gaultier to Torcy, Oct. 29, 1712 (see p. 231 above, App. to Chap. XIII).
- <sup>250</sup> P. 218. *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 403-404.
- <sup>251</sup> P. 218. *Torcy*, II, pp. 347-348.
- <sup>252</sup> P. 219. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1138.
- <sup>253</sup> P. 220. *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 422.
- <sup>254</sup> P. 220. *Parker*, p. 175; *Müllner*, p. 356.
- <sup>255</sup> P. 220. *Müllner*, p. 358; *Ormonde, Memoirs* (1738), pp. 173-176; *H.M.C. Eliot-Hodgkin* (1897), pp. 204-205; *H.M.C. Portland*, IX, p. 332.
- <sup>256</sup> P. 221. *D'Urfey's Pills to purge Melancholy*, VI, p. 347.
- <sup>257</sup> P. 222. *Aff. étr. Ang.*, *passim* for 1713, e.g. 247, ff. 42-43 and 156, Gaultier to Torcy, Dec. 19, 1713; *Leake*, II, pp. 374-392, for the story of the occupation; *Steele's Importance of Dunkirk considered*, 1713.
- <sup>258</sup> P. 222. *Legrelle*, IV, p. 680.
- <sup>259</sup> P. 223. *Bol. Letters*, III, pp. 57-58, 82; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 234-235, 467; *Macknight's Bolingbroke*, p. 308; *Sichel's Bolingbroke* (1901), pp. 404-409.
- <sup>260</sup> P. 223. *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, p. 123.
- <sup>261</sup> P. 224. *Matthew Prior*, pp. 180, 202-203.
- <sup>262</sup> P. 225. *H.M.C. Portland*, IX, p. 375.
- <sup>263</sup> P. 225. *Torcy*, II, pp. 336, 340, 344; *National Policy and Naval Strength*, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>264</sup> P. 226. *Bol. Letters*, III, pp. 417-439.
- <sup>265</sup> P. 226. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, ff. 268-275; *Lamberty*, VIII, p. 51.
- <sup>266</sup> P. 227. For the orders given to the fleet and Admiral Wishart's own action, see *Parl. Hist.*, VII, App., pp. lxxix-lxxxiv (or *Tindal*, IV, pp. 381-384). Capt. Camocke, R.N., wrote that 'at the request of the King of Spain the said Camocke ordered men-of-war to cruise off Barcelona and prevented any supplies to enter that port,' *Byng Papers*, III, pp. 55, 63. Whether he was acting under orders from Admiral Sir James Wishart is not clear.
- <sup>267</sup> P. 228. *Berwick*, II, pp. 110-125; *Mahon*, Chap. IX; *Parl. Hist.*, VII, App., pp. lxxi-lxxxiv; *Macknight's Bolingbroke*, pp. 348-353; *Matthew Prior*, pp. 205-206; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 347-348, 380-384; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 365-366; *Steele's Crisis* (1714), p. 32; *De Foe's White Staff*, pp. 15-16, and *Swift's Public Spirit of the Whigs* for contemporary defence of the Ministers.
- <sup>268</sup> P. 228. *H.M.C. Bagot*, R. 10 (1885), Pt. 4, pp. 342-343; *H.M.C. Corporation of Chester*, R. 8, p. 395 (Ap. 4, '1712' should be 1713); *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, f. 373.

## CHAPTER XIV

- <sup>269</sup> P. 233. *De Foe*, II, pp. 701, 710, 781-782; *New Mills Cloth Factory* (Sc. Hist. Soc. 1905), pp. lxxxii-lxxxiii.
- <sup>270</sup> P. 233. *Calamy*, II, p. 210; *De Foe*, II, 725-726, 745-749; *Macky, Scotland*, pp. 294-295; *Glasgow, its Origin, Growth and Development*, John Gunn

- editor (1921), pp. 40, 63; *Economic Evolution of Scotland*, Henry Hamilton (Hist. Asso. Leaflet No. 91), p. 4.
- <sup>271</sup> P. 234. See *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 335; *Somers MSS.*, letter of Mr. J. Jekyll to Somers 1709; *Cal. Treas. Papers 1708-1714* (1879), pp. xviii-xix, 71, 77.
- <sup>272</sup> P. 234. *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 41.
- <sup>273</sup> P. 235. *Burnet*, VI, pp. 80-84, Dartmouth's and Onslow's notes; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 340-344; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1045-1049, 1066; *H.L.J.*, Dec. 20, 1711, and June 6, 1782; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 148-149; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 458-459; *Add. MSS.* 17677 FFF, ff. 10-12.
- <sup>274</sup> P. 236. *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 30; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 467-468; *Mathieson*, pp. 195, 211; *Wake MSS., Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake of Jan. 14, 1710; *H.M.C.*, R. 1 (1870), p. 118.
- <sup>275</sup> P. 236. *Mathieson*, pp. 195-196; *Wake MSS.* in Christ Church, *Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake from Edinburgh, Jan. 14, 1710.
- <sup>276</sup> P. 236. R. H. Story's *Carstares*, p. 321.
- <sup>277</sup> P. 237. *Wake MSS., Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake of Jan. 14, 1710; *Chambers*, III, pp. 366-367.
- <sup>278</sup> P. 238. *H. of L. MSS. 1708-1710*, pp. 356-359; *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 240.
- <sup>279</sup> P. 239. *Mathieson*, pp. 200-204; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 147-148; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 379-385; *The Scottish Toleration argued* (anon., but actually by Carstares), 1712; R. H. Story's *Carstares*, pp. 325-334, 349; *Stats. of Realm*, IX, pp. 557-559.
- <sup>280</sup> P. 240. R. H. Story's *Carstares*, pp. 335-343; *Mathieson*, pp. 204-212, 237-241; *Stats. of Realm*, IX, pp. 680-681; *Edgar*, II, pp. 366-369; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, pp. 15-16, 275-277, 307 note, 404; *Right of Church members to chuse their own overseers*, by Rev. James Hog, 1717.
- <sup>281</sup> P. 240. *Wodrow Anal*, II, p. 133.
- <sup>282</sup> P. 240. Defoe's letters to Oxford about Scotland will be found in *H.M.C. Portland*, IV and V, *passim*; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 346-347, 378; R. H. Story's *Carstares*, p. 335; *Carstares' Letters*, pp. 774-776, a very curious letter; *Mathieson*, p. 210.
- <sup>283</sup> P. 241. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 414-417; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 148-149 [621]; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1214-1220; *Mathieson*, pp. 291-292; *Hume Brown*, III, pp. 149-151. The full text of Article 14 of the Union Treaty will be found in Defoe's *History of the Union*, p. 533, and elsewhere.
- <sup>284</sup> P. 242. See Halifax to Oxford of May 27, 1713, *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 292.
- <sup>285</sup> P. 242. *Swift's Works* (1814) (ed. Sir W. Scott), XVI, p. 71; *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 41.
- <sup>286</sup> P. 243. *Portland*, V, pp. 498-499; *White Staff* (De Foe), 1714, Pt. 2, pp. 15-22; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476-483.
- <sup>287</sup> P. 243. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1336, 1339-1340; *White Staff* (De Foe), 1714, pp. 17-18; *Lockhart*, I, p. 377.
- <sup>288</sup> P. 243. Mark Thomson, *The Secretaries of State 1681-1782* (Oxford, 1932), p. 33; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 467-468.

## CHAPTER XV

- <sup>289</sup> P. 245. *Lansdowne MSS. (B.M.)* 1236, ff. 261-262; *H.C.M. Bath*, I, pp. xi, 217.
- <sup>290</sup> P. 246. See *A Noble Rake, the Life of Charles, Fourth Lord Mohun*, R. S. Forsythe (Harvard, 1928), pp. 201-210.
- <sup>291</sup> P. 246. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 266, Major Cranstoun's letter of Oct. 1705; see also *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 85-86.

<sup>292</sup> P. 247. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 26, 1712. The conversation between the Duke and Maccartney, which Col. Hamilton swore took place before the duel began, seems to me highly tendentious and improbable, and helps to throw doubt on the value of the rest of his evidence. That evidence and the testimonials of the other onlookers, as given to the Privy Council, will be found in *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, pp. 312-314; see also *Defence of Mr. MacCartney*, by A. Friend (1712), pp. 16-22. The case is discussed very fully in R. S. Forsythe's *Life of Mohun (A Noble Rake)*, Harvard Press, 1928. Readers will remember that what Col. Esmond says is not evidence. For Chesterfield's evidence as to the second trial see Temple Scott's *Swift's Prose Works* (1925), X, pp. xxii-xxiii.

<sup>293</sup> P. 248. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 505, 507.

<sup>294</sup> P. 248. Gaultier to Torcy, Oct. 12, 1712. 'M. de Bolingbroke pour commencer tout de bon a travailler aux affaires de Montgoulin [James] veut absolument scavoir qui sont ceux d'entre les Whiggs qui lui offraient il y a dix huit mois ou environ de lui rendre service. Il ne faut pas, s'il vous plaît, que Mons. Prior sache rien de tout ceci,' *Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 82; *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 502; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, p. 248.

<sup>295</sup> P. 248. See D'Aumont's letter, App. E, p. 337 above, on the change of French policy as a result of the Peace to more active espousal of the Jacobite cause (Apr. 18, 1713).

<sup>296</sup> P. 249. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 504.

<sup>297</sup> P. 249. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 503.

<sup>298</sup> P. 250. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1232-1235.

<sup>299</sup> P. 250. *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, p. 259.

<sup>300</sup> P. 253. *H.M.C. Egmont R.* 7, I, pp. 238-239, 246. See also *Guardian* for May 19, 1713; *Nichols' Literary Anecdotes*, VI, p. 84, Gay's letter; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 330; Miss Aikin's *Addison*, II, pp. 76-96; Aitken's *Steele*, I, pp. 371-373. A curious reason why *Cato* ran no longer than twenty nights is given in *H.M.C. Egmont R.* 7, I, p. 239, May 7, 1713.

<sup>301</sup> P. 253. *Journal to Stella*, Apr. 13-18, 1713.

<sup>302</sup> P. 254. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 24, 40, 45 and note; *Journal to Stella*, June 6, 1713.

<sup>303</sup> P. 255. 'The Lords have made a representation to the Queen in which they desire her to surmount the insurmountable difficulties the Spanish trade lies under by the last Treaty. . . . The clamour of the merchants, Whig and Tory, has been too great to have passed a vote in vindication of it as it stands ratified' (Ford to Swift, July 6, 1714, *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 171). See also *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 272, Lexington's own doubts at Madrid, and *ditto*, p. 337; *British Merchant* (ed. 1721), III, pp. 93-326, for text of the Treaties and Whig comment. Miss McLachlan of Girton, who is working on the subject, has kindly given me information. In June 1714 a merchant writes from Cadiz: 'We are in a worse condition than in the reign of King Charles II and not half so favoured in duties as the French nation' (*British Merchant*, III, p. 224). For the Parliamentary Debates see *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), pp. 213-216.

<sup>304</sup> P. 257. *Cunningham*, pp. 414-415. For the way the Scottish Members voted on the Commercial Treaty see the lists on pp. 33 and 42, *Letter from a Member of the H. of C. to his Friend in the Country relating to the Bill of Commerce*, 1713.

<sup>305</sup> P. 257. *Hanmer*, pp. 24-29, and App. E, pp. 336-337 above.

<sup>306</sup> P. 258. *H.C.J.*, May 14 and June 18, 1713; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1210-1213, 1220-1223; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 146-147, 150-151 [620, 622]; *Hanmer*, pp. 31-33; *Leadam*, p. 207; *Macpherson*, II, p. 420; *R.H.S. (England and Portugal)*, 1907, pp. 170-172; *Mercator*; *British Merchant*; *Trade with France, Italy, Spain and Portugal considered*, 1713 (sometimes wrongly attributed to Defoe);



*Letter to a West Country Clothier*, 1713; Epistle from *Heinsius to Walpole*, 1713 (Tory squib to deflect feeling on the controversy against the Dutch); *Letter from a Member of the H. of C. to his Friend in the Country relating to the Bill of Commerce*, 1713, defence of the Treaty, with a useful division list, showing which of the Opposition were Whigs and which 'Whimsical' Tories; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 351-353. For the riot of the London silk-workers see *L'Hermitage, Add. MSS.* 17677 GGG, f. 190.

<sup>307</sup> P. 259. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 300.

<sup>308</sup> P. 259. *H.M.C. Verney*, R. 7, p. 508, Mar. 24, 1713.

<sup>309</sup> P. 259. *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 15, Mar. 28, 1713.

<sup>310</sup> P. 259. Halifax to Oxford, Mar. 8, 1713: 'I cannot but think it would be to your Lordship's interest more than any man's else to establish the Queen in peace and quiet, and put the nation in peace and security for ever. Upon this footing I beg to enter into whatever measures you please to prescribe. Allow me to wait upon you to adjust anything you judge proper for that purpose, and I dare say Lord Somers will be ready to attend you, though what passed between us shall be a secret till you command me to speak of it.' May 26: 'I am very desirous to lay hold of all occasions to take measures with your Lordship for the good of my country and the security of the Protestant Succession.' May 27: 'I have made further progress in that matter and you may be sure of being effectually supported in the maintaining of the Protestant Succession and the Union,' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 270-271, 292. See also pp. 108, 115, 120, 125, 131, 133, 134, 251, 254, 268, 275, 451 for other such letters of Halifax to Oxford, running from Nov. 1711 to May 1714.

<sup>311</sup> P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 466, 468, 660.

<sup>312</sup> P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 326, 661.

<sup>313</sup> P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 466-468, 661; *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 198.

<sup>314</sup> P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 311, his letter of July 27, 1713.

<sup>315</sup> P. 261. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull for Oxford's letter of Nov. 25; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 661; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 319.

<sup>316</sup> P. 261. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 322.

<sup>317</sup> P. 262. *Granville*, pp. 127-130; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 279, 329-331; *H.M.C. Cowper*, III (1889), *Coke MSS.*, p. 107.

<sup>318</sup> P. 262. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull, letter of Sir Christopher Musgrave to Dartmouth, undated.

<sup>319</sup> P. 263. *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), pp. xii, 206, 210-213.

<sup>320</sup> P. 264. *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury*, pp. 206-216.

<sup>321</sup> P. 264. *Granville*, p. 130.

## CHAPTER XVI

<sup>322</sup> P. 266. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, 374-376; *Swift, Enquiry into Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry*.

<sup>323</sup> P. 267. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 247, f. 135 (printed in *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506); *Kemble*, p. 513.

<sup>324</sup> P. 267. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, pp. 264, 291, 294; *Salomon*, p. 336.

<sup>325</sup> P. 268. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 507-518 (well selected from *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.*, where I have verified the correspondence). *Salomon*, pp. 335-345; *Add. MSS.* 31255, f. 8, James to Cardinal Gualterio, Apr. 23, 1714. Ilberville took the same line as Gaultier as to the fatal consequences of James refusing to dissimulate his religion, see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 508, and App. E, pp. 339-340 above.

- <sup>326</sup> P. 268. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 512, 513; *Salomon*, pp. 334-345.  
<sup>327</sup> P. 269. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 517.  
<sup>328</sup> P. 270. *Shakerley MSS*, letter of Peter to George Shakerley, Feb. 20, 1707.  
<sup>329</sup> P. 271. *Wilkins' Political Ballads* (1860), II, p. 114; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 361.  
<sup>330</sup> P. 271. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 247, ff. 80, 159, App. E, p. 337 above; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 364.  
<sup>331</sup> P. 272. *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, pp. lix-lx, 278-279, 286, 307-308.  
<sup>332</sup> P. 272. *E.g. Bothmar to Robethon, Macpherson*, II, pp. 636-637.  
<sup>333</sup> P. 273. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 472-473, 477-478; *Salomon*, pp. 306-307 notes.  
<sup>334</sup> P. 273. *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough from MSS. at Madresfield Court* (Murray, 1875), pp. 69-70.  
<sup>335</sup> P. 274. See the three pamphlets named in the text; also Chadwick's *Life of Defoe*, Chap. IX; John Forster, *De Foe* (ed. 1860), pp. 139-140; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 266-267, 274-284, 392-395.  
<sup>336</sup> P. 275. Aitken's *Steele*, II, pp. 14-23; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1266-1329; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 360-361.  
<sup>337</sup> P. 276. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1346-1347; *Hanmer*, pp. 35-47.  
<sup>338</sup> P. 276. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1335-1343; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 366.  
<sup>339</sup> P. 277. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 223, 589; *Salomon*, pp. 334, 337-338.  
<sup>340</sup> P. 279. For the whole affair of the writ see *Michael*, pp. 327-329; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 543, 559-562; *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 412-438; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 416-419, 662; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 472, 589-592, 603-605; *Kemble*, pp. 512-521.  
<sup>341</sup> P. 280. *State Trials*, XV, pp. 83, 368; *Life of John Sharp* (1825), I, pp. 358-359; Calamy's *Baxter's Life and Times* (ed. 1713), I, pp. 665, 684; Samuel Wesley, *Reply to Mr. Palmer's Vindication of the Dissenters* (1707), pp. 24-25.  
<sup>342</sup> P. 280. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1350; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 389; *Add. MSS. (L'H.)* 17677 GGG, ff. 197-198, for a discussion on the question of disenfranchisement of Quakers and other Dissenters in 1713.  
<sup>343</sup> P. 281. See *McLachlan*, *passim*.  
<sup>344</sup> P. 281. *De Foe*, I, p. 267; *McLachlan*, pp. 70-72.  
<sup>345</sup> P. 282. *Statutes of Realm*, IX, pp. 915-917; *Add. MSS. (L'H.)* 17677 HHH, ff. 255-256, 262.  
<sup>346</sup> P. 283. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1349-1358; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 385-389; *Add. MSS. (L'H.)* 17677 HHH, f. 238, for Ed. Harley's vote; *Mr. Steele's Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill to Prevent the Growth of Schism*, 1714; *Life of Dr. Radcliffe* (1715), pp. 84-85.  
<sup>347</sup> P. 283. *White Staff* (De Foe, 1714), p. 33; *Leadam*, p. 218; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 383.  
<sup>348</sup> P. 283. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 389, 395; *Swift, Prose Works*, V, pp. 430-431, *Queen's Last Ministry*.  
<sup>349</sup> P. 284. *Calamy*, II, p. 293 note.  
<sup>350</sup> P. 284. *McLachlan*, pp. 7, 9, 15, 85; *Beeching's Atterbury*, p. 217; C. J. Abbey, *The English Church 1700-1800*, I, p. 208.  
<sup>351</sup> P. 285. *Swift, Prose Works*, V, pp. 431, 452-455, *Queen's Last Ministry*; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 174, 223.  
<sup>352</sup> P. 285. *Swift, Prose Works*, V, pp. 406-407, *Some free thoughts upon the present state of affairs*.  
<sup>353</sup> P. 287. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1358; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 384, 391-393; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 467-473; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 699-700; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 257, f. 122; *Macpherson*, II, p. 631; *White Staff* (De Foe, 1714), pp. 34-35; *Charles*

Lesley's *Letter to a Member of Parliament in London*, dated *Bar le Duc*, April 23, 1714; *Kemble*, pp. 515-517.

<sup>384</sup> P. 288. *Add. MSS. (L'H.)* 17677 HHH, ff. 268-270, 282, 288-289, 293-295, 301-302; *Swift, Prose Works*, V, p. 405 (*Free thoughts upon the present state of affairs*); *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1361-1363; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 393-405; *Leadam*, pp. 218-219; *Boyer's Queen Anne* (1735), p. 666; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 365-366; *Add. MSS.* 25495, *South Sea Co.'s Court of Directors' Minutes*, ff. 166-170, 175-183, 185; *Boyer's Pol. State of Great Britain*, VIII, pp. 12-13.

<sup>385</sup> P. 290. *Diplomatic Instructions*, France, II (ed. Wickham Legg), pp. 34-35, 70-75, 81, 105-108; *Basil Williams' Stanhope*, pp. 189-190, 211-229; on the claims of Savoy to the throne of Britain still in consideration, see *Kemble*, p. 513 and *Aff. étr. Ang.* 247, f. 135 (*E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506).

## CHAPTER XVII

<sup>386</sup> P. 292. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 405, 407; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 199, 202, 223.

<sup>387</sup> P. 292. *Arbuthnot*, pp. 64, 68.

<sup>388</sup> P. 292. For the growth of the irreconcilable split in the Tory Party, see *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, pp. 188-197 and *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 228.

<sup>389</sup> P. 293. *H.M.C. Stuart*, pp. 323, 325; *Berwick*, II, pp. 132-133.

<sup>390</sup> P. 294. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 246-247; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 168, 185; *Salomon*, p. 313, note 3.

<sup>391</sup> P. 295. *Michael*, p. 360; *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 198. Even before the fall of Oxford L'Hermitage had reported that Atterbury was to be Privy Seal.

<sup>392</sup> P. 296. *Granville*, pp. 138, 259-260.

<sup>393</sup> P. 296. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 699-700; see more fully, *Add. MSS.* 9129, ff. 17-19.

<sup>394</sup> P. 297. *H.M.C. Lonsdale*, p. 249.

<sup>395</sup> P. 297. Macky's *Journey through England* (1732), II, pp. viii-ix.

<sup>396</sup> P. 297. *Hardwicke Papers* (1778), II, pp. 522-525; *Verney*, I, p. 274; General Hamilton's *History of the First or Grenadier Guards* (1874), II, pp. 59-60.

<sup>397</sup> P. 298. For the feeling of the army about the Tory Ministers see *An Apology to the Army, written by an Officer*, 1715.

<sup>398</sup> P. 298. *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 190; Ilberville to Torcy, Aug. 7, 1714, *Aff. étr. Ang.* 257, f. 259, App. E, p. 339 above.

<sup>399</sup> P. 299. *Salomon*, pp. 312-314; *Michael*, pp. 358-359; *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 202; *Basil Williams' Stanhope*, pp. 145-146.

<sup>400</sup> P. 299. Appendix E, p. 339 above, and *Macpherson*, II, pp. 636-637.

<sup>401</sup> P. 300. *English Advice to the Freeholders of England* (1714), p. 4 (written by Atterbury just after the accession of King George).

<sup>402</sup> P. 301. Chesterfield, *Miscellaneous Works* (ed. 1777), pp. 15-17; the details cannot be considered certain on such late and second-hand evidence, but Stanhope's leadership and the general intention are beyond doubt. *Salomon*, p. 231; Mahon, *Hist. of England*, 1836, I, p. 133; *Basil Williams' Stanhope*, pp. 142-145, 464-465; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 462-463.

<sup>403</sup> P. 301. App. E, p. 340 above, Ilberville, Aug. 11, 1714 (N.S.).

<sup>404</sup> P. 302. *Michael*, p. 363.

<sup>405</sup> P. 303. *P.R.O., Privy Council Register* 2, 84, f. 371 and f. 385.

<sup>406</sup> P. 304. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 207, 215 and note 3; *Michael*, p. 364.

<sup>407</sup> P. 305. *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 371-385.

- <sup>378</sup> P. 306. For the proceedings of July 31 see *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 385-389. For Bothmar's letter to his master about Craggs see *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 227, f. 252.
- <sup>379</sup> P. 306. *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 389-390; 2, 85, f. 1.

## EPILOGUE

- <sup>380</sup> P. 313. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 214, 224, letters of Aug. 3 and 7, 1714.
- <sup>381</sup> P. 314. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 491.
- <sup>382</sup> P. 314. See Sarah's letter of July 29, 1714 (O.S.), from Antwerp, in *Kemble*, pp. 516-517.
- <sup>383</sup> P. 315. *Coxe*, Chaps. CXIII, CXVII; *Macpherson*, II, p. 640; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 410; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 216-217; *Klopp*, XIV, p. 654.
- <sup>384</sup> P. 315. *Salomon*, pp. 316-319.



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# THE NETHERLANDS

## Campaigns of 1709-12


English Miles  
0 5 10 20 30 40 50

Places taken by Marlborough in 1709-11 underlined thus: Mons 1709

(Bouchain and Douai were retaken by the French in 1712)

Boundary of Spanish Netherlands (Austrian 1713) . . .


Dutch Barrier towns assigned at Utrecht 1713 underlined thus: Tournai



Note:- In the final Treaty of 1715 between Great Britain, the United Provinces and the Emperor, made under Whig auspices, the Emperor withdrew Mons, Ghent, Charleroi, and the forts at Philippe and Damme from the Dutch Barrier agreed at Utrecht 1713, and gave instead to the Dutch in full sovereignty Venloo and other territories, and more satisfactory commercial arrangements. see Montgomery Ch.VIII.

# EUROPE

after the Peace of Utrecht



- Spanish. ....
- Austrian Dominions .....
- Brandenburg-Prussia .....
- Venice .....
- Boundary of the Empire  
(The parts of the Empire not coloured are  
innumerable petty German Principalities,  
Free Towns etc.)

